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ABSTRACT
This thesis focusses on the 1878 to 1920 period of the
history of the United States House of Representatives in an
attempt to explain the momentous changes which occurred with-
in the House during that time. It'was during this time that the
central features of the contemporary Congress (the fragmenta-
tion of power, the dispersion of decision-making responsi-
bilities, the compartrmentalization of legislative tasks, and
the adoption of an institutional role which emphasized policy
oversight) first asserted themselves in an enduring way.
Understandingwhy these traits emerged, therefore, serves as a
useful means of understanding the forces which continue to sus-
tain Congressional behavior today.
In general, the study argues that the changing inner
world of Congress is largely the product of the specific and
varying forms and patterns of conflict which that institution
must ultimately resolve. It suggests that variations in the
patterns of conflict within the House stem from changes which
occur in the American political system as a whole. Conflict
within the House, it proposes, both reflects the divergent
pressures of the dynamic political environment, and at the
same time serves as the primary source of organizational and
normative change. The sources of that internal conflict and
the way external pressures are translated into legislative con-
flict, therefore becomes the key to understanding why Congress
has evolved the way it in fact has evolved, and implicitly, why
the House behaves as it does.
Ultimately, the Thesis suggests that the institutional
character of the House is best explained by the peculiar changes
which encouraged that body's national constituency to discard
the political norms, the organizational assumptions, and the
political expectations which had so marked the American political
culture of the late nineteenth century, and to adopt those
which increasingly after 1908 began to mark that of the
twentieth century. The weakening of the political party at
the turn of the century, the particularization of the national
issue agenda, and the transformation of the norms of public
participation in political affairs shaped (and were clearly
reflected in) the process which took the House from its nine-
teenth century institutional form to its twentieth century
form.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Walter Dean Burnham
Title : Professor of Political Science
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
The modern House of Representatives is an institution
which owes a great deal to its past. Many of the character-
istics which together define the House have strong and ex-
p!icit links with decisions made and changes brought about
by earlier generations of Congressmen attempting to create a
legislative system capable of functioning in the vastly
altered twentieth century American political environment.
This debt to the past is readily acknowledged if rarely
explained in most contemporary studies of Congressional be-
havior. Analyses of House leadership patterns, for example,
typically invoke turn of the century changes in organization
and structure, particularly the 1910 revolt against Joseph
Cannon, as central to the fragmented power structure which
obtains in Congress today. Students of the committee system
almost ritually ascribe major portions of that system to
the dispersion of power and authority which occurred quite
dramatically in the first decades of the twentieth century.
Implicit throughout much of the contemporary literature on
Congress is the idea that although specific patterns of
modern Congressional behavior are the products of equally
specific factors at work within the contemporary legisla-
tive system, they are both circumscribed and constrained
by structural transformations imposed on Congress' organiza-
tion sometime in the past.
-9-
The major problem of course has been to resurrect this
past in a usable form. Clearly, the changes which the House
of Representatives underwent in the first decades of the
twentieth century were important, but it is less clear what
role these changes played in shaping modern Congressional
behavior. What meaning, in fact, do these historical events
have for contemporary patterns of legislative behavior?
What role do turn of the century changes play in constrain-
ing or regulating the patterns which constitute the modern
Congressional process? On the one hand, the persistent in-
clusion of the historical dimension in Congressional studies,
however vague, suggests that the past indeed merits serious
attention. And yet the very vagueness of these scholarly
appeals to the past indicates that much remains to be done
by way of developing a systematic use of using history to
explain contemporary institutional behavior.
This study, then, will attempt to develop a useful set
of generalizations about present Congressional behavior
through an examination of the forces which tended to define
the evolution of that behavior. It will begin with the
assumption, which prevails, at least implicitly in the curr-
ent literature, that the present Congress is largely an out-
growth of turn of the century changes in the American political
system, and changes within the House of Representatives itself.
It will argue furthermore that these changes affected modern
Congresses not as contemporary scholars tend to view it --
in particularistic, isolated ways -- but rather in a system-
atic and comprehensive manner. It will suggest that to a
-10-
very large extent, the norms, constraints, patterns of
membership interaction, and most centrally the manner in
which conflict is managed are the products of the House of
Representatives' accommodation or truce with the vast
changes which altered the shape of its political environ-
ment between 1880 and 1920. With the marginal modifications,
contemporary Congresses function within the broad limits of
this accommodation process defined and consummated by the
end of that period.
The study will examine the late nineteenth century House
of Representatives and the forces within and outside which
shaped its institutional assumptions, with particular em-
phasis on its partisan approach to conflict. Among other
advantages, concentration upon this era of Congressional
history provides a comparative model against which the con-
temporary legislative process can be usefully contrasted.
For, by and large, the historical changes which led the
House to develop its modern legislative style during this
period reveal much about the forces which continue to sus-
tain and reinforce the organizational assumptions, the norms
and patterns of conflict which collectively constitute the
national legislative system today.
The central proposition of this study is a relatively
simple and straightforward one. That is, the most critical
alteration to occur in the development of the contemporary
Congressional process -- an alteration which developed
between 1880 and 1920 -- involved the manner in which
-11-
political conflict was managed by that institution. During
this period, the House shifted from norms of conflict which
were largely mandated by the nature of the party system to-
ward one which functioned in an environment where accumula-
tive voting cleavages in American political life had become
increasingly rare. By the early 1920's, this bi-partisan
conflict mode was well on its way toward being supplanted
by a far more complex, pluralistic and institution-specific
system of conflict and conflict resolution. It will be
argued that the transformation which occurred in the Con-
gressional process -- its norms of member behavior, its dis-
tribution of power, its reallocation of tasks and its altered
demands upon and criteria for assessing member performance --
was the result of the House's attempt to conform to the
exigencies of the new style of political conflict emerging
between 1900 and the early 1920's.
The decline of partisanship is a well-worn and almost
hackneyed theme in both the general political literature of
the period, as well as in much of the recent work on the
development of Congress during this time. The point here
is not that the House simply adapted to the internal organiza-
tion vacuum left by the decay of national parties -- an
argument often forwarded -- but rather that the transforma-
tion of the lines of political conflict, outside as well as
within Congress, forced members to dramatically and consciously
restructure the entire internal workings of the legislative
process.
The fall of parties within Congress was only a part --
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and in itself more a reflection than a cause -- of this
restructuring process. This pluralization of conflict was
the product of changes in the American political culture,
changes in the mechanics and values surrounding the election
and representation processes, changes in the nature of demands
placed upon national political leaders and changes in the
policy outputs of American political institutions as a whole.
It was also the result of changes in the way the individual
member of Congress perceived his own role in the House and in
the national political system, as well as changes in his funda-
mental approach to political decision-making. These and other
changes in national political life forced the House of Repres-
entatives to search for new, more appropriate ways of carrying
out its legislative function.
These changes confronted the House with the task of
devising an organization which was at once capable of managing
conflict -- conflict increasingly independent of external
links and constraints -- while at the same time ensuring that
the fundamental decision making process would not be immobili-
zed by that conflict. More than anything else, this search
for consensus in a plural House served as the logic beneath
the norms, structural traits and broad institutional assump-
tions which arose to give the nineteenth century Congress
its modern form.
If observers of the contemporary Congressional process
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are relatively quick to acknowledge certain connections
between early twentieth century changes in the House and
present practices, they are rather more reluctant to explain
why these changes occurred. And, for the most part, they
tend to shrink from drawing more than the vaguest links
between those changes and modern patterns of legislative
behavior. What occurred between 1900 and 1920 in the House
of Representatives is generally viewed as a series of episo-
dic historical events which nevertheless tended to have a
significant impact on specific aspects of modern Congressional
behavior. As such, these "accidents" -- which remain either
unexplainable or unworthy of explanation -- serve as immutable
givens in analyses of why the House of today acts the way it
does.
Studies of the House power structure, for example, typi-
cally recall the 1910 St. Patrick's Day revolt against the
Speaker as a critical event in the development of its con-
temporary form. Nelson Polsby, for one, in spite of the
fact that he has probably done more than anyone else to
evolve a systematic portrait of Congressional history, never-
theless forwards a most unsystematic view of the relationship
between turn of the century events and latter-day legislative
process. "Principally because of historical accidents that
destroyed the temporary unity of both the national parties
earlier in this century," he asserts, "Congress built on some
19th century precedents in ways that have maintained and in
some cases enhanced its independence in the political system."
-14-
This feature -- the relative weakness of the party and con-
sequently of the structures of formal centralized leadership
-- is the key to the dispersion of power in the House of
Representatives and the political resiliency of the Member
of Congress, who Polsby adds, stands in marked contrast to
the Members of Parliament "in most Parliamentary systems"
who are little more than mindless creatures of the political
parties that run them."'
Robert Peabody similarly sees the early twentieth
century as a watershed in the historical development of modern
leadership norms and resources. While before 1910, Speakers
-- particularly Republican Speakers after 1890 -- were viewed
as heavy-handed partisan leaders with immense power at their
disposal, Peabody notes that
since the revolt against Cannon in 1910
the problem has been almost the opposite.
How can any Speaker make use of his much
more limited formal powers to achieve his
party's legislative objectives, let alone
help Congress maintain a parity with an
ever expanding executive branch? 2
Leroy Rieselbach, in a typical critique of the Congressional
process broadens Peabody's focus on leadership to suggest
that many of the problems which plague the House's participa-
tion in national policy making stem from these same turn of
the century changes. The
palace revolution in the House of Repres-
entatives that overthrew Speaker Joseph
Cannon marks the beginning of the modern
era. Since then, with the single exception
of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946, the main outlines of Congressional
organization and procedures have evolved
slowly until in recent years the
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situation has become, almost static. The
major elements (of Congress' present
problems) have been intact for some years. 3
Yet, while Congress' past is readily recalled, it is
usually done so in a manner which tends to reinforce the sense
that however important the changes of the early twentieth cen-
tury were for modern Congressional behavior, they are to dis-
tant in time or conceptually too indirect to be worthy of
detailed exploration. Despite the implied suggestion that
Congress labors under constraints imposed early in the century,
it remains a characteristic of behavioralist Congressional
research to dismiss the sources of these constraints by con-
fining references to them in introductory remarks or in the
most perfunctory acknowledgements of their existence.
Such a treatment of Congress' past raises a number of
questions then. While it is clear that the events of the
turn of the century are significant, it is not at all clear
how they have affected subsequent patterns of institutional
development in anything but the most limited manner. One
of the stumbling blocks to the use of the historical dimen-
sion in Congressional research, first of all, stems from a
partial uncertainty about what exactly happened -- what
changed in the Congressional process during this time beyond
the formal curtailment of the Speaker's powers. It is there-
fore important to achieve a fuller understanding of the
Congressional transformation which occurred between 1900
and the early 1920's.
-16-
Secondly, the search for historical relevance poses
potential problems of fit with the prevailing tendency in
modern research to view the House as a discrete social
system. This structural-functional approach to the Con-
gressional process has inherent weaknesses in explaining
the kinds of dramatic changes which occurred in the House
at the turn of the century, and suggests that perhaps
certain modifications be made in the way we observe and
characterize the sources of Congress' behavior. Given the
assumption, therefore, that the House's present complexion
is in fact directly related to these historical changes, it
is necessary to both understand what happened around the
turn of the century and at the same time develop some way
of incorporating those changes into a consistent and com-
prehensive view of Congress' institutional development.
While the mainstream of scholarly work on the House of
Representatives remains largely wedded to the anti-
historicist approach to legislative patterns of behavior,
an important literature has arisen to explore these ques-
tions. For the most part, the search for a useful institu-
tional past can be grouped into three identifiable categories
by the nature of the assumptions they make about the politi-
cal process and the methodological and epistemological
approaches they tend to bring to their tasks.
The first group consists largely of those who have
-17-
produced descriptive institutional histories of the House.
Some of the less impressive examples of this group's con-
tribution to the field are works such as Ernest Sutherland
Bates' The Story of Congress,4 and Marjorie Fribourg's
The United States Congress,5 which do little more than
describe which event preceded which. Bates, for example,
organizes his study along a simple time line, allotting
one chapter to each Congress. Better examples of this
descriptive-chronological school of House historiography
include Alexander's History and Procedure of the House of
Representatives,6 and Congressional Quarterly's Origins
and Development of Congress,7 and Galloway's History of
the United States House of Representatives.8 The most
important studies in the descriptive-historical group, how-
ever, tend to be those with what Peabody calls the "reformist"
orientation.9 Galloway's Congress at the Crossroads,1 0 and
Burns' Deadlock of Democracy and Congress on Trial,11 are
two notable examples of this approach to Congressional
history.
The chronological group's contribution to Congressional
research tends to vary in value with the accuracy and depth
of its reporting of events. Thus, Alexander's study is
still read as a useful collection of nineteenth century Con-
gressional developments -- particularly in regard to formal
aspects of the House organization. The reformist group's
studies, on the other hand, tends to vary in value with the
extent to which the central issues addressed by the authors
-18-
reflect relatively time-bound public debates over such issues
as Congress' role in American Politics or its general effec-
tiveness. Thus, Galloway and Burns (particularly Congress
on Trial) are out of fashion today as little more than
interesting examples of the major concerns of political
analysts thirty years ago. The historical dimension, while
employed in these studies, tends to be molded to meet the
needs of whatever argument is being forwarded, and as such
does not take us very far forward integrating congressional
history into the mainstream of legislative research.
The second group of scholars devoted to the search for
a meaningful Congressional past consists of those who confine
that search, for the most part, to questions dealing with the
House of Representatives' internal structures and processes.
This group tends to be most closely associated, through the
assumptions its brings to its studies (either explicitly or
implicitlyl, and through its reification of specific internal
aspects of House behavior, with the type of research which
now dominates Congressional scholarly work. Its systems
orientations and its inherent belief in the pre-eminence of
Congress' internal dynamic is the most important hallmark
of this school.
Nelson Polsby unquestionably stands as the one who has
done the most to develop the systems or internalist approach
to the House of Representatives' past, both in his actual
studies of Congressional history Cfor example, "The Institu-
tionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives"J 2 and
"The Growth of the Seniority System in the U.S. House of
-19-
Representatives" 13), and in his attempts to establish a
broader theoretical framework within which the search for
meaning in Congress' past could be usefully linked to the
body of scholarship which makes that same search in the
contemporary setting. 14 This group also, to a certain
extent finds a kinship with the pre-behavioralist
descriptive-historians who examined various portions of
the House's internal system. Polsby cites, for example,
Follett's and Giang-Wei Chiu's studies of the Speaker,
Hasbrouk's study of the party system in the House, Brown's
examination of leadership and interestingly enough Alex-
ander's History and Procedure of the House of Representa-
tives among others as rather embryonic expressions of the
systems approach which would by the 1960's emerge to
dominate the central norms of Congressional research.1 5
The third broad approach to Congressional historical
scholarship tends, by and large to lay heavy stress upon
the nature of the House's political environment. In its
historical development and in its present behavior, this
group argues, Congress is largely the product of the con-
straints which surround it. Although there has not yet
emerged from this group a comprehensive theory of the way
in which Congress' evolution has shaped its behavior, a
number of important steps have been taken in that direction.
H. Douglas Price's elucidation of careerism, for example,
has focussed attention on a significant aspect of Congress'
early twentieth century transformation. The study also
-20-
provides an interesting counter to the internalists' view
of Congressional history by suggesting that at least in some
ways the relationship of the House with its political environ-
16
ment was remarkably direct and important. Other con-
tributions to this general approach have been made by
Burnham,1 7 Erikson,18 and Ferejohnl9 who tend to focus on
elections both as reflections of political reality and as
concrete determinants (or constraints) of political institu-
tional -- particularly House -- behavior.
The major debate over the nature and significance of
Congress' past has developed, of course, between the latter
two groups of scholars -- between those who like Polsby see
the House of Representatives as a relatively stable and
above all discrete political institution and who consequently
search for explanation of Congressional behavior (past and
present) among internal norms, structures and relationships
-- and those, who like Burnham and Price tend to see Congress
as inextricably linked to its external political world and
the forces at work there. For the internalists, the House
is a system which labors under norms, values and structures
defined by its function in American political life. For
the ecologists, on the other hand, Congress is an adaptive
mechanism which is linked with, and reflects the changing
realities of its environment. These lines of contention,
therefore, and the major arguments which each group forwards
in its attempt to relate the House to both its political
world, and to its political past, merits serious attention.
-21-
This intellectual conflict provides insights into Congress'
past and a useful point of departure for our attempt to
expose the salient features of Congress' turn of the century
transformation. It also serves to concentrate our focus
upon the extent to which that transformation remains an
integral part of (and consistent with) contemporary views
of Congressional behavior.
The search for historical relevance can be most usefully
begun through a review of Polsby's "Institutionalization of
the House of Representatives," which stands as the most
ambitious attempt to develop a comprehensive theory of Con-
gressional development. Indeed, more than this, it can be
said to be the most systematic exposition -- as well as the
single most important justification -- of the assumptions
which underlie the bulk of the post-1950's scholarship on
the House of Representatives. In many ways, its short-
comings and conceptual problems reflect the broader problems
inherent in that general approach to Congressional research
which constitutes the post-behavioral phase, in Peabody's
terms, of research on the House of Representatives. 2 0
Polsby's attempt to engraft onto the political evolu-
tion of the House the theory of institutionalization begins
with the assumption that the central dynamic in that history
is to be found within the institution itself. The norms,
patterns of behavior and structural features which uniquely
-22-
contribute to Congress' character as a representative legis-
lature have essentially developed internally. The House has
developed, not evolved into an increasingly complex institu-
tion capable of contributing to the policy-making needs of
a twentieth century political system. The distinction is a
rea' one for Polsby. Development is pursued by relatively
autonomous (autonomous in the structural-functional sense
that they determine their own internal values) organiza-
tions which internally create the structures and mechanisms
they need to accomplish the tasks and fulfill the political
roles they have created for themselves. Evolution, by con-
trast, is largely the process whereby an organization adapts
itself to the demands and constraints imposed upon it by
forces external to the institution.
The process of institutionalization generally results,
according to Polsby, in the organizational movement from
simplicity to complexity, which is itself the product, he
surmises, of the historical increase in the level of res-
ponsibility placed upon the national government in the
American political system Citself, presumably the result of
the growing modernization and integration of the nation),
and its growing centrality within that system. "As the
responsibilities of the national government grew," he
suggests, "as a larger proportion of the national economy
was affected by decisions taken at the center, the agencies
of the national government institutionalized." 2 1 Consistent
with the main assumptions of structural-functional analysis,
-23-
institutionalization is characterized by an attachment to
ideas of gradualness and continuity. 22 For Polsby, then
the history of the House is essentially the story of its
logical and continuous progression into modernity.
The process itself is reduced to three broad compon-
ents. First, "an institutionalized organization... is
relatively well-bounded, that is to say, differentiated
23from its environment." Polsby invests this "autonomy"
variable with a great deal of importance and, particularly
as it is elaborated in a later article entitled
"Legislatures"24 it stands as the distinguishing mark, not
only of an institutionalized organization but also of his
general view of the House of Representatives as well. For,
the extent to which the House is in fact bounded or autonomous,
determines in large part, the extent to which the other
attributes of the legislative process are developed accord-
ing to an internal logic or whether they are thrust upon it
by its political environment. The measures of boundedness
include the levels of membership turnover and the extent to
which House leaders are tied to predominantly House careers
recruited from within the body.
With the establishment of autonomy as the first attri-
bute of institutionalization, Polsby turns to the second
component of the process -- the increased complexity of the
House. This variable is operationalized to include "the
growth in the autonomy and importance of committees, ...
the growth of specialized agencies of party leadership, and
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... the general increase in the provision of various emolu-
ments and auxiliary aids to members ...,25 The presumption
is, once again, that since the House is a bounded organiza-
tion, the development of complexity proceeds according to
an internal logic and develops along lines consonnant with
the functional needs of the institution itself. This is
of special importance for the third and final variable in
the institutionalization process which relates to the
naeure of decision-making in the House of Representatives.
The institutionalization of the House, Polsby argues,
is associated with a shift from particularistic and dis-
cretionary toward universalistic and automated decision
making. 2 6 This trend is most centrally reflected in the
growth of the seniority system which of course transferred
the committee leadership recruitment process from partisan
and personal considerations Ci.e. of the Speaker) to more
uniform and automatic standards (seniority). The decline
of blatantly partisan conflict over contested election
results is also introduced as an index of this process.
Taken together, these three components reaffirm the prevail-
ing contemporary portrayal of the House of Representatives as
a closed political system autonomously designing its internal
system to meet the demands of its legislative role in a
modern political setting.
The historical view which thus emerges from Polsby's
essay is one in which the House moves inexorably toward and
ultimately through the process of becoming an autonomous,
-25
complex and professional actor within the national political
system. Congress' past is essentially an integrated part
of this gradual process of functional change. This devotion
to the idea of gradualness and continuity is especially
problematic in view of Polsby's own acknowledgement of the
dramatic nature of the changes Congress underwent around the
turn of the century. As his data shows, the shifts in turn-
over, seniority violations and previous tenure levels of
House leaders (Speakers) during this period were anything
but gradual.
Polsby attempts to integrate these major changes into
his institutionalization theory by suggesting that the House
was jolted by a series of non-incremental yet consistent
changes which dramatically thrust it through a final
organizational threshold. "Some of our indicators,", he
asserts,
give conditional support for a "take-off"
theory of modernization. If one of the
stigmata of the take-off to modernity
is the rapid development of universalistic,
bounded, complex institutional forms, the
data presented here lend this theory some
plausibility. The "big bang" seems to come
in the 1890-1910 period on at least some of
the measures. 2 7
The idea that the turn of the century changes were wholly
consistent with the gradualness of the Congressional drive
toward autonomy is developed further in "Legislatures"
where Polsby argues that this "take-off" consolidated many
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of the already potent forces working toward the creation
of an autonomous legislative system. In particular, he
suggests that the House discarded the last vestiges of its
pre-modern state (which he characterizes as an arena)
during this time and became the essentially modern,
autonomous Ctransformative in his words) legislative system
described by contemporary scholars. 2 8
Polsby's view of institutionalization, and particularly
the heavy stress placed on the idea of autonomy fulfills two
broad conceptual functions in the literature on Congress.
It first of all gathers together in a logical manner the
divergent strands of the history of the House of Representa-
tives into an integrated whole, and secondly it does so with
a theoretical framework which remains faithful to, and there-
by justifies the assumptions which have led post-1950
researchers toward the lines of inquiry they have in fact
taken. In a sense, Polsby leads Congress' past inexorably
toward the present in a manner which renders internal norms,
member attitudes, and formal structures of the House's
internal organization the legitimate foci of those who wish
to understand the national legislative system. To be sure,
Polsby does not dismiss completely the latent power of
external forces to shape internal behavior. As he notes:
our present findings give us ample warning
that institutions are also continuously
,subject to environmental influence and
their power to modify and channel that
influence is und to be less than all-
encompassing.
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And, as he adds in "Legislatures", "Between the pure cases
of arenas and transformative legislatures, there stretches
a continuum whose breadth and main features are not well
understood.,,30 The main point remains, however, that Con-
gress is far closer to the autonomy of the latter portion
of that continuum than it is to the relatively permeable
former position. As such, the key to understanding Con-
gressional behavior lies pre-eminently in its internal
processes.
Building upon this logical base, then, it becomes
theoretically consistent to study the House as an isolated,
internally dynamic system. It becomes useful to dissect
Congress, as modern scholarship has in the main tended to
do, into constituent parts or sub-systems. Fenno's research
on committees, for example, legitimately transcends its
case study format to become a comprehensive analysis of a
dynamic component of the Congressional system. In isolating
these sub-systems, and focussing on purely internal processes,
he in no way undermines his ability to derive a plausible
explanation of committee behavior.3 1  Examples of leader-
ship succession in Peabody's Leadership in Congress can be
similarly viewed as part of a legislative attempt to derive
a comprehensive explanation of Congressional behavior, des-
pite the fact that it isolates the process from external
forces Cincluding that of political parties). 32  This
approach is fully consistent with Polsby's exposition of
Congressional history. As an autonomous and discrete
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system, it becomes possible to dismiss external linkages,
as Tufte does in "The Relationship Between Seats and Votes
in Two Party Systems," where he suggests that Congressional
independence reaches as far as relatively complete control
of the electoral process (through gerrymandering).33 Charles
0. Jones' attempt to attribute the overthrow of Joseph
Cannon and the curtailment of the powers of the Speakership
almost entirely to internal questions of coalition building
and strategic miscalculation is squarely in this tradition,35
and, attempts by Fenno3 4 and others to relate changes in the
Congressional appropriation process between 1885 and 1921 to
largely internal forces Ci.e. committee-specific voting
interests) are also examples of the internalist approach to
congressional history. Finally, Dexter's assertion that
Members of Congress hear what they want to hear and respond
in ways they themselves determine proper is yet another
illustration of the extent to which Polsby's conception
of the history of the House is reaffirmed in the literature
on Congress.36
The questions which this approach to the House of
Representatives' history raises, of course, nevertheless
remain. In particular, how sound is the theoretical base
Polsby has constructed for both this literature and for
the main lines of Congress' past? Despite the fact that
it develops an integrated and comprehensive theory of
Congressional history which fits neatly with current views
of legislative behavior, does institutionalization adequately
and realistically describe how the legislative process has
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become what it is today? Does it accurately explain how
the House of the nineteenth century became the House of
the twentieth century? Finally, does it focus upon the
primary source of organizational change -- the dynamic
core and the key explanatory variable -- in the development
of the structures and norms which define the modern House?
The argument can of course be made that Polsby's institu-
tionalization-autonomy thesis is more at home as a post hoc
justification of modern research trends than it is as a
guide to the history of the House. And, while institution-
alization theory does expose certain elements of the nature
of Congress' historical transformation, it confronts certain
problems when it attempts to explain and describe precisely
what it was that happened to Congress during the first
decades of the twentieth century.
The problems encountered in adapting institutionaliza-
tion theory to Congress' evolution stem first of all from
weaknesses inherent in institutionalization theory itself
and, secondly, from Polsby's particular attempt to fit the
transformation of the House of Representatives into his own
variant of that theory. The first of these problems con-
cerns the theoretical utility of the concept of institution-
alization. As Polsby notes, "The process of institutionaliza-
tion is one of the grand themes in all of modern social
science." 37  It carries with it many of the attributes
which are viewed as critical and eminently desirable in
a modern political system. Notions of institutional
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identity, for example, as well as ideas relating to structural
complexity, widely shared and deeply rooted norms of orderly
interaction among members, organizational efficiency, func-
tional independence, the ability to exercise political author-
ity, stability, and an autonomous internal decision making
process are central to the various definitions of institution-
alization, as indeed they are to broader political development
theory itself. Yet, while institutionalization stands as a
potentially useful analytic device, and while scholars have
been able to convey a general idea of what it means the con-
cept remains rather vague and ill-defined. 38
In a sense, institutionalization theory tends to divide
the process into two distinct portions. On the one hand,
institutionalization is often defined as a goal or end point
on the developmental continuum -- an end point which essen-
tially encompasses the qualities which together constitute
a developed and modern organization. The second general pre-
occupation of institutionalization theory involves the process
of becoming. It is concerned primarily with how an organiza-
tion takes on the attributes which together constitute
institutionalization.
The first aspect of institutionalization theory, then,
is typically descriptive. It sets forth the characteristics
viewed as desirable (or imperative) in a modern organiza-
tion. Some of these descriptive definitions are
relatively narrow as for example Polsby's or S.N. Eisen-
stadt's 39 which tend to see the institutionalized body as
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one largely governed by routinized and well-bounded norms
of behavior. Eisenstadt, unlike Polsby, however, links
his simple routinization and autonimization to broader
more complex patterns of modernization. That is, the
institutionalization of organizations must, if it is to be
a significant force, occur along lines consistent with the
demands of a modernizing society and polity. Thus, for
example, the attributes of routinization and autonomy can-
not be viewed as part of modernizing (or positive) dynamic
if it tends to proceed at the increasing expense of that
organization's status and efficacy in the political system.4 0
Others, like Richard Sisson, a student of Indian state
legislatures,tend to view institutionalization as incorporat-
ing the notion of legitimacy. An organization -- particularly
a political organization -- which regularizes its internal
norms to the detriment of its enduring ability to command
compliance for its outputs (in the case of legislatures,
laws and public policy) is not institutionalized.4 1 This
characterization is echoed and elaborated by Loewenberg who
argues that institutionalization is inextricably tied to
the nature and level of support it can elicit, and related
to this its perceived centrality to the political system
of which it is a part.4 2
The most notable attempt to include these and other
ideas into a unified and comprehensive concept, and to
develop it beyond the level of a heuristic theory is prob-
ably Huntington's formulation in which institutionalization
-32
is defined as "the process by which organizations and pro-
cedures acquire validity and stability. The level of institu-
tionalization of any political system can be defined by the
adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of its
organization and procedures."43  The more adaptable, com-
plex, autonomous and coherent an organization is, the more
institutionalized it is. But, how do we apply this idea
to concrete political organizations? Exactly how adapt-
able must a body be before it can be said to be institution-
alized? How does one measure complexity or autonomy?
Another set of questions arises from what Sisson suggests
are "problems of conceptual tension that are not resolved"
by Huntington or indeed by any other political development
theorist. "That is to say," Sisson continues, "complexity
may be disruptive of coherence; autonomy, in terms of the
pluralization of social representation may endanger coherence;
complexity may in certain instances be disruptive of
autonomy." 44
The problem of evaluation is an even more serious one
for Huntington and indeed for institutionalization itself.
In the first chapter of Political Order in Changing Societies,
Huntington suggests that a polity is institutionalized if it
is able to successfully manage the increased participatory
demands placed upon it by its constituents without either
destroying itself or lessening its value to society. In a
sense, he creates a circular or tautological argument which
states that an organization is sufficiently institutionalized
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if it continues to maintain its existence, and insufficiently
institutionalized if it is unable to maintain its status or
existence. As Sisson asks of Huntington:
What is the relationship between institu-
tionalization and performance? Performance
is here conceived largely in terms of self-
maintenance and is thus synonomous with
institutionalization itself. As it stands
there is no way of judging institutionaliza-
tion with respect to external measures of
effectiveness or performance.45
In the absence of such independent measures, institutional-
ization threatens to become little more than an organizing
concept, useful in assembling disparate fragments of data
into one piece, but relatively useless as a springboard for
developing broader generalizations. Is, in fact, the essence
of institutionalization stability and self-preservation as
Huntington seems to imply? Or does it indeed exist as an
independent and measurable factor in political organiza-
tional life? If it is an independent force, (as, once again
Huntington has yet to demonstrate) what role does it play
in actually shaping the development of political institu-
tions?
These questions are central to the second major aspect
of institutionalization theory which involves, once again,
the way in which an organization achieves the attributes
generally viewed as important in a modernizing institution.
This notion of becoming is distinct, if often largely
implicit Cas for instance in Polsby's formulation of the
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concept) from the actual definition of what an institution-
alized organization actually is. As we have noted, Hunting-
ton tends to view the process of institutionalization as
being a fairly deterministic process which occurs if the de-
mands placed aupon an organization, at any one time, do not
overreach that body's ability to cope or adequately respond
to those demands. The implication is that institutionaliza-
tion proceeds in a natural progression unless it is interrup-
ted by a non-incremental or dysfunctional increase in the
level of inputs (demands) loaded onto the organization.
Other scholars tend to view the details of the process
of becoming quite differently. Adam Pzeworski, for example,
using the Western European case, tends to see institutionali-
zation as peculiarly vulnerable to non-incremental decreases
in participatory impulses of a political system's constitu-
ency.46 Peter Gerlich, partially reinforcing Huntington,
however, tends to view institutionalization as the product
of the extent to which the increase in pressure on political
organizations is consistent and gradual over long periods of
time. He elaborates upon this theme by suggesting that this.
pressure variable is the creature of large scale socio-
economic forces at work in the political environment.47
To a certain extent, his pressure variables as well as his
notion of their impact on political institutional develop-
ment is a variant of some of the themes stressed in the
social mobilization and political development literature. 48
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At the same time, while these and other theorists view
the institutionalization process as being affected by differ-
ent broadly (and usually vaguely) defined forces, all tend
to agree that the process is a long term deterministic onp.
This teleological quality, in other words, tends to invest
institutionalization itself with a built-in dynamic quality.
It implies that, left alone, institutions will naturally
tend to develop from simple to complex ones, for example,
and from subordinate to autonomous ones. Institutionaliza-
tion is, thus at once a natural(ti danc inherent in
organizations as well as the indirect product of very long
term, large-scale environmental forces. This deterministic
view of organizational development stands in vivid contrast
to those models, which will be explored later, which con-
ceive of organizations as the products of contextual forces
at work in their usually very immediate political environ-
ment.
The two components of institutional theory (institu-
tionalization as an end-point and institutionalization as
a process of becoming) become very important in PolSby's
study because they hold the key to whether his invocation
of that theory serves to explain certain facets of Congress'
development, or whether it merely serves to organize random
pieces of data into a coherent descriptive whole. To serve
the needs of explanation, Polsby must first show that his
indices are indeed the central variables in the institution-
alization process and second that this institutionalization
-36-
process is in fact the motive force behind the evolution
of the House of Representatives.
How well, first of all, do Polsby's indicators of
institutionalization reflect the complex process other
political development theorists have attempted to define
and explicate? As he admits, his own version of institu-
tionalization does in fact depart from those of others,
and in particular reduces the process to a much simpler
scale. The broad range of theoretical views of institu-
tionalization, Polsby concedes, is:
bound to prove an embarrassment to the
empirical researcher, since, unavoidably,
in order to do his work, he must pick and
choose among a host of possibilities --
not those that initially may be the most
stimulating, but those that seem most likely
to be reflected in his data, which, perforce
are limited. Thus the operational indices
I am about to suggest which purport to
measure empirically the extent to which the
U.S. House of Representatives has become
institutionalized may strike the knowledge-
able reader as exceedingly crude ...49
To be sure, this is a legitimate caveat. Any attempt
to operationalize grand theory must confront such a problem.
Given, furthermore the inherent vagueness, and as we have
shown above, the questions of internal consistency which
tend to plague institutionalization theory in particular,
certain theoretical modifications -- even if they are made
in order to fit a specific data set -- are decidedly in
order. At the same time, it nevertheless remains useful to
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ask whether or not in the process of adapting theory to
data, Polsby has not shifted the idea of institutionaliza-
tion far enough away from its original meaning to cast
doubt on the applicability of the concept to Congressional
development.
For Huntington as well as for Sisson and Loewenberg,
for example, institutionalization involves questions of
validity as well as stability. To be institutionalized,
an organization must acquire stability and validity,
Huntington reminds us.50 This inclusion of some sense of
institutional efficacy is central to Huntington's notion
of the process and indeed makes sense because it forces
institutionalization to distinguish between simply static
and insulated organizations and stable and autonomous ones
(at least qualitatively if not quantitatively). Huntington
also includes the notions of adaptability and coherence in
his theory suggesting that institutionalized organizations
are neither rigid and routinized nor fragmented and
immobilized by the process which confers stability upon its
internal structure. The stability which accompanies
institutionalization should not, in other words, be achieved
at the expense of an institution's ability to adapt to changes
in its environment nor at the expense of its ability to per-
form its natural tasks. These three components of institu-
tionalization then - efficacy, adaptability and coherence --
which are critical for Huntington's and others' scheme are
absent in Polsby's. By comparison, Polsby's institutional-
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ization process becomes more accurately characterized as
a less grand Cif still usefull theory of routinization
(e.g. Polsby's discretionary to automatic decision making)
and insulation (e.g. boundedness).
The central indicators of Polsby's theory do come
closer to the formulations of S.N. Eisenstadt, however,
whose immediate view of institutionalization is more uniquely
concerned, as Polsby is, with the routinization dimension.51
But then, institutionalization does not, for Eisenstadt,
carry with it all of the profound positive implications with
which Polsby seems to want to invest it. As Eisenstadt sugg-
ests, institutionalization can serve as a source of institu-
tional stagnation as well as of development and modernization.
"Specific processes of institutional change," he writes,
"open up some potentialities but may block others, and in
some cases the institutionalization of a given solution may
'freeze' further development or give rise to stagnation or
continual breakdown."5 2 Thus, the limits Eisenstadt places
on his definition of institutionalization also places real
limits on its significance as a component in the political
development process. As a necessary, but by no means suffi-
cient condition for the growth of organizational strength
and value, institutionalization is not meant to stand on its
own as a single determinant of the extent to which an organi-
zation is viable or not. In this narrowed sense of the term,
institutionalization has a significant impact on political
development only if it• is accompanied by other functional
forces surrounding the modernization process. To invoke
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institutionalization as Eisenstadt defines it then, and
indeed as Polsby seems to view it, tells us very little in
and of itself about that organization's value, strength,
resiliency or power within a political system.
Finally, Polsby cites Weber's The Theory of Social
and Economic Organization, and his exposition of the rational-
legal typology as a source of insights into what constitutes
institutionalization.53 To be sure, the House of Repres-
entatives does reflect the rational-legal patterns of organi-
zational behavior in its norms of conduct and of decision-
making. It is unclear, however, particularly from Polsby's
study, whether this is an attribute which was peripheral to
early Congresses and has become a central part of House be-
havior (we are of course shown that Members of Congress are
certainly more civil to one another now than they were in
the early to mid-nineteenth century), or whether Congress
has by and large always functioned under more or less rational-
legal forms of behavior (for example, decisions have always
been made through votes, specialized committees have always
had a measure of influence over the decision-making process,
and formal rules and procedures have almost from the start
played a role in guiding and constraining membership inter-
actio4
More significantly, however, is the relationship of the
idea of hierarchy in the bureaucratic model to the concept
of rational-legal modes of organizational behavior. Accord-
ing to Weber, the increasing complexity of an institution in
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the rational-legal mold, tends to force that organization
to adopt some coordinative structures. This coordinative
capacity is typically developed through the centralization
of power and authority within the institution. 54 This
notion of centralization is of course absent in Polsby's
institutionalization scheme and indeed could be said to
undermine, in part, the saliency of viewing the House of
Representatives' development as having proceeded according
to the dictates of a modernizing dynamic (at least in terms
of Weber's own conception of that modernizing dynamic). For,
as is evident, the period which constituted Congress' most
dramatic surge (or "take-off" in Polsby's terms) toward
institutionalization was also the period which witnessed
the abandonment of centralized leadership as a primary
organizational norm (for example the overthrow in 1910 of
Speaker Cannon).
These problems of fit between the general, albeit
vaguely defined idea of institutionalization and Polsby's
concrete application thus raise questions as to whether or
not the changes which occurred over the course of the history
of the House were in fact essentially and pre-eminently those
of the modernization process Polsby seems to suggest. The
suspicion, of course, is that by and large Polsby shows that
only certain aspects of what is generally thought to con-
stitute institutionalization are apparent in Congress'
historical development.
This suspicion is fueled by Polsby's inability to
demonstrate how this process was achieved largely through
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changes which were originated from within the House itself.
This, in a sense, is the critical distinction he seems to
want to make between his view and that of other Congressional
historians who stress outside political forces (particularly
immediate contextual ones) as the motive force behind the
internal changes which occurred. Yet, to be able to make
this distinction clear, he must somehow show that the trans-
formation the House underwent, did in fact stem from long
term incremental adjustments which were made in functional
response to the emerging organizational needs of a modern-
izing institution. He must show that Congress was not ran-
domly shaped by the erratic forces working in its fluid
political environment, but rather that it developed accord-
ing to a modernizing dynamic marked above all by a continuity
and an independence from the political struggles and issues
which animated that environment. This he fails to do. The
only insight we thus gain from Polsby into the sources of
institutionalization (in other words, the process of becoming),
is the muted suggestion taken from Durkheim's The Division
of Labor in Society that perhaps it grew out of the increas-
ing responsibilities placed on the national government.5 5
Among the problems this admittedly tentative effort to
relate Congressional history to an autonomous, internally
dynamic set of motive forces must deal with are the follow-
ing: Did all governmental institutions institutionalize?
Did they do so together and at the same rate? More critically
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we must ask, How can we conceptualize in clearer terms the
relationship'between the level of responsibility placed on
the national government and the specific nature of its
institutions' functional adaptation to those increasing
responsibilities? In effect, is institutionalization an
identifiable dynamic process which led Congress toward its
present form?
These questions point to a number of weaknesses, then,
in the institutionalization model both as a concept and as
an explanation of Congress' historical development. Institu-
tionalization is incomplete in its attempt to identify and
indeed to fully describe the range of changes Congress
experienced in its transformation from its late nineteenth
century form to its contemporary form. It is also unable
to show that this transformation was largely the product
of internal forces. To be sure "The Institutionalization
of the U.S. House of Representatives" does describe important
portions of Congress' historical development (routinization
and organizational insulation), but it is not able to explain
why these particular facets of that development process were
so pronounced. Nor is it able to explain why they tended
to become so rapidly and deeply entrenched in the Congress-
ional system when they did. This is largely a function of
institutionalization theory's difficulty with the whole idea
of change itself, which is not at all overcome by the simple
abstract presumption that Congress has largely developed
according to the functional imperatives of a modernizing
dynamic.
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Finally, institutionalization is unable to either
fully integrate external change with internal organization
change or to produce a logical reason for its theoretical
exclusion from the model. Of course its inclusion would
raise serious problems of internal consistency in the model,
but its exclusion raises even more serious questions, par-
ticularly given the systematic linkages which exist between
Congress and its outside world (elections, the representation
norms, and the structural ties with other political and
governmental institutions). The attempt to deny the impor-
tance of external forces is perhaps not as critical a weak-
ness in contemporary analyses of Congress which focus on
period of time when major shifts in the United States poli-
tical environment are relatively rare.5 6 But, it is critical
when the attempt is made to apply these assumptions to Con-
gressional behavior during an era when such major shifts
did occur in the House's political environment. In other
words, theories which focus upon largely internal aspects of
political institutions find it difficult to cope with the
influences major external change is likely to impose on those
institutions.
Consequently, the internalists' consistent difficulty
in coping with the external dimension throughout Congress'
history (by neither integrating it into their models of
Congressional development nor adequately denying its impor-
tance) is magnified in their attempts to account for the
dramatic shifts which in fact occurred in the character of
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the House of Representatives in the first two decades of
the twentieth century. That something major was indeed
happening to Congress at this time is clearly acknowledged,
both in "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of
Representatives" and in "Legislatures".
In the former, Polsby makes a casual attempt to incor-
porate these changes into his model by alluding to a take-
off stage in the institutionalization process, but this
line of reasoning is never really pursued. In "Legislatures",
he suggests that the turn of the century appears to have been
a critical period in the history of the House, but concedes
that difficulties exist in determining exactly what happened
or why. The suspicion is raised, however, that the changes
which transformed the House during the opening years of the
twentieth century (and by extension Congress' long term
development) were at least partially the products of forces
which were at work beyond both the boundaries of the House's
internal world and the narrow limits of institutionalization
theory. 5 7
This suspicion is given free rein in the body of litera-
ture which stands at the opposite end of the internalist-
ecologist spectrum, and which in contra-distinction to
Polsby's view, argues that Congress' development was in fact
dominated and molded by its political environment. For these
scholars, the dramatic shifts in Congressional behavior at
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the turn of the century were a clear reflection of larger
shifts occurring in the American political system.
Whereas, for example, the internalists argue that the
development and continuing behavior of the house of Repres-
entatives is largely the function of the norms, structures
and relationships which dominate its internal character,
the ecologists tend to argue that Congress behaves primarily
according to the kinds of constraints (e.g. elections, party
shifts, normative changes in the American political culture)
which affect all American political institutions. Secondly,
while the internalists tend to seek confirmation for their
views in analyses of present forms of Congressional behavior
twhich ecologists would argue places Congress in a relatively
static political environment), the ecologists tend to find
reaffirmation of their approach in the shifts which occurred
in Congressional behavior between 1890 and 1920. Finally,
where internalists tend to stress the essential continuity
of Congressional history, ecologists find ample evidence
that the institutional evolution of that body is marked by
sharp and vivid discontinuities.
It is therefore useful to explore the arguments of this
latter group, as it was to explore those of Polsby and the
internalists, because they clarify the central issues of the
debate between these two groups and indeed address . the
fundamental questions which continue to surround the attempt
to develop a productive approach to Congressional history.
The examination of the ecologists' approach also lends
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additional support to the idea that the attempt to under-
stand Congress' early twentieth century transformation is
an important part of the attempt to explain that institu-
tion's political development.
In general, the ecologists tend to view the House of
Representatives as the product of factors which character-
ize and animate that body's immediate political environment.
In contrast to the institutionalization theorists' approach,
this body of scholars is intimately concerned with the notion
of contexts. Variations in the immediate political environ-
ment of the House over the course of its history are seen
as the keys to that institution's evolutionary tendencies.
In the era of intense regionalism (in the first half of the
nineteenth century) for example, Congress was very much the
creature of sectional pressures; in the era of strong parties
the House of Representatives, in its organizational struc-
tures and normative values was the creature of partisanship;
and in the era of group politics, it is very much the
creature of pluralist values and interests. Although no one
student of Congress has articulated a comprehensive theory
which works through the details of these general assertions,
such a characterization can be seen to emerge from the
collective assumptions of the ecologists' approach to various
portions of political behavior in the House of Representatives.
The most comprehensive statement of the assumptions
which underlie the ecologists' conceptual view of American
politics in general and national political institutions by
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extension is found in Walter Dean Burnham's various studies
of the electoral process. In Critical Elections and the
Mainsprings of American Politics, for example, he suggests
that the American Political System is fundamentally static
and insulated from the dynamic social and economic forces
which surround it and periodically impose upon it a re-
definition of its nature and role. As he argues:
The periodic rhythm of American electoral
politics ... arises out of an interaction
between rapid change leading to dislocation
in an autonomous socio-economic system, and
glacial or non-existent change in the
structures and routines of mass electoral
politics.
As the socio-economic system develops but
the institutions of electoral politics and
of polity remain essentially unchanged,
dysfunctions centrally related to the largely
untrammeled evolution of the former become
more and more visible, until whole classes,
regions or other major sectors of the popula-
tion are injured or threatened with injury.
Finally the triggering event occurs, critical
realignments follow, the universe of policy
and of electoral coalitions is broadly re-
defined, and the tensions generated by the
crisis receive some resolution. 58
American political institutions are therefore supremely
governed by the particular forces at work within their
immediate environment. These contextual factors emerge most
centrally as crises, which because of the inherent inability
of the political system to adjust incrementally to socio-
economic change (because of rigidities within party struc-
tures, between partisan political groups or because of formal
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and normative restraints on the relationship of the govern-
mental structures with its social and economic environment),
must do so in cyclical jolts. Thus, American history is
viewed as the dramatic appearance of a succession of poli-
tical and ideological coalitions which were relevant to the
immediate crises to which their appearance was a response
(1828, 1860, 1896,and so forth) interspersed with periods
during which these forceful coalitions gradually decayed.
To Sundquist, another critical realignment theorist,
these cyclical eruptions of political activity and change
are automatic in their occurrence. 59  For, Burnham, however,
while decay is inevitable or almost inevitable, regeneration
of the political system through the emergence of new, pur-
poseful coalitions built upon the altered demands and needs
of its dynamic social and economic system is not. In fact,
this view, which holds that decay is the natural tendency
of American political coalitions as well as the institutions
they dominate, is quite the obverse of institutionalization
theory which implicitly holds that modernization, rationaliza-
tion and the drive toward complexity are the elemental forces
in organizational development. 60  Consequently, the ability
of political institutions to respond adequately is depen-
dent upon the extent to which the central ingredients of
that realignment process - parties, economic institutions,
electoral entrepreneurs or political leaders, ideological
groupings -- view the political system (or institutions
within that political systeml as the logical arena for the
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struggles and conflicts they seek to resolve. Critical
realignment, then, tends to view the structures and institu-
tions of American politics, in vivid contrast to the inter-
nalists, as the relatively neutral locus for the resolution
of conflicts which develop out of the constant changes which
enliven its dynamic social and economic environment.
This view of political institutions as rather passive
and chronically maladaptive actors in American history is
reinforced by Louis Hartz who in The Liberal Tradition in
America suggests that at base, the United States' political
system has exhibited a relatively strong and consistent
attachment to the broad assumptions of the Lockian creed.
Government is to remain, so this creed holds, largely the
creature of its constituents; it is to be controlled by its
environment rather than the reverse. 61 Clearly the unique
structural characteristics imposed upon the American political
edifice by the founders in 1789 are a reflection of these
Lockian norms, but significant indicators of their enduring
relevance can also be seen in such qualities as the United
States' historical tendency toward electoral moderation and
the continuing salience of the 'limited government' ethos
in political institution-building from the notion of econo-
mic self-regulation to the ideas which initially supported
and which continue to sustain the establishment of independent
and quasi-independent regulatory agencies, for example).
The sources of this limited role for the state in the
United States, Hartz argues, are to be found in the unique
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elements of American social and political history. Unlike
most Western European nations, for example, American society
has found itself in basic agreement over the social and
economic assumptions which have shaped the establishment
of its governmental system. The Hamiltonian challenge to
these assumptions, and the debate over slavery, notwithstand-
ing, American history has been marked, in Hartz' view, by an
enduring value consensus. This consensus has emerged because
American bourgeois society never faced the consistent and
prolonged challenges its European counterparts faced.
Hart's point here is that the European liberal states,
characterized by a more prominent role in shaping and guiding
European society, were forced into that prominant role by the
nature of the historical conflicts between feudal and
bourgeois economic and social traditions and needs. Control
of the state became critical in determining the outcome of
those struggles and for maintaining the hegemony of middle
class interests in the transition from feudal-agrarian to
industrial societies. The fundamental feature of American
history, Hartz continues, has been the absence of this con-
flict between values and social norms of feudal and bourgeois
traditions. The absence of this historical conflict in the
United States and the presence by contrast of a relatively
strong sense of value unanimity precluded the development of
a strong central polity. As Burnham characterizes this
feature of American politics, "We have not government in our
domestic affairs so much as non-rule. "6 2
In large part, Huntington amplifies this point in the
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second chapter of his study, Political Order in Changing
Societies, where he suggests that the American political
system was born out of the rather fragmented, decentralized
traditions of Tudor England.63 The structures and values
which stemmed from that organizational mold, preceded, in
Hartz's terms, the greatest historical struggles which
occurred from the seventeenth century on in Europe and
which ultimately shaped the patterns of the "modern" poli-
tical systems which developed from those struggles. As such,
the United States can be viewed as a fragment culture which
broke away from the European whole before Europe had become
dominated by the conflicts which proved to be the source of
its modern political systems.6 4
The implications then of the Hartzian concept of poli-
tical development in the United States, to Huntington's own
way of thinking, are that the American political system is
uniquely marked by (11 the supremacy of fundamental law as a
constraint on political action; (21 the structural fragmenta-
tion of authority; C3) the consequent non-sovereignty of the
state (sovereignty is seen to reside in either the people or
in fundamental lawi; and thus (4) the competence of the polity
to act as a source of fundamental change is limited. "In
seventeenth-century Europe," Huntington explains,
the state replaced fundamental law as the source
of political authority and within each state a
single authority replaced many which had pre-
viously existed. America, on the other hand,
continued to adhere to fundamental law as both
a source of authority for human actions and as
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an authoritative restraint on human behavior.
In addition, in America, human authority or) sovereignty was never concentrated in a single
institution or individual but instead remained
dispersed throughout society as a whole and
among many organs of the body politic. Tradi-
tional patterns of authority were thus
decisevely broken and replaced in Europe; in
America they were reshaped ~nd supplanted but
not fundamentally altered.6
Once again, Huntington echoes Hartz in identifying this
rejection of centralized political sovereignty noting that
the American polity was never called upon to provide the
impetus for the transformation of the society or the economy
to the extent the states of Western Europe were called upon
to do. In addition, the United States (presumably up until
the twentieth century) was not faced with the constant need
to coordinate a strong national defense effort. 66
This view of American history, then, imposes certain
assumptions upon the analysis and evaluation of the evolution
of national political institutions. Above all, it tends to
deny the existence of the conditions which would lead institu-
tions to develop the ability to direct their own development.
It presents a historical view in which the process of sus-
tained institutional modernization -- in the classic European
form -- is inconsistent with the central elements of American
political history. It further suggests that the attempt to
view institutional development as the product of institution-
alization is incompatible with the broadly anti-modern
tendencies at work in the American political system. It
consequently strongly implies that the changes in Congressional
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behavior Polsby saw as part of an institutionalization
) process must logically be something quite different. But,
the question remains, if the changes which Polsby identified
are not part of a continuous modernization dynamic, what
then do they represent?
The ecologists' answer, which is largely fragmentary,
tends to be rooted in historical contexts. Given the anti-
developmental conception of American history, the search for
the roots of institutional change focusses upon these aspects
of Congress' environment which from time to time forcefully
redefined its role in national political affairs. As such,
ecologists derive their answers from the events or crises
which tended to directly affect that redefinition process.
Logically, this approach can be applied to the entire sweep
of Congressional history. The emergence of mass parties
and sectionalism, for example, are viewed as important ele-
ments in the strengthening of the Speakership under James
Polk between 1837 and 1839.67 Yet, for the most part, the
scholarly attention of ecologists as well as internalists
tend to settle on the events which shaped the House between
1890 and 192Q.
The concentration on this era stems first of all from
the magnitude of the changes which occurred (as Polsby
clearly shows)68 and secondly, from the impact those changes
continue to have on the House today. The energies of these
scholars tend to be focussed, as indeed those of Polsby and
the internalist historians are, on attempts to explain why
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these changes occurred and on understanding why they continue
to be relevant for contemporary Congresses. Within this
search, the idea of a "System of.1896" stands as an extremely
important point of departure.
Clearly, the significance of the 1896 Presidential Elec-
tion was appreciated by most of its participants and observers,
but E.E. Schattschneider was the first to suggest that its
meaning far transcended the bounds of its immediate political
impact. "To understand what has happened in American politics
in the past generation," he wrote in 1960,
it is necessary to go back to the election of
1896, one of the decisive elections in
American history. It is necessary to under-
stand what happened in 1896 in order to under-
stand the Republican party system which domina-
ted the 9?untry in the first third of this
century.
The importance of this election, he stressed, lay in
the manner in which the Republican Party, particularly the
conservative wing of that party, achieved and maintained its
dominance of American political life in the first part of
the century. Essentially, this dominance was founded upon
the conservatives' ability "to impose on the country the
conflict which divided the people the way they wanted them
to be divided." This "substitution of one conflict for
another" Ci.e. the northern conservative - southern con-
servative conflict for the radical-conservative conflict)
was designed to isolate "southern and western radicals from
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each other", and was made possible by a tacit alliance
between northern conservative Republicans and southern
conservative Democrats.70
This transformation of the lines of conflict, other
observers have noted, was accompanied by other more struc-
tural changes in the United States political system. Between
1890 and 1920, voting regulations were modified in a manner
which to some reformed and democratized the electoral sys-
tem7 1 but which to others simply consolidated the gains of
the northern-southern conservative alliance by undermining
many of the norms and procedures which had helped to sustain
the strong role of mass parties in the late-nineteenth cen-
tury.72  Voter participation dropped markedly in the years
after 1896 throughout many parts of the nation and electoral
coalitions became less monolithic and less effective in
mobilizing support for broad aggregations of political issues.
In the society at large, meanwhile, other significant,
if less direct, shifts were imposing equally notable changes
on America's political behavior. The nationalization of
social and economic organizations along functionally speci-
fic lines tended, according to Samuel Hayes, for example, to
mirror the progressive dismissal of parties -- tied to
localistic and therefore outmoded issues and interests --
from national political rleŽanc%.7 3  In their places, formal
interest groups asserted their right to manage political con-
flict and campaign in their own ways for preferred policies;
independent regulatory commissions were either strengthened
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or established and their apolitical tendencies encouraged;
and other institutions increasingly beyond the immediate
grasp of partisan conflict (such as administrative agencies)
gained levels of power and salience which lent further
weight to the forces shifting American politics from its
traditional paths. To some, these changes were direct out-
growths of the decisions made and bargains struck after the
1896 elections. To others, that election's outcome was but
another symptom of broader changes occurring nationally which
mixed a belief in progress and order with a forceful repudia-
tion of the old norms of political conflict.7 4
The significance of these large-scale transformations
has not been lost on a number of scholars who seek to link
them with specific changes within Congress. H. Douglas Price,
for example, argues that the rise of the seniority system was
a function of the growth of careerist tendencies among Members
of Congress. The decline of membership turnover (due to new
primary and election laws which tended to free the congress-
man from strict reliance on his party; the demise of anti-
election norms among both political leaders and evidently the
electorate; and the rise of one-party dominance within elec-
tion districts), the increasing tenure of Members of Congress,
the decreased frequency of "alterations in party control" of
Congress since 1894 and the growth of political careers tied
exclusively to service in the House of Representatives were
among the major sources of the ensconcement of the seniority
75
norm.
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To a certain extent, this casual pattern can be reduced
to Huntington's simplified assertion that "the longer men
stay in Congress, the more likely they are to see virtue in
seniority.76 This view of seniority, then, is strongly
linked to the changes occurring in Congress' turn of the
century environment. As the constraints which underwrote
the competitive and partisan organizational and procedural
qualities of the nineteenth century House began to fade,
and the Congressional role in national politics underwent a
redefinition process, the natural political tendenciesz6f
Members of Congress were given freer rein -- they were
allowed to construct an institution more in line with their
own personal goals and ambitions.
Polsby, on the other hand, devaluing the importance of
external changes, views the roots of the rise of seniority,
as lying in the internal dynamics of the House during this
time. The gradual emergence of seniority, he suggests, is
largely attributable to the strategic realities of coalition
building within the House of Representatives which changed
in the first decades of the twentieth century. Although in-
directly related to changes in the national (particularly the
Republican) party structures, the increasing reliance on
seniority was more directly the product of shifts in the way
the House ordered its internal political system. As he
argues:
Cannon's problem seems to have been that he
took over a relatively unified party and had
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little need at first to build a special suppor-
tive coalition. When the party began to split
apart in his third term, he responded by attempt-
ing to maintain a workable coalition by dumping
insurgent chairmen and rewarding loyal
Republicans with chairmanships . . . The costs
of Cannon's efforts to T9intain a supportive
coalition are clear ...
The weakening of the powers bf the Speaker by Republican
Party insurgents in union with Democrats which followed
Cannon's strategic miscalculation, therefore, serves for
Polsby as a major cause of the rise of seniority. Polsby
also suggests that the norms of specialization and organi-
zational differentiation, inherent in institutionalization
theory were also at work. 78
In his argument, Polsby's differences with the ecologists
becomes somewhat less distinct but nevertheless remain. By
and large, the links between specific actions in the House of
Representatives and broad external political changes are
extremely indirect. To be sure, the fragmentation of the
Republican party begun in the 1890's did lead to the increas-
ingly pronounced break-up of the Republican legislative party
in the period between 1900 and 1910, according to Polsby,
which in turn affected Cannon's ability to retain traditional
committee selection procedures. But, the emergence of senior-
ity was more directly tied, once again in Polsby's view, to
the institution-specific realities of the House of Representa-
tives as an increasingly institutionalized political system.
Price, himself, tends to see this as a contrast to his
own Cand the ecologists) approach to the question of internal
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changes in the House.7 9 The rise of seniority was for him
part of a broader, externally directed process which,
beginning in the 1890's, and as part of the general trans-
formation of American politics which occurred during that
time, removed Congress, as it did other creatures of partisan
conflict, from the mainstream of the national policy-making
system (at least in relation to the powerful role it had
played in the latter half of the nineteenth century).
In effect, the rise of seniority was but another patho-
logical symptom of the twentieth century insulation of the
House of Representatives. As the links which bound Congress
.(and indeed the entire political system) to its constituents
were modified and the House of Representatives became less
directly tied to the often dramatic fluctuations of the nine-
teenth century electoral system, as Price suggests, it took
on forms more consonnant with a stable -- some argue static
and stagnant -- organization. This is certainly Huntington's
view 80 and it is echoed by Burham who argues that the
changes experienced by the House during this era were but
reflections and symptoms of a process that ultimately served
to insulate and in a sense isolate that institution from the
mainstream of American politics and public policy making. It
is appropriate, he asserts,
to note two things about this process. In the
first place, it was a process by which an
institutional structure was adapted, or adapted
itself, to the increasingly depoliticized and
elite-insulated environment of American politics
which reached its height in the 1920's. In the
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second place, the institutional patterns estab-
lished during this evolution toward its con-
temporary form have never been substantively
altered since the 1920's, either by the New Deal
realignment or any subsequent development in
our electoral politics.8±
Burnham clearly views the House of Representatives as a
casualty of the American political system's retreat from
partisanship. In a less qualitative vein, he also sees a
sharp relationship between the broad changes of the 1890's
and early 1900's and the structural modifications Congress
effected within itself. This theme is elaborated in his
later article "Insulation and Responsiveness in Congress-
ional Elections," where he details the magnitude and direc-
tion of electoral changes working on Congress' behavior.
Here, he shows that competitiveness in House elections has
declined; that the incumbent is increasingly less affected
by electoral change; that there is a corresponding decline
in the differences between the legislative parties; that
Congressional (i.e. House) elections exhibit their own pecul-
iar dynamic which appears to be independent of partisan elec-
toral behavior in, for example, Presidential elections; and
finally that voter participation is declining.82
The suggestion is of course that these factors are the
result of the long term depoliticization of the American
electorate and the emergence of alternate modes of political
participation. Candice J. Nelson argues, for example, that
the growing power of incumbency (itself a reflection of Con-
gress' insulation) is the result of the increased numbers of
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independent voters in the electorate. 83  Erikson reinforces
this point arguing that the power of incumbency "coincides
with ... the reported erosion of party identification as an
electoral force."84  Finally, Ferejohn suggests that the
decline in electoral competitiveness and the consequent rise
in the strength of incumbency derives from that fact that
even party identifiers are now "more responsivle to non-
partisan criteria for decision making in House elections." 85
To a certain extent, the present insulation of Congress,
which Burnham traces, once again back to the changes in the
American political system between 1890 and 1920, exhibits
qualities which are also characteristic of the internalists'
notion of autonomy. The distinctions which exist between
these two concepts, however, are more than semantic. For
ecologists, the House is an institution which has been
rendered progressively more peripheral to the mainstream of
American political decision making. Its position is a
pathological symptom of the extent to which it has been
unable to adapt fully to the exigencies of twentieth century
American politics.
The insulated House, then, approaches the internalists'
view of the legislative "system" only insofar as it is left
relatively free (by its insulation) to create its own set
of procedural norms and roles. In quiescent political times,
the House does indeed tend to take a life all its own, and
patterns of socialization on the part of the members into
the various sub-systems and systems of Congress become a
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logical focus of study. Unhampered by large-scale infusions
of new members with new goals and new ideological orienta-
tions, the House does tend to exhibit many of the system-
like qualities stressed by the internalists. 86
Thus, in the absence of significant electoral intrusions
onto the internal world of Congressional organization, Members
of Congress exploit a number of organizational resources to
protect their incumbency. Mayhew suggests, for example, that
the creative use of the frank and other public relations tools
greatly enhance a:.representative's re-election chances and of
course help reinforce key aspects of the overall insulation
phenomenon.87 Fiorina argues that Members also exploit their
special relationship with executive branch agencies by serving
as intermediaries between constituents and the bureaucracy
88to good electoral advantage. In a sense, the increased
reliance on resources involves certain modifications of the
House procedural and normative organizational structure
(itself evidence of a continuing adaptation process to the
real if nevertheless minor changes occurring in the House's
political environment). Thus, insulation is not institution-
alization or autonomy. Congress continues to be the creature
of its environment, according to the ecologists, a notion
which becomes more apparent during times of relatively major
external changes (for example, the changes in Congress'
internal procedures which followed the 1974 House elections).89
Despite the relevance which ecologists continue to see
for their approach to Congressional behavior in modern times,
however, most attention remains heavily focussed on the
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changes which affected the House at the turn of the century.
There are, nevertheless, gaps in the ecologist argument.
While, for example, the magnitude of the shift in Congress'
environment is clearly shown by ecologists, the precise im-
pact of these changes on the House's internal structure tends
to be implied more readily than it is actually demonstrated.
The most successful attempts to establish and define
the nature of this link, tend to be those which resort to
inductive assumptions about the mix between presumed member
goals and institutional structure. Thus, Price views the
reorganization of the House of Representatives in the early
twentieth century as the combined product of an organization
evolving the ability to meet the longer term career goals
of its members (for example, freer and more immediate access
to power, a more permeable decision-making system, and an
increase and a broadening of the distribution of concrete
perquisites and symbols .of status and prestige). 90 Mayhew
applies much the same approach to the contemporary House
suggesting that the present structures and norms are ideally
suited to enhancing the re-election probabilities and thus
prolonging the political careers, of Members of Congress.91
The notion remains, however, that this adaptation of institu-
tional structures to member goals is made possible by the
decline of the external constraints which affected Congress-
ional behavior before the turn of the century and which from
time to time still emerge to restrain and mold the internal
structure of the House. It is a function of Congress'
insulation rather than of its institutionalization.
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The concentration upon individual ambition as the
central dynamic in Congress' turn of the century reorganiza-
tion and redefinition process places perhaps too much weight
on this one dimension of political behavior. On the one
hand, of course, Price is concerned primarily with the rela-
tionship between careerism and the seniority norm. At the
same time, he does see the causal link between these two
variables as an important reflection of the other changes
which accompanied the emergence of the seniority rule in
the normative and formal structure of the House.
In either case, the sole reliance upon professionaliza-
tion or careerism as an explanation of the changes Congress
underwent leaves a number of questions unanswered. First
of all, how well does the careerist impulse explain the rise
of seniority? To be sure, it makes intuitive sense to relate
individual goals with organizational structure, particularly
where that structure is relatively free of other constraints
(i.e. where it is free to respond to its members' wishes).
Given this assumption of insulation, nevertheless, does
seniority really serve as an adequate fulfillment of the
professionalist drive? Does seniority intuitively meet the
professional goals of the careerist? Would not the quint-
essential careerist organizational solution have lain more
properly in the democratization of the committees themselves
and the diminution of the often arbitrary powers of the
committee chairmen (which is essentially what has been
happening in the House since 19701?
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As Price himself notes, the adoption of seniority also
failed to reduce the element of chance inherent in the impor-
tant decisions relating to committee assignments. While this
responsibility was transferred from the Speaker to various
incarnations of a committee on committees, it still remained
in the hands of a very few members and open to the same vagaries
which had characterized its exercise in the era of the strong
Speakers.9 2
Secondly, the professionalist focus as defined by Price
and others tends to ignore other impulses which animate the
institutional outlook of the Member of Congress. Beyond a
career measured by longevity, it can be safely assumed that
an early twentieth century careerist must have also wanted
the House to remain a body in which the pursuit of a career
was a worthwhile endeavor. He must have certainly wanted
the House to maintain at least a semblance of power and in-
fluence in national political life. He must have also wanted
it to be structured in such a way that it would be able to
resolve important questions of public policy and make decis-
ions as much in line with his own views as possible. He might
also have wanted to erect an organizational structure which
would encourage his own desire to develop a specific expertise
necessary for handling the increasingly complex subjects
dominating the national policy-making agenda. These and
other goals competed with the simple uni-dimensional drive
for stability and longevity among members and consequently
exerted their own influences on Congress' organization in a
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manner not easily accounted for in the careerist paradigm.
Thirdly, the extent to which the system of 1896 insula-
ted the House of Representatives and removed major constraints
on Congressional procedures remains problematical. As Burn-
ham argues, many individual seats in Congress remained highly
competitive throughout this period, thus moderating the extent
to which the "safe seats" syndrome affected the organizational
goals of all members.9 3
Finally, the emergence of new external linkages (interest
groups, for example) also raise questions as to how unres-
trained the professionalist impulse was in influencing internal
House norms and procedures. This thesis is only partially but
promisingly explored in the literature on pluralism and the
rise of interest group politics in the United States beginning
around the turn of the century. Truman, for example, shows
that interest groups emerged as effective political organiza-
tions most dramatically in the early years of the twentieth
century. This rise in terms of numbers as well as importance,
of functionally specific groups was most compatible with a
political system which was permeable and which provided mul-
tiple points of access to the various institutions of govern-
94
ment. The dispersion of power and the entrenchment of
the committee system certainly coincided, at the very least
with the development of this group based norm of political
conflict. And, as Price points out in his article, "Micro-
and Micro-politics: Notes on a Research Strategy," the rise
of interest associations had a profound effect on the general
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notion of representation -- an impact which was undoubtedly
felt very keenly by the House of Representatives.9 5
This development of the political power of interest
groups also had an important impact on the relationship be-
tween Congress and the Executive branch, and on the way
legislators perceived their own law-making role. Regulatory
commissions, and executive bureaus tended to serve as the
political focus of the new pluralist order and, as Lowi
notes, Congress tended to adapt and even reinforce this trend
by granting progressively greater degrees of autonomy and dis-
cretion to these agencies and commissions. 96  While, in any
case, the precise relationship of pluralism to Congressional
organization has not been adequately studied, it is neverthe-
less clear that the appearance of this new and powerful force
in the national political arena at the turn of the century
certainly exerted a major influence on the legislative pro-
cess.
The problems inherent in the attempt to relate the rise
of pluralism in American politics to the internal legislative
process reflects the wider problem ecologists confront in
inferring Congressional behavior from external changes in
the legislative environment. In its broadest sense, the
concentration on electoral change, on changes in the funda-
mental norms shaping national lines of political conflict,
and on the transformations in the manner in which that con-
flict was organized clearly hold significant implications
for the way an institution like Congress develops its in-
ternal system of rules and procedures. There remains,
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however, the problem of relating these broad changes to
specific aspects of the Congressional process in more pre-
cise terms. Price is more successful here than others, but
as we have noted, even he faces problems in his attempt to
show that the careerist impulse was the major motivating
element behind the adoption of the seniority norm and by
extension the other characteristics of the post 1910-1920
House of Representatives. He finds it difficult to dismiss
the idea that careerism competed with other forces in the
ultimate determination of what would come to constitute the
modern Congressional process (for example, the modernization
dynamic discussed by Polsby 9 7 and to a certain extent im-
plied by Price's use of the term professionalization).
A related problem is that ecologists tend to under-
estimate the strength of internally derived norms and patterns
of behavior at work in Congress. As Polsby strongly suggests,
and despite the questions his own approach raises, the House
of Representatives is not now, nor was it at the turn of the
century a simple adaptive organism whose nature was unilater-
ally shaped by external events. The problem ecologists tend
to confront in this regard is the identification of the dynamic
nexus where external forces are translated into internal
institutional characteristics. They tend to ignore the manner
in which the institutional forces at work within Congress exert
their own independent influence in modifying and cushioning
the impact of changes in the larger national political environ-
ment. They find it difficult to explain why the House adapted
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precisely as it did to the changes working in its outside
world. Ecologists tend to observe the nature and direction
of changes in Congress and then argue that intuitively these
changes are largely consistent with the external changes to
which they are a presumed response. But, it is not clear
whether the sum total of internal change is equal to the sum
total of the changes working on the House's environment.
Despite this vagueness in identifying the link between
external change and organizational change within Congress,
the ecologists' approach exhibits two major qualities as an
explanatory model. It first of all integrates Conigress'
development into the mainstream of American political history.
The evolution of the House of Representatives is woven intp
the broader fabric of the progression and alteration of other
major forces in American political life. The second, and
more significant strength of the ecologists' approach derives
from this first quality, but is important in its own right.
The integration of Congress with its political environment
the ecological approach provides, introduces a critical dy-
namic element into the model of institutional change. Unlike
the internalists, who devalue external influences and who are
only impartially successful in identifying alternate sources
of tension and change within Congress, ecologists are able
to rely on the inherent and readily visible dynamic proper-
ties of large-scale social, economic and political change
(as reflected, for example, in electoral realignments) as
the central force impelling the House from old to new forms
of organizational behavior.
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The difficulty internalists face in explaining organ-
izational change in Congress, on the other hand, is partially
offset by the important value they place on internal proc-
esses. The stress they lay on the independent effects of
internal norms, values and organizational traditions suggests
that the assumptions which lead students of Congressional
change toward a wholly external perspective ignores the man-
ner in which an institution modifies and to a certain extent
manipulates the impact of large-scale change on its internal
structures. Thus, while the evolutionary or adaptive model
of Congressional development provides a useful basis for
examining organizational change, the internalist caveat pro-
vides a necessary balance for understanding more precisely
how those external sources of change affected the internal
workings of a House of Representatives in transition. Com-
bined with the ecological model, it suggests that the roots
of the modern House are to be found neither entirely in the
political transformations occurring at the turn of the century,
nor entirely within the organization itself, but rather at the
point where internal and external forces intersect.
This study will be devoted to the identification and
exploration of this critical intersection in an attempt to
explain the source and nature of the changes which trans-
formed the House of Representatives between 1890 and 1920. It
will suggest, first of all, that Congress was in fact par-
ticularly affected by the forces which at once redefined the
political world in which it functioned and at the same time
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altered the expectations placed upon it. The study will
argue that among the changes thrust upon the House, the most
significant were the general depoliticization of the national
policy-making process, the heightened expectations placed
upon the national government, the progressive decline of
electoral competitiveness in certain regions of the country,
and the shift from cumulative and aggregative to plural and
fragmented norms of political organization. It will suggest,
secondly, that these changes interacted with the career goals
of the Members of Congress themselves, as well as with the
primary legislative tasks of the House of Representatives,
the political values and beliefs of the members, and the
standards of performance devised by the institution to incor-
porate, modify or redirect the impact of changes in the exter-
nal world. Those two broad sets of constraints combined to
redefine the internal organizational structures and proced-
ures of the House at the turn of the century.
Clearly, the House was centrally affected by some amal-
gam of these two sets of forces. The simple listing of these
constraints, however, takes us no further than the debate
between the ecologists and the internalists. Yet, they do
suggest the utility of synthesizing both arguments into a
somewhat modified approach to the question of Congressional
change in the opening decades of the twentieth century and
indeed Congressional change in general. As we have noted,
both groups tend to agree more or less that major changes
affecting Congress' internal processes and to a very decided
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degree the main characteristics of its role in the United
States' political system occurred between 1890 and 1920.
Neither group, however, agrees upon what the overall impact
of these changes was for, Congressional behavior and Congress'
role in the national policy-making system. What appears to
result in institutionalization for the internalists seems in
some respects to result in insulation for the ecologists.
The other portion of the debate between these two groups and
the other major source of disagreement centers upon the ques-
tion of causality. Each group distinguishes itself from the
other in the assumptions each makes about the general nature
and source of institutional political change.
These divergent assumptions lead the two groups, as we
have noted, into the two equally different approaches to
Congressional behavior and Congressional change we have ex-
plored above. The problem each continues to confront, how-
ever, is the extent to which the identification of a relatively
clearly defined central dynamic still eludes their grasp. And,
as long as a clearer portrait of the nature of the forces
animating Congressional behavior continues to exist only as a
vague quantity, research on the sources and characteristics
of Congressional organizational change is likely to remain
equally vague.
What is needed is some concrete and visible link between
what are viewed as independent forces in the political system
(for the ecologists these forces include once again the elec-
toral system and its socio-economic environment and for
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internalists it includes very broad forces of modernization
and social mobilization outside of Congress and an indepen-
dent institutionalizing dynamic within it) and the actual
struggle to develop and change the organizational realities
of the House legislative process. How, in effect, is the
House of Representatives linked to the motive source of
organizational change? Through what channels do elections
come to affect the nature of Congressional organization?
Or, where do we look for evidence of an institutionalizing
dynamic in Congress?
The most successful attempt in this regard remains
Price's identification of the individual member and his
career goals as one observable and particularly relevant
factor in the welter of forces impelling Congress through
the organizational changes of the 1890-1920 period. more
than anyone else, Price has brought attention to the fact
that change in Congress is not so much a mechanistic process
whereby the institution either evolves in mute and automatic
response to environmental change or develops as the uncon-
scious servant of some vague institutionalizing force, but
rather it is a creative struggle of members, ideas and wills.
The strength of the careerist approach lies in this concen-
tration upon an active mediative nexus -- a critical inter-
vening variable -- in the history of the House of Representa-
tives. The question which must still be posed, however,
revolves around the extent to which careerism is comprehen-
sive enough to explain more than a portion of the changes
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Congress underwent in the first decades of the twentieth
century. While it is a useful beginning, the limitations
inherent in the careerist approach to Congressional behavior,
are strong enough to urge upon students of the House a broad-
er search for a more productive focus -- one which encom-
passes more of the components affecting the process of
institutional change.
One possible alternative which builds upon the careerist
contributions to the identification of the central interven-
ing variable in Congressional development and evolution lies
in the concentration on the nature of conflict in the House
of Representatives. As a political institution, the most
elemental imperative Congress responds to is that of managing
conflict in such a manner that it is able to carry out its
most basic decision making functions. The peculiarities in
Congress' recruitment process, in its linkages with an exter-
nal world and in the expectations and demands placed upon it,
suggest that its approach to the dual problem of conflict and
consensus is likely to be unique and relevant to internal
patterns of behavior.98 It could be argued, then, that the
structure and character of a legislative institution in
general is essentially the continual formal attempt of that
body to reconcile the singular properties of its political
world and the patterns of conflict that world creates within
the organization, with the elemental need to resolve that
conflict and make decisions. Its members must devise a set
of procedures which effects some balance between the inherent
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legislative tendency toward conflict and the need to
achieve some measure of policy consensus.
The decision-making system of the House, -- the system
devised by its members to resolve, dampen, or defer conflict
within that institution -- will therefore be built around
the specific and varying forms of conflict Congress is forced
to confront and manage. This assertion suggests a possible
model of legislative behavior and change. Figure 1 shows
the outline of this proposed model. It begins with the
assumption that the House must confront and adapt to a set
of conditions over which it has little control -- conditions
which determine the pattern and scope of conflict which exists
within the legislative process. These, for the most part,
external political "givens" include the nature of the issues
which from time to time animate American political life and
the kinds of demands and strains on the political system they
tend to produce. Sharp divisions in society, and intense
conflict over specific issues can be expected to have an
impact on the terms of conflict within Congress.
Similarly, the nature and patterns of political organiza-
tion in the society as a whole can be expected to impinge
upon the manner in which conflict emerges in the House.
Strong cumulative political cleavages in the national poli-
tical system which are well organized will tend to produce
one kind of conflict in the House and more fragmented plural-
istic forms of political organization in the nation can be
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Figure 1 -- A proposed Model of Institutional Adaptation in
the U. S. 1House of Reopresentatives.
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expected to produce quite another pattern of internal con-
flict. Finally, the patterns of recruitment are important
in the determination of political conflict in the House.
Since the members of Congress are selected through the elec-
toral process, significant shifts in voting behavior will
have equally significant impacts on the issues which divide
Congress' internal world. The lack of competitiveness in
one particular region, for example, will tend to affect the
internal distribution of views, ideals and interests in the
House.
These realities of Congress' external world have impor-
tant effects on the internal workings of the House. But,
their impact is not a purely direct or linear one. The simple
fact, for example, that the wishes, ideals and interests of
an entire population are reduced through the process of
representation to the individual wills, beliefs and interests
of three to four hundred Members of Congress produces its own
dynamic effect on the nature of conflict in the House. The
external "givens" are mediated by individuals who have their
own legislative, personal and career goals, who have their own
unique sets of political beliefs and ideals, and who carry
with them their own often peculiar ways of viewing the ex-
ternal world and its demands.
These internal "givens" are also affected by the inter-
action of members and indeed, as the internalists suggest,
by the patterns and norms of conduct and behavior which
obtain in the ongoing legislative process. The infusion,
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for example, of relatively small numbers of new members can
be expected to produce a few changes in the way the House
conducts its business. In such cases, the existing values
in the House can be expected to play a great role in shaping
the new members' beliefs, perceptions and even their goals.
An infusion, on the other hand, of relatively great numbers
of new members, who have been elected on the basis of drama-
tic shifts in the issue-orientation of the electorate, or in
response to very intense public conflict over demands, can
be expected to have more influence and power in shaping the
internal norms of the House. In the absence of strong ex-
ternal impulses, and in the absence of large-scale infusions
of new members into the House, systemic processes can be
expected to play a significant role in shaping House behavior.
Notions of socialization, social control and stability are
quite relevant to the analysis of the Congress during such
times. Strong external forces can, on the other hand, be
expected to produce patterns more in line with ecologist
assumptions (patterns of institutional adaptation, for
example).
These differing forces, in any case, affect the way
members interact over the scarce resources of the House's
internal world. And, the way they interact over these scarce
resources determines (or in effect defines) the nature of
conflict within the institution. Shifts in the patterns of
conflict, in turn, produce changes in the way the House must
manage conflict and make decisions. The House must adjust
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its internal processes to reconcile its need to make decis-
ions with the inevitable though variable nature of conflict.
It responds to this variation in the terms of conflict by
changing portions of its procedural and normative code of
behavior -- its rules, norms of conduct and its distribution
of power.
Congress has three broad sets of mechanisms for res-
ponding to conflict. It affects the resolution of conflict
1) by the way it distributes power, prestige and status in
the House; 2) by the way it structures its decision-making
process -- in the roles it apportions, in the procedures it
creates, and in the structures it erects; and 3) by the way
it defines the limits and scope of its decisions (Congress,
for example, can moderate the level of conflict in part by
simply reducing the ultimate importance and impact of its
decisions). The curtailment of the powers of the Speaker in
1910 and 1911 can be seen as example of the first mechanism;
the increasingly strong reliance on seniority and the growth
of committee (particularly vetol powers after 1910 are ex-
amples of the second mechanism; and the progressively more
significant grants of discretion and authority to commissions,
and executive agencies since World War I can be viewed as
examples of the third mechanism.
As Figure 1 proposes, these new norms and procedures
either affect or can be affected themselves by modifications
in the terms of conflict. Patterns of conflict within the
House can be marked by a measure of continuity, in which
case existing norms and structures become reinforced. Or
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the terms of conflict can be marked by major changes which
will tend to upset the existing procedural changes. As
noted, the consensus system does have its own independent
impact on both the combination of attributes which constitute
the institution's internal political "givens", as well as on
the nature of conflict itself.
This study, then, will attempt to explain House behavior
by counterposing conflict for consensus as the real interven-
ing variable which shapes its internal processes. It will
approach the organization and procedural norms of Congress
through the kinds of conflict it must resolve. In contrast to
those who search for the roots of Congressional behavior among
the elements of its "social structure" defined by stable and
recurring patterns of membership interaction, it will argue
that norms of behavior and structural aspects of the institu-
tion are themselves alterable and adaptive to internal changes
in the nature and scope. of political conflict mandated largely
by changes in the external political world.
It will argue that conflict is central to a legislative
organization and the evolution of such an organization is
really the story of its adaptation to, and the accommodation
of, the changing modes of conflict it must manage. And, unlike
those who tend to view the House as essentially a discrete
social system, the view of Congressional evolution as essen-
tially the reflection and product of changes in the nature of
the conflict it has been forced to confront, assumes neither
a homeostatic urge to maintain a specific equilibrium on the
part of the House (defined as either the desire to retain a
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relatively stable set of norms and procedures or as the
attempt to retain a fixed idea of Congress' role in the
national political system), nor a logical progression from
lower to higher forms of organization (as expressed in
institutionalization theory). Nor does it assume an institu-
tion (such as Fenno's committees) which has a commanding con-
trol over its environment. Unlike the Appropriations and
Ways and Means Committees, for example, the turn of the cen-
tury House had no such power to manipulate the recruitment
of its members. It had no real power as an institution to
create a consensus through its recruitment process. Congress
was forced to deal with a world. it did not make and which it
could only fractionally mold to its wishes (for example,
Gerrymandering, but it could even be argued here that gerry-
mandering is only effective in a stable or static political
environment).
Of course, the House has exhibited elements of contin-
uity and stability throughout its history. The fact that
certain members did manage to win re-election over relatively
long periods of time indicates that certain elements of the
internalist paradigm are relevant and important. The sig-
nificance nineteenth century Congressmen attached to senior-
ity and the deference with which they tended to deal with
members who had enjoyed lengthy careers in the House do
suggest that elements of a social system were at work even
before the turn of the century. The idea here is that par-
ticularly major changes in the nature of Conflict in the
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House tend to invert the systems view of institutional be-
havior by forcing that institution to rearrange its internal
values by adapting to new imperatives mandated by new forms
and lines of conflict. In periods of significant change in
the terms of conflict within the House (mandated, once again,
by large infusions of new members, major changes in the rela-
tive salience of various issues or the transformation of the
national policy-making agenda) the forces which tend to pro-
mote continuity and stability give way to discontinuities
and instability in internal norms and relationships. In
such times, members do not become socialized into the be-
havioral patterns of the House. Rather they tend to force
the House to redefine its internal social structure to meet
the new lines of conflict which they represent. In this re-
gard, the experience of the freshman class in the ninety-
fourth Congress, and its resistance to the existing norms in
the House, demonstrate that the internal Congressional system
is still not immune from the imperatives of altered patterns
of conflict.
The following chapters, then, will deal with the way the
House of Representatives in effect responded to the political
world of which it was a part, and how it incorporated and
modified the intrusion of that world through the manipulation
of its internal norms, rules and structures. These chapters
will explore the manner in which the House employed its own
resources -- the power to distribute authority, the power to
allocate decision-making responsibility, the ability to
structure debate and 'e power to define the limits of its
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own decisions -- to solve the dilemma of building a measure
of consensus and agreement out of the specific forms of con-
flict and disagreement it faced.
To this end, the study will first attempt to show that
the external political world has in fact played a pre-
eminent role in ordering the patterns as well as the scale
of conflict within the House. Chapters II and III, first of
all, will explore the 1880 to 1921 period in an effort to
describe the changing political culture of the United States
during this time and demonstrate the impact of those changing
forms on the shape of conflict within the House. Chapter II
will be devoted to an examination of the 1890 to 1896 period,
and Chapter III will concentrate on the 1896 to 1920 period
in a further attempt to distinguish the partisan character
of the former from the anti-partisan, particularistic and
increasingly plural character of the latter. This shift in
the American political system from the partisan to the plural-
ist style produced a dramatic series of changes in the forms
of conflict within the House of Representatives.
The changing forms of conflict within the House -- the
products of transformations in the American political system
as a whole (once again, transformations in the way constituent
demands were articulated and organized, and transformations
in the specific concerns of those constituents) -- in turn
forced the Congress to re-design and re-structure the system
by which it managed and resolved conflict, and modify the
process by which it achieved its legislative decisions. In
-84-
a partisan setting, for example, the House decision-making
) system faced quite different pressures and different obstacles
to the construction of a policy-making consensus, than it did
in a setting in which political coalitions were less mono-
) lithic, less united, and more permeable. Similarly, the Con-
gresses dominated by a majority party plagued by serious fac-
tional disputes (the Democratic party in the late nineteenth
century, for examplel produced a different legislative process
and exhibited a character distinct from one dominated by a
coherent, unified and cohesive majority party. Chapters IV,
V, VI, and VII, then, will attempt to demonstrate the res-
ponsiveness of the legislative process to periodic variations
in conflict styles, by comparing four different periods of
Congressional evolution between 1880 and 1921.
It will first describe the case of the Democratic Houses
of the late nineteenth century in an attempt to demonstrate
the impact of factionalism upon the Congressional process.
The extent to which this process was sensitive to changes
in conflict styles within the House will be shown by an
examination, in Chapter V of the quite different legislative
system which emerged when the unified and coherent Republican
Party dominated the House in the same late nineteenth century
political era. Finally, Chapters VI and VII will discuss the
effects of the disintegration of the national party system,
the changing shape of political participation and demand-
making in the nation, and the emergence of a new more fragmen-
ted and particularistic political culture upon the internal
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character of the House of Representatives. As these four
chapters will show, the Congress was during this period
(and presumably remains), extremely sensitive and responsive
to shifts in the norms of conflict it must ultimately manage
and resolve.
Within the 1880 to 1921 period, this study will con-
centrate on five periods of formal Congressional reorganiza-
tion. Through the use of election data, manuscript sources
and secondary historical research materials, it will attempt
to describe and explain the nature of the normative and
physical constraints which affected Congressional behavior.
It will also attempt to relate those constraints to the
debates and struggles which occurred over Congress' formal
efforts at reorganization. Although it is clear that the
mix between external and internal political pressures brought
to bear on the House of Representatives throughout this period
are apparent in most of its activities, the structural as
well as normative shifts which occurred in the patterns of
Congressional behavior are most dramatically reflected in
those debates which centered around organizational changes.
Nowhere else do individual Members of Congress confront the
terms of their own ambitions, their own sense of the institu-
tion, than in the often strenuous and prolonged conflicts
which shaped the distribution of authority, power and pres-
tige in the House. The struggle over these formal rules
then provides potentially useful insights into the way the
institution as a whole faced and responded to the challenges
hurled at it by the new political world emerging at the turn
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of the century in the United States. The exploration of
) these rules can tell us a good deal about why the House of
Representatives of the nineteenth century became, by and
large, the House of today,
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CHAPTER II
Party and Constituency:
The Sources of Legislative Conflict
1878-1896
Conflict is inevitable in legislative institutions. It
is an unavoidable fact which, this study argues, serves as
the single most important force in the evolution of legis-
lative norms and procedures. The form of internal conflict,
its scale and patterns does much to determine the way such an
institution carries out its goals and functions and indeed,
as we have suggested in the last chapter, how these goals
and functions are themselves defined. The courses of con-
flict and the multiple factors which sustain that conflict
thus constitute a natural focus in the study of the evolution
of the United States House of Representatives. For, as has
been argued, the rules and norms of the House are essentially
that institution's attempt to build a consensus out of the
particular and varying forms of fragmentation and dissensus
it confronts.
This chapter then will attempt to identify the sources
of conflict in the House of Representatives between the
later 1870's and the mid-1890's. It will suggest, in the
process, that the conflict within Congress was the product
of a welter of forces which worked both outside of the
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institution as well as within. It will argue, however,
that the extent to which internal sources of conflict (com-
peting career goals, divergent ideological and issue or-
ientations of the members themselves, differing percep-
tions of the roles and functions of Congress in national
affairs, and conflicts over the distribution of power.and
authority in the House) affected the patterns of internal
legislative conflict was a function of the constraints im-
posed on those internal forces by the political environ-
ment and its own organizational norms, conflicts and agenda.
In turn, the extent to which the political environment
affected the internal Congressional process was itself a
function of the normative as well as substantive links it
forged with Members of the House through its party (or
other political organizational) structures -- both local
and national -- and through the force of electoral competi-
tion. The force of purely internal sources of tension and
competition on the patterns of conflict in the House, for
example, tended to be greater when the weakness of the ex-
ternal constraints left those internal sources relatively
free of outside interference. Conversely, when the links
which bound the House to its political environment were
relatively strong, internal sources of competition were
forcibly restrained and their impact on the patterns of
conflict in the House Cand indeed on the Congression pro-
cess as a whole) were suppressed.
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It will thus be argued that the precise combination of
factors affecting internal conflict in the House of Repres-
entatives was determined above all by the extent to which
the external political system established -- or failed to
establish -- its control over the institutional dynamics of
the Congressional process. It will be suggested that the
characteristically non-insular quality of Congress (the
levels of insulation, it must be noted, varied perceptibly
within this period of time), and of the degree to.which that
institution was integrated with the national political system
was not, as the internalists argue, a function of weakness or
a lack of development in the House, but rather a function
of the strength and nature of the structural and normative
constraints which linked Congress with its outside world.
Among the forces working to constrain and influence the
patterns of Congressional conflict and behavior, this chapter
will focus first on the nature of political organization in
the United States between 1878 and 1895, and the extent to
which parties tended to be nationally cohesive, and relatively
unified on policy and ideological goals, or fragmented. It
will secondly attempt to identify the issues,(particularly
the tariff, voting rights, and the currency question) which
either reinforced party distinctiveness and complimented
organizational strengths, or which underscored inherent weak-
nesses and divisions within these parties. Thirdly, this
chapter will attempt to show that the force of electoral
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competitiveness played a major role in linking party organi-
zations and broad national policy and ideological concerns
to the internal world of the House of Representatives. Fin-
ally, it will attempt to demonstrate how these external
factors directly affected the behavior of members of Con-
gress and constrained them in their pursuit of institution-
specific goals, issues and prizes. Subsequent chapters will
be devoted to more detailed examinations of the specific
patterns of conflict upon which the normative and procedural
internal organization of the House was constructed or modi-
fied. This chapter will simply attempt to describe in general
the sources of these conflicts; show in general how the exter-
nal and internal worlds tended to interact; and in the process,
demonstrate the pre-eminent influence of the external over the
internal world.
In 1882, Carl Schurz, the veteran xLp mezr who was al-
ready well known for his pronounced antipathy to the strong
party system, suggested that partisanship was on the very
brink of extinction. Arguing that the forces of factionalism
within the two major parties "are much fiercer than the con-
tests between them," he attributed this disintegration to
"the gradual disappearance of the issues which originally
divided the parties . . . The questions immediately connected
with the Civil War," he concluded, "are virtually disposed
of."2  As David Rothman notes, however, Schurz's dismissal
of party government was somewhat premature as it remained
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apparent that despite the internal dissension, parties in
general, and the Republican Party in particular, "still
possessed a strong hold on the people's affections and did
not intend to relinquish it."3  Indeed, as a committed
proponent of Civil Service Reform, to whom the idea of
strong partisanship was anathema, Schurz was expressing an
ardent hope about the immediate future of party government
more than he was accurately reporting the actual character
of American politics. Although it was the kind of assess-
ment many of the readers of the patrician North American
Review wanted to believe, it grossly underestimated the
strength of the party in the national political system.
Closer to reality, perhaps, was the view of an equally
ardent, if less notable supporter of the Civil Service idea,
John I. Mitchell, who in October of the same year suggested
a more realistic if less rosy view of the conflict between
the forces of partisanship and reform. Noting that some
Congressmen want to serve their country tdefined, of course,
as serving the Civil Service cause), Mitchell acknowledged
that others, "who, regarding their highest allegiance as
due their party, their faction or their own political ambi-
tion, devote themselves principally to the sort of civil
service reform, thus defined: 'How to get the other fellow's
man out and yours in.' As (this) class appears to be more
numerous, at present, than the former," Mitchell conceded,
"reform by congressional action will probably be postponed
until public opinion imperatively demands it."4 And, in
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the early 1880's, most indications pointed toward the con-
clusion that public opinion was not yet prepared to abandon
the principle of partisanship.
In many ways, the fortunes of the Civil Service reform
movement (or the "Snivel Service" as its detractors called
it) reflected the strength of the party system upon which
it was an assault. To be sure, there appeared to be a grow-
ing, if still relatively small group of citizens, largely
confined to the articulate middle classes who found the
corrupt excesses of partisanship distasteful. As a result
of this political disenchantment, as well as of their own
professionalist ideology, they sought to undermine the entire
party system by directing their reform efforts at the very
heart of the patronage system through which parties derived
much of their strength and resiliency. The assassination of
James A. Garfield in 1881 by a Stalwart Republican, had pro-
vided a major stimulus to the reform cause and did much to
galvanize overnight, support for the Pendleton Act which
created a significant if still tenuous opening wedge for the
forces opposed to what were perceived as bossism and corrup-
tion in government. At the same time, the limits of the
relatively modest Civil Service Act and the reluctant and
usually half-hearted support it generally received when it
was implemented, made it abundantly clear that the strong
party system still retained its pre-eminence in American
politics.
I _no) -
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This public attachment to partisanship was supported by
a diverse combination of factors. The patronage power of
the majority party was a major source of formal support, of
course, since through the mechanism of public appointments,
the party in power possessed concrete resources and sanctions.
In the distribution of postmasterships, collectorships and
the entire range of political jobs at its disposal, the party
(at Federal, state and local levels) could physically rein-
force its hold on the loyalties of its followers by rewarding
party regularity and penalizing deviation. Yet, the utility
to parties of the patronage system was not confined simply to
the fact that it provided a means for granting or withholding
requests for employment. The enduring value of patronage lay,
in the 1880's and 1890's, in the manner in which it compli-
mented both the localistic and geographically-specific organi-
zation of the parties themselves. As Sorauf suggests, parties
in the United States have traditionally emerged as confedera-
tions or merely aggregations of local political organizations.5
And, as Hays points out, this mode of organization fit neatly
with the way American society was itself structured in the
nineteenth century.6  The kinds of patronage dispensed
meshed easily with this social reality, and as a result tended
to reinforce the allure of partisanship. By and large, in
other words, the jobs which lay at the disposal of party
leaders were precisely those which tended to strengthen the
geographical appeal of the party system. In an era when
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appeals to region were of greater importance than those to
functional groups, for example, and indeed when appeals to
functional interests were virtually indistinguishable from
regional appeals, the power to distribute postmasterships,
collectorships, bonuses, subsidies and other types of
constituency-oriented largess has a compelling political
value. Appointments such as these, which had a direct rele-
vance to the' region-bound loyalties and political concerns
of the electorate, and which made up the bulk of the patron-
age arsenal at the disposal of party leaders, aided the
party organization and strengthened the legitimacy of parti-
sanship as a social norm.
The pervasiveness of party loyalty also derived from
the nature of the issues which animated American political
life in the 188Q's and 1890's. Here, the towering reality
of the Civil War bore its inevitable and unmistakeable mark
on the specific issues which fueled party competition. More
than a mere symbol of the beliefs and attachments which
powered the political machinery of the nation, the War re-
mained in the early 1880's a potent source of conflict and
division, a ready standard of orthodoxy, as well as a
unifying symbol for a host of ancillary ideas and ideologies.
In part, its resiliency stemmed from the significance of the
event itself. No other single experience in 19th century
American life so mobilized and guided the political emotions
and actions of the electorate. Yet, the Civil War also
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symbolized and concretely complimented the inherent sectional
nature of the conflicts which had underlaid, and which con-
tinued to dominate, the political agenda of the nineteenth
century, thereby reinforcing and re-legitimating the lines of
those conflicts.
As a distant issue unto itself, the Civil Wara-still
kindled, in the 1880's deep and often violent passions. The
war was still close enough to have been the major experience
of the majority of mature adults during this time, and yet
still far enough away from the collective consciousness of
the electorate to have taken on an almost religious and mys-
tical quality. It had its own mythology, its own hagiography
(in the North and in the South), both of which were reaching
full bloom fifteen years after Appomattox. War heroes were
routinely trotted out by both parties during election cam-
paigns in overt and usually successful attempts to translate
marshal glory into partisan victory. Honorable service
during the war (variously defined) was a prerequisite for
higher public office. 7 Thus, as late as 1889, George Hoar
could safely claim:
The men who have given character to the great
free states of the North are, in the main,
the men who have given and now give character
to the Republican Patty. The men who gave
character to the slave states of the South
and to the civil administration of New York
City are, in the main, the men who have given
and wh now give character to the Democratic
Party.
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Memories of the hardships and suffering of war gradually
faded as groups like the Grand Army of the Republic (G.A.R.)
successfully built extensive social and political networks
based on remembrances of the War's more benign and noble as-
pects, and on the feelings of kinship which it had spawned
among its participants. Such memories and social networks,
however, also served to remind Americans of the roots of
that conflict and helped sustain the antagonisms which had
marked the war. In this way, partisanship was at least
implicitly presented to the American electorate as the
logical extension of the war in terms of the manner in which
it played on both the solidarities and the divisions created
by that war. Party conflict was a surrogate *aw, viewed in
many ways as a legitimate continuation of the struggles
which had divided the nation between 1861 and 1865.
To an extent, both parties were thus able to establish
supremely legitimate bases for their political crusades for
public office. The Republicans were more successful in this
regard than the Democrats, but both parties enjoyed a measure
of success in constructing strong links between their elec-
toral campaigns and the Civil War. There was a continuing
attempt to merge the goals of the War with the ongoing
struggle for political power. In both North and South, the
"Bloody Shirt" was waved as an invitation to voters to con-
sider how closely sectional loyalties and partisan support
were tied. The Republican Party's rather greater success
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in building these links in the minds of its supporters
stemmed from its more homogeneous base of support. In the
North and Midwest, it could appeal to wartime memories un-
equivocally since it was intimately associated with the war
which it, with the help of those regions, had prosecuted and
won. ,As Brand Whitlock of Ohio observed, the Republican
Party, even in the 1890's, "was merely a synonym for patriot-
ism, another name for the nation . . . It was inconceivable
that any self-respecting person should be a Democrat."9
And, as Wayne Morgan adds, "during those halcyon days, a
youth could mature outside the South without knowing there
was another party."l0 Even in the South, where it pursued
its strategy of building a political coalition of white
yeoman farmers and former slaves, the Republican Party could
be almost as forceful in identifying itself with the issues
of the war.
The extent to which the Republican Party defined itself
in terms of Civil War rhetoric, and allied itself with broad
Civil War ideals, while it served to strengthen its appeal,
also helped solidify the party structure and indeed the whole
idea of partisanship itself. If, in other words, the goals
of the Civil War crusade were indistinguishable from the
goals of the Republican Party, then party disloyalty was
tantamount to treason. Civil Service reformers, therefore,
no less than Democrats and former Confederates, were all tar-
gets of the kind of vitriol zealots generally reserve for
-98-
challengers of orthodoxy. The 1870's were marked by this
kind of crusading fervor Cboth on behalf of the Republican
Party and on the behalf of partisanship) against Republican
opponents and probably marked the high water point of the
idea of party for party's sake. Oliver Morton, for
example, was one of the leaders of the Senate during this
time and one of the strongest adherents of Republican party
allegiance. Rooted firmly in the perceived identity of pur-
pose between the Republican Party and the Civil War, Morton
was vehement in his support for the idea of partisanship.
In the course of one tirade against Civil Service reform he
reiterated this support, asserting: "I hold the Republican
Party superior in importance to any man who is a member of
it . . . this is a government of parties." 11  But, as
Matthew Josephson notes, this statement paled in comparison
to the strong party sentiments of Zach Chandler of Michigan
who repeatedly "called down upon those who opposed Stalwart
policy not only the plagues of Egypt, but even the curse
of nuptial sterility. "l 2  And, while this brand of extreme
partisanship had cooled somewhat by the 1880's, American
politics was still seen as the creature of parties. In
Henry Adams' novel Democracy, for example, one of the central
characters, Senator Ratcliffe (probably a caricature of James
G. Blainel3) clearly expresses the prevailing mood of his
political generation when he suggests that "Our strength
lies in this twisted and tangled mass of isolated principles,
the hair of the half-sleeping giant of Party."l4 For the
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Republicans in .particular, therefore, while party passions
had cooled somewhat, and while some of the initial force
behind party regularity had been mellowed by the inevitable
emergence of factionalism, the idea of party and party
government continued throughout the 1880's and 1890's to
command a significant following among Republicans.
The extremist brand of partisanship found in the Re-
publican party was conditioned in the Democratic party by
the existence of important constraints on cohesiveness and
party unity. Above all, the Democrats suffered from an
inability to translate the Civil War into a truly national
organizing asset as the Republicans had done. To be sure,
the War was a central factor in the already commanding,
and in the 1880's, still growing Democratic dominance of
Southern politics. As Lawrence Goodwin suggests, for ex-
ample, assorted appeals to the past, to the southern war
effort and to the party of the fathers which symbolized
both, did much to break the back of the Populist movement
in the late 1880's and early 1890's in the South.15  In
other words, the Democrats in the South were able to equal,
if not surpass the achievements of the Republicans in equat-
ing the nobility and glory of the Civil War with their own
brand of partisan politics.
In the North and Midwest, however, Democrats found
themselves at a decided disadvantage wherever they were
foolish enough to challenge the special mystique the Civil
War seemed to confer on the Republican Party. Despite their
-100-
assorted attempts to neutralize this Republic asset, for
example, through the nomination of northern war heroes for
positions of leadership (Hancock's nomination for President
in 1880 and allusions to Speaker Samuel J. Randall's honor-
able Union war record), they were never able to erase their
opponents' powerful Civil War legacy. As a result, the
Democratic Party outside of the south, and to some extent
in the south, tended to represent a loose coalition of those
whose political ideals were based on concerns which had
developed independently of the Civil War. Thus, northern
Democrats tended to be a curious mixture of urban machines,
old school Jacksonians, Jeffersonian agrarians and political
reformers who were often bound together by little more than
a common antipathy to the Republican party. The Democratic
Party was in 1880, Morgan argues, "little more than a collec-
tive grievance . . . The overriding concept of 'local rule,'
remembrance of things past, and dislike of the Republicans
kept the party an entity, but this was self-defeating, since
it meant a lack of focus and discipline. 'l6
The issues which enlivened, and gave a measure of sub-
stance to, partisan conflict in the 1880's tended to compli-
ment the sectional cleavages reflected in the Civil War.
While legislation and reforms aimed at consolidating the
principle goals of the War had already reached their peak in
the late 1860's and 1870's, issues which emerged directly
from the War continued to have a place in the campaign
rhetoric and on the public agenda. The aftermath of the
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contested 1876 Presidential election had led to a dramatic
relaxation of Republican attempts to push forward its pro-
grams of civil rights for freed slaves in the South and a
virtual end to the attempt to form a competitive Southern
Republican Party. Locally relevant issues -- residues from
the Civil War -- continued to animate politics around the
nation throughout the 1870's, particularly in the South
where state governments .confronted problems and conflicts
left by the retreating Republican-installed governments,
but by the early 1880's the Republican party nationally
had all but abandoned the substantive portions of its re-
construction program and the South began its unfettered
slide into one party rule.
While the Republican party retreated from its commit-
ment to comprehensive civil rights reform -- the Supreme
Court's 1883 Civil Rights rulings marked the end of a linger-
ing death which had lasted from 1877 -- a few issues taken
from the civil war agenda remained as reminders of the
Republican Party's ideological roots. Voting rights con-
troversies continued to spark partisan conflict throughout
the 80's and early 1890's, as Republicans and Democrats
paid, from time to time, symbolic and self-serving tribute
to the conflicts which had divided the nation between 1860
and 1877. In 1879, for example, the Democrats in control
of the House of Representatives attached a succession of
political amendments Cor "riders"I to theArmy Appropriations
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bill which in effect barred federal troops from maintaining
order (and presumably guaranteeing black and Republican vot-
ing rights) at the pools in the South. President Hayes'
vetoes of a succession of Appropriation bills with such
riders attached to them led to a virtual stalemate between
executive and legislative branches, and left the army unpaid
for months.
The eruption of this issue, and the manner in which the
Democratic House pursued its goals in this regard, surprised
and angered Republicans and not a few Democrats in the North
who were content to allow the issues of the Civil War recede
from the public's mind. Republicans quickly sensed a useful
campaign issue at.hand and competed among themselves to pro-
vide the public with the most eloquent and the most imagina-
tive analysis of the crisis. James G. Blaine, for example,
suggested that behind the Democratic refusal to appropriate
funds for the army was a thinly veiled and sinister attempt
to "get rid of the civil power of the United States in the
elections to Representatives to Congress."l17 Indeed, Blaine
charged, this was only part of a broader Democratic attempt
to repeal "all the war measures of Abraham Lincoln."1 8
Roscoe Conkling of New York echoed the sentiments of his fac-
tional rival CBlaine) in a colorful speech ten days later on
April 24, 1879. "This is a struggle for power," he thund:ered.
It is a fight for empire. It is a contrivance
to clutch the National Government . . . The
nation has tasted, and drunk to the dregs, the
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sway of the democratic party, organized and
dominated by the same influences which
dominate it again and still. You want to
restore that domination. We mean to resist
you at every step and by every lawful means
that opportunity places in our hands. We
believe that it is good for the country,
good for every man North and South who loves
the country now, that the Government should
remain in the hands of those who were never
against it."1 9
Northern Democrats, meanwhile, feared a strong voter
reaction in the 1880 elections. "I am astonished at yester-
day's work in the House!!" a friend frantically wrote to
Speaker Randall; "Has Congress gone mad!!",,20 Another
Northern Democrat, Leopold Morse of Boston was even more
morbid about the effect the appropriation issue would have
on his party's electoral chances in 1.880:
The story goes at yWashington that Speaker
Randall met Congressman Leopold Morse of one
of the Boston districts the other day, and
blandly inquired how the party stood at
Boston. "Which party?" replied Morse.
"Why the Democratic party, of course," said
Randall. "There isn't any Democratic party
there," exclaimed Morse, in his quick
business-like way. "This Congress has killed
it. "21
For the most part, however, agitation over voting rights in
the South remained a secondary issue which erupted to enliven
national politics only occasionally throughout the 1880's and
1890's. The last real attempt to ensure equal access to the
polls Cand not so incidentally to ensure the possibility of
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Republican electoral success in the southern states) was
Henry Cabot Lodge's 1890 bill which passed the House but
died in the Senate.
Other vestiges of the Civil War legacy surfaced from
time to time during the 1880's to remind political leaders
that at least a few of the issues raised therein were not
completely forgotten. Grover Cleveland, for example,
enraged Northern war veterans when in 1887 he tentatively
approved the suggestion of his Secretary of War Endicott
that captured Confederate battle flags be returned to the
South. The reaction of the G.A.R., among others, wa-
immediate and intense and led Cleveland to rescind his
order, not, however, before much damage was done to his
chances for re-election. Cleveland also antagonized North-
ern war veterans with his persistent vetoes of pension bills
and found, much to his dismay, that while many of the war
issues had been laid aside, a few narrow yet deeply held
ones remained to claim a place on the national political
agenda.2 2  Indeed, the G.A.R. would contiiue to be a major
and formal force in national politics well into the twentieth
century.23
Aside from these exceptions, however, Republicans as
well as Democrats were content to table the specific policy
goals of the Civil War in favor of less concrete, if more
electorally rewarding symbolic appeals to the past. And yet,
if the Civil War issues were themselves abandoned, the con-
flicts which emerged to take their place in the 1880's tended
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to conform to the sectional basis of American politics essen-
tially laid down during the war. Some, like Wilfred Binkely,
for example, argue that the demise of the Civil War conflicts
left American politics in a sterile vacuum devoid of any
issue aside from the artificial ones created by the parties
for electoral purposes. The parties, he asserts, had become
ends in themselves.2 4  Yet, while it is true that none of
the issues which emerged after the mid-1870's ever again
excited the kinds of emotional response produced during the
reconstruction era, a number of significant and (at least
ultimatelyl polarizing issues did begin to emerge in the
early 1880's.
The tariff issue was raised with increasing urgency
during the decades of the eighties and nineties, and to a
certain extent actually dominated the public political forum
between 1884 and 1890. Of course, the tariff was not at all
new to American politics. It had been a traditional focus
of often sharp debate throughout much of the nineteenth cen-
tury and underscored, in its early years, the deep sectional
tensions which underlaid pre-Civil War politics. Its
resurrection in the early 1880's was due in part to the
demise of the Civil War issues, but it was also the product
of an active redirection of public attention toward economic
questions. The resurgence of the tariff was also the result
of conscious attempts on the part of the national parties to
develop more relevant, and for the Democrats, more electorally
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appealing issues to replace the declining policy remnants
of the Civil War.2 5  In the main, the call for tariff re-
form (by which the Democrats meant a reduction in tariff
schedules or "tariff for revenue only") had a logical
attraction for a party which had traditionally espoused
the low tariff cause. Support for the protectionist cause
was similarly a natural direction for the Republican Party
which still paid tribute to many of its Whig ideological
roots.
The emergence of the issue, therefore, was partially
the result of the conscious effort of the national parties
to find a new set of issues worthy of voter attention and
support. But, the rise of political conflict over the tariff
was also the product of economic conditions and popular
pressure which worked independently of party strategic in-
terests. Taussig, for example, attributes the emergence of
the tariff issue in the 188C!s to the progressively greater
Federal revenue surplusses whicL began appearing in the late
1870's. After the nation recovered from the severe depress-
ion of 1873, he suggests, the focus of the economic debate
was shifted from the currency question (which tended to be
a characteristic political preoccupation of Americans during
bad economic times throughout the nineteenth centuryl to the
tariff issue.
The revival of [businessl activity in 1879 and
the years following caused a great increase in
imports, and so a great increase in customs
-107-
revenue. For several years after 1879, the
surplus revenue was on the average over a
hundred million annually. The redundant
revenue compelled a revision of the customs
duties, and it was inevitable that not only
the financial but the economic aspects of
the tariff should once more become prominent. 2 0
In theory, the Democrats took what by right should have
been an undeniably attractive position on the tariff ques-
tion. Their growing call for tariff reduction had a clear
appeal to an electorate perennially interested in tax relief.
In practice, however, the Democrats found numerous stumbling
blocks to their attempts to actually implement their reform
and retrenchment policies. While, for example, the principle
of lower tariffs had an obvious general appeal, attempts to
achieve just this tended to crumble before the special sppeals
of specific regional and economic interests. The sugar indus-
try in Louisiana could not lend its support to a tariff
schedule which lowered the duties on refined sugar imports,
for instance, and Philadelphia Democrats were equally adamant
about reductions in the iron and steel rates. Thus the
renewed focus on the tariff did little to invest the Demo-
cratic party with the unity or cohesiveness it so despera-
tely sought.
Nevertheless, the tariff question did come to serve as
the predominant focus of political conflict throughout the
1880's. In 1884, for example, William Morrison's attempt
to achieve a horizontal or across-the-board reduction of the
tariff schedule failed in the face of united Republican
-108-
opposition supplemented by a group of Democratic insurgents
led by Samuel Randall Cdubbed by the tariff reformers as
Samuel Randall and his forty thieves). In 1886, Cleveland
presented Congress with a strong Presidential message which
for the first time identified tariff reform as the primary
goal of his administration. With the battle joined, Demo-
crats united, more or less, around the very moderate 1887
Mills bill which, despite its numerous concessions to special
interests, was defeated in the Republican Senate. Both
parties then went to the hustings in 1888 with the tariff
issue high on the agenda. That election:gave the Republicans
working control of both Houses of.Congress as well as the
Presidency for the first time in eighteen years. With vic-
tory in hand, the Republicans proceeded to push through the
protectionist McKinley Tariff, an effort which more than
anything else cost them the 1890 mid-term elections.
The emergence of the tariff once again filled the void
left by the demise of the issues produced by the Civil War.
It constituted a. policy concern which did much to give a
measure of new life to the Democratic Party, but it also
exacerbated some of the old tensions within the party.
Throughout the 1880's and 1890's, the Democrat's tariff
rhetoric tended to alienate some of their followers whose
interests were threatened-by reduction, and the party's
actual performance twhich deviated markedly from its
rhetoric). tended to disappoint its more vocal tariff reform
supporters.- But, the reform appeal did mesh fairly well
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with the traditional bases of Democratic support even if it
did little to alter the enduring regional schisms which
cleaved across America's political map and through the Demo-
cratic party ranks. In the end, the sectional appeal of the
tariff did little more than reinforce the already existing
lines of partisan political conflict in the 1880's.27
The tariff-, therefore, became a major substitute for
the issues which had propelled the party machinery in the
years immediately following the Civil War. But, while it
proved to be an immensely important issue to a number of
voters and while it conveniently did little to change the
lines of political conflict established by the Civil War,
it did not inspire the kind of passion, the solidarity or
the unequivocal support of the voting public that-.l
those earlier issues had. And, while it did produce a new
focus of debate, it did little to enliven partisan conflict
or infuse the party system with fresh ideas or a new relevance
for the electorate. Nor did it measurably strengthen or unify
either party's internal structure. For the most part, the
tariff issue did little to halt the gradual decay of the Civil
War political alignment. This was true of both parties to a
certain extent, but the Democratic party in particular found
in the tariff little relief from the internal factionalism,
the internecine warfare which had plagued its existence, and
constrained its influence on the course of national politics
since the end of the Civil War.
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Democratic voters were equally ambivalent about their
party's traditional stand against excessive federal spend-
ing. On the one hand, many seemed to applaud the Jackson-
ian stance of their leaders in opposing what they termed
extravagance Clargely the responsibility of the Republicans)
in government spending. For many of these voters, the feel-
ing persisted that federal spending was indistinguishable
from federal interference in local affairs. At the same
time, however, the Democratic attachment to the principle
of governmental frugality was undermined by requests of
particularistic Cusually regionall interests for public
money. The farm bloc, for example, tended in general to
demand a progressively greater share of federal assistance 2 8
throughout the 1880's, as did merchants and farmers in the
south and central portion of the country demand funds for
improvements in flood control and transportation systems
along the Mississippi River. At a Rivers and Harbors con-
vention held in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, for example, in 1885,
the assembled members adopted a resolution "heartily favor-
ing liberal appropriations by Congress for the improvement
of the rivers and harbors in all parts of the United States,"
and attempted to underscore "the importance of making these
adequate appropriations." 2 9  To be sure, many of the demands
for increased federal expenditures among Democrats were
neatly couched in traditional party rhetoric. Thus, in
explaining the reasons for supporting increased federal spend-
ing for rivers and harbors bills, Congressman A.S. Willis (D)
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of Kentucky suggested that increased spending would in this
case actually save the government money. '-I have always
contended," he said in an interview, "that hundred of thous-
ands of dollars have been .annually lost to the government by
a failure to appropriate money to carry on existing improve-
ments on rivers and harbors."30
Republican voters, meanwhile, had far less trouble
supporting increases in Federal spending. Wedded to the Whig
philosophy of active governmental intervention in the nation's
economy, many Republicans welcomed an acceleration of federal
developmental efforts. Railroads had already become a legiti-
mate beneficiary of the national government's largess (includ-
ing a 20Q million dollar subsidy for the Texas and Pacific
railroad in the 1870'sl, and few Northern Republicans had
qualms about extending the scope of federal spending, at least
in principle. Republicans also seemed to derive a special
pleasure from the differences this issue brought out in the
Democratic Party, and tended to encourage Southern requests
for funding over the resistance of "their fellow Democrats
of the North, who lectured them strongly about 'Grantism',
public morals and reform. '"3 1 Republicans also tended to
unite around the idea of federal spending simply because
many of them were direct recipients of federal money in the
form of pensions and bonuses granted, by the late 1880's, to
progressively greater numbers of those who had served in
the Union Army during the war.
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The fourth set of issues which fueled party conflict
throughout the eighties and nineties revolved around the
currency question. - Like both the tariff question and the
federal spending issue, the currency problem was a recurrent
focus of national political conflict. Eventually, however,
it would do what neither of the other two issues had been
able to do by serving as the central instrument of a wrench-
ing partisan political realignment in the mid-1890's. Al-
though the specific terms of the currency debate were.
modified between the 1870's and 1896, the general outlines
of that debate remained fairly constant. Ranged along one
side of the question were those who supported a hard currency
system tied at that point to the gold standard. Against them
arose various strands of support for a "soft" currency system
based either on the fiat greenback dollar issued during the
Civil War, or on some other "elastic" medium which was in
some way tied to the productive needs or wealth of the nation.
The search for such a soft currency ultimately, and ironically,
concluded with an attachment to the silver standard.
From the beginning of the soft currency debate, Demo-
crats tended to be more susceptible to the appeals of both
Greenbackers and their ideological descendants, the Free
Silverites. In the 1870's, Greenbacker-Democratic coalitions
were elected in the South and in the North and Midwest. Ohio,
Indiana and Maine were all scenes of at least partially
successful soft money electoral drives as were many areas of
the South where Democrats and Greenbackers entered into loose
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coalitions in the 1870's. Republicans were themselves not
immune from the appeals for a flexible currency, and a
number of Republican political leaders endorsed the idea of
soft money.32 Free Silver continued to attract more Demo-
cratic than Republican voters, but neither party was in the
end free of the internal dissention this issue caused.33
Republicans from western silver producing states like Colorado,
Nevada and others were particularly prone to the enticements
of free silver as were Democrats from the South and Midwest
whose agrarian constituents were by the late 1880's and early
1890's caught between the twin binds of chronic indebtedness
and a deflated dollar. To both groups, an elastic currency
held out great, if often overstated, promises of economic
gain. And thus, for both parties, the Greenback agitation
and later the Free Silver movement posed a continuing and
in the end decisive organizational dilemma for the attempts
of both parties to maintain or develop an internal cohesiveness.
Finally, Civil Service reform continued to attract some
attention throughout the 1880's and 1890's. But beyond the
limited reforms initiated during the Arthur administration,
little of substance was done to advance in any comprehensive
manner, the cause of professionalism in the national bureau-
cracy. Both Cleveland and Harrison, for example, were harried
by the conflicting demands of spoilsmen and reformers within
their parties who competed for Presidential attention.
Cleveland, for example, began office with overt pledges of
t
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support for the civil service movement, but the exigencies
of coalition building, and the eagerness of his fellow
partisans to enjoy the fruit of a long awaited electoral
triumph inevitably forced him away from the kind of commit-
ment his Mugwump backers sought.34 Harrison too faced
unrelenting, if somewhat less divisive pressure for reform
from zealots like Civil Service Commissioner Theodore
Roosevelt who constantly complained to friends of the
President's indifference to meaningful and substantive re-
form. "I do wish the President would give me a little active,
even if onlyverbal, encouragement," Roosevelt confided to
Henry Cabot Lodge; 'It is a dead weight to stagger under
without a particle of sympathy from any of our leaders here."3 5
As Roosevelt quickly learned, however, the neutralization
of the patronage system was not the kind of issue which would
provoke much support among members of the strong, and in the
188Q's and 189Q's, relatively cohesive national Republican
Party.3 6  Indeed, as late as 1899, President McKinley found
it relatively easy to withdraw from the civil service umbrella
37
close to -ten:.. thousand appointive positions. The Civil
Service ±eform issue, therefore, had a variable and, with
only a few exceptions (the ignition of public.opinion in the
wake of the Garfield assassination was one example and the
importance of the Mugwump voting bloc in states like New York
and Massachusetts was anotherl a minor impact on the shape of
political conflict in the late nineteenth icentury.
I I A
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These issue clusters then (primarily focussed around
the Civil War, the tariff, federal spending, the currency
question and to a lesser extent civil service reform),
tended on their own, and in combination, to significantly
affect the nature of conflict within the nation's political
institutions. The decline of the Republican single-minded-
ness which had emerged out of the Civil War, and the emer-
gence or the re-emergence of new issues in the late 1870's
and 1880's tended to reflect and indeed to play a major role
in the gradual decay of the political and organizational
alignments brought about by the Civil War. The Democrats,
who during the entire Reconstruction era had been unable to
develop an issue base around which their supporters could
rally, were particularly hard hit by the uncertainties and
the continued fragmentation inherent in the increasingly
clouded political agenda of the late nineteenth century.
Yet, the Republicans were also affected by a perceptible, if
by comparison with the Democrats, a gradual erosion of their
once monolithic, committed and disciplined organizational
base. As divisions within each party (again, much more appar-
ent in the Democratic party than in the Republican party)
became more animated -- as the issues which came to dominate
the political agenda of the 1880's and 1890's increasingly
cleaved across existing lines of party solidarity -- the
institutions of government were forced to seek new organiza-
tional methods of accommodating the increasingly complex- and
more diffuse lines of conflict these new political realities
created.
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The House of Representatives was particularly sensitive
to, and constrained by the alterations in the issue content
of electoral campaigns and particularly the debilitating
effect this had on the Democratic party, which together
forced it to constantly modify the manner in which it defined
and achieved its own legislative consensus. To a certain ex-
tent, this evolving issue agenda was the product of political
leaders themselves, and insofar as this was true, it repres-
ented a controllable political resource for getting votes
and winning elections. To a great extent, however, the
appearance of new issues, of new centers of voter interest,
occurred independently of institutions like the House. And,
to the extent this was so, these issues exerted an important
and an autonomous external influence on the patterns of con-
flict within the Congress, and ultimately on the norms and
organizational procedures which from time to time were devised
to manage these changing patterns of conflict.
These diverse and often cross-cutting issues affected
the internal conflict of the House primarily through the
mechanism of elections through which, every two years, pro-
ponents of one causer'or another were recruited to pursue their
own and their supporters' political, ideological and partisan
goals. In their.most obtrusive form, elections determined
the relative strengths of each party in the House of Repres-
entatives, and equally important, the make-up of the competing
institutions of federal power -- the Executive Branch and the
Senate. - Yet, elections throughout the 1880's and 1890's also
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reaffirmed in a concrete way .he underlying political ten-
sions which existed in American politics and channeled those
tensions to national political institutions like the House
of Representatives. In so doing, these elections also
magnified the strengths and weaknesses, the cohesiveness and
the fragmentation, and the discipline and the disorder of the
parties which organized campaigns and channeled public demands
for political action in the halls of Congress.
The regionally, heterogeneous nature of the Democratic
Party, for example, which was torn between a stronghold in the
South and diverse power centers in the Midwest and Northeast,
was continually reaffirmed by Congressional election patterns
in the late nineteenth century. These election patterns also
reflected the relative homogeneity (at least in terms of the
Civil War alignmentj of the Republican regional basc. The
northeast and Midwest were the primary sources of that party's
strength, while some of the border states (for example, Mary-
land, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri) also
returned, from time to time, Republican candidates to the
House. Table 2.1 shows the partisan electoral patterns for
three Congresses in the years 1878, 1884 and 1888.
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Table'2.0 228 Regional Distribution of Party Strength in the
House of Representatives in the 46th, 49th and 51st
Congresses (percentages down in parentheses)
46th
Congress
49th
Congress
51st
Congress
Deo Rep Other Tot Dem Rep Other Tot Dem Rep Other Tot
New 2 23 3 28 3 22 1 26 3 23
Egland (1) (17) (14) CLO) (2) (16) ') (8) (2) (14)
Middle .13 44 10 67 25 41
Atlantic (9) (3 (45) (23) (1i) (29)
South 39 3 1
Atlantic C28) C() (5) 43 41 6(13) (24) (6)
South 58 1 4 6 65
Central (42) (1) (18) (22A o (4)
3 69 17 44 -
(20) (21) (11) (27)
49' 42 7
a ý) (2 8) W)
2 72 62 10(13) (22) (41) (6)
0 96
(0) (8)
8. 69
(89) (2il
0 49(0) C•)
0 72(0) (22)
9 100 26 73 1 100(60) (:1) (1) (43.) (11) 01)
Moun- 0-
tain (0)
Western I
states 1()
2 *0 2 0, 2
(2) (0) (1) (0) (1)
1I(5)0 5 1 6C(2) (1) C4)
2 .0 2 0
0 72
(0) (2) (1)
Totals 140 131 22 293 173 137
100 99 101 102 101 100
15 325 152 164. 9 325*100 100 100 100 100 100
four
* Does not include states admitted to the Union after the
1888 elections (Montanae North Dakota, South Dakota and Washigton).
Percentages subject to rounding error
Mied-
West
27 (I43(19) (2 ~ 85 36 55
2
.(.)
0 7(0) (2)
- ,-I
-119-
Clearly, the Democrats dominated the South Atlantic and
South Central region of the country. In that area, which
made up 37 percent of the Congressional seats between 1878
and 1888, the Democratic party derived 70%, 62% and 69% of
its total House membership. The Republican source of support,
meanwhile, was equally skewed toward the Northeast and Mid-
western regions of the country. Those areas which collec-
tively controlled between 60 and 62 percent of the seats in
Congress returned 92%, 85% and 86% of the total Republican
House membership in the years 1878, 1884 and 1888.
The Democratic hold on the Southern Congressional Districts
was by 1878 already extremely strong. Elections there tended
to be less competitive on the whole than those in other regions
of the country. As Table 2.2 shows, the South tended to have
a lower proportion of highly competitive contests (defined as
producing a percentage margin of victory between the winning
and second place candidate of ten percent or less) and a much
higher proportion of decidedly non-competitive contests
(margins of victory above thirty percent). Clearly, the most
highly competitive region of the country in the 1880's was the
Midwest where between 59 and 63 percent of the Congressional
election contests were won with less than a ten percent
margin of victory in the three elections summarized. In 1878,
for example, although only 29% of the House membership came
from the Midwest, that region represented over 40 percent of
the constituencies which were won by less than ten percent.
The Middle Atlantic States were also relatively competitive
I -120-;
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Table 2.$.-- Regional Variations in I•argins of Victory in
House Elections. (46th, 49th,. and 51st Congresses)
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(or more accurately, contained significant pockets of intense
electoral competitiveness) particularly in the 1884 elections
when 48% of the contests there were decided by a ten percent
margin of victory or less.
Because of the nature of electoral competitiveness in
the South, the Democrats tended to have a greater number of
"safe seats" in Congress -- or at least as safe as norms of
office rotation and nominating convention contests allowed.
In the three elections surveyed, for example, between 22 and
28 percent of the Democratic seats were won in districts which
gave their candidates margins of victory which exceeded thirty
percent. The Republicans, by contrast, could count on only
seven to nine percent of their membership being returned with
such margins. The Republican dominance of its Northern and
Midwestern heartland, was thus conditioned by pockets of
significant Democratic competition.
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Table .2.) -- Distribution of Competiveness by Party (46th, 49th
and 51st Congresses)
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The quest for House seats tended therefore to become
most intensively focussed upon those Northern and Midwestern
states which were marked by high levels of electoral com-
petitiveness. Given the Democrats' almost exclusive domin-
ance of the South and the Republicans' almost equally command-
ing control of much of the North and Midwest, Congressional
elections tended to hinge on the few remaining marginal
states like New York, Ohio, Illinois and Indiana where, as
a consequence, national elections tended to be won or lost.41
For the Republican party, the search for electoral victory in
these states did little to dilute its essential policy,
sectional and ideological orientation beyond the obligatory
factional bargains which were required to gain and sustain
support from these areas. For the most part, this took the
form of recruiting natives of these states to high party and
political posts. Thus, between 1876 and 1896 every President-
ial and Vice-Presidential candidate of the Republican as well
as the Democratic party (with the exception of the Republican
nomination of Blaine of Maine in 1884 and the Democratic
nomination of Hancock of Pennsylvania in 1880) came from one
of these four pivotal states. These concessions posed few
ideological or sectional problems for the Republican party
since each of these states contained significant pockets of
voters who shared the Republican attachment to the portent
symbols Cif not always the substancel of the Civil War. Large
segments of the electorates of these states also found little
difficulty in espousing the Republican party's views on the
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tariff, the currency question, the role of the national govern-
ment in economic development, and civil service reform.
For the Democrats, on the other hand, the need to solicit
votes in these Northern and Midwestern States did introduce
an element of heterogeniety (both sectional and, as has been
noted, ideologicall into the party organization, and with it
inevitably a measure of tension. For clearly, Democratic
voters in the South had somewhat different reasons for suppor-
ting the party, and a different set of symbols and traditions
linking them to the goals of the Democracy than did the
citizens of Ohio, New York, Illinois and Indiana. And, indeed,
beyond the thin common bond of anti-Republicanism, little else
seemed to hold this disparate collection of Democrats -- voters
as well as leaders -- together.
These electoral realities created major tactical dilemmas,
however, for both Republican and Democratic parties in their
quests for national political power. Although the forms of
these dilemmas were different for each party, they neverthe-
less imposed equally major constraints on both organizations
in their attempt to optimize the trade-offs between the pursuit
of ideological purity, unity and electoral victory. Of these
three problems, for example, electoral victory in Congress-
ional elections tended to be the most elusive for the Republi-
cans. While they remained throughout the 1870 to 1895 period
a relatively unified and cohesive party (despite often major
factional disputes), they tended to be consistently unable to
assemble numerical majorities in the House of Representatives.
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That this problem was real, and for the most part unique to
the particular patterns of House elections (as opposed to
Senate and Presidential elections where they tended to do
much better) is demonstrated by the fact that between 1875
and 1895 the Republicans were in control of the House only
twice, during the 47th and 51st Congresses (1881-1883 and
1889-18911. During this same period of time, the Republican
party lost control of the Senate only twice (in the 46th and
in the 53rd Congresses) and controlled the Executive Branch
in all but six years CCleveland's first term 1885-1889 and
the first half of his second term 1893-1895).42
Thus, while for the Republicans, maintaining a semblance
of organizational.unity and coherence was relatively easy,
actually gaining a majority of seats in the House of Repres-
entatives was a chronic problem. Restricted, by the early
1880's to the North and Midwest, the party was forced into a
position where it had to win towering majorities in those
regions in order to achieve an even modest edge in the House.
Given the competitiveness and consequent electoral uncertainty
of many of the Congressional districts in this region, this
was a formidable task indeed. The elections of 1888 are a
useful example of how convincingly the Republican party had
to win in the North and Midwest if it wanted to control the
House. In that election, the Republicans won 88 percent of
the seats in the New England States, 64 percent of the Middle
Atlantic contests and 73 percent of the one hundred Midwestern
contests. Given the relative competitiveness of those regions,
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particularly the Mid-Atlantic and Midwestern areas, these
results reflected a major tactical victory. And yet, this
election provided only the barest of majorities for the
Republican party in the 51st House. Thus, while gaining
control of the House of Representatives was a major problem.
for the Republicans, once accomplished, the party, because of
its relatively homogeneous base of support, produced a more
cohesive and disciplined legislative organization.
The Democrats, by contrast, found that winning numerical
majorities in House elections was the least of their problems
during the late nineteenth century. The power to control the
South and to make significant and enduring inroads to the
North gave them the upper hand in producing what were at least
on paper, legislative majorities in the House. The ideologi-
cal and sectional heterogeneity of the party's base of voter
support, however, provided major obstacles to the Democratic
attempt to turn numerical majorities into coherent legisla-
tive organizations. The inter-regional nature of the Demo-
cratic coalition created problems, as did the growing challenge
of the Populists to the internal cohesiveness of the once solid
southern wing of the party. 43  Thus, the Democratic party
was continually, throughout this period of time, forced to
expend a great deal of energy coping with the often debilitat-
ing strains and tensions of internal divisiveness. This, more
than the problem of winning elections, was the primary or-
ganizational problem of the Democratic party in the late
nineteenth century.
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While election results determined which party gained the
) right to organize the House of Representatives, and while they
do indicate some of the central issues which animated both
parties in their attempt to achieve and effectively exercise
political power on a national level, the simple description
of these electoral patterns tells us little about the relative
significance of elections as constraints on the behavior of
the victorious candidate once seated as a Member of Congress.
The results, by themselves, tell us little about how directly
the factors which surrounded the election of a Congressman
continued to guide or constrain him once he reached Congress.
Nor do they tell us consequently how directly the conflicts,
the issues or the ideological preoccupations of the nation as
a whole were likely to be either reflected, modified or ignored
by the House of Representatives once its members assembled.
The central problem can be reduced here to the question of
how strongly the Members of Congress Cand therefore the House
itselfl were linked to the broader political environment.
Clearly, the process of representation carries with it
certain obstacles to the existence of a perfect match between
the national political spirit and Congressional policy making
orientations. The simple act of selecting three to four
hundred men to translate the national political will of 100
million people into concrete action assures that national
policy and public interests will sometimes clash. Imperfec-
tions in the apportionment process, vagaries in the patterns
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of electoral support, and indeed the constituency system of
representation itself, also tend to affect the extent to which
political decision making in a legislative body accurately
reflects the nation's priorities. Beyond these unavoidable
refractions of the democratic process, there can exist wide
variations in the levels of legislative responsiveness or
insulation. In the 1880's and 1890's, the House of Repres-
entatives tended to be strongly affected by the partisan and
sectional tensions working in America's national political
environment. To be sure, it was an impact which was condi-
tioned and mediated by the exigencies of institutional partisan
conflict. Yet, while this party linkage certainly imposed its
own peculiar coloring to the representative process, it never-
theless forced the House to respond to external forces in the
pursuit of its own institutional goals. The party link also
imposed real constraints on the extent to which Members of
Congress could follow personal ideological or career goals.
A number of factors supported this nineteenth century
Congressional integration with the society at large. The
strength of the partisan norm, for example, which was strong
in the electorate, undoubtedly affected the behavior of Con-
gressmen in the House. While it is difficult to gauge
precisely the nature or hierarchy of members' loyalties,
clearly the attachment to party was important. This abstract
allegiance to the ideal of partisanship was reinforced by the
nature of the election process itself. In the 1880's and
90's, the party, through its local and national committees
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was directly responsible for selecting nominees (through
caucuses or conventionsl supporting their campaigns, distri-
buting ballots and sometimes buying votes. Party regularity
was a necessary, if (due to the competitive nature of nine-
teenth century elections) not a sufficient condition for elec-
toral victory. And, although this loyalty was often directed
as much to the local party apparatus as it was toward the
national party and its platforms and goals, it did exert a
significant influence on political candidates, forcing them
to be cognizant of party rather than purely personal goals.
Members of Congress in the nineteenth century tended to rise
and fall with, rather than independently of, their party.43A
The strength of external political attachments for the
nineteenth century Member of Congress can be described most
vividly and perhaps most accurately as the absence of the
possibility for developing strong alternative attachments to
the House of Representatives. This, in turn, was a partial
function of the levels of competitiveness which marked many
of the House election contests and which consequently reduced
the chances for long, uninterrupted terms of service for many
Congressmen. It was also a partial function of restraints on
service imposed by local party officials, and to a certain
extent, of voters who had their own ideas about the length of
tenure of their representatives. The norm of office rotation,
for example, was strong in many areas of the nation throughout
the nineteenth century, and placed major obstacles in the way
of careerist attachments to the House of Representatives.
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Finally, personal choice often dictated relatively short terms
of service for Congressmen. For many, Washington was far
away from their home districts and the constant necessity of
long distance commuting made the prospect of a lengthy career
something less than attractive. 4 4 Life in the nineteenth
century Capital, itself, was also often seen as a hardship
for Representatives on a limited income, with its assorted
problems of housing, weather and an absence of family life
which did little to induce the reluctant Member of Congress
to consider long term residence there.4 5
The effect of the combination of these factors on the
length of Congressional service can be seen in part in an
examination of tenure patterns of Congressmen between 1878
and 1890. Although the precise causes are less clear in this
data, it is nevertheless apparent that throughout the 1880's
and early 1890's Members of Congress, by and large, were not
in the habit of developing strong attachments to the internal
world of the House of Representatives. And, as long as this
was the case, Congress' internal processes were directly tied
to, and constrained by, at least one important portion of its
political environment. The electoral system, with its con-
flicting issues, promises, demands and ideals mediated by a
healthy party structure, played an enormous role in ordering
the priorities, goals and therefore the patterns of conflict
which appeared in the House.
The 1880's and 1890's were marked, first of all, by a
continuation of the high levels of membership turnover which
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had obtained throughout the first seventy-five years of the
century. Over 60 percent of the members of the 48th Congress
were Freshmen, as were 53.8 percent of the 54th Congress. 46
During this period the proportion of Freshmen to non-
Freshmen ranged between a low of 38.6 percent in the 47th
Congress to a high of 60.3 percent in the 48th Congress. As
both ecologist and internalist scholars of Congress argue,
this pattern of high turnover effectively kept the house
from insulating itself from the external political world,
and sustained the links which in the main tied Congress to
the fluctuations and reverses of national political life.
Within the high turnover patterns, there were of course
minor regional and party differences in actual rates, as
Table 2.4 shows. As the elections of 1878, 1884 and 1888
demonstrate, the Mid-Atlantic region tended to be slightly
overrepresented by Freshman members. In 1878, for example,
48 percent of the Members of Congress from that region were
Freshmen. The only region with a higher percentage was the
Rocky Mountain region, which at that time had only two Rep-
resentatives in Congress. In 1884 and 1888, 39 percent of
the Representatives of the Middle Atlantic region were
Freshmen (this during a time when the figures for the House
as a whole were 41-percent in 1878, 30 percent in 1884, and
33 percent in 18881. The South, meanwhile, was slightly
underrepresented by Freshman members. In 1878, 1884 and
1888, while representatives of the South Atlantic region con-
stituted 15 percent of the total membership of the House,
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only 14 percent (18781, 13 percent (1884), and 14 percent
(1888) of the House Freshmen were from that region (40 per-
cent, 31 percent and 41 percent of its total delegation were
Freshmen in these three Congresses). The same was true of
the Midwestern region's Congressional delegation which tended
to be slightly though consistently lower in turnover (37 per-
cent of its members were Freshmen in the 46th Congress, 33
percent in the 49th, and 32 percentiin the 51st Congress)
than the norm. The other regions tended to vary in their turn-
over figures. The Northeast had only five Freshmen in its
regional delegation in 1884 (19 percent), but in 1888 returned
eleven (42 percent) Freshmen members. The South Central States
also fluctuated between a high of 40 percent (25 Freshmen in
18781 and a low of 24 percent (17 Freshmenl in 1888. Finally,
Republican turnover was slightly higher than Democratic turn-
over in all three elections (40 percent Republican to 37 per-
cent Democratic in 1878, 36 percent to 35 percent in 1884, and
35 percent to 30 percent in 18881. Despite these relatively
minor differences, however, the striking feature of nineteenth
century turnover patterns, as reflected in these three elections,
is the extent to which relatively high rates were normal
throughout the country and in both major parties.
These relatively high turnover rates (certainly high when
compared to twentieth century rates) do much to explain as
well as refe3ct the contention that Members of Congress in
the late nineteenth century tended to view their association
with the House of Representatives in short term perspectives.
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This is clear, for example, in an examination of tenure
patterns in general for the 1878, 1884 and 1888 elections
shown in Table 2.5. In all three cases, well over a majority
of Congressmen (72 percent in 1878, 69 percent in 1884, and
57 percent in 1888) were in either their first or second term
of office. Table 2.5 also indicates that while lengthier
terms were becoming slightly more evident by the time of the
1888 election, two to three terms constitued the normal length
of service for a Member of the House. The few Congressmen who
did remain in Congress for longer terms tended to be fairly
evenly distributed between the two major parties in all three
elections.
Although these tenure patterns were the products of a
combination of forces which were not fully observable, some
idea of their roots can be seen in the electoral decisions
made by the Members of these Congresses, at the end of their
two-year terms. Table 2.6 provides a view of what subsequently
happened to the Members of Congress-elected to the 46th, 49th
and 51st Congresses after their terms expired. Of the 293
Members of the 46th Congress, for example, 110 were not re-
elected to the 47th Congress. Of these, 56 were Democrats
(40 percent of the total Democratic membership in the House),
42 were Republicans (32 percent) and 12 were Independents or
third party candidates (55 percent of the Independent member-
ship). Of this 110, sixty-two or 56 percent declined to be
candidates for re-election. Only thirty-seven (34 percent) were
actually defeated either for renomination or in the general
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election. The proportion of members voluntarily retiring from
the House remained relatively high throughout this period, al-
though the figures do show a noticeable decline. In the 49th
Congress, for example, (where 136 or 42 percent of the member-
ship was not re-elected) seventy Members of Congress or 51 per-
cent of those not re-elected refused to seek another term while
in the 51st Congress (where 164 or 50 percent of the total
membership was not re-elected in 1890) sixty-six or 40 percent
of the group leaving Congress, voluntarily retired. Mirroring
this decline in voluntary exits from the House of Representa-
tives was an associated proportionate increase in the number
of Congressmen who sought renomination but were defeated (34
percent in the 46th Congress, 38 percent in the 49th Congress,
and 45 percent in the 51st Congress). In terms of the total
membership, however, the proportion of voluntary retirements
was relatively stable throughout this.period. For example,
21 percent of the total membership of the 46th Congress volun-
tarily retired after the expiration of their two-year term
while the figure was 22 percent for the 49th Congress and
20 percent for the 51st Congress.
To a certain extent, these figures lend credence to
the argument that the House of Representatives was just
not attractive enough to its members to induce them to invest
time and energy in a career there. The relatively large
number of members declining to serve further suggests that
whatever political ambitions these men entertained, they
were not confined to the walls of the House. Nor, we can
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safely assume, were their loyalties likely to be directed
primarily toward an institution from which they would so
frequently and so readily retire. This in turn supports
the contentions of those who, like Polsby, suggest that the
attractiveness or unattractiveness of the House as a career
focus was the primary factor in determining the rates of
turnover in Congress. The significant role of voluntary
retirements in the late nineteenth century turnover rates
suggests to these internalists that the House was not yet
sufficiently institutionalized to encourage the kind of
professionalism among its members which marks a "modern"
legislative body.
Further examination, however, suggests that the
attractiveness factor was a function of forces which had
little or nothing to do with the modernization of Congress,
and that the House was unattractive to careerists primarily
because of external constraints on member behavior which
not only discouraged, but even prohibited Congressmen from
making the House supportive of careerist ambitions. This
can be shown, to a certain extent, by an analysis of some
of the sources of voluntary membership retirement. In most
cases, as Table 2.7 shows, voluntary retirements and
electoral defeats were part of the same external phenomenon
-- electoral competitiveness -- and not necessarily personal
or institutionally determined career choices. Excluding the
Members of Congress who either died in office, were unseated
in contested election contests within Congress, or resigned
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Table 2.7 --M Electoral Competiveness as a Factor in Members'
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in mid-term (eleven in the 46th Congress, fourteen in the 49th
Congress, and twenty-four in the 51st Congress), both volun-
tary retirements and electoral defeats were highly related to
margins of victory within each Congressional District.
In the 46th Congress, for example, of the 62 Membersowho
retired at the end of their two-year term, 37 (or 59 peocent)
were from the most competitive districts (where margins of
victory were 10 percent or less). The pattern is about the
same for those who ran for re-election but who were defeated.
Of the 37 members who were defeated for re-election in 1880,
22 (or 59 percent) were from the most highly competitive dis-
tricts. The figures were equally clear for subsequent elec-
tions. In the 49th Congress, 36 of the 70 retiring members
(51 percent) were from the most competitive districts as were
24 of the 52 Members of Congress (46 percent) defeated for re-
election. And, in the 51st Congress, 30 of the 66 retir&es
(46 percentl were from competitive districts, as were 69 per-
cent of those defeated for re-election (the elections of 1890
were disastrous for the Republican Party, particularly in
the House -- a factor which explains the sharp rise in the
overall number of electoral defeats).
The point here then is that the relatively high turnover
rates in the nineteenth century House were at base a function
of electoral competitiveness irrespective of whether the mem-
ber of Congress voluntarily retired or was defeated in a bid
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to retain his seat. The relatively high numbers of competi-
tive districts simply rendered the idea of a career in Con-
gress impossible for many Representatives. As a result of
this -- and not the internal forces of institutionalization
or mal-institutionalization -- there was little opportunity
or little inducement to design a House which complimented
the needs of the careerist. The party (nominating system)
and the electoral process constituted strong restraints on
the extent to which a Member of Congress could ignore or
fail to focus both his attention and his ambitions on the
forces and structures which worked beyond the hallt of Con-
gress.
Once again, electoral competitiveness was not the sole
cause of high turnover rates. They were also a function of
non-electoral yet equally external factors such as local party
strictures on lengthy terms of service, the necessity of bal-
ancing the claims to office of rival groups or localities
within a Congressional District, or voter attachments to
norms of rotation. In all of these cases, however, just as in
the case of electoral competitiveness, Members' careers were
routinely placed in the hands of people, organizations, or
political norms which acted independently of the internal
world of Congress. William Robinson, for example, writing
in 1930, reminded his readers that:
The principle of rotation in office and the
ordinary uncertainties of Stateand District
politics have always tended to shorten the
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average term of service, and these influences
were even more potent in the last three decades
of the nineteenth century than in our own day.
The natural result has been to place on the
incoming member the burden of proving that he
is entitled to a hearing ere an ungrateful con-
stituency consigns him again to private life.5 1
A Congressman, in other words, could contemplate a long
career in legislative politics only if he was fortunate enough
to be free of all of these externally imposed constraints. A
colleague wrote of James A. Garfield, who spent nine terms
in the House of Representatives, for example, that "His situa-
tion as a Representative of the nineteenth Ohio District was
exceedingly favorable to his aspirations, as it was the custom
of that district to continue a man in its service when once
installed, and its overwhelming majority relieved him of all
concern about the result."52  Thomas B. Reed, James G. Blaine,
Nelson Dingley and other Representatives of Maine also tended
to benefit from the traditions of their local Republican
Parties which similarly tended to encourage long terms of
service in Congress. 5 3
The majority of Congressmen, however, were not as for-
tunate as these exceptions to the nineteenth century rule.
B. A. Fryer's Coargressional History of Berks District 1789 -
1939, for example, describes in relatively great detail the
strict rotation formula enforced by the Republicans of Berks
District in Pennsylvania in the late nineteenth century to
assure a measure of proportionate representation to the two
counties (Lehigh and Berks) which made up'that district. 54
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Much earlier in the century in 1843, Abraham Lincoln con-
fronted the same intra-district rivalry for the honor of
sending a Representative to Congress55 and in effect the
same constraint on tenure in 1848 when he was denied
renomination by his District Party organization. 56  Even
Thomas B. Reed confronted this kind of pressure for rotation
of a Congressional District's seat among its constituent
localities when he first ran for his party's Congressional
nomination in 1976. "The sitting member was from York (Maine),"
Reed's biographer, Samuel McCall recounts, "and it was claimed
by his friends that he was entitled to another nomination be-
cause the representative had been chosen from Cumberland
County, where Reed lived, much more than its proportionate
share of the time." Reed was eventually nominated despite
this appeal to the principle of distributive rotation by
his opponents within the party, but years later, he would
draw a lesson from this experience suggesting that "In
politics, if you want to defeat a man because he is a bad
lot, a thief, or a knave, don't say that; explain how he
comes from the wrong town."5 7
Robert Struble also suggests that the public (i.e. voter)
attitudes toward norms of rotation were relatively strong in
the late nineteenth century. As he notes, re-election chances
tended to diminish (to a marked if gradually decreasing extent
throughout the nineteenth centuryl with the number of terms
served.58  The combined totals of the experience of the 46th,
49th and 51st Congresses reaffirms Struble's findings that
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re-election chances tended to vary inversely with the number
of terms served (as Table 2.8 shows) suggesting that evcn
those who were given the nomination by their local party
committee faced the possibility of voter resistance to lengthy
terms. These figures exclude the Congressional Districts in
the South where the electoral decision was overshadowed in
importance by the Democratic nominating conventions in dic-
tating the tenure patterns of its. Representatives.
Taken together, these electoral and structural proper-
ties of the national system which recruited Members of Con-
gress lend support to the argument that the high turnover
(and the consequent non-institutionalized or non-insular
qualities of the House of Representatives) was predominantly9
the product of constraints imposed outside of Congress and
not of the relative attractiveness or unattractiveness of
the House as a career base. In terms of causality, then,
what happened within the House in terms of career choices
and presumably therefore in other realms of Congressional
behavior, was largely determined by what happened outside of
Congress. In other words, just as the combination of elec-
toral competitiveness, structural and normative restrictions
on lengths of service, and voter and party norms of rotation
forced the Member of Congress to fix his own political atten-
tion upon institutions and forces outside of Congress, so
too was the House thus forcibly integrated with, and reflective
of the issues, conflicts and dynamics of national politics.
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The Relationship Between Re-electoral Defeat and
the Total Number of Terms Served by nembers of
the 46the 9th and Slot Congresses. (Non-Southern
Congressional Districts Only)
Number of
menboers Defeated
in Re-election Bid
Percentage of
Unsuccessful Re-election
Attempts to Total
sembership seeking
Re-election
First Term 42 24
.Second Term 34 28
Third Term 16 31
Fourth Term 10 33
Fifth Term - 29
Sixth Term 36
Seventh Term 2 33
Bighth Term or More 3 16
//
Table*2#9
Term
of
Service
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To be sure, there were always tensions between the local and
national loyalties and demands within Congress placed on the
Member of Congress by his political environment, but the
extent to which one was a primary pre-occupation over the
other was a function of the nature and organizational strengths
or weaknesses of the party structures which attempted to recon-
cile the two, and not necessarily of the internal consensus
building structures of the House itself.
These figures on membership career patterns tell us two
important things about the relationship of the House of Rep-
resentatives with its environment. They first reaffirm the
ecologist assumption that the extent to which the House pur-
sues an isolated, internally oriented course in general is
determined by the nature of its political environment and
the links which forcibly bind, or fail to bind, that institu-
tion to the outside world. Congress is a creature of this
external world. These figures secondly suggest that in the
late nineteenth century, this external world engaged the
instruments of constraint actively and successfully. Al-
though the level and the effectiveness of these external con-
straints did vary, even within the relatively short period
between 1878 and 1895, the House was generally not left to
its own devices during this time. Career choices were deeply
affected, for example, by actors, structures and norms
created and worQkin Qutside of Congress. i.gue pQation; ,
and voting decisions on the part of Congress were also deeply
affected by such external forces. Thus, although there
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existed an inevitable tension between the demands of its
political environment and the desires and orientations of
its members once seated in Congress, the House was forced to
relegate its internal dynamic to that of the external poli-
tical world.
That a tension existed between the restraining force of
the political environment and the internal institutionally-
specific tendencies of the House of Representatives can be
seen in the changes which occurred in turnover patterns during
the 1880's. Table 2.9, for example, which shows the inter-
relationships between re-election choices in the 46th, 49th
and 51st Congresses, indicates that while turnover remained
high in all three of these Congresses (First term membership
actually increased with time in these three casesJ, there was
an important shift in the relationship between voluntary re-
tirement, electoral defeat and re-election success. The pro-
portional relationship between voluntary retirement and elec-
toral defeat are most striking. Of those members of Congress
of the"46th Congress who were not re-elected to the 47th
Congress, for example, the majority were voluntary retirees
(62 retirees to 37 who unsuccessfully sought re-election).
This difference diminished in the 49th Congress where 70
Members of Congress voluntarily retired and 52 attempted
without success to achieve re-election. In the 51st Con-
gress, this pattern was reversed, when the majority of those
leaving Congress were those who were defeated for re-electionl.
Once again, the 18%0 Republican electoral disaster helps
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Table 2.I -- The Relative Decline in the Proportion of iembers
Voluntarily Retiring From Congress At the End of
Their Terms of Office*
46th
Congress
Did Not Seek
Ree*lection
Sought Re-elec-
tion But
Failed
Re-elected
Totals
49th
Congress
62
(22)
37(13)
183(65)
282,
70(23)
52(17)
189(61)
311
5181
Congress
. 66(22)
74(25)
161(53)
301
* Does not include those who died in office, resigned during their
terms of office or who were unseated in election contests in
the House. The figures for the 51st Congress also excludes thp
five Representatives of the Four states admitted to the Union
immediately foloowing the 1888 election.
· -e I
· I I I
: t
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explain this reversal. But the changing proportion of
.voluntary to involuntary retirements also suggests that to
a certain extent, the House, despite the external constraints
on its behavior, was become (or being made into) a more
attractive place to reside for longer periods of time. The
increasing desire for tenure, which these figures suggest
existed, however, was still tightly controlled by an environ-
ment which, in these same three elections, was responsible
for progressively higher rates of turnover.
Again, the point is that the internal urges of Congress
and members of Congress (member goals, ideals, ambitions and
issue orientations) were deeply.affected by the restraining
influence of the national electoral and party system. The
relaxation of this active intervention of the environment
into Congressional affairs in the twentieth century would
later create new patterns of institutional behavior, and new
definitions of Congress' role in American politics. The
weakening of the externally imposed constraints on Congress-
ional behavior would later give the House more latitude in
aligning its rules and norms with the internal goals and
ambitions of its members, in relative independence of the
demands of its political environment. But, the fact remains
that just as the behavior of the late nineteenth century Con-
gress was a function of the broader, external patterns of
conflict and political organizational norms of that era, so
too was the twentieth century insulation of the House a
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function of the forces working (or failing to work) in its
environment. This latter point will be brought out in the
second half of this study. Meanwhile, it is important to
note that the late nineteenth century House of Representa-
tives functioned in a political system which forcibly inte-
grated that institution with the issues, ideologies, and
political cleavages which animated American political life
at that time. Congress was very much the creature of par-
tisanship, sectionalism, and the specific issues which con-
stituted the national political agenda of that era.
These largely external forces, then, played important
roles in determining the patterns of conflict which developed
within the House in the 1880's and 1890's. The general cul-
tural attachment to the party as a norm of.political organiza-
tion tended to impose a measure of tactical discipline, if not
actual unity upon members elected to Congress. That this
partisan constraint worked differently among Republicans
and Democrats, was, in turn, a function of the issues, and
the sectional electoral coalitions each party contained.
The Civil War, as well as ancillary sectional issues like the
tariff, tended to reinforce both the relative cohesiveness
of the Republican Party and the heterogeneity and the strong
pull of fragmentation (reinforced by the rampant localism
and issue-based factionalism) in the Democratic Party. At
the same time, new issues were emerging in the last decades
of the nineteenth century Ccurrency reform, civil service
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reform and federal spending) which tended to dilute the
organizational strengths of both parties to a certain extent.
Yet, even here, the unity of the Democratic Party base of
support was affected more than that of the Republican Party.
The impact of these external forces on the internal con-
flict in Congress was relatively direct. Given the strength
of the partisan norm and the sectional specificity of issues
(which, once again, conformed to both the basis of party
organization and Congressional representation), the cohesive-
ness and diversity of the electorate tended to be fairly
accurately reflected in the House of Representatives. By
and large, the Republican constituency tended to be more united
over basic political goals than the Democrats, and con-
sequently, both the national Republican party structure as
well as the Republican Legislative Party in the House tended
to be more cohesive than its Democratic counterpart.
This difference between the parties in terms of cohesive-
ness was a continuing source of anguish for Democrats and a
constant focus of Republican scorn. "The difference
between the Democratic party and the Republican party in Con-
gress is this." John G. Fitzgerald of Boston suggested in
1879, "The Republicans invariably vote for their party --
too many of the Democrats first look to their districts and
themselves."6 1  In 1885, the New York Herald underscored this
point in noting that "The Democrats have a majority of forty
in the House. But it would be difficult, and probably im-
possible to find a single point of public policy, good or
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bad, upon which enough Democrats in the House are agreed."
The Herald concluded by suggesting that the "Democratic
party in the House is not an organized body capable of
united action, but a mob."6 2
While Republicans in general took great pleasure in
reminding the Democratic party of its organizational short-
comings, no one took this task more seriously than Thomas
Reed, who with obvious relish dismissed that party as a
"hopeless assortment of discordant differences, as incapable
of positive action as it is capable of infinite clamour."63
The master of invective, Reed was constantly drawn to the
spectacle of Democratic disarray:
In the heat of the summer sun we watch the
perspiring Democratic patriot engaged in the
only work his House of Representatives has
ever undertaken, the work of trying to find
a day of adjournment, which when it comes,
will again land him on the stump with prin-
ciples to let suitable to each locality, and
hampered by no deed done or policy established;
the same old Democratic maverick, never branded
until the day of sale and not even then
indelibly. 6 4
He concluded his article asserting that the "Democracy cer-
tainly do enter the next campaign unembarrassed by their
immediate past, and with great power of being natural, that
is, of being all things to all men."65
While Republicans were thus gleeful over the organiza-
tional problems of their opponents, Democrats were just as
often frustrated by the disunity and fragmentation of their
party. A friend of Samuel J. Randall, for example, com-
plained in 1879 that "To me it appears certain that our
bickering and our dissensions will make it easy for (the
Republicans) to reinstate themselves in possession of the
National Government."66  One prominent Democratic member
of the House, Hillary A. Herbert of Alabama, attempted to
explain this disunity by ascribing it to the strong pull of
constituency service. In 1894, at the height of a period
of bitter Democratic divisiveness, he argued that "individual
members are too sensitive to what they imagine to be the
demands of their immediate constituencies. They are gen-
erally too apprehensive that they may not please everybody,
and rather than incur displeasure they abandon, now and then,
the principles of the party which elevated them (to power).,,67
His generalizations were meant to be drawn from the House
membership as a whole, but Herbert clearly shows a preoccupa-
tion with the sources and effects of the painful problems which
were just then tearing his party apart.
These subjective evaluations of the fragmented nature
of the Democratic party, as well as those which saw the Re-
publican Party as a unified monolith -- The Washington Post,
for example, attempted to equate this unity in an 1885 edi-
torial with "intolerance"68 -- are borne out by Clubb and
Traugott's study "Partisan Cleavage and Cohesion in the House
of Representatives, 1861 - 1974."
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Table 2.10 is reproduced from this article, and while Clubb
and Traugott remind us that aggregate data such as this
potentially masks a great deal of individual variation in
political behavior, it is nevertheless interesting to note
that in the years of Democratic control of the House of Rep-
resentatives, the indicators of both party unlikeness and
association of vote with party tend to be lower than they
are for the Republican Congresses. The only exception is the
46th Congress which was controlled by the Democrats and
which produced relatively high indices of partisanship. The
prolonged and bitterly partisan conflict over the Army Appro-
priations Bill during the extra session in 1879 does much to
explain this deviation from the normal pattern. With this
single exception, the indicators are at their highest points
during the Republican controlled 47th and 51st Congresses.
When the Democrats controlled the House of Representa-
tives, therefore, the consensus building system (the internal
norms, the rules and the institutional roles taken on by
Congress) was confronted by patterns of conflict which were
somewhat more diffused and less coherent than those which
were produced by a Republican control of the House. The
organizational system of the House tended, therefore, to
differ in times of Democratic rule from those of Republican
dominance, as we shall see in subsequent chapters. It is
important to note here, however, that the late nineteenth
century House of Representatives was a constantly changing
political institution in terms of the conflicts and con-
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table 2.14 - Democratic and Republican Differences' in Party Votirng
in the House of Representatives 3etween 1879 and
. 1895 (Taken from Clubb and Traugott, "PartisanCleavage and Cohesion in the House of Representatives,
1861-1974.")
Average Party
Unlikeness Party
Votes
Average
Association of
Vote with
Party (Lamlbda)
46 (.1879-1881) Dem 61.0 •76 2
47 (1881-1883) Rep 58.4 69 : 95
48 (1883-1885) Dna 47.3 65 .34
49 (1885-1887) Dem 50.0 6? .37?
50 (1887-1889) Deam 2.2 .53 .28
51 (1889-1891) Rep 71.3 83 .64
52 1891-1893) Dm8.8 43.20
53 (1893-1895) De 47 28
Democratic Averages
Republican Averages
46.7
64.85
58.5
76.0
.33
.55
Congress
Number
IMajority
Party
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sequent internal pressures which these variations in party
control created, and which the organizational structures of
the House were thereby forced to manage.
This chapter has attempted to describe the forces which
defined the essential elements of the political system in
the late nineteenth century United States, and consequently
of the forces which in turn determined the lines and patterns
of conflict which animated the internal world on the House
of Representatives during this period. It has suggested
that these forces not only produced a unique political en-
vironment for Congress, but that they also fashioned an
equally unique and powerful set of links between that environ-
ment and the internal House system.
These links were constructed and channelled through
the local constituencies to which the Members of Congress
were singularly attuned. This constituency link was mediated
in turn by a number of factors which in combination created
the patterns of conflict which obtained in the nineteenth
century Congressional process. Among the forces which
characterized and conditioned the constituency link in the
nineteenth century were the abstract attachment of the
American public to party as a legitimate instrument of
political organization and competition; a concrete attach-
ment to party organizations in the public pursuit of pre-
ferred goals; an ideological and historical attachment to
sectional interests (reflected in both the issues which
-157-
emerged during this period and in the distribution of party
strength); a fundamental divergence between the two major
parties in their ideological and specific issue orientations
and in their levels of organizational efficacy and coherence;
and a relatively high degree of electoral competitiveness
which, along with the other restraints on long terms of
office for House members, integrated Congress' internal patt-
erns of conflict and policy making with the character of its
political environment.
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Chapter III
The Triumph of Particularism:
The Courses of Legislative Conflict
1896 - 1921
The forces which constrained and in turn determined the
patterns of conflict within the House of Representatives in
the late nineteenth century were transformed by the events
and movements which rearranged the shape of America's politi-
cal system in the first two decades of the twentieth century.
The conditions which had combined to produce and reinforce
broad political coalitions before 1900 either decayed, were
modified or replaced by a new generation of voters and ideals.
Sectional loyalties were becoming increasingly irrelevant to
a nation more concerned with functionally defined attachments.
Powerful political symbols such as those which had come out
of the Civil War and which were able to anchor and unify the
political beliefs of huge portions of the American population
had run their course without being supplanted. The organs
of national political conflict -- the parties which coordina-
ted decision-making, which existed to build and sustain work-
able national political coalitions and which provided a link
between voters and leaders, federal and local levels, and
different regions of the country -- were declining as effec-
tive instruments of democratic rule. Indeed, by the first
decade of the new century, the whole idea of partisanship
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was at least suspect in the minds of many, and under direct
attack by a host of others. New issues which cleaved across
the traditional structures of American politics in very non-
traditional ways, were creating a compartmentalized and par-
ticularized approach to political demand-making and to the
public policy process. Finally, the electoral system which
had integrated political institutions with the broader poli-
tical world were beginning to weaken as competitiveness, voter
participation and rates of membership turnover declined. Mem-
bers of Congress, by the end of the first decade of the twen-
tieth century, were already beginning to find themselves freed
from many of the restraints which had so affected their
predecessors in office.
The relaxation of the environmental constraints on Con-
gressional behavior took three distinct forms. First, the
Progressive Era assault on traditional norms of political or-
ganization in the nation was but a part of the broader attempt
to transform both the manner in which demands were channelled
from the public to the institutions of national power, and
the manner in which political decisions were actually achieved
at the national level. Partisanship, as a norm, as well as
the parties themselves suffered an eclipse (the powers of the
national party organization were particularly hard hit) and
indeed the whole idea of conflict as a decision-making tool
suffered as new and optimistic ideas about rationality and
efficiency in public policy-making became popular. These
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new ideas, which were nevertheless based on very traditional
American assumptions which mixed a belief in social progress
with a mistrust of centralized power, tended to encourage
the development of alternate forms of political organization
which existed both independently of the party system as well
as independently of each other.
The second broad shift in American politics was reflected
in the types of issues which appeared on the national public
agenda at the turn of the century. The demands for govern-
mental intervention in social and economic matters, hereto-
fore centered largely on state and local institutions, became
focussed on the Federal government. The idea of regulation
itself (a major part of the new public agenda of the early
twentieth centuryl produced the demand for new institutional
forms of responding to public political demands, and in effect,
further encouraged the pluralization of American politics.
Coupled with the new public management ethos, this regulatory
responsibility, and the particular institutional forms it
tended to take (rationalization of the bureaucracy, the
creation of independent commissions, and the normative faith
in the idea of expertisel both narrowed the perspectives and
limited the powers of purely political (i.e. elective) struc-
tures of the Federal Government.
Finally, and as a result of both of the above factors,
the electoral system was transferred from its status as the
single most important source of authority for an individual
office-holder and the primary constituency link, to one of
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competing with other sources of authority, and other linkages
between government and the public. This was partially the
result of new laws which regulated and limited the scope of
party activity and which indeed redefined the role of the
party in the national political system. It was also the
result of restraints applied to the voting process itself,
which in some areas merely discouraged voter participation
in elections but which in others actually disenfranchised
entire segments of the population. Finally, it was the result
of the early twentieth century dispersal of political author-
ity among a growing number of non-elective structures. This
fragmentation of national political authority relieved elec-
tive institutions of the virtual monopoly (the Supreme Court
notwithstanding) they had exercised over the national policy
making process in the nineteenth century. Voter participation
tended to decline dramatically as a consequence of these fac-
tors, as did electoral competitiveness, both of which con-
tributed to a significant weakening of elections as a major
constraint on legislative behavior. These factors also trans-
formed the manner in which the electoral link influenced Con-
gress' internal processes.
The transformation of American politics of which these
three conditions were a part, had an important effect on the
nature of conflict within the House of Representatives. In
the absence of strong coordinative national structures working
outside of Congress, and indeed of the tendency of the American
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public to attach itself to the kinds of broad issue coalitions
which were so apparent in the nineteenth century, and finally.
in the absence of powerful elective inducements for members
of Congress to look beyond the walls of the House toward inte-
grative parties, conflict in the House of Representatives
turned inward and became fragmented. Left free of the coordina-
tive influences so characteristic of the nineteenth century
political system, the interaction of Members of Congress
began taking forms mandated by internal problems, pressures
and forces. External links which existed between the rep-
resentative and his constituency (a constituency itself in-
creasingly free from national political constraintsl tended
to exacerbate the tendencies toward parochialism and par-
ticulariam in Congress and lend further weight to the frag-
mentation of conflict.
This chapter will attempt to describe these changes
which occurred in Congress' political environment, and show
how they affected conflict within the House of Representatives.
It will suggest that just as the nineteenth century Congress
was the product of its environment and the structural rela-
tionships which had tied the House to that environment, so too
was the Congress emerging in the early twentieth century the
product of its altered surroundings. The unique political
system which had supported coherent and cumulative patterns
of conflict in the nineteenth century House of Representatives
gave way to one which increasingly allowed the internal
patterns of conflict in Congress to become more reflective
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of segmented and often parochial (if not personal) goals,
ideals and interests. Coalition building became a function
of specific issues and personalities brought together by
more momentary than long term causes.
The idea that the fragmentation of conflict within Con-
gress was primarily the result of major transformations in
the American political system as a whole stems from assump-
tions about how an unconstrained or relatively insulated House
of Representatives would behave. There is little in the con-
stitutionally prescribed Congressional system, for example,
that encourages the attachment of the individual Member of
Congress to long term, cohesive and disciplined political
coalitions or organizations. The legislative system outlined
in the constitution tends to work away from the kinds of
cumulative and cohesive internal patterns of political con-
flict which were so much a part of the late nineteenth century
Congresses. Residency requirements, regular biennial elec-
tions and the independent and localized constituency-oriented
perspectives which such requirements encourage, provide
sizeable hurdleas to the forces working to construct enduring
and meaningful policy-making coalitions.1
Such coordinative forces must also work within a con-
stitutional system which by its Federal structure encourages
and even mandates fragmentation (separation of powers) and
parochialism in the national policy making process, and
which explicitly attempts to block the development of
2cumulative political cleavages. Peculiarities in the
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historic evolution of the United States as a nation have also
tended to preclude the emergence of the kinds of massive and
reinforcing social cleavages which have often underlaid the
emergence of strong party structures in other nations. 3 All
of these factors contributed to the extent to which the mass
party system came, by the end of the first two decades of the
twentieth century, to. rest upon an increasingly fragile and
tenuous base. As strong as partisanship and party govern-
ment were as national norms of .political organization in the
latter half of the nineteenth century, both became progress-
ively more vulnerable to attacks on their power -- particu-
larly their relatively centralized (at least by American
standards) power over national policy making -- as the peculiar
events (the Civil War and Reconstruction) which had created
and strengthened them faded from the American public con-
sciousness.
This growing disaffection with parties, and the trans-
formation of political demand making in the United States of
which this disaffection was a part, stemmed from a number of
different nineteenth century (and to a certain extent, char-
acteristically American) roots. This movement away from the
political party as an organizational norm was first of all
the product of a growing, if very diffuse disenchantment
with the performance of the nineteenth century political
system. This disenchantment was expressed by a loose collec-
tion of protest movements united by little more than the
-1 P A
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common belief that the parties and the governmental process
they directed constituted a distortion of the true democratic
ideal. Various reform movements such as the Mugwumps, the
Populists and later the Progressives all came to equate the
specific evils they sought to erase with the parties and
indeed the party system which produced them. The issues each
of these groups espoused tended to lead them ultimately beyond
a single attempt to displace or win control of the parties
they opposed, to a fervent moral crusade against the under-
pinnings of the system which, they thought, had led those
parties to behave the way they did. These groups were at once
the symbol and the instrument of a national reaction against
the excesses of American political life in the late nineteenth
century with which the parties were associated.
-Interlocked with these forces working against partisan-
ship, was a very.traditionally American distrust of central-
ized power, which the parties, by the late nineteenth century,
had come to symbolize.4  Thus, in many ways, the assaults on
trusts and other forms of centralized economic power in the
nation were often indistinguishable from the assault on parties.
In part, this was because the exercise of power on the part
of the parties was believed by many to be as dangerous to
democratic ideals as the unfettered exercise of economic power
by the trusts. Indeed, it was felt that the one simply led to
the other. The parties, in other words, were seen as the
creatures of the trusts they had protected and strengthened.
Anti-partyism was also the product of an often paranoid fear
of mass political movements. Populism, for example, had
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created a great uneasiness among southern elites and many
northern and mid-western middle class groups, much as the
urban party machines had unsettled northerners throughout
the nineteenth century. This fear was followed throughout
the nation (but particularly in the Northeast and in the
South) by an attempt to both limit the dependence of parties
and public institutions on the will of its constituents and
at the same time restrain the power of those institutions to
affect public policy.
To the extent that this particular set of forces con-
stituted the motivation for the forces working to transform
the norms of national political organization, the reaction
against partisanship existed as a loosely defined protest
movement. Indeed, elements of all of these negative motivat-
ing factors probably existed in most of the attacks on the
party system. Yet, the attempt to reform the organizational
basis of American politics also had more positive strains.
Many of those who sought the overthrow of strong party govern---
ment did so out of the belief that there existed better ways
of making public policy. Traditional nineteenth century
political decision making procedures which relied on conflict,
emotional appeals to voters and party supporters, on dema-
goguery5 and on a fundamental concern for political power
as an end in itself was outmoded, many reformers felt, and
stood in the way of meaningful national advancement.
Imbued with an abiding faith in the inevitability of
social progress, and touched in part with an enlightenment
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faith in the power of individuals to control and perfect
their environment, the missionaries of reform joyously
attacked the party system with promises of better, more pro-
ductive and less corrupt methods of managing national prior-
ities. Old forms of political conflict, they assured them-
selves, could be replaced by structures, procedures and
norms which would allow public policy to be guided by the
laws of reason and logic. With the zeal of moral crusaders,
party reformers called for the establishment of a political
order based on the new twentieth century virtues of rational-
ity, efficiency and expertise. The forces opposed to the
continuance of strong party control over the nation's poli-
tical institutions were thus arrayed along a continuum which
encompassed at the one end a single-minded protest against
the two major parties and at the opposite extreme, an optim-
istic belief that America's political salvation was at hand.
For the most part, however, the assault on party government
was a distended and often vaguely defined mixture of the two.
The most virulent opposition to the major parties and
the political system which they dominated arose from those
groups which sought unsuccessfully to supplant the Republicans
and the Democrats in that dominance. The Populist movement,
for example, provided extremely sharp denunciations of the
party system, as it did of other salient features of American
politics. This antagonism was probably strongest in the South
where the Democratic Party unsuccessfully and often fraudul-
ently frustrated the electoral efforts of the Populist Party. 6
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Strong party rule was equated with political persecution
by Southern Populists who like Tom Watson saw their cause
as a principled battle against the entrenched forces of
repression. Thus, he could proudly, if prematurely, proclaim
the overthrow of Democratic party tyranny in Georgia in 1896
as one of the most significant achievements of the Populist
movement: "No citizen any longer hesitates to take sides
with any party he likes, or to vote for any candidate he pre-
fers. The day of political persecution is over -- even in
the South -- and Populism did it.,"7
The belief that the People's movement had been victim-
ized by the major parties in its attempt to establish itself
as a significant political force in American politics, led
its supporters to be among the most vitriolic critics of
existing norms of partisanship. In his utopian novel,
Looking Backward, for example, Edward Bellamy, a Christian
Socialist tractarian who worked on the fringes of the Populist
protest, created a perfect civilization of the future in which
there are "no parties or politicians, and as for demagoguery
and corruption, .they are words having only an historical
significance." In that novel, Bellamy envisioned a post-
partisan and indeed a post-political world which no longer
placed "a premium on baseness." 8
To many, the disenchantment with the parties and the party
organizational norm stemmed from the emergence of a closer,
and to many a more sinister relationship between business and
parties. "The will of the party machine," Henry George charged
in 1905,
• has to a great extent superseded the great demo-
cratic will . . . That is to say, the people at
large have long since been so engrossed by the
business of getting a living that they have
turned over the matter of their political think-
ing largely to party machines, and Privilege has
only had to capture those machines to acquire
control of a greatly centralized political power. 9
Parties were the instruments, many felt, of big business' con-
trol of the national political system. As such, assaults on
the powers of industry were often indistinguishable from
assaults on the party system.
George Mayer suggests that this merger of purpose between
party (particularly the Republican partyl and business was
already in progress by 1884. "Without apology or equivoca-
tion," he suggests, the new Republican leaders of the mid-
1880's "tried to identify the party with the emerging entre-
preneurial class."1 0  Matthew Josephson, on the other hand,
places this.union in 1888 and describes it more emphatically
as "a kind of invisible revolution wherein the party institu-
tion, the living core of political government, was to be com-
pletely adapted or made over in accordance with the needs of
an advanced, large-scale capitalism."11  This growing iden-
tity of purpose between business and party government (again
particularly visible in the Republican party, although key
economic interests were by the late nineteenth century also
consummating stronger links with the Democratic party)
rendered those parties vulnerable to reformers who wanted to
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curb the monopolization of American industry, and in effect
fueled their arguments that huge industrial combines
threatened not only the economic well-being of the nation,
but its democratic system as well.
Fear of party government, however, also provoked intense
opposition from those who, alarmed at the fury and partial
success of the Populist movements (and to a certain extent,
the later activity of the Socialist parties) or the Free-
Silverite capture of the Democratic party in 1896, feared
mass parties as instruments of an unbridled popular (read
moS) will. The efforts of the Southern elites to reassert
their control over the Democratic party in the wake of the
Populist movement is one example of this12 as were the
various attempts .of state legislatures in the Northeast to
restrain the exercise of political power by the urban
machines.13
The fear of partisan conflict was also, however, evident
in the gentler and more reasoned critiques forwarded by in-
creasingly vocal elements of the middle class who were both
suspicious of party rule and eager to implant their new pro-
fessionalist outlook on America's political system. The
Mugwump reformers of the 1880's, for example, "hoped that
governmental efficiency and economy would balance a tendency
to ruthless social mass." They believed that civil service
reform would stabilize the gains they had made since the
Civil War by keeping "power in the hands of those fitted to
rule. "14
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This underlying fear of radical change also permeated
much of the Progressive movement which would later implement
some of the Mugwump program. The progressivism of William
Allen White, for example, was tinged with an elitist mistrust
of mass political action. This mistrust can be seen in
White's earlier bouts with Kansas Populists whom he had at
once feared and scorned. In his famous attacks on the suppor-
ters of Bryan in the 1896 election, White echoed the very
sentiments expressed in the Federalist Papers over a century
before, and revealed the same paranoia over the prospect of
giving free rein to the demands of a mobilized "faction".
"Give the prosperous man the dickens!" White parodied the
Democratic appeal,
Legislate the thriftless man into ease, whack
the stuffing out of the creditors and tell the
debtors who borrowed the money five years ago
. . that the contraction of the currency
gives him the right to repudiate.
Whoop it up for the ragged trousers; put
the lazy, greasy fuzzle, who can't pay his
debts ,n the altar and bow down and worship
him."
This fear that the mechanisms of political organization --
the parties -- were susceptible to the same process by which
the "radicals" had captured the Democratic party in 1896,
seemed to pervade the thinking of many other notable and
articulate critics of the nineteenth century partisan poli-
tical norms.16  Fear, mistrust and frustration brought wildly
divergent political views together on the question of party
rule.
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For the most part, however, efforts aimed at transforming
the organizational basis of American politics struck a more
balanced and positive tone -- one which diluted the fear and
frustration with promises of something better. Optimism, and
a belief in social progress, two characteristic aspects of
the American creed, were by the early 1900's reasserting them-
selves more forcefully than ever before.1 7  Laced through
with an additional dose of typically American moralism and
zeal, these twin values were a major source of Reformers'
yearnings. "The progressive mentality," Mowry notes, which
translated these beliefs into political action:
was imbued with a burning ethical strain which
at times approached a missionary desire to
create a heaven on earth . . . (It) was gener-
ated in part from both a fear of the loss of
group status and a confidence in man's ability
to order the future. Had progressive militancy
come in a more despondent intellectual z.
- * . climate and in a bleaker economic day,
group fear might have overcome group hope . . .
But in the warm and sunny atmosphere of 1900
the optimistic mood prevailed.1I
An enlightenment spirit pervaded the society and the feeling
rapidly emerged that man was fully able to control his environ-
ment.
This new pragmatism resembled the Enlightenment of a
century and a half before in that it fostered the kind of
optimism and bred a sense of competence and efficacy in the
minds of men of action similar to that sense which had animated
the great changes in thought (and subsequently in action) of
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of the eighteenth century. Unlike that earlier movement,
however, the new twentieth century American did not focus
his search on the great, universal, and inevitable abstract
mechanism or law which drove the world, but instead sought
to discover the particular methods by which his part of the
world could be driven to specific ends. Much of the re-
formist economic, social, and political concerns in the
early decades of the twentieth century fully reflected this
new mood. Thus William Allen White could equate the reform-
ist spirit with the same ingenuity and drive that led Henry
Ford to develop the affordable automobile. In 1908, White
later wrote:
Henry Ford had not come along to democratize
the motor car, and it was still a toy of the
upper middle class . . . But everyone'sensed
the fact that the expensive toy which then
cost anywhere from eight hundred to three
thousand dollars would soon be within reach
of all. How? No one knew. But they had a
hunch, a deep conviction probably based on
the fact that we Yankees generally got what
we wanted, that soon the motor car would
come to all the middle class. It was prob-
ably that same hunch that set us marching to
Utopia, that gave Bryan and Roosevelt teir
hold on the imagination of the people.
Ray Stannard Baker, too, would later recall the youthful
exuberance with which he confronted the "Great American
Renaissance". Were not the economic problems, the social
ills, and the political corruption, he asked himself, "mere
blemishes on the rugged countenance of America, easily to be
removed when we had time to turn from the enormous labor of
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taming a continent?"20
This belief in human competence and American social
perfectability was an abiding faith of the new turn-of-the-
century thinkers. Simon Patten's The New Basis of Civiliza-
tion, for example, trumpeted this theme as did William James
and John Dewey.2 1  New ideas of management entered the indus-
trial sector which displayed a new commitment to efficiency
and productivity. Time clocks began appearing in factories,
fences were erected and consonnant with the spirit of the
new order, "more systematic and more centralized schemes of
management" appeared in the private sector.22  Inevitably,
this enlightenment spirit also forced its way into the poli-
tical sphere as people like Gifford Pinchot and F.A. Cleve-
land sought ways of applying the principles of scientific
management to policy making institutions.23 Preachers of
the new order attacked the evils of the old with a whole-
hearted almost religious devotion to the new "Gospel of
efficiency. "24
To these reformers, the traditional norms of political
organization, and the reliance on the party system those
norms encouraged, constituted major stumbling blocks to the
realization of their better world. Partisanship was also to
many a symbol of the waste, the irrationality and the corrup-
tion they sought to eradicate. In particular, reformers of
the early twentieth century sought to remove the structures
and political procedures which, they felt, distorted demo-
cratic politics and which reduced the power of the political
system to effectively and fairly dispense public goods. State
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governments thus began regulating parties by removing, or
attempting to curb the features of the political system
which concentrated coordinative power in the hands of the
party leadership. The Australian ballot was introduced in
more and more states as the reform movement gathered strength,
as were other laws designed to moderate the power of parties
in the electoral process. Some states attempted to further
circumvent the parties by implementing new initiative, refer-
endum and recall provisions in their constitutions. Voter
registration became widely approved throughout the nation and
by 1908 almost two thirds of all the states in the United
States had initiated some form of the direct primary.2 5
These reforms had an unavoidable impact on the saliency,
power and coherence and, in turn, the effectiveness of the
political parties. In many cases, they tended to reduce the
role of the party in the general political process. Yet,
they also, and perhaps more significantly, forced on the
American public a critical re-examination of its ties to
parties as supreme instruments of political decision-making.
Party regularity and other normative foundations of the nine-
teenth century party strength and resiliency were questioned
and independence in voting and other facets of political
activity was extolled. These reforms, therefore, measurably
weakened the parties' power to control their representatives
in public office and in turn to coordinate policy making.
The effects of these efforts, however, were not evenly dis-
tributed throughout the political system. As Wiebe notes,
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local bosses were remarkably immune from the progressive
challenge to partisanship, and at the state level, pro-
gressives were successful only in selective regions.26
Still, the reform movement did have a decisive impact on
the highest levels of the party structure -- particularly
in the extent to which it weakened the ability of the parties
to produce purposive and united national political coali-
tions.
In effect, then, the Progressive movement was most effec-
tive in undercutting the fragile mechanisms and links which
bound diverse local and state party organizations into co-
herent wholes. The routinized channels of communications
between state and local party organizations and national party
structures were weakened as Federal powers of patronage (par-
ticularly those aimed at the lowest and most local levels of
the bureaucracy) were reduced by civil service reform. The
rising costs of local and state level.political campaigns,
which now included primaries, pushed campaign financing
further beyond the ability of national party institutions to
supply the electoral needs of its members. Indeed, the
intra-party struggles for ascendancy.which these primary
elections now placed on a public stage also undermined the
national party's ability to coordinate and to a certain extent
control the recruitment process, and contain factionalism.
Party reforms tended to magnify local and regional tensions
within parties at the same time they were reducing the re-
sources these parties possessed for dampening internal
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conflict and disagreement. The net effect was to give local
party organizations relatively greater autonomy in their
pursuit of public power. As such, the brand of partisanship
which emerged from the Progressive era, in part due to the
structural reforms enacted during that era, was one increas-
ingly devoid of national purpose and universal symbols, and
one which was fragmented and diffuse in its sense of mission.
The national party structure and indeed the electoral
system was also the casualty of another side of the progress-
ive vision -- the side which sought to turn political decision
making from its traditional paths of conflict resolution to
new paths of public management. This aspect of the reform
movement sought to remove from the political arena, policy
decisions which would best be made by disinterested, neutral
and highly qualified experts.2 6B Regulatory commissions
proliferated between 1910 and 1920, and burgeoning executive
bureaus arrogated progressively greater power in growing
independence of elected officials. Shrouded in the misty
glow of scientific management and legitimized by the twen-
tieth century faith in the virtue of expertise, these new
autonomous wielders of political authority, tended to con-
strict the scope of legislative, and to a certain extent,
executive decision-making power.
The rise of these new institutions of public power re-
flected, and in turn contributed to, a perceptible diminution
of the role of parties, and brought into question the value
of partisanship itself. The belief in reason and logic which
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these new bodies were seen to represent tended to disparage
of organizational norms which remained wedded to old and
worn-out methods of public decision-making. There was a
growing belief that government decision-making bodies should
have the same high regard for efficiency and productivity as
business and industry. In 1910, Senator Dolliver suggested
as much in a speech in which he called for a creative mix-
ture of business in politics. He was quite willing to concede,
however, that "Our executive departments are not only business
institutions, but there is a cheerful sense in which they are
also political institutions." 27 But even this stand was too
moderate for many, like the Chicago businessman who wrote his
Congressman in 1922, "We want to see more business and less
politics in Congress." 28
The normative shift away from parties as the single legi-
timate link between public institutions and private interests
and away from partisanship as the central instrument of poli-
tical decision-making (and indeed the increasing fragmentation
of the national party structures) had an important independent
impact on the nature of conflict within the House of Repres-
entatives. The Republicans were particularly shaken by this
new approach to political organization, which led them toward
the internal disarray they had in the past so gleefully
observed among Democrats. Party regularity among voters and
among the party's office-holders (particularly Members of
Congressl was no longer an assured behavioral pattern. In
the absence of national cohesiveness -- once again a partial
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result of Progressive reforms -- formal powers to sanction
deviation evaporated and were supplanted by an increasing
impatience with the coordinative restraints imposed by a
central party leadership. The public disaffection with
parties and party government; the emergence of competing
institutions of public authority Land a corresponding pro-
liferation of interest groups); and the structural limits
placed on the power of party leaders to discipline their
rank and file and command a broad allegiance all contributed
to a dramatic shift away from the kind of party coherence,
unity and power which had so marked the political process in
the late nineteenth century. The party lash, as Tom Watson
had so gleefully contended, was indeed losing its sting
(at least outside the South).
The issues, which by and large found their way onto the
public agenda between 1896 and 1921, reinforced this norma-
tive and structural shift away from the strong partisanship
of the late nineteenth century. Indeed, a major concern of a
sizeable portion of the American electorate was the issue of
party regulation itself. But these issues also had an inde-
pendent effect on the organization of political ideas and
personalities in the manner in which they interacted with the
new reformist institutions of public authority tagain; the
strengthened bureaucracy, the independent commissions and
quasi-autonomous boards). Broad issue clusters seemed to
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form less readily as diverse agencies of Federal power tended
to encourage a segmentation and pluralization of demand-
making. Specific interests were no longer forced to channel
their often particularistic demands through the single Con-
gressional bottleneck. Their fortunes were no longer auto-
matically tied to the complex bargaining process through
which Congress, with its towering demonance of the nineteenth
century policy-making system, balanced competing claims and
demands.
Clearly, the fragmentation of the issue agenda, the
dispersal of political authority at the Federal level, and
the emergence of anti-partyism were all interrelated pheno-
mena. Each of these tendencies had independent, if reinforc-
ing roles in transforming the nineteenth century political
system of conflict to its twentieth century form. Thus, just
as the normative and structural changes in the organization
of political demand-making had a direct effect on the nature
of conflict within the House of Representatives, so too did
the issues which emerged after 1896 tend to lead the nation
away from the cumulative cleavages which had been so character-
istic of American politics in the late nineteenth century.
A major, perhaps the most compelling, issue cluster to
work its way onto the public agenda involved the broad ques-
tion of privilege -- economic and political -- and the dis-
tribution of power in the nation. Armed with a fundamental
antipathy to the concentration of economic and political
power, reformers led an increasingly vocal assault on an
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extremely broad range of social, political and economic
institutions. Linked together in many cases by little more
than the common assumption that gross inequalities in the
distribution of economic and political resources inevitably
led to abuse, manipulation and corruption, these new reformers
scattered their energies across a wide and often diffuse range
of very specific problems.
Industries and businesses came under their muckraking
scrutiny as did political parties. Local, state and national
governmental bodies and even universities were also targets
of the reformist investigation into American life.2 9  Lincoln
Steffens, for example, exposed urban corruption in his articles
for McClure's Magazine, and Ida Tarbell exposed the hold
Standard Oil exercised over the petroleum and transport indus-
try.30  Reformist novelists too entered the arena in the
frantic rush to expose imperfections in American society.
Frank Norris wrote of the economic and political tyranny of
the Railroad over the farmers in California in his novel, The
Octopus31 and Theodore Dreiser described the corrupt world
of the urban traction magnate in The Titan.32 Entire maga-
zines were devoted to the new progressive brand of social
criticism which unlike previous political reform movements
(particularly the Populist movement) which were aimed at
general and sometimes abstract distortions of American society,
"called names and exposed specific abuses with documented
facts."33  Paradoxically, however, the specificity which
characterized the progressive assault on the evils of the
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American system kept the reform movement from developing
the broad unity of purpose and the organizational coherence
which had characterized the Populist movement and indeed
earlier third party campaigns. Progressives attacked the
American political and economic system in segments and in
the process contributed to the fragmentation of the national
issue agenda.
This progressive movement also differed from the Populist
movement, which Wiebe suggests, "acted as reform's precipi-
tant,"34 in its ultimate faith in middle class values and
indeed in the perfectibility of American society. 3 5 Viewing
the basis of that society as essentially sound, reformers
generally saw themselves as social tinkerers rather than the
agents of massive change. On the one hand, this led to an
ambivalence about the social problems they faced and on the
other hand it further contributed to the fragmentation of
the progressive cause. Richard Hofstadter argues that
This ambivalence is in itself not startling.
It can be seen, for example, in the natural-
istic writers who condemned the dog eat dog
morality of the competitive world and yet
succumbed to admiration for the mastery of
the survivors. One finds it in Jack London's
entire career; it colors all of Dreiser's
treatment of his tycoon in The Titan. At
another level it can be seen in the work of
the muckraker like Lincoln Steffens, who in
his autobiography reported the high regard
in which he came to hold city bosses at the
very time he was interviewing them for his
muckraking essays on their evil works; and
it can be seen in another way in Ida Tarbell,
whose devastating book on Standard Oil was
followed not long after by works extolling
big business leaders. It can be seen, oddly
enough, in the Socialist press, whose analyses
of capitalism were sandwiched between adver-
tisements for get-rich-quick investments. 36
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This curious ambivalence can also be seen in the meas-
ures reformers urged on American society to curb the abuses
they sought to expose. The call for rational methods of
regulation and expert management of political and economic
institutions paid implicit tribute to some of the very
sources of economic and political power and strength they
criticized. In one sense, for example, the optimistic belief
in the doctrine of efficiency was derived from the organiza-
tional advances private industries had made in the late nine-
teenth century.. Thus the social and political distortions
which emerged from the society were merely specific abuses
of institutions and processes which were fundamentally good.
This notion can be seen throughout the body of progressive
literature in the mixed reviews reformers gave the increas-
ing centralization of economic organizations. Ida Tarbell's
attack on the excesses of the trusts, for example, was
moderated by a respect for the rapid social and technological
progress they had underwritten:
The temptation to condemn industry as a whole
because a few powerful men became inordinately
rich not only prevented a proper weighing of
the advantages the public was receiving, but
it prevented a cool and effective dealing with
the roots of the evil. Popular attention fas-
tened on the conspiracies or the wicked indivi-
dual rather than on the nature of his practices
which the existing economic and political system
made possible.
It was this ambivalence then that led to the fragmenta-
tion of the attack on the social and political ills so
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characteristic of the progressive era. The trust problem,
) for example, meant different things to different reformers,
a fact which was reflected by the wide divergence of view
points progressives brought to the search for solutions to
) American social and political problems. Centralization, many
decided, was not an inherently bad thing. There were good
and bad trusts, 38 it was believed by Progressives who con-
sequently divided over the question of which trust (or indeed
which twentieth century probleml posed the greatest threat to
their vaguely defined vision of the preferred American way of
life.
Amidst the fragmentation of the issue agenda, character-
ized by divergent reform approaches to distinct sub-sets of
twentieth century American society, Progressives tended to
unite over the need to change the manner in which political
decisions were made. In particular, the system needed an
infusion of "democracy" by which was meant a more open recogni-
tion of the divergent reform or policy concerns of different
people and interests from different regions of the country.
Reformers wanted a less rigid set of political structures --
one which would give a freer hand to the specific demands and
concerns which they brought to the national government. Thus,
the internal workings of Congress became a major preoccupation
of the reformist search for a purer America. Institutional
change became a primary issue concern since it was a virtual
prerequisite for further and more particularistic reforms.
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State governments had already been targets of reform
crusades and in many areas major political changes had been
introduced and enacted. The national institutions of govern-
ment, however, became a focus of the Progressive cause only
in the first decade of the twentieth century. This focus on
the nationll government was the result of a number of different
factors. It emerged first of all out of the growing realiza-
tion that reforms, particularly those aimed at regulating the
abuses of business power, was not something individual states
could do well. "If one State passes good laws and enforces
them, and another state does not," Progressive Senator Albert
Beverige reasoned,
then the business men in the former state are
at a business disadvantage with the business
man in the other State. The business men in
the State that has good laws suffer from the
very righteousness of that State's bad laws,
and the business man in the State that has
bad laws profits by the very wickedness of
that State's laws.~
Divergent state reforms were ineffective in the absence of
some measure of national regulation.
National elective institutions also came under the reform-
ist scrutiny because in many ways the existing arenas of public
decision-making were not capable of recognizing and implement-
ing the often competing policies progressives wanted to enact.
The ambivalence of the emerging Progressive attitude toward
trusts and the often vague distinctions reformers wished to
draw between good and bad trusts, for example, led many to
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believe that effective and realistic economic regulation was
beyond the ability of a legislative or purely political
body. The determination of subtle qualitative differences
between industrial combinations, and the realistic control
of the trusts, it was believed by both reformers and many
businessmen, were better left to commissions of experts em-
powered by broad legislative mandates to deal with specific
questions of interpretation on a case by case basis.40
Reformers wanted to use the commissions to curb the power
and corrupt excesses of the trusts. But many industrialists
were also eager to establish a better defined set of ground
rules which ordered the relationship between government and
business. Many of them saw in the progressive solution a
system which would insulate businesses from (and to a certain
extent moderatel the fluctuating demands and pressures of
their political environment.
The increasing focus on institutions of national govern-
ment as any independent political issue, was also the result
of the interplay of other issues on the public agenda. The
tariff question continued to be a major issue concern of
political activists and one which did much to precipitate
the external call for the reform of the internal organiza-
tion of Congress. "The Progressive movement," Cordell Hull
suggested in his Memoirs, "broke on the country with a fury
following the enactment of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Bill.
The new tariff became the spearpoint of the attacks of the
progressive forces . . .against the many alleged evils
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calling for liberal remedies."41  The tariff dispute which
surrounded the 1910 Payne-Aldrich Bill increased the pressure
for Congressional reform because it symbolized for Progressives
the close and insidious relationship which existed between
parties and the trusts. The belief was fostered that neither
party, nor any other political organization could make any
progress toward tariff reform in a Congress organized along
existing centralized lines.
This delegitimization of the internal Congressional pro-
cess was further reinforced in the Public mind and elevated
to a national issue by the fortunes of other specific reform
crusades in the House and Senate. The Ballinger-Pinchot dis-
pute, for example, greatly heightened public impatience with
the Congress,42  as did House action on other conservation
measures such as the 1908 Appalachian-White Mountain Bill
which was blocked by Joseph Cannon and his supporters over
the objections of President Roosevelt and "the practically
unanimous opinion of the Republican Party throughout the
country." Concluded Outlook, a progressive magazine, "This
is what we mean by government by oligarchy." 4 3  Each of
these issues, and the manner in which Congress dealt with
them, combined to create the impression among a growing
portion of the voting public that useful popular reform was
impossible as long as the outmoded internal organization of
the House continued to allow a few leaders to exercise an
arbitrary, absolute and unresponsive power over the legisla-
tive process.
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Beginning in 1908, the national press began publicizing
the "evils" of Cannonism with a veritable deluge of articles
and features on Uncle Joe Cannon himself as well as on other
aspects of the internal structure of the House of Representa-
tives. 44 The 1908 Democratic Convention included the reform
of the internal procedures of the House as one of its goals
in the platform,45 and Progressive Republicans like Irvine
Lenroot of Wisconsin, who was that year running for his first
term in the House, found it politically useful to stress his
opposition to Cannonism. "We will never have representative
government in the House," Lenroot argued in his campaign
pamphlet, "with the present rules and Speaker Cannon."4 6
This campaign against the collective abuses of the legis-
lative system provoked a bitter and very divisive struggle
within the once united Republican party. Opposing camps with-
in the party rapidly advanced toward open rupture. "Shake
hands with Cummins, Dolliver, Bristow, Murdock, and a few of
the (other progressives in the Congress), the salt of the
earth," one Iowan wrote a friend, "and tell them that out here
in the west we admire them."4 7  Congressional letter boxes
were flooded with correspondence from constituents who had an
active concern over the outcome of the internal struggle which
approached its climax in 1910. "We believe in the cause of
the insurgents," a group of ditizens wired George Norris, a
leader of the anti-Cannon or insurgent faction of the Republi-
can House membership. "We are unalterably opposed to the
present 'system' under which laws are enacted by the few for
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the benefit of a few."48  And, "Down old Joe Cannon if
possible," was the cryptic injunction of another constituent. 49
Outside the Midwest, however, support for the insurgent
cause was weaker. One of the feelings "that I encounter
p frequently here (in the east) ..." Ray Stannard Baker wrote
Robert Lafollette late in 1910, "is that the insurgent move-
ment is largely an agricultural movement . . . In short many
) thoughtful Eastern people look upon the movement as sectional
in its character.n50  Even within the Midwest, there were
deep divisions between pro and anti- Cannon stands. "Dimicrats
and a fiew hot air yowlers that hav no political pricipals
will pat you on the back," one legislator wrote Norris from
his home state of Nebraska in questionable English, but in
terms that were clear enough. "But you are not fooling the
inteligent Men of the Republican Party that are Republicans
because they beleave in republican Principals."51
Cannon himself scoffed at the reform element in his own
party and accused them of seeking major changes with little
thought toward ultimate goals. "I am sometimes reminded,"
he later wrote, "of a newspaper waif I read many years ago:
I'm thankful that the sun and moon
Are both hung up so high
That no pretentious hand can stretch
And pull them from the sky
If they were not, I have no doubt
But some reforming ass
Would reconmmend to take them down
And light the world with gas.52
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Assured of the correctness of his position Cannon once re-
marked, "Yes, I know that I am a Czar in Democratic plat-
forms and in some moral-uplift magazines, but only just so
long as I have a majority behind me who like a Czar."53
Despite his outward composure and his characteristically
crusty complacency, however, little could mask the .fact that
his party was becoming wrenched apart by increasingly voluble
dissension. "The conditions are the worst I have ever.known
to exist in the Republican party," one advisor wrote President
Taft in 1909 of the state of the party in the Mid-west,
In a word, to use a popular expression, the issue
in the Middle West is sharply defined as "Cannonism"
and "Aidrichism".
If the party fail to pass from the control
of these men, then there will be a demand for a
new party, which5qhall comprise the independents
of both parties.5
Another wrote the President, "I have never seen the feeling
as strong as it is now since the Blaine vs. Cleveland cam-
paign." Taft's correspondent concluded that a Cannon victory
in the legislative battle then going on in the House of
Representatives would mean a massite Republican defection to
the Democrats, particularly in the Midwest in 1910 and possibly
in the 1912 Presidential elections. 55
Clearly, the internal divisiveness within the party,
borne out of the Progressive frustrations with the existing
structures of legislative decision-making worked to the
immediate advantage of the Democrats, but in the long run,
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neither party could find much profit in the reformist revolt.
For, in the end, the national progressive assault on coordina-
tive rule in Congress, and the break-up of the Republican
party which it effected, led to the evolution of a new poli-
tical order in which the substantive features of the nine-
teenth century form of majority rule -- the encouragement of
cumulative voting cleavages and the existence of accountable
national political parties -- would play a less central role.
The issue agenda of the early twentieth century contained
concerns of major importance to a democratic nation, but the
manner in which those concerns were debated, the forms of
conflict they engendered and the solutions which emerged from
that debate,more than anything else fragmented,55A and to a
certain extent obscured the lines of political conflict in
American politics.
Other issues and other concerns of this period tended
to reaffirm the fragmenting dynamic inherent in the Progress-
ive challenge to the nineteenth century form of democracy.
Foreign Affairs, for example, gained a new divisive relevance
in national politics in the closing years of the nineteenth
century as Americans became preoccupied with the debate over
the nation's imperial ambitions and responsibilities. To many
members of both parties, and both conservatives and progress-
ives, this expansionist impulse was at odds with American
traditions and ultimate self-interest. Some progressives
like Theodore Roosevelt and Albert Beverige were ardent
expansionists while others were equally committed anti-
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imperialists. Robert Lafollette was opposed to the scheme to
create an American empire as was William Jennings Bryan.56
Main-line Democrats and Republicans also opposed the movement
to acquire colonies overseas. Twenty-five Democratic Senators
(including Senator Gorman and Senator Mills), for example,
voted against the Treaty of Paris in 1899,57 and, many other
prominent supporters of the anti-imperialist cause were solid
party meoJbers. John Sherman, George S. Boutwell and Thomas B.
Reed5 8 from the Republican party opposed American expansionism
as did John G. Carlisle and Grover Cleveland of the Democratic
party. Other notables like Andrew Carnegie, Carl Schurz and
Charles Francis Adams, Jr., men of a more indeterminate parti-
san stamp, too lent their support to the cause.
Like so many other political questions raised in the
American public forum around the turn of the century, the debate
over foreign expansion in general (and the Spanish-American War
in particularl tended to bring the relationship between the
traditional ideals of the nation and its actual behavior into
sharp focus. Edward Atkinson, for example, charged that an
imperialistic course would bring the United States "down to
the level of the semi-barbarous states and nations of con-
tinental Europe." Expansionism, he asserted, was "uncalled
for, totally foreign to our system of government."59  Charles
Francis Adams, Jr., grandson of John Quincy Adams and a
patrician Mugwump, was equally uneasy about the acquisition
of overseas colonies. "We are blood guilty; and we are doing
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to others, in violation of our traditional policy and all
the teachings of history, what we have protested against
when attempted on us or doing elsewhere."6 0
At one point, in 1899, anti-imperialists, who had given
institutional shape to their ideals by creating the Anti-
Imperialist League in 1898, threatened to lead a bolt from
the two major parties and run a third party campaign in the
1900 Presidential election on the Spanish-American War issue.
The insertion, however, of an anti-imperialist plank in the
Democratic platform in June, 1900, largely at Bryan's request,
and the withdrawal of support and money by Andrew Carnegie in
January, 1900 from the proposed course, quashed the third
party idea.61 . For the most part, the anti-imperialist move-
ment subsided at this point, but, not before it had produced
yet another breach in the party system, and contributed to
an already growing disillusionment with the American political
system. This disillusionment extended as far as the powerful
Thomas B. Reed who, frustrated in his efforts to block the
Spanish-American War and the imperialist adventure, resigned
both the Speakership and his Congressional seat in 1899 and
left politics in disgust.62
World War I also brought foreign policy into sharp focus
as a political issue. The 1916 Presidential elections were
to a great extent fought over the issue of American neutrality
with both sides claiming their candidate was most committed
to the task of keeping the nation out of the European war.
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The entrance of the United States:.into that conflict in 1917
tended, however, to change public opinion from opposition to
support for America's war effort. As such, World War I did
not lead to the divisive intra-party bitterness which the
Spanish-American War had provoked. Yet, while divisiveness
was not a major problem for the parties of the War era (there
was of course some notable opposition to the war from the likes
of Robert Lafollette and George Norris), United States entry
into the European War did have other equally important con-
sequences for American politics. The war tended, for one
thing, to further obscure party distinctions and in a sense
accelerate the movement away from partisanship and party
government toward the more Progressive concept of public
management. The war effort was organized in a way, for ex-
ample, which circumvented Congressional politics. New war
time regulations were implemented by a host of new commissions
and executive agencies; representatives of trade associations
or large-scale industries became directly linked to the Federal
war effort through the establishment of special War Boards;
the demands of war financing taxed Congress' unstructured and
to some, capricious appropriations system and further under-
mined public confidence in that institution's ability to per-
form even its most essential duties effectively and wisely;
and finally the quasi-consensual political mood of the nation
led to a virtual suspension of overt partisanship both outside
the government and within at least for the duration of the
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War. The restoration of a more normal pattern of politics
after the war, revealed the extent to which World War I had
merely continued, if not accelerated, the compartmentaliza-
tion and in a sense the depoliticization of the American
policy-making system. The technocratic approach to politics
which the turn of the century America brought to its govern-
mental system was explicitly encouraged during the war, at
the inevitable expense of the more traditional decision-
making structures and processes.62A
The norms of political organization and the issue con-
cerns which emerged around the turn of the century, thus
complimented each other in their impact on political conflict
in the United States. The major coordinative institutions of
political organization -- the parties -- were weakened by
legislation, by regulation and by a growing popular dis-
enchantment with the idea of partisanship itself. Parties
were relieved of their virtual monopoly over the political
processes of the nation, replaced by a system which dis-
tributed power more widely among competing institutions of
authority. 'To be sure, parties continued to play a major --
perhaps even a predominant -- role in American politics well
after 1921, but their relative strength and their control
over the public decision-making process, particularly at the
national level were both severely restricted by the turn of
the century reformist movement. 63  As the public tendency
toward cumulative political cleavages, upon which mass parties
rested, declined; as regulations and new laws increasingly
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expropriated many of the resources of national party organi-
zations (the patronage arsenal, the forced contributions from
government workers to party coffers, the relatively central-
ized control over national political institutions); as state
and local party organizations became more autonomous and more
responsive to purely local issues, interests and concerns;
and as primary laws, voter registration laws, and ballot laws
came into wider.use, the ability of political parties to
coordinate, discipline and marshal their memberships into
cohesive national political coalitions declined. As the issue
agenda itself became more compartmentalized' (functionally as
well as regionallyl, both as a cause and a consequence of the
decline of the national party structures, national political
conflict became more fragmented and diffuse.
The emergence of the new political order at the turn of
the century, therefore, was essentially the story of the emerg-
ing triumph of particularism in national political affairs.
The emergence of particularism, in turn, was the result of
the weakening of the forces which in the nineteenth century
had served to moderate and dampen the fragmenting impulses
of America's diverse political culture and its segmented
constitutional structure. This fragmentation of the national
political process was at once caused by and symbolic of the
normative changes' in the public's manner of organizing its
demands and interests, and in the actual concerns which made
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up the national political agenda. This transformation was
) also reinforced and reflected by changes in electoral
patterns. Voter turnout declined throughout this era, for
example, whether because of restrictions on voting rights,
through outright disenfranchisement or through increased
apathy toward what Goodwyn terms the narrowing of the nation-
al political debate.64 Competitiveness, and voter participa-
tion declined in House elections and the power of incumbency
correspondingly increased dramatically, as candidates freed
from the demands of strong extra-local party ties were more
singlemindedly able to pursue campaigns based on a strong
allegiance to local issues, demands and concerns. The
increasing weakness of the national party structures in rela-
tion to local party organizations and to a certain extent the
new primary electoral system which allowed candidates to
circumvent parties altogether in the quest for national public
office relieved Members of Congress of the often difficult and
unappealing task of having to balance national allegiances
with purely local demands. Increasingly the transformation
of the national political system allowed candidates to direct
their attention, and their political appeals to the local
interests and concerns of those few people who voted for them.
A major effect of this dispersal of public attention was
the overall reduction of voter participation and presumably
interest in national elections. Table 3.1 shows the decline
in voter turnout at Congressional elections between 1878 and
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Table 3.1 -- Voter Turnout in Congressional Elections, 1878-1918(sources Walter Dean Burnham, 1977)
Year
1878
1880
1882
1884
1886
1888
1890
18921894
1896
1898
1900
1902
1904
19061908
1910
1912
1914
1916
1918
Average levels
1878-1896
Average levels
1898-1918
South
48.4%
63.7
51;9
61.8
42.0
61.6
44,7
57.8
47.2
57.0
23.8
27.9
18.6
28.7
20.6
25.4
18.6
29*9
14.8
Non-South
70.3%
84.9
70.0
82.8
70.6
87.0
70.4;
79.6
67.8
81*5651.
74.6
61.174.0
6069
64.2
58.5
66.445.8
53.6
25,8
77.3
.Total, U.S.A.
65.o0%
79.7
65.7
77.8
63.9
81.1
64.6
74.7
67.4
7769
60.1
72.4
63.952.0
63 6
51.6
55.7
50.1
38.8
39.9
71.8
5~.7
I I - - --
- I I-·
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1918. To be sure, part of this decline must be attributed,
as Jerrold Rusk and others have suggested, to the legal
impediments to voting enacted between 1896 and 1918. 66 Voter
registration laws, more stringent residency requirements and
other attempts to curb fraud at the polls played a role here
as did the institution of poll taxes, literacy tests and the
other mechanisms of disenfranchisement predominantl?%:used
in the South. Yet, the decline in turnout seems to have
stemmed as well from what Burnham and others have come to see
as an accelerating depoliticization of the national policy-
making process and indeed of the American political system.67
The progressive belief in public management, the twentieth
century decapitation of the party system all contributed to
this fragmentation-of the public's political focus. In under-
mining the:monopoly elective bodies had over the national
public policy-making process Cwhich undermined the party's
role in public policy-making), the architects of the new
pluralist order reduced the relative importance of govern-
mental institutions like Congress to the voters, and as a
result encouraged the decline in participation in the electoral
process.
As public attentiveness to national elective institu-
tions of government declined, the constraints- which had in
the nineteenth century bound Members of Congress to their
political environment also atrophied. This decay of the-links
between the Member of Congress and national political concerns
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and a national political constituency was a product, in part,
of the disintegration of the coordinative influences which
had been so important to nineteenth century representatives.
As the public Attachment to broad national political symbols
and ideals Csectionalism, for example, and the Civil War
ideology) declined, and as norms of political organization
shifted away from broad integrative structures, Members of
Congress were left relatively free of constraints on parochial-
ism. As the interests and attachments of their constituents.
became more fragmented, so too did the focus of the Member
of Congress become diverted toward more particularistic con-
cerns.
The constraints which bound the Member of Congress to a
local constituency were also visibly weakened in the first
two decades of the twentieth century. Most notably, levels
of competitiveness which, particularly outside the South, had
remained high throughout the latter part of the nineteenth
century, began a precipitous decline. Table 3.2 shows the
declining frequency of closely contested elections between
1878 and 1918 in an examination of five Congressional elections
in that period. It is evident that an increasing number of
seats were being won in the post-1900 period by wide margins
of victory. In the 1878 elections, for example, only 18 per
cent of the House membership had won its seat by a margin of
over 30 percent. By the time of the 1918 election, fully 47
percent of the House had been returned with such margins.
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Table 3,2 -- Proportion of Competitive to Non-Competive Seats
in Five Congressional Elections ýwtween. 1878
and 1918. (All Seats)
bVargin of Victory
10.1% to 30% 30.1% and above
1878 41% 316 187
1884 47 36 17
1888 48 34 18
1908 32 37 31
1918 24 30 47
Election 0 to 10%.
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Similarly, whereas 41 percent of the House membership elected
in 1878 had won by a margin of victory of ten percent or less,
only 24 percent of the 66th Congress (elected in 1918) were
from such competitive districts.
Clearly, the southern states produced the highest number
of non-competitive seats throughout this forty-year period.
In part, the product of the one-party system which had become
entrenched by the 1880's, the proportion of non-competitive
districts to competitive districts in the south nevertheless
continued its decline between 1878 and 1918 as Table 3.3
demonstrates. Whereas, for example, thirty-three percent of
the Representatives of the South Atlantic region were elected
by margins of over thirty percent in 1878, sixty-six percent
of that region's members were elected by such margins in 1918.
Competitiveness, however, also declined throughout the
nation. In 1878, for instance, only three percent of the
Representatives of the Middle Atlantic region were returned
to Congress with margins of victory of over 30 percent. By
1918, fully 47 percent of the elections in this region were
won by margins of over thirty percent. Even the Mid-Western
states, which had been so marked by high levels of electoral
competitiveness in the 1880's showed major shifts away from
close margins of victory. In the 1878 election, for example,
59 percent of the Representatives of this region won their
contests by a ten percent margin or less over their nearest
opponent. In 1908 this had declined to 44 percent and by
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Table '3.3 -- Proprtion of Competitive to Non-Competive Seats
in the Different Regions of the Country, 1878 to
1918 (46th, 49th51lst, 61st, and 66th Congresses)
Region* 46th Cong.49th Cong 51st Cong 61st Cong 66th Cong
0 30% 0
to and to
10% above 10%
New
England 39%
Middle
Atlantic 46
South
Atlantic 26
South
Central 19
.Mid-.
West 59
MIountain
Region 100
Far
West 80
30% o0 30% o 30% .0 30%
and to and to and to and
above 10% above 10% above 10% above
14% 38% .19% .46% 15% 28% 34% 28% 225
3 48 10 41. 12 23 22 25 47
33 37
41 32
27 49 33 26 58 20 66
33 32 38 28 53 18 70
7 63 5 62 3 44 9 27 29
0 50o .0 50 0 50 0 22 22
0 71 . 71 0 15 31 29 48
_ I L I I_
L L- _-__
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the time of the 1918 election, only twenty-seven percent
of the Mid-Western States' Representatives were elected by
a ten percent margin or less.
Because of the heavy reliance of the Democratic party
upon the southern region for its Representatives, its mem-
bers were far more likely to come from non-competitive dis-
tricts than Republicans. In the election of 1908, for
example, 47 percent of all Democrats in the House had won
their seats by margins of victory of over thirty percent,
and by 1918, well over half (64%) of the total Democratic
membership came from such districts (indeed, 55% had won
their seats by a margin of over 50%). Again, the contrasts
between these figures and those of the late nineteenth cen-
tury Congresses are striking. Compared to the 47 percent
and 64 percent figures for the Democrats in 1908 and 1918,
for example, only 28 percent of the Democrats of the 46th
Congress had won their seats by a margin of victory of over
30 percent. In subsequent Congresses these totals fluctuated
only slightly -- 22 Fercent in the 49th Congress and again
28 percent of the Democrats of the 51st Congress were elected
by a margin of victory of thirty percent or more.
The Republicans were far less likely to have won with
such overwhelming margins at any point during this period,
but, even their figures showed marked increases between the
late nineteenth century and the first two decades of the
twentieth century. In the three nineteenth century Con-
gresses surveyed, for example, the proportion of Republicans
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table 3.4 - Competiveness by Party in the Elections of 1908
and 1918 (percentages down bn parentheses).
61st
Congress
Dem Rep Other Total
.-. 66th
"' .. '" . ngress
Dem Rep Other
0% to 5%
5.1% to 10%
10.1%"to 20%
20.1% to 30%
30.1% to 40%
40.1% to 50%
50%'and above
29 36 2(17) (19) (25)
16 36(9) (17) 1(13)
69 23 30 3(18) (13) (15) (6)
53 1 27 4(13) (8) (!4) (8)
56
45(10)
35 58. 93 23 51 9 83
(21) (28) (0) (24) (13) (26) (18) (19)
10(6)
11
(6)
39(19)
15(7)
2(25)
0(0)
51
(13)
26(6)
6(3)
10(6)
5 15 2 22(3) (7) (25) (6)
35 4(18) (8)
22 4(
(11) (8)
45
(10)
36.(8)
6 9 8 23'(3) (5) (16) (5)
.64 7 1 72 99 24 18(38) (3) (13) (19) (55) (12) (36) 141(33)
170 208 8 386 181 198 50 429
4argin of
Victory Total
Totals
N.A.
_ I I_ I
-- L I I
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elected from highly non-competitive districts remained con-
sistently low (nine percent in 1878, eight percent in 1884
and seven percent in 1888). In 1908, however, seventeen
percent of the Republican election victories were by margins
of over thirty percent and in 1918 this figure had risen to
twenty-eight percent. Clearly, in other words, there was a
massive shift in the levels of competitiveness between the
1880's and the twentieth century in both parties. However
else the "System of 1896" affected the American political
system in the decades which followed, it was certainly accom-
panied by dramatic changes in the competitiveness of House
elections.
These widening margins of victory and the increasing
ease with which Congressional elections won, in turn constitu-
ted a significant relaxation of the external constraints
affecting individual Members of Congress in the House of
Representatives. Relieved of the acute sensitivity to the
peculiar and often contradictory demands (e.g. national vs.
local constituencies, and national vs. local demands and
interestsl of the nineteenth century electoral system, early
twentieth century Representatives were increasingly attentive
to and directed by the social and political dynamics at work
within the House,
The loosening of the electoral leash (both in the sense
that the political environment with its norms of political
organization, issue clusters and the process of political
coalition-building had changed, and also that Members of
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Congress were less strongly linked by elections to this
changed environment) during this era provided the Member of
Congress with an autonomy unknown to his nineteenth century
predecessors. Membership turnover, for example, declined
rapidly during this period as the environmental constraints
which had, among other things, underwritten the electoral
uncertainties of the nineteenth century Congressional career
weakened. The proportion of Freshman members which had
averaged 39.62 percent between 1878 and 1901, dropped to
24.99 percent between 1901 and 1921. In 1899, the turnover
rate reached its lowest level (30.1 percent Freshmen) in
the history of the House of Representatives, breaking a
record which had been set in 1881 in the 47th Congress. This
mark was itself surpassed in the next Congress (the 57th
Congress, 1901-19031 when turnout declined to 24.4 percent
and again in the 59th Congress Cl9Q5-19071 when the propor-
tion of Freshmen to non-Freshmen reached 21.0 percent and
yet again two years later when the figure declined to 19.9
percent in the 61st Congress. 71 As Table 3.5 shows, this
sharp drop in the turnover rate occurred in every section of
the country. The percentage of Freshman members was lowest
in the Northeastern states' delegation which in the 61st Con-
gress contained only three Freshmen (10%1 and which in 1919
had only two C6%L. The South Atlantic and Far West also had
relatively low turnover rates (15% and 16% in 1900 and 1919 in
the South Atlantic delegation and 8% and 19% in the Far West's
delegation.
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Table 3.5 -- First Term I.:embers as a Percentage of Total
membership of Each Regional delegation.
61st
Congress
Dem Rep Other Total
66th
Congress
Dem Rep Other Total
0% 12% 0o
21
10% 0% 8% 0% 6%
17 0O 16 45 29 16 27
8 38 0 15 11 4o o .16
16 36 0 19 15 55 o 20
15
25
0 8 0
20 18 25
100 23 13 28 - 50 26
42 20
8 50 33
42 0
o 19
19 18 29 13 22
.Region
New
England
Uiddle
Atlantic
South
Atlantic
South
Central
Mid-
West
Wlountain
Region
Par
West
Totals
L~ ·r -
- -- I - , _ _
I
r
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As these figures suggest, Members of Congress were not
only more secure from electoral defeat in the twentieth cen-
tury, than they had been in the late nineteenth century, but
they were also freer to serve longer terms in office. As
Table 3.6 shows, 33 percent of the members of the 61st Con-
gress had served five terms or more in office and in the
66th Congress, this figure had dropped only slightly to 28
percent. By contrast, only seven percent of the total House
membership had served five terms or more in the 46th Congress
and only fourteen percent in the 49th and 51st Congresses.
These figures reinforce the notion that consistently lower
rates of membership turnover were becoming increasingly
commonplace in the twentieth century as they had not been in
the nineteenth century.
To a certain extent, the dramatic decline in the turn-
over rates of the early twentieth century were the products
of an increasingly attractive Hjuse of Representatives.
As Table 3.7 shows, voluntary retirements from the House
declined both in relation to total membership and as a pro-
portion of the total number of members of Congress leaving
the House. Where, for example, 56 percent of the Members
of the 46th Congress who were not re-elected to the 47th
Congress, were those who did not choose to stand for re-
election, only 32 percent of the membership turnover between
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Table 3.6 -- Total Terms served by I.embers of Each Party An the
.61st and 66th Congresses. (Percentages down in parenthe-
ses)
Number of
Terms Served
61st
Congress
Dem Rep Other Total
66th
Congress
Dem Rep Other
one
two
three*
four
five
six
seveh
eight or
more
34 38(2d (18)
38 28(22% a3)
20 34(12) (16\
27 32(16) (15)
9 16
9 21
15) ( .
2
(25)
0100)
0
(o)
69
(1
(36)
.9)
2 8 e
8)7
26 2 12
214) ) 6(23)24 6 17(2 3) (3)30 23 9Q7) (I 1 (7)12g 11 3
16 -r5) (6)
13 5 0
12 7 .1
J? ! () U!327 20
v5) 46) 1).
170 212 8 . 390 _181 202 52
Total
9?(22)
70
(16)
85(20)
62(14)
33
c.8a)
18
20'
( 1)
_ I I_ __
L -- _ __
Totals
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the 61st and the 62nd Congress was attributable to voluntary
retirements, and only 31 percent of the turnover between the
66th and the 67th Congress was the result of a voluntary
withdrawal of the membership from the re-election contest.
As the House of Representatives entered the twentieth century,
in other words, the total number of Representatives actively
seeking to remain in Congress rose. In the 46th Congress,
for example, 75 percent of the members sought re-election.
In the 49th and 51st Congresses, this figure had dropped
slightly to 74 percent and 72 percent. By 1911, however,
85 percent of the members of the 61st Congress actively tried
for re-election while the figure was 83 percent in 1921.
Yet, while attractiveness, or the desire for re-election
was a necessary condition for sustained decreases in the
turnover rates, it was clearly not a sufficient condition.
The increasing desire to remain in Congress had to be accom-
panied by the growing probability that a Member of Congress
could actually be re-elected. Although, in other words, the
simple desire to seek re-election was at least a partial
function of the attractiveness of the House of Representatives'
internal world, it was, to an even larger extent, dependent on
the realities of the external electoral system. Changes in
the internal processes of the House, designed to make that
body more attractive to the careerist, it could therefore be
argued, were more the products than the cause of reduced turn-
over levels. It was the increased probability that
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Table 3.7 -- The Sources of i.:emb^"ship Turnover in the 61st and
66Th Congresses.
61st
Congress
Dem Rep Other Total
66th
Congress
Dem Rep Other
Died in
Office
Resigned
in Office
Unseated .
Did not Seek
Re-election
Defeated for
Re-election
or for
Renomination
Re-elected
Total not
Re-elected 29
Totil Seeking.
Re-election 150
4 *6 1 11 10 4 1 15
S 5 o 6 8 3 3 14
0 0 0 0 1 0 2 3
15 26 1 42 23 12
9 61. 1 71
141 114 5 260
98 3 130
9 44
50 9 6 65
89 174 31 294
92 28 21 141
6 331 139 183
Total
_ __ _ ·_ __ I
_ _ _ I
175 37 359
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progressively greater number of Representatives would in
fact be re-elected -- the result itself of declining electoral
competitiveness -- that allowed Members of Congress to direct
their energies toward the creation of a more alluring and
professionally rewarding internal House system.
This can be shown in a number of ways. We have already
noted (in Chapter 21 that voluntary retirements by Members
of Congress at the end of their two-year term, as well as
the probability of re-election, were both directly related
to competitiveness throughout the late nineteenth century.
This pattern continued into the twentieth century as Table
3.8 demonstrates. In the 61st Congress, for example, 33
percent of the active membership (i.e. those who had neither
died in office, resigned in mid-term or were unseated in a
contested election casel had been elected by a margin of
victory of ten percent or less. Yet, 43 percent of those
who decided against standing for re-election were from this
category, as were 48 percent of those who stood for re-
election but were defeated. In the 66th Congress the pro-
portion of the members elected from the more competitive
districts had declined to 25 percent. In that Congress,
23 percent of the voluntary retirees were from thiskcategory.
While voluntary retirees were thus slightly underrepresented
here, the proportion of those who sought retelection but
failed was a relatively high 43 percent. The declining re-
lationship between competitiveness and voluntary retirements
-214-
Voluntary Retirements, Unsuccessful Re-election
Attempts and Re-election by Cbmpetiveness in the
61st and the 66th Congresses (percentages doom in
parentheses).
A* B 0C* Total A'
10
(24)
14
6l 4
(5)
0
(.0)
2
(5)
20
(28%
14(rd·
24
(34)
2
')
.5(?)
95
54
59
(23)
69(19)
50
92
(7)
20
66'
61
2,739(zo)6G.4)
5.
2
(5)
12
(27)
B* C* Total
16q25)
16
2 5)
1
(6)
.)
13C29.
28lo)-
18
So;6)
104
(35)
58
?43
119\76
43
31
23-
129ý32
42 71 257 370 44 .65 294 . 403
A a blembers who retired at the end of their term
B IMembers who were defeated for re-nomination or re-election
C w bembers who were re-elected
Figures exclude those who died In office, resigned their seat In mid-term,
or woo were unseated in election con'ests.
Table 3.8 --
~argin of
Victory
0% to 5%
35.1% to 10%
10.1% to 20%
20.1% to 30%
30.i% to 40%
40.1% to 50%
50% and above
Totals
_ I I __I
_ L L __ I L_ _ _ _
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can be partially explained by the increasing attractiveness
of the House to its members which led them to seek re-election
irrespective of their chances. But, it can also be viewed
as the product of the relative increase in the number of mem-
bers who decided to retire after serving relatively long terms
in the House (whether for reasons of age or sheer weariness).7 6
In either case, the likelihood of re-election still tended to
increase, in the twentieth century, as competitiveness ca-
declined.77
These figures suggest two things. First, although the
decision to seek re-election continued to be conditioned by
external electoral realities (i.e. competitiveness), continued
membership in the House of Representatives was, by the first
two decades of the twentieth century, becoming more attractive
to incumbents. Despite electoral uncertainties, members from
both parties and from both competitive and non-competitive
districts were more likely to desire re-election in the first
two decades of the twentieth century than their precursors had
in the nineteenth century. Indeed, as Table 3.9 shows, the
effect of competitiveness in curbing the desire for re-election
diminished between 1878 and 1918. The decision to seek re-
election, in other words, is not as closely tied to com-
petitiveness in the later Congresses surveyed as it is in the
earlier ones (particularly the 46th and 49th Congresses).
At the same time, the actual proportionate re-election
rate (i.e. those who are successful in their attempt to gain
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Table 3.9 -- Peentages of Successful Re-election Attempts to
Total Seeking Re-election by Competiveness in the
46th, 49th, 51st, 61st and 66th Congress.*
Margin of
Victory
46th
Cong
49th
Cong
51st
Cong
61st
Cong
66th
Cong
A B A B A B A B A B
8% to 5% 67 63 68 77 74 61 86 68 88 69
5.1% to 10% 72 84 85 81 84 52 84 67 ? Q 70
10.1% to 20% 81 88 7?6 76 .77 75 85 69 88 76
20.1% to 30% 87 85 83 77 68 87 87 95 86 97
30.1% to 40% 93 100 78 79 .94 . 88 90 91 84 85
40.1 to 500 83 90 88 100 70 89 100o 80 91 86
50.1% and above- 87 95 81 76 84 82 97 92 91 89
A = Percentage of membership seeking Re-election
B = Percentage of those seeking Re-election who Succeed
*(All figures exclude those who either died in office, resigned
their seat in mid-term or wdo were unseated in election contests)
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re-election) remains relatively consistent throughout this
forty-year period in its relationship with competitiveness.
In 1878, for example, 63 percent of those members from the
most competitive districts seeking re-election were actually
successful. In the 49th Congress, this figure had jumped
to 77 percent, but in the 51st, the 61st and the 66th Con-
gress, it declined to 61 percent, 68 percent and 69 percent,
respectively. Similarly, of the total number of members
actively seeking re-election, 83 percent of the 46th Congress
were re-elected, as were 78, 69, 79 and 82 percent of the
49th, 51st, 61st and 66th Congresses. These figures thus
secondly show that decreases in competitiveness, far more
than the increasing attractiveness of the internal workings
of the House, explain the decline in the membership turnover
rates in the first decades of the twentieth century. This
implies further that internal changes in the House system
designed to render that body more attractive to its members
and more compatible with their careerist aspirations, were
the results of the external relaxation (in terms of com-
petitiveness) of the electoral link between constituents and
Members of Congress. The decline in competitiveness, and
the corresponding increase in seat security w'hich accom-
panied that decline, allowed individual representatives in
growing, and by the end of the first two decades of the
twentieth century decisive numbers to seek and ultimately
achieve the creation of an internal House of Representatives
reflective of the needs of long term careerists.
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The normative strictures against lengthy careers among
the voting public also declined as factors in Congressional
elections. As Struble notes, length of service as measured
by the number of terms served was no longer a negative attri-
bute for voters by the second decade of the twentieth cen-
tury. 79  Table 3.10 reaffirms this suggestion by demonstrat-
ing that the clear relationship between the number of terms
served and the likelihood of electoral defeat evidenced in
the late nineteenth century Congressional elections had, by
the early twentieth century, diminished. Whereas, in other
words, the probability of electoral defeat had risen almost
uniformly with the number of terms served in the nineteenth
century Congresses surveyed, in the twentieth century Con-
gresses surveyed tagainithe 61st and 66th Congresses) the
probability of re-election tended to vary independently of
the number of terms served. A visible change had occurred
between the late nineteetth and early twentieth centuries,
in the public attitude toward careerism in the House of
Representatives. This increased constituency tolerance of,
if not an active normative support for longer terms of
service for Members of Congress, constitutes an additional
indication of the extent to which the electoral tie was
loosening.
This increasing insulation from the electoral uncertain-
ties and fluctuations of the nineteenth century voting system
had a dramatic effect on the behavior of Members of Congress
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Table 3.10 - The Relationship 3etween Re-electoral Defeat and
the Total Number of Terms Served by ;iembers of the
61st and 66th Congresses (N;on-Southern Districts
Only).
Number of
S~embers Defeated
in Re-election 3id
Percentage of
Unsuccessful Re-election
Attempts to Total ..e:ber-
ship Seeking Re-election
First Term 23 22%
Second Term 14 .17
Third Term 18 22
Fourth Term 11 17
Fifth Term 5 18
Sixth Term 7 37
Seventh Term 6 27
Eighth Term or 10 23
MJore
Term of
Service
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in general, and on the patterns of conflict within the House
in particular. The influence of this increasing electoral
insulation was largely directed toward the growth of auton-
omy and independence of the Member of Congress. To be sure,
the simple decrease in the level of competitiveness in Con-
gressional elections masked locally important variations in
the recruitment of representatives. Intra-party contests
and primaries in dominant party districts were sometimes
close, even if the general election fights were not. Still,
the overall relationship between competitiveness and turnover
suggests that, in general, the Member of Congress of the early
twentieth century was far more secure in his seat than his
counterparts in the late nineteenth century. And, by and
large, this security tended, along with the other changes in
the American political system, to lead toward less cohesive,
less durable and more fragmented patterns of conflict within
the House of Representatives.
This fragmentation of conflict was inextricably linked
to the general and dramatic changes which occurred in the
last decade of the nineteenth century and the early decades
of the twentieth century. It was in part the product of the
weakening of the national party system and the compartmental-
ization of the national issue agenda. Members of Congress
were freed by these two transformations from important and
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powerful constraints on their behavior within the House.
Lines of accountability between the Member of Congress and
his constituents became altered, and political priorities of
both member of Congress and constituent became less well de-
fined, more variable and more diffuse. The increasingly weak
party lash and indeed the emerging respect for partisan inde-
pendence diminished the idea of party regularity.
The new distended issue agenda and the emerging vagueness
in the floating lines of political conflict in Congress' ex-
ternal world also tended to obscure the performance of the
Member of Congress from the view of the public. The tendency
of the voting population to develop long term, consistent and
broad political attachments declined as the tendency to view
political demand-making in discrete, issue-specific ways in-
creased. The signals sent by the political environment to the
House of Representatives, in turn, became less powerful as
they became less clear. Thus, as conflict in the American
political system became less coherent and well defined, the
links which had forcibly bound the House to its nineteenth
century political world weakened. Elections, too, declined
as a coordinative constraint (indeed it declined in many areas
as any kind of a constraint at all) as competitiveness at the
polls gradually disappeared and as voter participation dropped
off markedly. The dispersion of national political authority
to other Federal institutions also contributed to the insula-
tion of the House and the relaxation of the strong links which
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had formerly existed between Congress' inner world and the
national political environment.
Thus, conflict within the House became less and less the
function of cohesive, programmatic and sustained attachments
to broad and long-term ideological and partisan goals, and
more a reflection of particularistic differences over parochial
interests and demands, or over personal perceptions, desires
and ambitions. Increasingly unchained from the constraining
and integrative influence of its national environment, the
House of Representatives began, in the first decades of the
twentieth century, to develop patterns of conflict which were
more the product of an internal dynamic. Unchecked by account-
ability to coordinative pressures from the outside world (again
partially because those coordinative pressures were becoming
increasingly rare, and in part because the electoral links
were themselves weakening), Congress slipped further into a
conflict mode in which temporary coalitions, momentary issues,
personal goals and parochialism became predominant.
Clubb and Traugott have quantified this decline in par-
tisanship in a more precise manner. Party regularity in
general, they suggest, has shown a steady but cyclical ten-
dency to decline between 1861 and 1974. The cyclical upswings
in the indices of party cohesion or party dissimilarity, they
argue, correspond to the three realignment periods encompassed
by their study Cthe Civil War realignment, the realignment of
1896 and the New Deal realignmentl. These upswings, however,
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were each followed by perceptible declines in partisanship
within the House. As they point out, however, there were
considerable differences in the rates at which the cohesive-
ness, developed by massive party realignments, decayed. The
Civil War realignment, for example, was following by a rela-
tively slight decline in the levels of partisanship and party
dissimilarity in the House of Representatives (a moderate
negative slope of -.56). The realignment of 1896, by con-
trast, was followed by a significant decline (slope of -2.02).
This decay was even greater than the rate at which the levels
of party dissimilarity within the House of Representatives
declined between 1933 and 1974, and certainly far greater
than that which followed the establishment of the Civil War
party system. "On the one hand," Clubb and Traugott conclude,
this pattern provides at least limited confirma-
tion of the hypothesis that the stronger partisan
institutions and structures of the latter nine-
teenth century worked to attenuate the deteriora-
tion of the partisan alignments and coalitions
produced by the Civil War and Reconstruction.
The weakened, and weakening, partisan institutions
of the twentieth century, on the other hand, can
be seen as accentuating the deterioration of the
partisan alignments and cleavages 2roduced by
the realignments of 1896 and 1932. 1
Clubb and Traugott's indices of partisan cohesion in the
House of Representatives provide further indication that the
patterns of conflict in that institution in the early decades
of the twentieth century differed markedly from the patterns
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of the 1861-1897 period. In this latter period, for example,
Democratic cohesion declined with time while Republican co-
hesion increased.82  Following the realignme.t of 1896, how-
ever, both parties suffered extremely high rates of decay in
their levels of party cohesion C-1.19 for the Democrats and
-1.30 for the Republicans on all votes and -1.50 for the
Democrats and -1.51 for the Republicans on party votes). 83
In fact, these coefficients (once again, derived from a
regression line fitted to the changes in party cohesion over
time) for both parties are higher -- that is to say, the
decline is sharper -- in the 1897 to 1932 period than the
rates for either the Civil War era or the New Deal period.
To be sure, partisan dissimilarity and cohesion were initially
very high around the time of the 1896 realignment, primarily
as a result of the extraordinary levels of party cohesiveness
and unity among House Republicans throughout much of the
1890's. Nevertheless, by the end of the second decade of the
twentieth century, both Republicans and Democrats were as
fragmented internally as the Democratic party had been in the
1880's and early 1890's. Clearly, in other words, the period
following the 1896 realignment was one of major and very
rapid change in the patterns of conflict within the House of
Representatives. And, these new twentieth century transforma-
tions in the patterns of conflict within the House of Repres-
entatives provoked equally new and.dramatic changes in the
way the House's organizational system went about its task of
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creating and sustaining a workable consensus.
These internal changes in the patterns of conflict --
the movement away from partisan unity in the pursuit of legis-
lative goals -- were rooted, this chapter has argued, in the
broad transformations which occurred in the American political
system around the turn of the century. The fragmentation of
the patterns of conflict, it has suggested, was the product
of the decline of mass political mobilization along party lines
among the voting public, the incr:easing rarity of accumulative
and long term political coalitions, and the evaporation of
unifying national political symbols and ideologies. The emer-
gence of new competing structures, values and ideals dedicated
to a more particularistic and more segmented approach to poli-
tical decision-making, weakened the coordinative, and to a
certain extent, integrative forces at work outside Congress.
In the absence of such strong integrative and coordinative
forces, and in the wake of the relaxation of the electoral and
structural (i.e. partisan) links which bound the Congress in
general to its environment, patterns of conflict within the
House of Representatives took on forms which were consonnant
with an insulated social institution. Conflict became a
function of transitory coalitions, particularistic interests
and often parochial.external demands. And just as the House
of the nineteenth century had developed rules, norms and pro--
cedures designed to manage the lines of conflict apparent in
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that era, the House of the twentieth century was forced to
adapt itself to the new exigencies-of conflict in that evolv-
ing pluralistic environment.
The external political world of the nineteenth century
was vastly different from the world which influenced the
House of the early twentieth century. Because of its pervas-
ive partisan norms of political behavior and because of the
strong links which tied those external partisannnorms to the
internal world of the House of Representatives, the consensus
building system of the Congress was forced to respond to
relatively cohesive, disciplined and certainly well-defined
and consistent lines of conflict. By the end of the first
two decades of the twentieth century, however, this pattern
of conflict had given way to less well-defined, more variable
and more diffuse lines of conflict.
These changes in the patternsoof conflict were largely
the result of changes in the external political world, but
they had real consequences for the ways in which the Congress
went about its task of effecting some sort of legislative con-
sensus. Forced by new external norms of political organiza-
tion, by issue agendas it could only marginally control, by
issue coalitions increasingly tied to particularistic and
more specific policy goals, and by a changing electoral system,
to manage changing forms of conflict and to reconcile new and
more diverse interests, needs and ambitions, Congress' form
of internal organization -- its ongoing response to the need
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for a system of conflict resolution -- transformed itself.
Gradually, but persistently throughout the first two decades
of the twentieth century, the nineteenth century House of
Representatives assumed its contemporary form.
-228-
CHAPTER IV
Democratic Factionalism and
The Legislative Process
1878 - 1895
The legislative process is constructed around the forms
of conflict it must contain and manage. As Chapter I has
suggested, Congressional behavior is determined, structured
and indeed, defined by the specific problems varying patterns
of conflict introduce into the House political system. The
roots of Congressional behavior -- and by extension, the
sources of Congressional change -- are to be found in the
forces which produce conflict within the House. As has been
argued already, this internal conflict is most centrally the
product of forces working in Congress' political environment.
Conflict within Congress, in other words, is a function of
the demands and issues which animate American political life
in general; of the manner in which these demands and issues
are organized in the American political system as a whole;
and of the ways in which the competition between issue sets
and divergent interests intrude upon the Congressional process
(i.e the ties which link the House to the broader political
struggles occurring in its political environment).
As Chapters II and III have suggested, the nature of
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political competition in American politics in general under-
went a number of dramatic changes between 1878 and 1921. The
changes in Congress' political environment throughout this
period, in turn, produced often equally dramatic changes in
the nature and patterns of conflict within the House of Rep-
resentatives. The relative fragmentation or coherence of
conflict tended to vary with the party in power, with the
extent to which one party controlled the different branches
of the Federal government, with the extent to which the con-
straints of the electoral system were strong or weak, and
with the cohesiveness or divisiveness of the ideological or
issue-bound coalitions which existed within the American
electorate.
As conflict varied within this period, so too did the
nature of the House's internal system of rules, and the
character of its norms of membership behavior vary. In
periods of fragmented conflict, internal decision-making
structures themselves fragmented, and power tended to be
more widely distributed among the membership. Norms of
individualism and constituency service predominated, and
sensitivity to the idea of minority rights in the legisla-
tive process emerged triumphant. By contrast, in times when
more polarized and more accumulative patterns of conflict
were evident (e.g. when partisanship within the House was
strong), power became more centrally exercised, decision-
making was more likely to be coordinated, and the cry
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"majority-rule" became the normative (indeed almost the
ideological) standard to which members were forced or were
predisposed to conform.
Clearly, the transformation of the American political
system after 1896 produced sweeping changes in the patterns
of conflict, and in turn in the normative and structural
features which characterized each House. Within the gener-
ally partisan 19 century period (1878-1895), however, there
were also some major variations in both the styles of conflict
within the House, as well as the manner in which the Members
of the House responded to those changing and divergent styles
of conflict. Periods of Democratic control, for example,
tended to produce normative and organizational responses which
differed significantly from those periods of Republican domin-
ance. The Democratic approach to legislative organization be-
tween 1878 and 1895 differed quite markedly from that taken by
the more unified, coherent and disciplined Republican party
during the same period of time. Indeed, in many ways, this
unique and fragmented Democratic approach to the Congressional
process produced a preview of the way tle House of Represen-
tatives would later respond to its pluralist twentieth century
environment.
The following chapters, then, will be devoted to a more
detailed examination of the ways in which the House actually
responded to these fluctuations and changes in its political
environment, and the manner in which it responded, over time,
to the patterns of internal conflict which those environmental
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changes forced upon it. Specifically, each chapter will deal
with the ways Members of Congress in four different periods
between 1880 and 1921 struggled to reconcile the patterns of
conflict they brought with them into the legislative process
with the need to manage and resolve those varying forms of
conflict and disagreement.
Each chapter will focus upon a different period of Con-
gressional reorganization in an effort to demonstrate the
continuing sensitivity of the legislative process -- and
indeed the sensitivity of the membership itself -- to the
changing structural, normative and procedural imperatives of
conflict within the House. The distinctive forms of conflict
the Congresses of each of these periods confronted, were met
by equally distinctive responses. As the following chapters
will attempt to show, the character, the norms and the formal
procedures each of these Congresses ultimately designed and
constructed were pre-eminently the products of Congress' on-
going struggle to reconcile the legislative process with the
forms of dissensus it was forced by its changing political
environment to manage and resolve.
This chapter will begin the examination of the organiza-
tional response of the House of Representatives to the vary-
ing patterns of conflict it was forced to manage, with a
description of the approach the Democratic party took to the
legislative process between 1878 and 1895. It will begin
with a brief view of the Democratic legislative party during
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this period, with particular emphasis on its internal lack
of unity and its recurrent and chronic problems of factional-
ism. Focussing on the 46th and 49th Congresses, it will
secondly attempt to describe the historical setting, and
explain the timing of the formal organizational changes which
the Democrats brought to the legislative process of the late
nineteenth century. Finally, and most significantly, this
chapter will argue that the content of these formal organiza-
tional changes was also quite clearly the product of forces
and events working in the immediate political environment of
the House of Representatives.
In particular, this chapter will stress the impact of
Democratic divisiveness on the nature of that party's organiza-
tional approach to the legislative process. Above all, this
divisiveness tended to produce an atrophy of the central organs
of political power in the House; a formal recognition of the
rights and prerogatives of sub-groups (if not individual mem-
bers); and a marked dispersion of decision-making responsibility.
In a highly partisan age, the Democrats were curiously divided
whenever they controlled the House, and many of the organiza-
tional changes brought about within Congress during the years
of this control reflected (and can be most centrally explained
by) this disunity. Subsequent chapters will elaborate upon
this point by demonstrating the extent to which the Democratic
approach differed measurably from the Republican approach to
legislative organization during the same general period of
time. As will be shown, the differences between the
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Republicans and the Democrats in terms of the patterns of
conflict each had to manage and contain, in the levels of
dissensus each had to confront when they controlled the House,
led to important differences in the legislative system each
party produced in the late nineteenth century.
Two specific actions by the Houses of the late nineteenth
century will be used as illustrations of both the strategic
problems the Democratic party faced whenever it found itself
in control of the lower chamber, and of the unique organiza-
tional responses which these problems led it to make. The
Revision of 1880 and the Reform of the Appropriations process
in 1885 both reflect the problems the Democratic party faced
in attempting to pursue its goals (or its members' goals),
serve its diverse and divided constituency, and produce
legislation. The former was a mild attempt to simplify and
streamline the existingrrules of the House -- one which pro-
duced few major changes in the way the House actually behaved.
The Revision did, however, produce for the first time since
1860 a real debate over the naturesof rules-making, and over
the central tenets of legislative organization, and a con-
scious examination of the basic behavioral norms and struc-
tural characteristics which animated Democratic Houses of
Representatives in the late nineteenth century. In the end,
the Revision of 1880 did little more than produce a formal
and explicit reaffirmation of what had since the mid-1870's
served as the quintessential Democratic approach to law-
making. As such, however, it provides a number of valuable
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insights into the ways Members of Congress (particularly
Democratic Members of Congress) tended to view their pro-
fession; why they held the views they did; and finally, how
those views affected the design of the legislative process.
The Reform of the Appropriations process in 1885, mean-
while, had a much more immediate and visible impact on the
legislative system. At the same time, the debate itself,
while more intense, was far less comprehensive in its examina-
tion of House procedures than the Revision of 1880. By and
large, the 1885 reform was aimed at a redistribution of power
and authority away from the Appropriations Committee. To be
sure, this had a significant impact on the legislative process,
but the questions raised during the consideration of this re-
distribution, and the range of opinions expressed were not as
great or as far-reaching as those which had emerged in the
1880 debate. Still, although the debate over this action was
far less comprehensive in scope than that which surrounded the
Revision of 1880, it does nevertheless provide another impor-
tant view of the manner in which Democratic Members of Congress
reconciled, from time to time, the legislative process with
their own unique goals, the expectations of their constituents,
and the varying patterns of conflict and disagreement which
the pursuit of those goals and expectations produced.
Both the Revision of 1880 and the Reform measure of 1885,
then, serve as useful indicators of the ways in which Democratic
Congresses in the late nineteenth century dealt with the problem
of constructing a consensus out of a particularly fragmented
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membership. Both also serve to demonstrate the responsive-
ness of the rules, the norms and in effect the character of
the House to the unique style of conflict nineteenth century
Democrats brought to their legislative task.
It is clearly appropriate to begin the examination of
the late nineteenth century legislative process with a dis-
cussion of the peculiar coalition problems the Democrats
faced in this era. More than anything else, the behavior
of the Members of the House and their approach to le 'is-
lative organization during periods of Democratic control
were the direct outgrowth of the particular patterns of
divisi*eness and disarray which marked that party between
1860 and 1895. This disunity within the Democratic party
can be seen quite clearly in contemporary press reports, in
the private correspondence of the legislative actors directly
involved, and in the more dispassionate observations of the
political analysts of the day. Of this latter group, Woodrow
Wilson provides, in his classic treatise on the Congress of
the 1880's, a useful introduction to the style and the traits
of the Democratic House of Representatives during this period.
In 1885, Wilson published his Doctoral Dissertation
entitled Congressional Government. Working at Johns Hopkins
University in an academic discipline newly imported from
Europe, Wilson brought to his task ideas which were also
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borrowed from European political thinkers. Walter Bagheot
was a particularly notable influence on Wilson's emerging
view of the American political process.1  Evident in
Congressional Government, for example, was Bagheot's notion
of the inevitable supremacy of the legislative branch over
the executive in modern political systems. Thus, Wilson
stressed the power of Congress in the Federal system, and
the dominant role it played in national public policy-making.
To understand the American political system, he believed, it
was necessary to understand how the United States Congress
worked.2
Armed with the broad assumptions of legislative politics
derived from Bagheot and others, Wilson nevertheless produced
an insightful and in many ways original view of how Congress
actually functioned. The Congress of the early 1880's, he
suggested, was essentially a Government of Committees -- a
"disintegrate ministry" -- where powerful and often autonomous
Committee Chairmen held uncontested sway over large portions
of the Federal policy making process. 3 Yet Wilson also noted
the existence of other, more centralized sources of power in
the nineteenth century House of Representatives. The impor-
tance of the committees, he conceded, conferred an extraordin-
ary amount of power upon the Speaker who in the nineteenth
century appointed the committees.
The most esteemed writers upon our Constitution
have failed to observe, not only that the stand-
ing committees are the most essential machinery
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of our governmental system, but also that the
Speaker of the House of Representatives is the
most powerful functionary of that-pystem. So
sovereign is he within the wide sphere of his
influence that one could wish for accurate
knowledge as to the actual extent of his power.
Bound as it was, in other words, to a fragmented decision-
making system, the House nevertheless contained countervailing
institutional structures capable of manipulating and coordinat-
ing that system.
Despite the tendency of modern scholars, therefore, to
invoke the Committee Government characterization of the nine-
teenth century House of Representatives, Wilson himself was
much more tentative and almost ambivalent about the role of
committees in the legislative process. While it is true that
he did emphasize the strength of the committees and their
independence, he was never able to dismiss the contradictory
idea that there were forces (if sometimes latent) which were
in fact capable of controlling the fragmented committee system.
Wilson's struggle with this point is evident throughout his
treatment of the House. While the Lower Chamber is fragmen-
ted, he argues, by Its reliance on the committee-based decision-
making system, there nevertheless exist sources of power and
authority within that body which are fully capable of imposing
a measure of coherence, on the legislative process. This
Wilson concedes, for example, in his treatment of the Speaker
and the party caucus. 5  Ultimately, however, Wilson comes
no closer to an explanation Cor indeed angexplicit recognition)
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of this structural contradiction which exists within Congress
between the forces of fragmentation and those of coherence
than the rather weak conclusion that one predominates over
the other depending on the character and competence of the
Speaker himself. "Mr. Speaker's powers," he writes:
cannot be known accurately, because they vary
with the character of Mki Speaker. All Speakers
have, of late years especially, been potent
factors in legislation, but some have, by reason
of greater energy or less conscience, made mgre
use of their opportunities than have others.
Clearly,. however, the impediments to the centralization
of power in the House of Representatives were not to be found
solely in the character flaws of the men the Democrats ele-
vated to the Speakership between 1878 and 1889 (as Wilson
implies). Rather, it was the divisiveness and disunity of the
party itself which precluded the exercise of strong.:central
control and which underwrote the fragmented committee system
Wilson so clearly described. Temporarily tnified in 1877
over the contested Presidential election of 1876 CThe Crime
of '76 to many ardent Democratsj, the Democratic coalition
quibkly disintegrated into often bitter factionalism as the
1880's approached. Leadership contests within the party
became more divisive and issue differences which had been
repressed by the sense of collective outrage with which most
Democrats* had met the final decision of the electoral
commission in- 1877 (to deny Samuel Tilden's election}7
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resurfaced in more fractious form.. The point which in the
end seems to elude Wilson's grasp, therefore -- and the
point this chapter seeks to make -- is that while the House
of Representatives of 1885 was indeed capable of coherence
(at least structurally), its dominant party, the Democratic
party, was not.
The Democratic party, as we noted in Chapter II, con-
tained deep divisions over the major political questions of
the day -- divisions which were not readily healed by even the
most adept leaders. "The surest way to defeat the Democrats,"
the New York Tribune crowed, for example, "is to let them'talk.
One of the result§ of the financial debate will be to set them
quarreling among themselves."8 Attempts to unite party factions
were constantly thwarted by such fundamental disagreements as
those which existed over the tariff question. Protectionists
such as Speaker Samuel J. Randall were bitterly opposed by
the strong and vocal tariff reform wing made up largely of
Southerners, but led by Illinois Congressman William Morrison.
As early as 1879 Randall found himself locked into a major
struggle with Morrison over the tariff and in turn over the
leadership of the Democratic legislative party. 9  The rift
between the two men, and indeed between the two sides of this
issue, defied compromise.
Speakership contests in the Democratic party caucus be-
came major tests of strength between implaccably opposed
factions, and the bitterness with which they were waged did
little to provide the ultimate victor with the base of support
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necessary to strengthen the office. As Richard Vaux sugges-
ted to Randall in the midst of the caucus battle for the
Democratic nomination for Speaker in 1879, "The bitterness of
the other side augurs badly for the unity of the Democratic
party in this the critical moment of its fortunes."10 Even
after his election, therefore, Randall continued to be plagued
by attempts of his own party members to undermine both his
personal prestige as well as the authority of the Speakership.
Daniel Ermentrout, for example, wrote Randall early in the
special session of the 46th Congress to suggest that he post-
pone naming his committees until later in the year. Arguing
that the Southern Democrats were trying to take control of the
Democratic legislative party as well as the House, Ermentrout
warned Randall r,3t to add to the tension and rancour by rush-
ing through his committee nominations. "The demand for
immediate appointment of committees," Ermentrout argued, "is
for the purpose of beginning to break down your influence as
far as possible, by the usual dis-satisfaction attending
announcement of Committees."11
John G. Carlisle, who became Speaker in the 48th Congress,
and who represented the Southern and Tariff reform wing of the
party faced much the same situation as Randall. Like Randall,
he too found himself hobbled throughout his Speakership by
intense factional warfare. "The Democratic Speaker Carlisle",
Matthew Johnson related:
found the utmost difficulty in making up the various
Congressional committees without splitting his
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.followers into warring classes. There was no
agreement among Eastern, Western and Southern
Democrats upon the tariff question, or upon
the currency question. At critical moments
Carlisle could never depend upon his party for
harmonious action. A quorum would actually be
lacking upon the day when the Speaker of the
House must be chosen. In Congress, the Demo-
cratic party made an unfortunate impression
of inconsistency and indiscipline.
Party regularity was at a discount during these years
as divisions within the Democratic party often produced opposi-
tion to stands taken by the leadership which was often more
vocal and bitter than that which emerged from the Republicans
across the aisle. Indedd, the Democratic Members of Congress
of the back benches (dubbed the "Barbary Coast" by reporters 3 )
were consistent only in their apparent devotion to the cause
of upsetting the efforts their own leadership in the House
to create a measure of programmatic unity and harmony. "The
topics uppermost -- the Silver Question and tariff revision,"
Henry Ward suggested in 1885, "divide . . . the sentiment of
the Lower House not at all on party lines . . . There is no
politics by party lines just now."14
This fragmentation of the Democratic Patty, and its
inability to produce a significant consensus over public
policy had a decisive impact on the organizational style, on
the structure of the decision-making process, and on the norms
which dominated the interaction of members during periods of
Democratic control. In the absence of an internal partisan
consensus, the Democrats were forced to construct a legislative
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system which would itself do what the Democratic party
organization could not -- provide a forum and the necessary
institutional mechanisms for settling differences, resolving
conflict and insofar as it was possible, make decisions.
The*Democratic approach to the design and construction
of a legislative process in the late nineteenth century,
then, was clearly guided by the peculiar patterns of dis-
array which that party contained. This is apparent in a
view of the general character of the Democratic concept of
legislative organization, as it was in the timing of the
specific procedural reforms which the party enacted. This
disarray, in turn, as well as the manner in which the Demo-
cratic Houses of the late nineteenth century went about the
task of building a suitable and workable legislative system
were both very much the product of the broader relationship
which linked the House to its political environment. The
way that political environment left its mark on the internal
world of the House of Representatives, and indeed the unique
way both world interacted during the periods of Democratic
control, provide ample evidence that the behavior of the
nineteenth century Congress was extremely sensitive and res-
ponsivre to forces and events working beyond the narrowly
defined limits of its internal world.
The significance of immediate environmental forces on
internal House behavior is perhaps clearest in an examination
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of the timing and the sources of the Revision of 1880 and
the Reform of 1885. The origins of the Revision of 1880,
for example, were rooted, according to the few modern scholars
who have examined it, in the almost purely internal desire of
the House leadership (of both partiesl to streamline and
systematize the formal procedure which regulated the legis-
lative process. 15  Most of these students of Congressional
history invoke the preamble to the Revision itself, which
argued that "The objective point with the committee (on rules)
was to secure accuracy in business, economy of time, order,
uniformity and impartiality."16  The origins of the Revision,
these observers .suggest, lay in the growing frustration of
the members with the old rules -- "the accretion," in James
A. Garfield's words, "of ninety years practice" thrown
"together by a mere accident of time and place" .....
The thing most needed is to simplify the present
rules of the House, and if we did not make a
single material change in the rules, we might
get them put in order and when any collision of
the rules is found, to rectify that collision
and make them clear and plain.17
The notion that the Revision of 1880 grew out of this frustra-
tion with existing rules and an almost "modern" preoccupation
with functional efficiency, reinforces internalist assumptions
about the developmental dynamics of the House and the institu-
tionalizing. tendencies df comfplex organizations.
A closer examination of the circumstances surrounding the
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growth of the support for a revision of the rules of the 46th
Congress, however, provides a q~ite different explanation.
While frustration with the tangled'.mass of rules certainly
played a role in pushing the House toward revision, non-
Congressional considerations and environmental forces played
an even greater part. In particular, the need for party
calm in a Presidential election year provided the Democratic,
as-. well as the Republican leadership with a far more compell-
ing reason for wanting to set the legislative agenda around
a non-controversial consideration of the rules.
Democrats seems particularly attentive to the need for
political calm, since for the first time in twenty-four years
they could reasonably look forward to the election of one of
their own to the Presidency-'in 1880. Nursing that possibility,
therefore, became a major preoccupation of Democratic leaders
in the House of Representatives. Indeed, one of the contest-
ants for the:Democratic nomination -- to many Samuel Tilden's
chosen heir -- was speaker Randall himself,18A who was thus
especially eager to dampen Democratic divisiveness and to
calm the irrascible southern wing of the party. "There mast
be a changed state of things'.in the south, and southerners
must be a little less conspicuous and a little more careful
what they say in Congress," was one Democrat's prescription
for victory in 1880, and Randall tended to agree. Respond-
ing to another party leader, the Speaker wrote, "I agree with
you as to the policy of the present House -- a short session,
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reduction of expenditures, little speech-making .. ..19
This sensitivity to the need for party calm was particularly
pressing in the wake of the bitter and explosive extra session
of 1879 which had produced the highly publicized and extremely
controversial fight between the Democratic House and the
Republican President Hayes over the Army Appropriation Bill.
The Revision of 1880, then, promised to dampen or at least
defer tensions and mute the internal divisiveness which had in
part revealed itself"during the extra session. Consideration
of the rules, Randall hoped, would steer Congressional debates
away from the questions most likely to inflame Democratic
factional passions -- the tariff and the currency question.
He also hoped it would allow him to postpone until the latest
possible moment the inevitable and usually volatile'debate
over the annual Appropriations bills. In sum, Randall wanted
to divert the attention of both the public and his party
colleagues away from the fundamental disunity which existed
within the Democratic ranks.
In June of 1879, therefore, Randall proposed to the House
that a select Rules Committee composed of Alexander Stephens
of Georgia, Blackburn of Kentucky, and Randall from the Demoz
cratic party, and William Frye of Maine and James A. Garfield
of the Republican side, meet over the summer recess to
"condense and codify the rules. '20  Garfield, leader of the
minority Republican party in Congress, like Randall, was also
eager to design a legislative agenda for the upcoming session
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which would essentially mark time until after the 1880 presi-
dential elections. For he, too, had h1s eyes on the Presidency.
The committee met in August at Long Branch, a resort on
the northern New Jersey shore, afidst only mild public interest,
and quickly and amicably drafted a proposed recodification of
the rules. There was little disagreement within the rules
committee over the report. Indeed, "The committee determined
at the very threshold of their labors . . . that their reported
revision should be the unanimous action and agreement of the
committee.",21
This lack of controversy within the committee largely re-
flected the corresponding lack of interest most committee mem-
bers felt for the project. Alexander Stephens, alone among
his colleagues felt a real need for a streamlining of the
cumbersome rules of the House, and consequently took the
Committee's publicized task quite seriously. The others evi-
dently did not share Stephens' abiding belief in the need for
reform. Randall's own conversion to the idea of reform had
clearly not come until the closing days of the extra session
and only then after he had latched upon the idea as a useful
means of spreading calm on the troubled waters of Democratic
divisiveness. So late had this conversion to the cause of
reform come, for example, and so late had the decision to hold
the conference been made, that Randall had difficulty securing
hotel reservations for the committee in Long Branch.22 Frye,
meanwhile, was late in arriving, and Garfield made every effort
to ensure that his own stay was as short as possible. 23 In the
-247-
end, the committee drafted a report which did little more
than reorganize the rules manual (although a few substantive
changes were proposed) and provide a non-controversial agenda
for the upcoming winter session.
As contemporary accounts show, the Long Branch rules
report had its intended effect. As debate over the proposed
revision, begun in early January, 1880, dragged on into
March, an exasperated press corps, which had eagerly anti-
cipated more of the conflict and rancour which had character-
ized the stormy special session of the previous year, vainly
sought for news in what quickly became known as a "do-nothing
Congress. "24 As Harper's Magazine reported:
Congress is in session, but the news from
Washington is very meagre and uninteresting.
The general object evidently is avoidance.
The Democratic fingers were so terribly burned
in the extra session . . . that the majority
in Congress is mainly anx Hus to do nothing
and see what comes of it.
Another observer judged the behavior of the House of Repres-
entatives during this period as "the dullest session I have
ever seen."26
Yet, the dullness was calculated, as most reporters were
quick to point out. "The politicians are engaged in forming
Presidential combinations, and none of them have any time to
waste in transacting the business of the session. "27 Debatee
over legislation likely to produce the kind of conflict which
erupted in the extra session of 1879, particularly tariff or
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financial kappropriations) legislation, was to be avoided
until the last possible moment. "The discussion of the new
rules," a New York Times correspondent reported:
has materially assisted in guarding the House
against financial matters, and there seems to
be a disposition on the part of the majority
on both sides to nurse the new rules until the
regular appropriation bills are ready for
presentation and consideration.28
The Revision of 1880, then, provided the Democrats, and
to a certain extent the Republicans, with what they most
needed in a Presidential election year -- a measure of calm
and an outward illusion of party consensus and unity. This
was probably recognized throughout the Democratic party, but
the idea of treading water until the November election was
probably most attractive to the Tilden faction to which
Randall was allied. This group had come to the conclusion,
during the stormy extra session of 1879, that the only issue
upon which they could unite the Democratic party and win the
coming election was that of the Republican behavior during
the contested election of 1876. It was believed that an
appeal to the electorate to reverse that political crime
could alone produce a modicum of party unity and win votes in
every section of the country.
Randall thus hoped that the consideration of the Revision
of the rules would work to divert the attention of Democrats
(within as well as outside of the House) away from the issues
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which divided the party and toward the one issue (the fraud
issue) which still promised to unite it. "It strikes me
that the whole matter is plain enough," Perry Belmont con-
ctuded in a March, 1880 letter to Senator Thomas Bayard of
Delaware (one of Randall's rivals for the Democratic Presi-
dential nomination),
that Randall and the rest of Tilden't creatures
in Congress have purposely and systematically
stood in the way of any Democratic measure of
tariff reform, finance or whatever else might
have been done by two Democratic Houses because
they have, in the Tilden interest, endeavored
to deprive the Democratic party of any other
issue but the one of having been gfrauded by
the electoral decision (of 1877).
Clearly, the Revision of 1880 was a prime instrument of this
general strategy of bringing the focus of the Democratic party
back to the one issue which could ensure success, both for the
party and not so incidentally for Tilden and Randall, in the
approaching Presidential election.
Just as the Revision of 1880 appeared in response to
the immediate strategic needs of the dominant wing of the
Democratic party in the House, so too was the emergence of
an Appropriations reform measure in 1885 tied to the political
needs of yet other segments of the party. Although the suppor-
ters of a redistribution of the powers of the Appropriations
committee suggested that their efforts were largely aimed at
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unblocking the log jam of Appropriations bills which were
inevitably brought to the floor of the House during the last
weeks of each session (and usually under a suspension of the
rules which limited debate and often forbade amendments),30
two broad issues, and a few smaller ones provided the immediate
spur to the reform movement of 1885. The tariff and federal
spending, and the debate both concerns provoked within the
Democratic party were largely responsible for the emergence
of a desire to curb the power of the Appropriations Committee
and its powerful chairman Samuel J. Randall. Commitee
chauvinism and executive-legislative competition may also
have played a role in sparking the anti-Randall and anti-
Appropriations committee struggle, but the tariff and the
desire to increase member access to the federal treasury were
the paramount issues at hand.
The tafiff played a curious role in the 1885 reform of
the Appropriations committee, For years the center of an
increasingly vituperative conflict between the proponents
of protection and the supporters of reform, the tariff issue
had, by 1885, become a personal struggle between Samuel Ra-dall
(leader of the protectionist wing of the Democratic party,3 1
who had been named chairman of the Appropriations Committee
in 1883 after losing the Speakership to fellow Democrat John
G. Carlisle) and William Morrison, who as Ways and Means
Committee Chairman was just as deeply committed to the cause
of tariff reduction. Relations between the two had never
been good,3 2 but they became most visibly strained in 1884
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when Randall and his Democratic allies ("The Forty Thieves")
voted with the Republicans to defeat (actually to strike out
the enacting clause of) Morrison's proposed bill to reduce
tariff schedules. 3 3  Randall's opposition to this bill, and
his power as Appropriations Chairman to block legislation by
manipulating the House calendar, by using of dilatory tactics
and by using the resources of his committee to engage in log-
rolling, made him a central target of tariff reformers. 34
As free trader Henry Watterson declared in his influential
newspaper, the Louisville Courier-Journal, Randall could
expect little gratitude from a Democraticpparty upon which
he had so clearly turned his back during the fight over the
Morrison bill.3 5
Dismay at Randall's performance during this 1884 tariff
struggle quickly turned into a concerted effort on the part
of tariff reformers to curb Randall's power, and weaken the
Appropriations Committee. As Morrison himself noted to free
trade economist David Wells, "Without amending the rules
. . . old Kelly, Wittend, Randall and Co. can prevent our
reaching anything as our calendar is already lumbered up."36
AS long as Randall controlled the appropriations process, the
emerging Democratic allegiance to tariff reform would never
see the light of day. "Randall, Eaton and the like,", he
lamented, "do not intend the Democratic party to succeed
except upon conditions which will enable them to control it
in the interest of protection.' 37 As the St. Louis
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Globe-Democrat concluded:
When Mr. Morrison declares, therefore, that his
object in urging the distribution of Appropria-
tions bills among a number of committees, instead
of referring them all to the Committee on
Appropriations, is to get. the bills reported at
earlier periods of the session, and obviate the
necessity for the passage of any of them under
a suspension of the rules, he prevaricates.
His actual feeling is that if these measures
shall be put beyond the control of Mr. Randall,
the way will be opened for the anti-protection
element of the party to shape and govern the
course of the House.38
In this sense then, the move to fragment the powers of the
Appropriations Committee, and distribute those powers among
a host of other substantive committees, came from the rising
free-trade element of the House which,like Edward Atkinson,
had come to believe that "a Democratic party which permits
itself to be ruled by pig-iron men of Pennsylvania through
their advocate Randall has ceased to be the true Democratic
party.n39
The 1885 reform measure was also, however, the product
of a new;qdetermination by Democratic Members of Congress to
increase Federal spending.4 0  Although proponents of the
rules change continued to insist that the measure would not
only relieve the Appropriations Committee of responsibilities
which "have been too great for one committee," 41 but also
do so in a way which "is in the interest of economy and wise
legislation,,42 many observers saw more selfish motives
behind the proposed change. "The proposition to revise the
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rules by distributing the several appropriations to the
several sub-committees appeals strongly to both ambition and
interest," the Philadelphia Times argued.43 Others, more
explicit in their assessment, suggested that it would unlock
"the doors of the Treasury to all manner of jobs," 44 while
yet another paper concluded, "There is nothing in it except
jobbery and that kind of confusion which jobbers like."45
Traditionalist Democrats railed against the abandonment
of old party values and predicted that the fragmentation of
the Appropriations Committee would give free reign to the
"hunger of the lobbyists, the promoters of questionable or
corrupt schemes and all the audacious rings which have long
been held in check."46 Many tended to agree with Randall
that the distribution of appropriations powers to the inter-
ested substantive committees would inevitably break down "what
is now a most wholesome check possessed by the House, through
the Appropriations Cotmittee, over each committee and by all
of the committees over that of Appropriations." 47  Thus,
while supporters of the change saw in it no marked departure
from traditional Democratic ideals,48 opponents tended to
agree with the notion that the fragmentation of the powers
of the Appropriations Committee constituted a virtual "caving
in of the head of the barrel into which the patriots will
shortly be found with their carms clear up to their shoulder."49
While Democrats debated among themselves throughout the
fall of 1885, Republicans, traditionally quite comfortable
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with high levels of federal spending, cheerfully lent their
support to the Appropriations reform measure. One reporter
suggested, in fact, that the report of the Rules Committee
which recommended the distribution of Appropriations bills
"has taken the precise form which Messrs. Hiscock and Reed,
the two Republican members of the (Rules) Committee commended;
and it is a Republican device."50 It was viewed as a Re-
publican device for two reasons. First, it accomplished
the immediate and, to the Republicans, extremely important
goal of removing what the traditional Democrats considered
to be the Congressional safeguards against excessive federal
spending.51  The loosening of the Appropriations Committee
constraint, however, also promised to increase expenditures
to the point where tariff reform would become difficult for
the Democrats to justify. Higher expenditures would require,
so most Republicans believed, higher revenues and consequently
pose a major problem for those in the Democratic party who
desired a reduction in tariff rates. The decision of the
Republicans to oppose the "champion Democratic protectionist
(Samuel RandallI," the New York Times argued, "is only to be
explained by their confidence that they were securing them-
selves much more strongly against any tariff reduction this
year."52 So certain, in fact, were many that the Appropria-
tions reform measure was in fact a Republican inspired plot,
that on the day after the bill passed the House, the Pitts-
burgh Daily Post led its description of the floor fight and
final result with the headline: "Democrats Duped: Outwitted
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by Republican Leaders in Congress."53
Other explanations of the origins of the 1885 reform
measure have been forwarded by more contemporary observers
of Congressional history. Fenno and others, for example,
have persuasively argued that the redistribution of the
powers of the Appropriations Committee was primarily the
result of the demands by members of the committees affected
for easier access to federal funds, and consequently for more
political power in the House decision-making process.54
While this argument is clearly compelling, it does not go
very far toward explaining why this consideration was so much
more pressing in 1885 than it had been before that time. Nor
does it adequately account for the fact that the committees
for the 49th Congress themselves were not appointed until
after the conclusion of the fight over the rules change. 55
Finally, Joseph Cannon, who was a member of the Appropria-
tions Committee in 1885, later suggested that a number of
executive branch department heads lent their support to the
reform cause in an effort to arrogate more power over the
legislative policy-making process.
The members of President Cleveland's cabinet
supported Morrison's plan not only to humiliate
Randall, but to curb his power, and I have
sometimes thought they were shrewder than they
were credited with being, and that they saw the
advantage to the executive department as well
as the punishment of Randall in the change.
It was the beginning of executive interference
in legislation which has led to executive
dominance in legislation for appropriations to
meet the demands of the spenders instead of
the demands of the taxpayers. 56
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Cannon's claim certainly coincides with the idea that the
fragmented Democratic pajority in the House of Representatives
tended to rely fairly heavily upon Cleveland ahd the execu-
tive branch for the leadership and coherence which they them-
selves so obviously lacked.5 7  Yet, it is not clear that the
support of the executive branch officials was decisive in the
House rules struggle.
The important point remains, however, that the factors
which combined to produce the Revision of 1880 and the Reform
of 1885 were deeply rooted in historical contexts. Both of
these measures, in their timing and in their purposes, were
direct responses to the immediate needs of the legislative
actors who were involved. The emergence of the Revision of
1880 as a central focus of legislative concern, for example,
was in response to the needs of the Democratic leadership
(again primarily the Tilden wing of the party) to dampen the
divisive conflict which threatened to destroy the party's
chances in the 1880 Presidential elections. The 1885 reform
of the Appropriations process, similarly, was the outgrowth of
a major struggle between the tariff reform and protection
elements of the Democratic party. Both, in other words, were
instrumental issues, or surrogates, for the broader conflicts
within the Democratic party which they represented. In the
timing of their emergence as issues and in the wider concerns
they reflected, the Revision of 1880 and the Reform of 1885
were the products -- not of an :institutioD-speific moderniz-
ing urge -- but of more immediate and recognizable contextual
factors working both within and outside of the House.
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While immediate issue needs explain the timing and the
purposes of the Revision of 1880 and the Reform of 1885, the
particular forms these measures took and the decisions ulti-
mately made by the members of the House during the debates,
were determined by the conflict setting in which each one
appeared. Both of these revisions, in other words -- the
debates they produced, and the organizational solutions which
came out of them -- reflected the patterns of conflict which
dominated the House of Representatives in the 1880's during
periods of Democratic rule. Both were part of the attempt to
reconcile the varied political needs of a diverse party mem-
bership (both within Congress and outside2, and the patterns
of legislative conflict which these varied needs spawned
within the Democratic Houses of the late:.nineteenth century,
with the persistent need to define and achieve a measure of
policy consensus.
The extent to which both the Revision df 1880 and the
Reform of 1885 were directly tied to the forms of conflict
peculiar to the Democratic party of the 1880's becomes clear
in an examination of the debates and decisions ultimately
encompassed by these two measures. In the precise way these
debates and decisions affected the distribution of power in
the House of Representatives, apportioned roles in the
decision-making process, and determined the role of the House
in the national policy-making system, they reflected the unique
constraints imposed upon the legislative process by the
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patterns of Democratic divisiveness,. The following sections
of this chapter will thus be devoted to a brief examination
of the extent to which the Democratic Congresses of the 1880's
used the Revision of 1880 and the Reform of 1885 to mold the
internal organization of the House to the needs and particu-
lar conflict styles which that party brought to the Congress-
ional process.
One of these peculiar needs, amply reflected in the
Revision of 1880, was the Democratic members' insistent re-
gard for what they termed "minority rights" and what their
opponents dubbed obstructionism. More than anything else,
this preoccupation was al.hallmark of the internal organiza-
tion of the House of Representatives during periods of Demo-
cractic control throughout the 1880's. To a certain extent,
the Republicans encouraged the adherence to this organiza-
tional norm, particularly in the 1870's during a time when
their own Civil War coalition was beginning to crumble, and
before they had. once again become united around the tariff
issue.58  Republicans also tended to be-:more attentive to
the idea of minority rights whenever they were the minority
party in the House. Yet, it is still clear, nevertheless,
that the".keenest support for minority rights throughout the
late nineteenth century came from the ranks of the perennially
fragmented and diffuse Democratic side of the House. Repres-
entative Herbert of Alabama would later recall that:
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Twenty and even ten years ago, the Democratic
and Republican parties so profoundly distrusted
each other that each was afraid to smooth for
the other the pathway to easy legislation. The
Republicans feared that some political revolu-
tion might 'wipe away war legislation' includ-
ing the tariff, and the Democrats feared a
more sweeping reconstruction law. . . . For
these reasons 'rights of minorities' were for
many years sedulously cared for in the rules.5 9
Despite Herbert's claim, however, bipartisan support for
the idea of minority rights was never as evident during periods
of Republican dominance as it was during periods of Democratic
control of the House. As Samuel Randall argued, the Democratic
party was far more solicitous of the rights of the minority,
than the Republicans even in the 1880's. The rules and norms
which were designed to restrict obstructionism or curb the
rights of minority members Cor dissenting members within the
majority partyl were largely adopted in Republican Houses.
"As soon as the party now in the majority (the Democratic
partyl obtained control of the House," Randall noted in
1879, "they immediately repealed those clauses of the rules
which fettered the minority as they thought unduly. '"6 0  As
the decade of the 1880's progressed, and as the internal
divisiveness of the Democratic party became more pronounced,
concern for these minority rights increased.
To the increasingly united and cohesive Republicans,
meanwhile, this regard for minority rights during periods of
Democratic control of the House became a major source of
frustration. It was an impatient Thomas B. Reed, for example,
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who in 1884 apologized to a constituent for having failed to
) secure passage of a bill by blaming the obstruction-oriented
rules of the then Democratic House'df Representatives. "You
and the community," he complained to his friend Andrew Hawes,
"little re&lize how hard it is to pass a bill under the rules
of our House. I tried my very best to have them changed but
such is the fear that the Democrats have to trust even them-
selves that they wouldn't take the power even tho' they had
a 70 majority and more . . .,61
There were a number of instruments of minority obstruction
in the Democratic House during the 1880's but the most visible
and most widely used was the Disappearing Quorum. This tactic
.was based on the parliamentary need for a quorum, or the
requirement that a majority of the membership be present for
the consideration of all legislation. Bills could not be
passed when less than a quorum was present. In the 1870's and
1880's, and during the Democratic controlled 52nd Congress in
the 189Q's, a quorum could be broken if members present in
the House chamber simply refused to vote. In an era when,
because of poor communications and transportation, and because
of the inevitable problems of absenteeism due to sickness or
death, membership attendance in the House during even the most
critical debates was often less than enough to assure a
majority party enough votes to establish a quorum, the Dis-
appearing Quorum was a potent strategic tool.' In the face of
a determined and silent minority, majorities often found them-
selves defeated by their inability to bring enough of their
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members into the well of the House to constitute an actual
majority or quorum of the total membership.
The Disappearing Quorum had been used sporadically
throughout the nineteenth century. The earliest instance of
its use was during the second session of the 23rd Congress
in 1835,62 when John Quincy Adams had refused to vote on
a bill before the House. For the most part, the Disappear-
ing Quorum was most heavily used in times when party coali-
tions were at their most fragile. The late 1850's, for
example, produced repeated instances of the resort to the
Disappearing Quorum, as in the case of the consideration in
1858 of a Presidential message concerned with the Lecompton
constitution of Kansas. 63
The 1870's also saw an .increased reliance on the Dis-
appearing Quorum to obstruct controversial legislation dur-
ing periods of both Democratic and Republican rule. In fact,
the practice was most emphatically reaffirmed as a legitimate
tactic, much to the later embarrassment of the Republicans,
in a ruling from the chair made by the then Speaker James G.
Blaine in 1875. Cognizant, perhaps, of the gradual decay of
his own party's unity, and certainly aware of the fact that
the Democrats had won control of the House in the 1874 elec-
tions and were due to take power in less than two weeks,
Blaine, on February 24, 1875 refused to overrule the Demo-
cratic use of the Disappearing Quorum to block an election
bill (or force bill to the southernersI. Arguing that to
do so would bring the House to the "very'brink of a volcano,"
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Blaine underscored the right of the minority to refrain
from Voting even if doing so prevented the establishment of
a quorum.64
As the Republicans languished in their minority role
for the rest of the decade, they were of course content to
support the continuance of the Disappearing Quorum and other
tactics of obstruction to help guard against Democratic
assaults on their legislation. More significant, however,
was the equally strong commitment of the majority Democrats
to the idea of minority rights -- a commitment which was borne
out of their divisiveness and policy incoherence. There were,
of course, movements from Democratic Members of Congress to
terminate their party's tolerance of what was essentially the
right of a minority to veto legislative initiatives, but none
of these attempts were ever successful. At the Long Branch
conference, for example, J.C.S. Blackburn of Kentucky had
apparently called for the insertion of a provision which would
have given the House the power to "compel its members to vote."
According to contemporary press reports, Blackburn "pressed
this subject tpon the committee, but it was finally laid over
until the next session.,,6 5
During the debate on the Revision of 1880, this proposal
was reintroduced, and became the focus of the first real
struggle over the provisions of the new rules code. On
January 27, 1880, John Tucker of Virginia stunned many of his
colleagues by proposing an amendment to Rule VIII which would
have allowed the House to count those present but not voting
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as part of the quorum. "The purpose of the amendment,"
Tucker noted, "is to prevent the non-action of the House
when a quorum is actually present."6 6 The response to this
move was immediate and sharp. Republicans, wary of the Demo-
cratic party which had provoked the army appropriation
struggle in the extra session of 1879, and which still con-
tained elements keen on dismantling the civil war legisla-
tive initiatives of the 1860's and 1870's, vehemently pro-
tested this proposed amendment. "It would be wrong in itself;
it would be unconstitutional; it would be violently partisan,"
Conger of Michigan charged.67  Admitting that he had "in
former years desired such a rule," particularly when the Re-
publicans were in the majority, he suggested that only fair-
mindedness had led him to refrain, as indeed he hoped it would
lead Democrats in the present House, to refrain from adopting
"so violent and partisan a measure."6 8  Even Thomas B. Reed,
who would ten years later surprise the nation with his famous
ruling effectively ending the use of the Disappearing Quorum,
in 1880 rose to protest the Tucker proposal. "It is a val-
uable privilege for the country," Reedd.argued, with his
attention riveted to the immediate self-interest of his minor-
ity party:
that the minority shall have the right by this
extraordinary mode of proceeding to call the
attention of the country to measures which a
party in a moment of madness and of party feel-
ing is endeavoring to force upon the citizens
of this land. And.it works equally well with
regard to all parties, for all parties have
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their times when they need to be checked, so
that they may receive the opinions of the people
who are their constituents . . .69
While Republicans, expressed a sense of righteous, if
clearly selfish,indignation over the proposed amendment, Demo-
crats were predictably divided over the issue. Despite their
majority status, the internal divisions within the party pro-
vided a real inducement to many Democratic Members of Con-
gress to tolerate, and often actively support the anti-
majoritarlan features of the disappearing quorum. "I think
we had better leave the rule just as it is," the venerable
Alexander Stephens cautioned his party brethren. The Member
of Congress is responsible to his constituency, he reasoned
and therefore, if these constituents "send a member here who
will not vote when in his seat, . . . it is a matter that con-
cerns him and them and not the House."70  Blackburn of Ken-
tucky, however, supported the idea of change, as he had done
during the Long Branch conference, arguing that the Tucker
amendment conformed to normal Anglo-Saxon parliamentary prac-
tice. It does not, he suggested, "abridge in any respect the
right that the minority should hold in the House."71
Ultimately, however, the Tucker amendment was rejected
by the Revisers of 1880 as a real threat to the rights and
prerogatives of both the minority Republicans and,more
decisively, of the factions within the Democratic party. This
latter concern was effectively and quickly voiced in Democratic
circles on the night of January 28, 1880, and by the next
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morning, Tucker was ready to withdraw his proposal. As Roger
Q. Mills, a Democratic Representative from Texas in the 46th
Congress later noted, Tucker's amendment "met with so little
encouragement from his own side, and such determined opposition
from the Republicans, that he withdrew it to save it from de-
feat."72  Tucker himself found "so many gentlemen on my own
side of the House, as well as a solid phalanx on the other
side of the House, in opposition to it," that he decided
against forcing the issue. 73 In the end, therefore, it was
not the Republican opposition to the measure, but the deter-
mined support of important segments of his own party for
minority guarantees which sealed the fate of the Tucker amend-
ment.
In a sense, the Tucker amendment threatened the heart
of the decision-making process which had emerged in the Demo-
cratic Houses of the 1870's and which would continue to mark
that party's approach throughout the remainder of the nine-
teenth century. In the absence of a clearly defined, coherent
policy orientation, and in the face of deep internal divisions,
the Democratic party within the House was not likely to support
the removal of veto instruments from the decision-making system.
The dilatory quorum was one way an intransigent faction could
guard against party initiatives which were viewed as anti-
pathetic to their goals, interests or political ideals. As
an open guarantee that was available to each group within the
party, and as a deterrent against majority rule, it also re-
flected the absence of a central and comprehensive consensus
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within the diffuse internal world of the Democratic legislative
party.
The disappearing quorum, however, was but one of the pro-
cedural safeguards of minority rights reaffirmed in the Revis-
ion of 1880, and but one of the checks on majority rule which
existed in the Democratic Houses of the late nineteenth century.
Another, more frequently abused privilege in this vein was the
Dilatory motion, which gave individual members the right to
filibuster House proceeding by proposing an endless series of
time consuming, although technically admissible motions from
the floor. Under the rules of the House, and indeed under the
tenets of parliamentary law in general, certain motions always
take precedence over others. The motion to adjourn, for ex-
ample, takes precedence over all other motions under the
rules of the House of Representatives.74  Thus, obstruction-
ists could typically move to adjourn whenever an objectionable
bill was brought before the House for a vote. When that motion
was defeated by a voice vote, the obstructionist could usually
call for a roll call vote. Failing that, the member could,
under the rules of the House both before and after the Revisiona
of 1880, reintroduce a motion to adjourn to a specific date,
thus setting the filibuster on its course once again. Clearly,
the admission of dilatory motions was a resource for those who
favored a more fragmented and more fluid legislative decision-
making system. Reaffirmed by the Revision of 1880, it pro-
vided yet another veto instrument for intransigent minorities
fearful of the concerted action of a majority against their
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own interests or goals.
Once again, the Democrats more than the Republicans con-
tinually propped up the idea of the dilatory motion. In
January of 1875, for example, the Republicans had forwarded
a proposal "to prevent dilatory motions for the remainder of
the session, but it failed to receive the two-thirds vote
needed to suspend the rules and give it a passage., 75  Again
in February of the same year, the Republicans, now less than
a month from handing over control of the House to the Demo-
cratic party (which had come out of the 1874 elections with
a majority in the Lower Chamber), h•-, tried once again to pass
a civil rights bill over the opposition of an obstructionist
Democratic minority by directing the Speaker to withhold
recognition of all dilatory motions except "one motion to
adjourn and one motion to fix the day to which the House of
Representatives shall adjourn." This rule was agreed to by
the House Republicans over the"strenuous objections" of Samuel
Randall and the Democratic party. Predictably, then, when the
next Congress convened in December of 1875, with the Democrats
now in the majority, this specific rule was struck down.
"Thus," Asher Hinds notes, "obstruction was officially rein-
stated. "76 Randall later justified his support of dilatory
motions by arguing that "Every presiding officer of almost
every legislative body in the United States has always deemed,
in the administration and execution of rules, that he stood
as a protector of the minority on such administration. '7 7
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Despite this avowed concern for minority rights, Randall
himself quietly but consistently worked to at least preserve
and to a certain extent expand the latent powers of the
Speakership. 78  The Revision of 1880, for example, largely at
Randall's insistence, gave the Rules Committee its status as
a standing committee, and although it would be a decade before
that committee would blossom into the prime instrument of
centralization in the House, majoritarianism and the strong
Speakership, it did represent alstep (if in Randall's career
as Speaker, an unfulfilled one) away from the fragmented,
veto-oriented legislative organizational style of the Demo-
cratic party in the 1880's.
Randall also successfully resisted a number of attempts
on the part of his fellow Democrats, during the debate over
the Revision of 1880, to curtail the formal powers of the
Speaker including that one which gave him the right to name
the committees of the House. 79  The most potent, if indirect
attack on the prerogatives of the Speakership was Oscar
Turner's proposed amendment to the 1880 rules code which
would discharge committees of consideration of any bill which
had not been acted upon Cby that committee) after thirty days.
This discharge amendment was aimed, on the one hand, at pro-
tecting !the rights of the majority and (preventing) the will
of the majority from being stifled by a committee." 80  Yet,
it was also a straightforward attack on the power of the
committees (and not so indirectly of the Speaker who had
appointed those committees) to control the legislative agenda
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of the House of Representatives. "The power of the committees
of this House," one angry Member of Congress charged, "has
reached a point startling to all lovers of democratic govern-
ment, and smacks of the Star Chamber and secret doings of the
privy council."81  Another member cautioned his colleagues, in
terms likely to strike a responsive chord among fragmented
Democratic party membership that "The tendency of our legis-
lation is growing more and more toward centralism and the
concentration of power in the hands of a few to the exclusion
of the many and that feature is as objectionable in the rules
governing this House as it is elsewhere."8 2
The immediate source of this minor revolt, however, lay
not so much in the general organizational tendencies of the
House, but rather in an intra-party dispute over the tariff.
Tariff reformers, within the Democratic party, were constantly
thwarted in their attempts to pass a rate reduction bill by
the actions of the Ways and Means Committee which refused to
report such bills to the House floor for debate. In choosing
the members of the Ways and Means Committee (responsible for
revenue bills), Speaker Randall had been very careful to
select members who generally shared his protectionist views,
and so under the leadership of New York's Fernando Wood, the
committee successfuly quashed attempts to enact or even (once
again) report bills aimed at reducing tariff schedules. In-
censed by this blocking action, the tariff reform element in
the party, led in 1880 by Turner and Adlai Stevenson, attempted
i
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to undermine the power of the Ways and Means Committee to fore-
stall revenue legislation. The debate over the thirty-day
discharge rule was essentially, therefore, a debate over the
tariff.
Predictably, Republican Members of Congress sided with
Randall, Wood and the protectionist wing of the Democratic
party in opposing the measure. Garfield, for example, charged
that Turner's amendment was clearly a "disorganizing measure. 83
although he made reference to its hidden purpose when he
suggested that "we do not want to run in tariff legislation
in this way just now."84  Hendrick Wright, a Democrat from
Pennsylvania, however, was even more direct in his denunciation
of the Turner proposal warning that "in this amendment there
is 'a cat in the meal tub,' and that a concerted"effort was
being made to overthrow the protective tariff. Wright con-
cluded, "I think the protective principle is in better keeping
now, in the hands of the proper committee, than it would be
if the plan suggested here were adopted."8 5  After a brisk
debate, the Turner amendment was soundly defeated as was the
more pointed substitute amendment offered by Stevenson who
proposed restricting the discharge option to revenue bills
only.86
In the end, then, the Revision of 1880 did little more
than reaffirm the Democratic committment to a fragmented
decision-making system. The veto powers inherent in the dis-
appearing quorum, the dilatory motion and other facets of the
party's-scrupulous regard for minority rights were left largely
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intact. Plagued by internal dissension and a broad diversity
of viewpoints, the Democratic party was in no position, in
1880, to push through a reform of the rules oriented toward
legislative action. Republican control of the Executive Branch
and the Senate also supported the organizational tendency among
Democrats toward a fragmentation of the decision-making process
and a broad distribution of veto powers among the House member-
ship.
To be sure, a portion of the Democratic membership (e.g.
tariff reformers) were anxious to take the legislative initia-
tive and attempted to change the rules to fit this activist
desire. Frustrated by six years of footdragging and outright
opposition (both within and.outside their party) to the cause
of tariff reductions, these Members of Congress like Turner,
Stevenson, Morrison and Mills sought ways of unleashing the
Democratic legislative majority. Mills of Texas, for example,
pleaded with the Rules Committee in 1879 to "so simplify the
rules that the majority can make their will the law as far as
the House is concerned. " 87 Yet, as the debate over the
Revision of 1880 demonstrated, there really was no coherent
or decisive Democratic majority to be unleashed. Ultimately,
the Democratic party followed the advice of those like Samuel
S. Cox of New York, who counseled his colleagues to embrace a
measure of deliberateness in the legislative process and thus
"avoid giving too much fluency to everything which comes
here.,88
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The dispersion of decision-making in the House of Repres-
entatives under the Democrats was necessarily underwritten by
a relatively broad distribution of power and authority. The
same divisiveness and disagreement over legislative goals
which precluded the emergence of support for a centralized and
coordinative decision-making system, also precluded support
for a centralized exercise of power in the House. The basic
divergence within the Democratic legislative party over policy
goals produced an unwillingness on the part of party members
to submit to one faction's political agenda. In a party which
contained multiple agendas, the centralization of power had
little support and even less legitimacy. It was also rele-
vant to the Democratic consensus building task. In a divided
party, agreement over specific legislative proposals could
only come in a system which recognized the fluidity and tem-
porary nature of issue coalitions within the Democratic Houses
of the late nineteenth century. A dispersion of power, there-
fore, which gave individual members and factions the flexi-
bility and bargaining leverage to propose and consider speci-
fic pieces of legislation (and thereby set the legislative
agenda such as it wast was preferable to giving one group the
power to impose its own agenda on the legislative process.
To a certain extent, the guarantees given minorities
within Congress during the periods of Democratic control,
(guarantees most forcefully reaffirmed, once again, in the
Revision of 1880) represented a major concession to this
demand for a devolution of power within the House and for a
-273-
more flexible policy bargaining process. The distribution of
power, however, also took other more significant forms during
the late nineteenth century era of Democratic rule in Congress.
The most important of these was the continuous Democratic
assault on the powers of the Appropriations Committee between
the late 1870's and 1885. The nature and ultimate success of
this assault on the Appropriations Committee illustrates the
fragility of centralized power, in whatever form, during
periods of Democratic rule between 1875 and 1895.
The Appropriations Committee has been, throughout its
existence, one of the most powerful committees in the House
of Representatives. Created in 1865 when, along with the
Banking and Currency Committee, it was split off from the
Ways and Means Committee, the Appropriations Committeecreached
the height of its powers in the late 1870's and early 1880's.
The emergence of the strong Appropriations Committee was
assured from the outset by its crucial control of one of the
House's most important prerogatives -- the control of the
Federal purse-strings. Yet, its relatively unbridled exer-
cise of power and authority during the late nineteenth century
was rooted even more squarely in the organizational nature of
the Democratic Houses of that time. In the fragmented internal
world of the nineteenth century Democratic Congresses, the
centralized power of the Appropriations Committee over federal
expenditures inherently gave it a great deal of leverage over
the other actors in the legislative process.
This leverage was reinforced by the provisions of the
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rules which gave the committee an almost unlimited power to
report its bills at any time. This meant, of course, that
the Appropriations Committee could essentially block legis-
lation reported by other committees which a majority of its
members opposed, by simply loading the House calendar down
with its own Appropriations bills. The power to obstruct
legislation in general and to report at any time bills which
went to the heart of the House's own role, and the source of
its own power in the Federal government (i.e. appropriations
bills) thus provided the Appropriations Committee with a
commanding position in the House of Representatives. In the
absence of a strong Speakership, and a unified and action-
oriented legislative process, for example, the Appropriations
Committee played a dominant role in setting the legislative
agenda, in obstructing or permitting the consideration of
public and private bills and in distributing political rewards
or sanctions Ci.e. granting or denying public fundsl. In the
Democratic Houses of the late nineteenth century, therefore,
where individual members jealously guarded their own preroga-
tives to obstruct legislative action, and where rampant
factionalism within the party precluded the development of a
strong leadership, the Appropriations Committee became, by
default, the de facto instrument, or more correctly, the
embodiment itself of political leadership (such as it was).
As the decade of the 1870's passed, however, it became
clear that even this surrogate for central leadership was
unacceptable to the fractious Democratic legislative party.
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"This House," one Democratic Member charged in 1880, "should
have recognized the fact ... that no one committee should
be clothed with more power than is found necessary to encom-
pass the public interest." The present rules tend to hurt
many of the Members, he continued:
for the reason that in reference to many matters
inwwh-ich they are interested they have not the
opportunity to present them to the House, because
the floor has been constantly occupied by the 90
members of the Committee on Appropriations .
Another Democrat warned that, "There has been during the last
few years a gradual concentration of power in the hands-of
the Committee on Appropriations, and it has grown to such an
extent that the whole House is ready to rebel against it."91
The resentment thus expressed was shared by other Demo-
crats in the House to the extent that a partially successful
attempt was made by the members of the Commerce and Agricul-
tural Committees to distribute appropriations responsibilities
to other committees. Indeed, the Commerce Committee had
formally won the right to report appropriations bills for
rivers and harbors legislation in 1879, and Hinds suggests
that it had actually exercised that power even before that. 92
In 1880, during the debate over the Revision of 1880, the
Commerce Committee once again successfully defended this
prerogative over the objections of Randall and the Rules
Committee, and in the process sparked a more general revolt
against the powers of the Appropriations Committee. 93
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In the wake of the Commerce Committee's successful fight
to report rivers and harbors bills, the House erupted in a
flurry of amendments aimed at forcing a wholesale redistribu-
tion of the power of the Appropriations Committee. On
February 3, 1880, Representative Aiken of South Carolina
introduced a proposal to give the Agriculture Committee power
to report appropriations bills for subjects relating to agri-
culture -- a proposal which was eventually passed.94  In
quick succession amendments were proposed which would further
divide the Appropriations process among a host of other
committees including the Military Affairs Committee,95 the
96Post Office and Post Roads Committee, The Public Buildings
and Grounds Committee 97 and the Committee on Patents. 9 8
Ultimately, only the Agriculture and Commerce Committees
were conceded the privilege of reporting appropriations bills
within their own specified jurisdiction. Yet, despite the
successful efforts of Randall and his allies (including most
Republican leaders1 in the struggle, it was clear that the
termination of the debate over the revised rules in 1880 had
not reflected any noticeable dampening of the resentment many
members felt toward the Appropriations Committee. Clearly,
the exercise of relatively central control over major portions
of the legislative process was at odds with the prevailing
views and interests of large segments of the diverse Demo-
cratic coalition. Given the array of ideals and goals repres-
ented by the Democratic legislative party, attempts to foster
strong leadership and party discipline through:institutions
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of centralized power rested on a weak foundation indeed.
By 1885, this restiveness among Democrats had once again
blossomed into open revolt against the power of the Appropria-
tions Committee, (which was now chaired by Samuel Randall).
Randall had been defeated in his bid to reassume the Speaker's
chair in the 48th Congress (the Republicans had controlled
the 47th Congressa by John G. Carlisle of Kentucky. Carlisle
had nevertheless appointed Randall to the Chairmanship of the
Appropriations Committee in an attempt to both recognize
Randall's eminence in the House and placate his numerous
followers. In this position, Randall dominated the legislative
process to the extent that little passed the House that did
not meet with his approval. This, coupled with his decisive
role in the defeat of the Morrison tariff reduction bill in
1884 produced a renewed issault on the powers of the Appropria-
tions Committee.
By the fall of 1885, as the first session of the 49th
Congress approached, anti-Randall and anti-Appropriations
Committee sentiment was clearly evident among Democrats
throughout the nation. In early November, Henry Watterson
published the results of a survey his newspaper had taken of
incoming Members of Congress which showed that changing the
rules in an effort to curb the power of the Appropriations
Committee was the "demand of the hour."9 9  Many of those who
responded to Watterson's poll, in fact, shared the view of
Representative Barksdale of Mississippi who charged that the
present rules gave the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee
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the almost limitless power "to obstruct legislation upon
measures to which he may be opposed." He concluded, "It
is an extraordinary prerogative of which he should be dives-
ted.-100
In Washington itself, the sentiment against Randall was
constantly encouraged by editorials in the local press. The
Post, for example, long a bitter opponent of the Appropria-
tions Chairman, recalled the previous session of the House
in terms not likely to arouse sympathy for the cause of either
Randall or his committee. The story of that previous session,
the Post suggested, "is one unbroken record of repression as
regards all measures not approved by the chairman of the
Appropriations Committee, and of unfair and improper favorit-
ism to all that he chose to further."1 01  Members of Congress,
themselves eager to open up the legislative process (par-
ticularly now that Democrat Grover Cleveland sat in the White
House), called for the taming of the Appropriations Committee
and its Chairman. "I am satisfied now that a change is
necessary in the House rules," Dockery of Missouri told re-
porters, "for, after hurrying to get the reports on worthy
objects Cfrom his own committee on Claims to the House floor),
we were rewarded by being put on the calendar and smothered
in a heap" in large part by the Appropriations Committee.102
As debate opened in the House over the issue, it became
clear that the Democrats were no longer willing to tolerate
the Appropriation Committee's control over the legislative
process. "I do not believe," one Democrat explained, "in
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this pretentious sort of honesty that some men set up here
that they and they alone are competent and qualified solely
to manage and distribute the treasure of this country." He
announced his support for the distribution of Appropriations
powers to the substantive committees "for the simple reason
that it emancipates the members of this House, that it makes
each member equal."1 0 3
The Rules Committee report itself proposed stripping the
Appropriations Committee of its jurisdiction over appropria-
tions bills dealing with matters originating in the Military
Affairs Committee, the Committee on Naval Affairs, the Comm-
ittee on Post Office and Post Roads, the Indian Affairs
Committee and the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Each of these
committees, in addition to the Agriculture Committee, would
have the right to report Appropriations bills for their own
specified substantive areas at any time.104  Randall was
the lone voice of dissent on the committee, (the favorable
votes coming from Carlisle and Morrison of the Democratic
Party and Reed and Hiscock of the Republican side), and he
warned his colleagues that the Appropriations reform would
inevitably lead toward excessive Federal spending.10 5
Few Democrats agreed with Randall's assessment, or at
least few saw the threat of a wholesale raid on the Federal
Treasury as important enough to outweigh the marked political
advantages promised by a more even distribution of the
Appropriations Committee's powers. Some, of course, like
Hammond of Georgia were wary of what was certain to lead to
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a decided departure from traditional Democratic ideals, par-
ticularly now that the party, for the first time since 1860,
controlled the Executive Branch. "I am afraid to try this
experiment when we have been posing for years as the party
of reform and the party of economy par excellence."106
Benton McMillin, too, warned that the fragmentation of
Appropriations powers "will destroy the unity of design
which should characterize the Appropriations for the various
departments."1 07 .
For the most part, however, Democrats and indeed Re-
publicans were, for different reasons, eager to weaken the
Appropriations Committee's control of the legislative-:process.
That control, Ollin Wellborn declared, constituted an "aristo-
cracy" within the House which was "subversive of the repres-
entative principle."1 0 8 A frustrated Randall responded to
these charges by suggesting that "It has become the fashion
in Congress that every proposition which does not meet with
favor or does not secure a hearing has its defeat attributed
to the Appropriations Committee."1 09  And, in fact, this was
precisely the contention of many Democrats who sought a broader
distribution of political power, a freer access to the
resources of political power, and a greater role in the
decision-making system in the House. Thus, on December 18,
the House voted overwhelmingly to reduce the Appropriations
Committee's control over the disbursement of Federal funds.
Although it still retained control over approximately 50
percent of the funds actually appropriated by the House, it
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was forced to accede to the distribution of the other 50:-ppr-
cent to six other committees.
The next day, the Washington Post gleefully proclaimed
in its article headline, "An end to Randallism . . . The
House Votes Itself Honest."11Q  Suggesting that the House
Democrats had at last emancipated themselves from the auto-
cracy 6f the Appropriations Committee, the Post concluded
that' "By the adoption of the new rules, the individuality
of every member has been made of much more consequence."
From a different perspective, however, the reform also
promised to relieve the House democrats of the last center
of legislative coordination. "What grand log-rolling there
will. be!" the pro-Randall New York Sun predicted, "Come see
for yourself. It will remind you of old times." 112
Indeed, the move away from any form of central coordina-
tion of the legislative process, whether through the refusal
to provide the Speakership with the legitimacy, the organiza-
tional tools or the support for unified action or through the
weakening of the Appropriations Committee did lead to the
kind of unstructured amorphous legislative system in which
log-rolling and fragile and temporary political coalitions
formed and dissolved. This was particularly ill-suited to
the policy needs, as loosely expressed as they were, 6f a
Democratic party publicly committed to tariff reform and
fiscal stringency. The structural requirements of both of
these issue orientations clearly lay in the direction of
discipline and legislative coordination. 'Log-rolling and
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a dispersed dicision-making system, in other words, were
not the institutional characteristics most likely to produce
the kinds of fiscal sacrifices or tariff rate schedules de-
manded by Democratic ideology.
It would be difficult indeed to ignore or restrain the
impact of the numerous constituency interests of those Mem-
bers of Congress now so deeply involved in the decision-
making process,. In fact, as Pressman shows, the level of
Appropriations rose dramatically in the areas covered by
the committees which in 1885 gained the right to report spend-
ing bills.11 3  Democratic action on tariff reform was simi-
larly compromised as the House of Representatives turned away
from the horizontal reduction idea to the much more moderate
itemized revision proposed in the 1888 Mills Bill. Clearly,
in other words, the legislative system!df procedures and
norms adopted by the Democrats between1U879 and 1885 were much
more sharply attuned to their intra-party patterns of conflict
and dissensus than they were to the specific organizational
needs of their loosely defined legislative agenda.
A final illustration of the extent to which organiza-
tional form responded to the exigencies of conflict rather
than to an internal institutional dynamic or to the functional
demands of specific issues,is the manner in which the Demo-
cratic party, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury, modified the role of the House in the national policy-
making system. In part a response to the levels of fragmenta-
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tion within the legislative party, these modifications in
Congress' role were also related to the conflicts which
existed between the House of Representatives and the Executive.
This changing role perception can be most clearly seen in the
forms the legislative outputs of the House took between the
1870's and the late 1880's. When the Republicans controlled
the Executive Branch, Democrats tended to view their role as
one which involved checking the policy excesses of the Adminis-
tration. When Cleveland was in the White House, on the other
hand, Democratic Houses modified their role toward actually
making public policy. The best single example of this fluc-
tuating role lies in the changing Democratic attitude toward
political riders on Appropriations Bills.
In the spring of 1879, Democrats attracted the nation's
attention in their showdown with President Hayes over the
Army Appropriations Bills. The instrument, of their challenge
was the legislative rider attached-'.to the appropriations bill
which essentially forbade the Luse of Federal troops at
Southern polling stations. These riders, in turn, were per-
mitted in the House legislative processby what came to be
known as the Holman Rule, named for*its author, Democratic
Representative William S. Holman of Indiana. Holman, later
known as the "watchdog of the Treasury", had led the move-
ment in 1876 to amend the rule regarding appropriations bills
to allow riders Cor amendments) on such bills if they worked
to "retrench" expenditures.11 4 Up until that time (or at least
throughout the years of Republican control of the House since
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the 1860's), legislation or legislative riders were prohibited
by the rules.
Clearly, Holman's intentions in proposing this change in
the rules were purely those of ensuring greater economy in
Appropriations bills. In an 1883 article, he made this clear,
reaffirming his view that the greatest threat to American
democratic ideals lay in "the remorseless growth of Federal
expenditures."115  Holman believed that allowing legislative
riders on Appropriations bills which reduced expenditures
would broaden the power of the House membership to control
Federal expenditures. The actual effect of the Holman rule,
however, went far beyond those of guaranteeing fiscal strin-
gency. In giving the Members of the House the license to
attach legislative riders or provisos to Appropriations bills
as long as they in some way led to a reduction of expenditures,
the Holman Rule also gave Democrats in Congress the power to
obstruct the political will of a Republican Executive and
Senate. For the most part, then, the Holman Rule was used
to veto Republican attempts to continue implementing its Civil
War legislative policies tfor example, the 1879 Army Appropria-
tions struggle.1116
The Holman Rule also conformed to the exigencies of con-
flict within the Democratic party. In the 1870's and early
1880's, it provided the Appropriations Committee with an
additional resource for controlling, in the absence of any
other center of leadership within the party, the legislative
output of the House. In a period when Democrats:could at
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least unite in opposition to Republican-supported policies,
most party members were content to give the Appropriations
Committee the power to guard against measures not in their
interest. The Holman Rule thus worked in Democratic Houses
as a useful veto instrument, which if it failed to serve
positive legislative ends, it at least provided Democrats.
with the ability to obstruct Republican policy initiatives
(or the power to obstruct implementation of those initia-
tives).
In the late 1870's and early 188Q's, therefore, Demo-
crats tended to support the inclusion of the Holman proviso
in the rules as the Republicans tended to oppose it. To
Randall, the Holman Rule was "the rock upon which the Repres-
entatives of the Democratic party on this floor placed their
party."11 7  Xt protected, so he reasoned, the Democratic
party from falling prey to the Republican policy-making mono-
lith. Others, like Goode of Virginia, agreed, noting that
the Holman Rule "has not only been the means of enabling
this Congress to save $30,000,000 of the people's money
but it has been the bulwark beyond which we have been able
to keep the army from the polls. "l18
Republicans, meanwhile, denounced the rule as "unwise
in practice, revolutionary in tendency, and contrary to the
spirit add genius of the Constitution."11 9  Minority leader
Garfield attacked the rule arguing that:
SEvery conceivable scheme of partisan legislation
that has torn this House with passion . . . all
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these Trojan Horses, all these evils, all these
political volcanoes which have burst in American
politics for the last three years in this Chamber
have done so through the crater of that rule
(the Holman Rule).12 0
The only value of the Holman Rule, Thomas B. Reed suggested,
was the role it would pl&y in "the extirpation of the Demo-
cratic party, which is to occur the next time the people of
the United States have an opportunity to pass upon it.,,1 21
Despite opposition, the Holman Rule was retained in the
Revision of 1880 as Democrats decided to continue in their
legislative role as the stumbling block to Republicaf poli-
tical initiatives. By 1885, however, this role no longer
suited the purposes of the Democratic rank'and file. With
the election of Grover Cleveland to the Presidency in 1884,
Democrats had little to fear from the Republican party, and
could envisage a somewhat different role for the House of
Representatives in national policy-making. Party members
were also becoming restive under the control of the Appropria-
tions Committee and sought freer access .to the Federal Treas-
ury. Over Holman's protest, therefore, the Democrats voted
overwhelmingly to replace the Holman proviso with a rule
which made the introduction of any amendment "changing exist-
ing law" out of order on all Appropriations bills.122
Clearly, the Holman Rule reflected a portion of the
Democrats' view of the role their Congresses would play in
the national policy-making system. To a certain extent, this
perception was directly related to the partisan composition
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of the other branches of government. When Republicans in
the Executive Branch of the Senate threatened Democratic
interests, the Democratic House retreated to the role of
legislative spoiler. When, on the other hand, a Democrat
was in the White House, Democrats relaxed their vigilant
stance in the House of Representatives and sought a part-
nership with the Executive Branch in national policy-making,
as was the case in 1885.
If the repeal of the Holman Rule in 1885 was related
to the partisan character of the Executive Branch, however,
the nature of the partnership which existed between the House
and the PreSidency during Grover Cleveland's years in the
White House was more a function of the continued divisive-
ness within the Democratic legislative party. The repudia-
tion of its role as legislative spoiler did not reflect a
new activist role for the House in national policy-making.
For, if there was in the late 1880's a Democratic program
(and it is difficult to find evidence of a broad and compre-
hensive political program within the Democratic party at
that time), it was largely designed and produced in the
Executive Branch. The tariff issue, for example, dominated
the legislative process only after Cleveland identified it
as the major area of concern for the party in his 1887 message
to Congress. The Mills Bill of 1888 was in response to this
message.123
Coordination of the legislative process was also exer-
cised by the Executive Branch during Cleveland's tenure as
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President. The lack of such coordination within the House,
and the fragmented decision-making system which continued
to preclude the emergence of such coordination in Demo-
cratic Houses throughout the late nineteenth century was
largely responsible for the extraordinary number of bills
which Grover Cleveland felt compelled to veto between 1885
and 1889.124 To a certain extent, Cleveland's use of the
veto was aimed at providing the legislative process with the
coordination and restraint which its dominant party within
the House was unable or unwilling to exercise.
The role of the House of Representatives in the national
decision-making system, therefore, was heavily colored by the
internal disarray of the Democratic party throughout the late
nineteenth century. As in its distribution of power, and in
the dispersion of decision-making responsibilities, the role
of the House in the American political process was largely
determined by contextual forces working in its immediate
political environment and the levels of dissensus it con-
fronted from within its own halls. When the Republicans can-
trolled the Senate and the Presidency, the Democratically led
House of Representatives was not likely to play a dominant
or initiative role in the national policy-making process. This
is almost self-evident. More toethelpoint, however, is the
fact that the House would also fail to play a dominant role
in national policy-making when the Democratic majority within
the House was torn apart by internal factionalism. Thus, for
example, even with Grover Cleveland in the White House, the
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severely divided Democratic party in the House could not
afford to play a positive role in national affairs.
As Joseph Cannon suggested later, the internal disarray
of the Democratic party between 1885 and 1889 forced the
House to take a subordinate role to the executive during
that period of time, despite the initially positive inten-
tions implied in the elimination of the Holman Rule in
1885.125 Congress' role, like other aspects of its inter-
nal organizational behavior, was a significant reflection as
well as a conscious response to the exigencies of internal
conflict or cohesiveness within the dominant party within
the House.
The internal world of the House of Representatives dur-
ing periods of Democratic control between 1878 and 1895, then
reflected that party's weakness, the internal fragmentation
and the organizational problems it was forced to confront.
Unable to create a measure of unity and discipline within its
own ranks during this time, it forced the House to provide a
system for building the consensus that thee.party itself was
unable to provide. In the absence of internal party cohesive-
ness, the Democratic decision-making process in the House was
driven, not by centralized coordination, but rather by the
disparate and often disjunctive groups, interest, structures,
and actors which competed, bargained and struggled for pre-
ferred political prizes within the legislative arena.
This in turn placed real limits on the role the House
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played in the national decision-making process. As an
institution which spoke not with one political voice, but
with many, and as one which expressed not one comprehensive
political program, but a diverse number of specific policy
goals, the House was forced to rely on the Executive Branch
for a measure of legislative coherence. Unwilling to provide
its own internal structures or leaders the power and author-
ity to define programmatic goals and to arbitrate between com-
peting interests and views, Members of the House were forced
to depend upon and accede to the policy coordination imposed
by the President. Of the 414 bills which were vetoed by Presi-
dent Cleveland between 1885 and 1889, for example, only two
126
were ever overridden by the Congress.
Ironically, therefore, the internal processes of the late
nineteenth eentury House of Representatives during the periods
of Democratic rule, presaged, in many ways, the organizational
forms twentieth century Congresses would later take. In many
ways, the distribution of power, the fragmented decision-
making system, the reactive Ci.e. to the policy initiatives
of the President and the Executive Branch) role they assumed
in the late nineteenth century, the Democratic Congresses were
products of the same kinds of ill-defined and fragmented con-
flict patterns which, for somewhat different reasons, would
mark both parties in the twentieth century House of Repres-
entatives. In the absence of cohesive partisanship, in the
absence of clearly defined and widely shared policy goals,
and in the absence of a clearly defined mandate from its
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national constituency, the Democrats of this era, like the
parties of the twentieth century, were forced to construct
an internal legislative system in which momentary coalitions,
log-rolling, dispersed centers of power and authority and
multiple veto points were predominant.
In this sense, the case of the late nineteenth century
Democratic Houses of Representatives illustrates the extent
to which Congress' internal world is determined far more
decisively by forces working in its immediate political en-
vironment than it is by more long range developmental dynamics.
External political realities and the effects of those external
realities on conflict within Congress produced the internal
world of the nineteenth century Democratic House of Repres-
entatives rather than a monotonic and. gradually unfolding
modernizing urge. Indeed, as subsequent chapters will show,
Congress' evolution was essentially the composite of a series
of discrete organizational responses to changes in that body's
political environment. As such, the Democratic House of the
late nineteenth century was essentially a direct organiza-
tional response to the political tensions, the conflicts and
disarray which that party brought into the legislative process
during this period of time.
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Chapter V
Republican Party Coherence
and the
Legislative Process
Internalists suggest that Congress' development has pro-
ceeded along relatively deterministic lines toward its pres-
ent form. This inexorable march toward modernity has produced
an institution which is at once an autonomous and effective
actor in Federal politics. The suggestion is, of course, that
the changes the House of Representatives has undergone in the
past century have been, by and large, consistent with the in-
ternally-specific needs of a political body entrusted with
the task of producing legislation for a modern society. The
history of organizational change within Congress, in other
words, conforms to the logic of an institutionalization proc-
ess carried on independently of the forces working in the
House's immediate political environment. Congress has pro-
gressed toward its present stage, contemporary internalists
tend to imply, in a constant, gradual and, despite minor
fluctuations or deviations, an almost linear fashion. The
history of the House of Representatives, therefore, is essen-
tially the one-dimensional story of that body's triumphant
rise to modernity.
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As ecologists argue, however, Congressional history has
no more proceeded according to the logic and imperatives of
one grand dynamic force than the rest of American history.
The story of America's political evolution, Burnham suggests,
for example, "is not quite all of a piece,"'  and as both he
and Price claim, neither is the study of Congress' evolution.
Rather, the patterns of Congressional change suggest that the
House is an evolving body -- an adaptive and relatively fluid
one which has gone through a number of significant institu-
tional transformations in the course of its history. Indeed,
as even Polsby concedes, its development has been marked by
decidedly rapid and non-incremental shifts in the very indica-
tors he employs to demonstrate its relative continuity. Thus,
for example, he struggles with the problems of relating the
major changes which occurred in the House around the turn of
the century to his theoretically gradual notion of institu-
tionalization.2
These non-incremental patterns of change, then, suggest
that the search for the roots of the evolution of the House
of Representatives be carried on beyond the systems-oriented
limits of the internalist approach to Congressional history.
This suggestion also finds support in an examination of the
extent to which the House did in fact change shape throughout
its history. Internal norms, rules and procedures, and indeed
even its role in the national political system changed from
era to era and even from Congress to Congress often in such
rapid and dramatic fashion, that the evolution of the House
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of Representatives can be more realistically viewed in terms
of a parade of almost discrete organizational incarnations
than it can in terms of a coherent developmental progression.
This theme can perhaps be best illustrated through an
examination of the dramatic fluctuations the House underwent
between the late 1880's and mid-1890's. During this period,
control of the House alternated between the Democrate and the
Republicans four times, with the Republicans ultimately estab-
lishing their hegemony in the 54th Congress. This period,
consequently produced often dramatic changes in the way in
which the House was organized and in the norms and procedures
which ruled the legislative process. As the prevailing level
of dissensus varied from Congress to Congress, and as the con-
textual features of the House of Representatives' political
environment (in particular, once again, the constraints which
bound Members of Congress to their constituents, and the manner
in which the political demands of those constituents were ex-
pressed and organizedl changed, the internal legislative world
followed suit. When, for example, the House was confronted
by periods of fragmented conflict, as it was when the internally
divided and heterogeneous Democratic Party was in control, the
organizational system responded with a characteristic decentral-
ization of power and decision-making roles and a typically
high regard for the rights of minorities to veto special pieces
of legislation. Periods of Republican dominance, on the other
hand, produced a House which was more attuned to the demands
and organizational resources of a coherent, unified and deter-
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mined majority interested in legislative action.
The contrasts between the Democratic and Republican
Congresses during this period serve as useful examples of
the extent 6t which the nature of the House of Representatives
was largely determined by fonces working in that body's poli-
tical environment. The timing of the internal changes within
the House, as well as the magnitude and nature of those changes
can be best explained by a search for the changing political
realities which encouraged Members of Congress to seek the
goals they in fact sought and which in turn forced Congress to
behave the way it did. By and large, in other words, the
pressures which worked to define the patterns of conflict and
dissensus within the House, also worked to define the way
Congress molded its organizational style and designed its
legislative process.
The point is that Members of Congress make the rules and
procedures, and create the kind of House system which best
meets their political needs. Mayhew and Price have already
suggested as much -- Mayhew arguing that election needs
dominate the Members' search for an internal organizational
style, while Price suggests that'career goals serve as the
primary consideration.3  Clearly, however, there is a multi-
tude of needs and a number of goals which Members of Congress
pursue in the Housel These needs, which are the product of
the combination of their own personal ambitions, goals and
political views are also constrained and conditioned by the
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demands and expectations, as well as the organization of
those demands and expectations of their constituents. The
accumulation and interplay of all these diverse needs and
forces impinging on the individual member (and leading him
to pursue the specific goals he in fact does pursue) are
reflected in the patterns of conflict, disagreement and
divisiveness which each House contains.
Irrespective of which specific goal or which particular
political need dominates the outlook of the Member of Con-
gress, in other words, it is the scale and pattern of
dissensus (which the pursuit of these individual goals and
needs on the part of Members of Congress produces) to which
the legislative process must adapt. Different and varying
patterns of conflict (whether there is a diversity of goals
and needs or whether there is a relative congruence of goals
and needsl will confront the Members of the House with differ-
ent and varying hurdles to the achievement of their goals.
In either case, it is this conflict and these specific patt-
erns of divisiveness which must be managed.and resolved if
Members are to successfully pursue the goals and meet the
needs they have set for themselves (or again, which their
constituents have set for them}. The legislative process,
then, is designed by the Members of Congress to resolve the
kind of conflict and the patterns of disagreement they con-
front in a way which allows them to best meet their legis-
lative needs.
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This point has already been brought out in the examina-
tion of the Democratic Houses of the 1880's, but it can also
be seen in the characteristics which distinguished those
Democratic Houses from the Republican Congresses of the
same period. In this chapter, these contrasts will be examined
in an attempt to reinforce the notion that the Congressional
process has evolved in an ongoing response to the forces
which shaped the patterns of conflict which existed within
the House of Representatives. The rules, norms and proced-
ures which emerged and disappeared, gathered strength or were
weakened through succeeding Congresses, were essentially the
instruments the Members of those Congresses employed to
reconcile their own goals and needs with the kinds of conflict
and dissensus they faced.
This chapter, then, will continue the examination of the
evolution of the House between 1878 and 19.21 with a descrip-
tion of the Republican organizational response, in the last
decade of the nineteenth century, to the needs and patterns
of conflict which it confronted within the House. It will
attempt to both explain the nature of that response -- the
norms, the rules and the procedures which came to dominate
the legislative process during the years of Republican rule
-- as well as the forces which produced that response. It
will suggest, finally, that the differences which existed
between Democratic and Republican Houses in the late nine-
teenth century, and the changes each party brought with it
to the legislative process, were the products of the
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political worlds each party represented, and of the distinc-
tive conflict styles which each party consequently brought
to the internal world of the House.
In the fall of 1888, the Republicans narrowly won con-
trol of the House of Representatives for the first time
since 1880 and only the second time since 1874. So narrow,
in fact, was the margin of victory (in terms of seats) over
the Democratic party that many observers expected the Re-
publicans to do little more than mark time until the 1890
elections. Indeed, in view of the large number of contested
election cases awaiting disposition by the House, the Repub-
licans, it was believed, could expect to control no more
than three or four seats above a simple majority, and given
the inevitable problems of absenteeism, sickness and death,
the prospects for a workable and sustainable majority were
not at .all bright.4  In addition, the existing rules
promised to help the DemocratsJin obstructing any Republican
legislative initiative which they deemed acceptable.
The rules of the House and the norms which animated
the behavior of its members, however, were the creation of
the Democratic party and depended for their strength on the
continued existence of a:majority party which was in disarray.
The dispersion of authority, the wide distribution of veto
powers, the broad opportunities provided for obstruction,
and the marked dev6lution of decision-making responsibility
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were all products of the very diffuse, ill-defined and uneasy
character of the Democratic legislative coalition. As the
first session of the 5.st Congress (i.e. the Congress elected
in 1888) approached, it was clear to an increasingly nervous
Democratic party that, despite the narrowness of the Repub-
lican majority, the House of Representatives was to be a very
different place in 1889-1890 than it had been during the
decade and a half of Democratic rule which had preceded it.
For one thing, the 1888 election had given one party
control of all three branches of government for the first
time in fifteen years.5  Clearly, the Republican party had
the resources and the power to take the policy-making
initiative. More significantly, however, was the fact that
the Republican party was ideologically geared toward legis-
lative action. This penchant for activism,moreover, was as
evident in that party's organizational base -- its inherent
issue coherence, the homogeneity of its constituency base,
its organizational unity, and its party discipline -- as it
was in the programmatic outlook of its members. Majority
rule, therefore, was the normative standard to which Repub-
lican Members of Congress tended to pledge-allegiance.
This attachment to the principle of legislative action
-- one which was reinforced by the specific provisions of
the party's political-lplatform -- had been evident in the
House throughout the 1880's, and had been encouraged by the
brilliant and majestic Thomas B. Reed. Reed towered over
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the other House figures of his timui~and far more than any-
one else became both the guiding spirit and the reflection
of the legislative outlook which emerged within the Repub-
lican party in the 1880's and which ultimately worked to
reshape the House of Representatives in the 1890's. Above
all, Reed redefined and rejuvenated his party's commitment
to legislative action (a commitment which had clearly waned
in the 1870's) and did much to set the agenda and secure
the organizational basis upon which this renewed commitment
could project itself on to the legislative stage.
Reed had been a consistent supporter of political acti-
vism since his early days in the House. His arguments,how-
ever, became more compelling as he himself rose in emminence
within his party. As early as 1885, for example, shortly
after he had been elected leader of the (then minority)
Republican party delegation in the House, Reed's appeals for
a restoration of the principle of majority rule in the Con-
gress became more insistent. "The greatest grievance," he
observed that year, "and the one that calls most loudly for
remedy is that under the rules that have grown up, the
majority of the House is without power over the business of
the House.n 6  Reed's early calls for a streamlining of the
internal procedures of the House were constantly thwarted
by a Democratic majority which, as he himself recognized,
had neither the organizational nor the ideological resources
for such an approach to legislative decision-making. "The
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Democratic party wants no legislation," he once quipped in
an address to the citizens of his home town, Portland,
Maine. "All the Southern men, who control the party, want
or ask for is to be left alone . . . Hence, all their plans,
whether in power or out, are centered on obstruction."?
Reed also tended to believe that the Democrats" obsess-
ion with minority rights stemmed from their inability to
assemble and sustain a coherent policy coalition. Fragmen-
ted and weakened as they were by internal conflict, the legis-
lative process of the Houses they ruled therefore wase
designed as much to protect Democrats from themselves as
t4ey wiee designed to protect and further the party's ill-
defined and diffuse political interests. Thus, Reed argued,
"the rules of the House, instead of being merely business
regulations, a mere systematization of labor, were a charter
of privileges for those whose arguments were too weak to
convince the House." The"Chicago Daily Inter-Ocean
reiterated this charge when it suggested that""the abuse of
the powers of the minority . . . largely grew out of the
fact that under the Randall rule the House presented the
spectacle of a.free-trade body presided over by a protection-
ist." Thus, the paper concluded, "The Speaker was at heart
more than willing to have the minority hold the majority in
check."9  The Democrats, in other words, were both progma-
tically disinclined, and organizationally unable to produce
the kind of legislative process Reed wanted, and so long as
they were in control -- and so long as they designed that
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legislative process -- adherence to the tenets of majority
rule was unlikely.
With the Republican victory in 1888, therefore, Reed
was given the opportunity to implement his organizational
ideas, much to the chagrin of his Democratic opponents.
Throughout the months preceding the opening of the first
session of the 51st Congress, political observers and suppor-
ters of both parties, engaged in a debate over the shape the
new House would take under Republican rule. Reed himself,
meanwhile, left little doubt that he would lead the struggle
to reorganize the House. In January of 1889, for example,
Reed reiterated his support for a changed state of affairs
in the House. "Minority rights in this country are guaranteed
by a written constitution," he told his colleagues. "The
rules of this House are not for the purpose of protecting
the rights of the minority, but to promote the orderly con-
duct of the business of the House."1 0  Democrats, uneasy
with Reed's devotion to the idea of majority rule, responded
with characteristic expressions of disapproval of what they
viewed as a majoritarian steamroller. "The rules of the
House are made not only . . . for the orderly conduct of
the public business," Charles Crisp charged, retreating to
the traditional Democratic position, "but there is a greater
and higher object, and that is to protect the rights of the
mi ority, to restrain, in the language of the old law-writers,
the unbridled license of the majority."ll
-303-
As the opening of the new Republican Congress approached,
others added their voices and pens to the discussion. ULyd S.
Bryce, for example, lent his reasoned arguments to the side
of majoritarianism in a North American Review article in
which he suggested that under the existing rules, the House
was far less than the representative body it claimed to be.
For instance, is it not an absolute denial of
the rights of the people, what is occurking
now? Here is a large majority of the House
desirous of expressing their views in one form
or another upon the Oklahoma and the Union
Pacibic funding bills -- measures affecting
countless numbers of people and vast interests
-- and yet one man holds them in check, obstruct-
ing also all other kinds of legislation for the
transaction of which three hundred and twenty':
four other members were sent here."12
Nor were the Democrats without their sympathizers in
this growing national debate. The Nation, for example,
supported the cause of obstruction and minority rights. As
late as 1891, this prestigious journal would continue to lend
its weight to the Democratic side, arguing that "The great
legislative mischief of our time is not the difficulty which
majorities find in legislating, but their disposition to
legislate overmuch . . . The legislative fever of the majori-
ties is one of the great curses of the day..1 3  More pointed
criticisms were forwarded by Democrats who, like McCreary of
Kentucky, warned the Republicans that if they "attempt to
commit arbitrary, unjust and oppressive acts, the Democrats
should fight them to the uttermost." When asked what would
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constitute an overt act of oppression, McCreary replied,
"An attempt to revise the rules of the House and impose
on the minority an arbitrary and tyrannical code."l4
The majority rule principle thus had its adherents and
detractors, both within and outside of the House of Repres-
entatives, and throughout the summer and fall of 1889, these
advocates made their cases to the American people. "Recogniz-
ing the fact that party supremacy must depend upon public
opinion," Roger Q. Mills cynically charged, the Republicans
"have been persistently courting its approval of the changes
(against the wishes of the Democratic obstructionists) in
order that they may have its support when they proceed to
level the barriers in their way. '"l5 Indded; the Republicans
did court public opinion, but they did so with arguments
designed to persuade the nation in general and their own
constituents in particular, that the attachment to majori-
tarianism was securely rooted in a consistent and non-
partisan regard for democratic ideals.
Yet, although the Republican commitment to an evolving
idea of majority rule was sustained in part by such an
abstract belief in the righteousness of that path, it was
also nurtured by the specific policy goals and the organiza-
tional basis of the Republican party itself. On the one
hand, in other words, the Republican party -- now in control
of the Senate, the Executive Branch and the House of Repres-
entatives - was anxious to press forth its policies and goals.
"Unless the House could be emancipated from the bad traditions
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of fifty years," Reed later a;gued, "there was no hope of
legislation, and all the fierce contests by which a Repub-
lican President had been elected and a Republican House had
been installed would have been in vain."l 6  Among the
specific pieces of legislation which a rules change would
allow to be passed, Henry C'abot Lodge promised, were changes
in the tariff schedules, the passage of an election law and
the extension of civil service reform.1 7  The Republican
party which had for fifteen years been unable to control the
Federal Government, was in 1889 eager to enact and implement
its national program. Thus, in October of 1889, Reed
promised that an attempt would be made to clear the path for
the Republican party agenda in the House by establishing
"rules which will facilitate the public business." 18 Reed
was predictably vague as to the forms these changes would
take, but it was clear nevertheless that they would reflect
his own belief that "Statesmanship does not consist in
attitudinizing and throwing responsibility on somebody else
but in doing something."1 9
The Republican assault on the rules -- supported as it
was by abstract appeals to democratic ideals and an activist
political orientation -- was in the end, however, based upon
the unity of the party. This relative lack of internal dis-
cord within the Republican party was the critical element in
the growing support for an overthrow of a set of rules which
had been enacted to serve the interests of a fragmented and
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divisive Democratic party. The House of 1889 was a far
different one than the Democratic Houses which had pre-
ceded it, and thus the call for a change of the rules was
essentially a call for the recognition of that difference.
The internal workings of the House system which had
been created and sustained in the 1880's by a party that
lacked a clear political consensus, by a majority that lacked
programmatic coherence, and by the existence of intense Demo-
cratic factional strife, would give way to a party coalition
that was programmatically united and relatively free of the
internal problems which had forced the Democrats to decen-
tralize the decision-making system, to allow the devolution
ofspower and to oversee the emergence of a passive, vete-
oriented role for the House,-in national political affairs.
The Republican victory in 1888, in other words, had laid the
foundation for a significantly altered legislative body --
one in which new normative assumptions and more powerful
organizational resources would be brought to bear. As one
alarmed Democrat concluded therefore from Reed's statements
and actions in the months preceding the opening of the 51st
Congress, "He does not propose to amend any rules, he looks
to bringing forward a spick and span new set!"2 0
Clearly, the Republican House of Representatives would
be different from the Democratic Houses which had preceded
it, but as Congress assembled in December of 1889, it was
still uncertain precisely how different that Republican House
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would be. For one thing, Reed was not assured the renomina-
tion as his party's candidate for Speaker. It was unclear,
therefore, exactly how far the leAdership would go in push-
ing through major organizational changes. The presumption
was that McKinley (Reed's prime Republican opponent) might
not be as zealous in pushing through the majoritarian reform
package as Reed. Beyond this, however, was the uncertainty
as to the level of support the majoritarian course would
find among the rank and file Republican members. To be sure,
the Republican party was united and capable of organizational
discipline, but the overthrow of the obstructionist norms
and rules promised not only a strengthening of the central
institutions of power and authority in the House, but also a
corresponding decline in the levels of power and autonomy
individual Members of Congress had come to enjoy in the
1880's.
On November 30, 1889, the Republican party caucus
met and on the second ballot nominated Reed for Speaker
giving him 85 votes to the 38 of his nearest rival, McKinley.
Reed was then duly elected to the Speakership by a vote of
the House on December 2, 1889, with the solid support of his
party. From that moment, it became clear that major changes
in the internal procedure of the House were imminent. Yet,
it was still unclear how far Reed's Republican colleagues
were prepared to allow the Speaker to go in creating the
organizational setting capable of ensuring the decisive legis-
lative action he desired. Reed, meanwhile, did little before
the December 21, Christmas recess to show his hand beyond the
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selection of committees, but all observers "were well aware
that trouble was brewing" for a confrontation over the rules. 21
On January 6, 1890, the House resumed amidst speculation
that Reed would soon make his move.2 2  Still functioning
under general parliamentary procedure, the House awaited the
Republican reform campaign. On January 22 Reed won a minor
skirmish over the call for a Teller vote on a Democratic mo-
tion to adjourn. Reed rejected the motion as obstructionist
and inadmissable, and was sustained by his party on a vote
of 149 to 137.23 The Democratic press reacted with predict-
able outrage to this parliamentary highhandedness, accusing
Reed of running the House of Representatives on "the plan of
the ward primary mass meeting where the side which gets its
man in the chair controls regardless of the vote."24  Mn
the days following this ruling, it became clear that Reed
was prepared to brook no compromise in securing the type of
legislative organization necessary for clear and decisive
action.
It was also clear that one of the first hurdles to that
preferred system was the Disappearing Quorum tactic which
promised to be a major weapon of the obstructionist Demo-
cratic minority in the closely divided 51st Congress. The
disappearing quorum, however, had also become a central symbol
of what Reed believed was more generally wrong with the in-
ternal procedures of the House. The use of the disappearing
quorum was originally meant, so Reed felt, to be "a convenient
method of demanding debate, of calling the attention of the
-309-
country to violent political measures, and deserved many of
the commendations it then received,
but when in 1882 it commenced to be the common
method of preventing a decision of election
cases, and finally in 1889 reestablished the
Liberium Veto of the old Polish Diet, whereby
a single member became the arbiter of destiny,
every man of sense recognized the fact that
the practice was doomed.25
Reed believed, in other words, that the disappearing quorum
had deviated from its original intent to the point where it
had become a major impediment to legislative action.
Reed had earlier found support for his position on the
disappearing quorum tactic in an article written by .yd S
Bryce which characterized the "habit of non-participation
while physically present (as) unfortunate." To the typical
British Member of Parliament, Bryce added, "the view which
recognized those who were physically present as being also
legally present (would commendl itself to his common-sense., 2 6
The Clerk of the British House of Commons would himself later
make much the same point in even stronger language. Comm-
issioned by the North American Review to examine Reed's
rulings in 1890, Reginald Palgrave characterized the dis-
appearing quorum as a "device beneath the tactics of the
most radical vestryman in effete old England."27 He also
caricatured the Democrats who engaged in this exercise as
"jesters" who "pipe their brethren into dance" and who "then
sit still and decline to make up the set."28
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The opinions of such outside observers, however, had
far less importance on the outcome of the struggle over the
disappearing quorum than those of the RepublicaMenembers"of
Congress upon whom Reed had to rely for support, and in
this group there appeared to be some uneasiness about the
scope, not only of Reed's imminent assault on the disappear-
ing quorum, but that which he also seemed eager to make upon
the entire range of minority rights and individual preroga-
tives in the House. The Washington Post, for example, repor-
ted on January 8 that "Mr. Reed's code of rules is not likely
to be altogether acceptable to his Republican colleagues on
the (Rules) Committee -- Messrs. McKinley and Cannon." The
Post concluded that "The chances are that all the innovations
proposed by Speaker Reed will not be sustained."'2 9
Other newspapers around the country were meanwhile
searching for clues as to exactly what Reed would ultimately
propose. The consensus seemed to be that the Speaker would
probably be careful to cultivate the support of his Repub-
lican colleagues, but that something dramatic was, neverthe-
less, in the works. McKinley himself, believed by many to
be a moderate on the rules issue, fueled this type of specula-
tion by dismissing opposition to the reform cause as little
more than empty bravado. "The people of the country," he
argued, after all, "are infinitely more concerned in what
the House is doing than they are in the rules that they are
working under."30
-311-
By mid-January, both sides began marshalling their
forces for a major struggle. Rules Committee member Samuel
Randall, who lay dying of cancer in his Washington residence,
summoned John G. Carlisle, the Democratic minority leader,
to his bedside to discuss Reed's proposals for reform. "I
think the proposed changes, many of them, very obnoxious in
their character," Randall told Carlisle who was the other
Democratic member of the Rules Committee, "and the House
will expect you and me to joiniin a minority report succintly
setting forth the vital changes and our objections thereto. '31
The Republicans, meanwhile, began making their own
preparations for the fight, the details of which were still
unknown to all but Thomas B. Reed. On January 17, 1890,
Thomas Henderson, Chairman of the Republican Caucus, sent a
circular around to all of his Republican colleagues urging
their attendance in the House chamber. Noting the chronic
absence of "some thirty Republican members," from the daily
sessions, Henderson requested all party members "to be
present every day from now on until the adjournment, it
being absolutely necessary that there should be present
during the sessions of the House a quorum of Republicans
for the transaction of public business."32
On January 27 the Republicans caucussed once again to
discuss the new rules which were at that point still being
considered by the Rules Committee. A number of members
lent their support to the idea of delaying the introduction
of the new rules until after the contested election cases
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had beenidecided. To many, the temporary powers granted
the Speaker under general parliamentary practice would
allow the quick and, to the Republicans, satisfactory
settlement of such cases. Others, however, who, like
Representative Cheadle of Indiana and Anderson of Kansas,
were uneasy with any broad-based reform which would radi-
cally and permanently curtail the powers of the individual
Member of Congress, expressed the hope that the favorable
disposition of the contested election cases would give the
Republicans a more comfortable majority and thereby elimi-ý
nate the need for anything as dramatic as an eradication of
the devices of obstructionsim. 33
In the end, the caucus acquiesced to Reed's relatively
vague appeal for support in case the Democrats should decide
to attempt to obstruct the debate oter the election cases.
Despite, or indeed perhaps because of this decision, many
left the caucus meeting uncertain as to just what they had
actually committed themselves to,34 and at least one member
(Anderson) had to be coerced into giving his blanket
approval for the Speaker's future actions.3 5  Even within
the Republican inner circle, uncertainty prevailed. "We
agreed with (Reed) that the filibuster must be destroyed
if the House was to accomplish anything for which it had
been elected," Joseph Cannon later recalled, but "no decision
was made as to when or how this was to be done. The Speaker
had to be the judge of the situation and conditions." 36
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On January 29,.Reed made his long expected move. After
the disposition of some routine legislative matters in the
House, John Dalzell, a Republican of Pennsylvania,brought up
for consideration the contested election case of Smith vs.
Jackson. In this case Jackson, a Democrat of West Virginia,
had been awarded his seat in the House by the Governor of
the State under what were at best clouded circumstances,3 7
and the Republicans had an extremely strong case for over-
turning his election and seating his Republican opponent,
Charles B. Smith.
The Democrats had apparently been anticipating the
report, but had not decided upon a course of action. The
New York Times reported that minority leader Carlisle had
noted earlier in the day that "he did not believe the Demo-
crats would prevent consideration, but would make their fight
on the adoption of the resolution unseating Jackson."38
The ranking minority member of the Elections Committee,
Charles Crisp of Georgia, however, reacted immediately by
raising the question of consideration (i.e. should the matter
be considered at this time?). Reed thereupon put the question
to the House on a voice vote, and determined that the issue
had been decided in the affirmative. Crisp responded once
again by demanding a division and followed this with a
demand for a roll call vote. The Republicans, meanwhile, had
lost their power to assemble a quorum Ca majority of the
House membership) through the death on January 9 of William
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Kelley of Pennsylvania, the sickness of another member and
family problems of a third. When the roll was called, there-
fore, the results showed that the Republicans did not have
the 165 votes needed to constitute a quorum. After a re-
count, the result of the vote gave the ayes 162 and the nays
1, with 163 not voting. The Democrats had used the disappear-
ing quorum to block the unseating of one of their members.
During the call of the roll, however, Speaker Reed had
been seen checking names on the tally sheet in front of him.
When the final result was announced, he calmly directed the
Clerk "to record the following names of members present and
refusing to vote."3 9  Beginning with Representative Newton
-Blanchard of Louisiana, Reed called out the names of the
Democrats whose physical presence he had noted during the
roll call. The applause and cheers which greeted Reed's move
from the Republican side of the House were quickly equalled
by the howls of protest from the Democratic side. "I deny
the power of the Speaker and denounce it as revolutionary,"
Breckenridge of Kentucky roared while Reed continued with
his list. At one point, James McCreary of Kentucky jumped
to his feet to protest Reed's calling of his name. "I deny
your right, Mr. Speaker, to count me as present," he cried,
over the din of raised voices. To this point Reed had not
acknowledged the Democratic protest, but after McCreary's
outburst, he calnly, looked up from his list of names and
gave his now-famous reply, "The chair is making a statement
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of the fact that the gentleman from Kentucky is present.
Does he deny it?"40  The Republican side erupted once again
with laughter and cheers, and the Democrats increased the
vigor of their protest, as the House settled in for a pro-
tracted and unruly four-day debate over the issue. By the
end of the first day, however, it was clear that Reed with
the united support of his party had successfully taken the
first step toward the massive reform program he had promised.
The unity of the Republican party during this crisis was
clearly the decisive factor in the struggle for majoritarian
reform which was effectively begun during the fight over the
Smith-Jackson election case. Without that support, Reed
could never have been successful in his assaUlt on the doctrine
of minority rights. This unity, in turn, hinged partially upon
the nature of the Republican coalition and its policy coherence
and unity of purpose in the House of Representatives. Pre-
pared to enact a major legislative program, the Republican
side of the House was clearly intent on creating the pro-
cedural instruments and designing a system capable of achiev-
ing its collective legislative goals. The checks on majority
action which the divided Democratic party had been forced
to enact by the pressures imposed by its own fragmented and
conflict-ridden membership was clearly unsuited to the dis-
ciplined activist leanings of the relatively united Republican
majority which now ruled the House.
The assault on the obstructionism of the Democratic
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Congresses, however, also succeeded in part because of the
extraordinary leadership of Thomas B. Reed. To be sure, the
factors which combined to produce the partisan unity -- the
strong allegiance of the members to (and their dependence
on) the party organization; the coherent and comprehensive
issue orientation of Republican representatives; the short-
term career perspectives; the tactical resources the com-
bination of these factors gave the Republican House leader-
ship; and the willingness of that leadership to use these
resources to encourage loyalty and discourage deviation --
were the keys to the success of the reform movement in the
51st Congress. Yet, it was Reed's leadership which ultima-
tely gave life to these latent forces and which produced
a clear definition of their legislative purpose.
Even the opposition within, as well as outside, which
immediately began assailing Reed as a Czar, a dictator and
even a "Mongolian-faced Despot,"41 acknowledged the force
and importance of his determination and courage. In the
midst of the storm over the quorum ruling, the Washington
Post reported, "Speaker Reed, against whom all this tumult
was directed, sat resolutely and grimly immovable, a constant
remainder to the Democrats that they must expect no quailing
on his part."42  Wrote another observer:
I am not one of those who question at all his
honesty or his sincerity. These are the very
qualities which make him dangerous. He is
clearly earnest all the time. His belief in
himself and in the correctness of all his
v-.ews never is shaken. •
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Even Lord Bryce, who found many of Reed's political views
distasteful, betrayed a grudging respect for his decisive
leadership. "You are always sure that he is dead wrong,"
Bryce explained, "but he makes you think at the moment that
he is dead right, for he not only has the talent of knowing
just what to say, but the genius of knowing just when to
leave off . . . He is a tower of strength, to which all his
party cling."44
In part, Reed's decisiveness and courage stemmed from
the certainty that his course of action over the rules was
the correct one. Years of reflection had led him to believe
that the Democratic approach to legislative organization was
neither consistent with the stature of the House of Repres-
entatives in national politics (or at least with the stature
he believed it ought to have in national political affairsY,
nor in line with the goals of an activist and unified Repub-
lican legislative party. The preoccupation with minority
rights and obstructionism, the diffusion of power and author-
ity, the weakening of central instruments of decision-making,
the lack of a coordinated policy Clegislativel-making process,
and a passive-House of Representatives, he believed, were all
pathological symptoms of a majority party handicapped by its
own divisiveness and disarray. Reed saw little reason why
the House should continue to function under rules and norms
which were essentially the products of the organizational and
political shortcomings of the Democratic party.
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A Republican House should not be compelled to submit
to a legislative process designed to cater to the internal
weaknesses and failings of the Democratic party. His belief
in the virtue of his own reform course of action, therefore,
was firmly rooted in his contempt for the impotence of the
Democratic party. When asked, for example, how he felt
facing the Democratic uproar over his quorum ruling, Reed
betrayed both his confidence in the logic. and wisdom of his
action, and his disdain for the opposition by replying, I
felt "Just as you would feel if a big creature were jumping
at you and you knew the exact length and strength of his
chain and were quite sure of the weapon you had in your
hands.,45
Reed's self-confidence, however, was also sustained by
his ability to cushion criticism and opposition with a sense
of humor and perspective. "what was done in the House was
right and will surely sustain itself," he suggested in a
letter to Theodore Roosevelt,
I have no fear of that, but meanwhile I expect
no little buffeting from the enemy and more
backbiting from certain quarters but the clouds
always roll by and the Lord knows his own. I
wish, however, that more distinct recognition
of them in this world was part of the divine
plan.46
Finally, Reed's decisive leadership was the result of
a personal determination to get his way with the rules or
leave the House. If he had lost the quorum ruling in 1890,
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Reed later revealed, "I should simply have left the Chair,
resigning the Speakership, and left the House . . . I had
made up my mind that if political life consisted in sitting
helplessly in the Speaker's chair, and seeing the majority
powerless to pass legislation, I had had enough of it."4 7
Reed added that "it is a very soothing thing to know exactly
what you are going to do, if things do not go your way4~4
Thus, although the dramatic changes in the procedures of the
House of Representatives were built upon the foundation of
the Republican party itself and the unity of purpose which
it brought to the Congress in 1889, they were in no small
way also the product of Reed's leadership. While, in other
words, the Republican legislative coalition itself provided
the essential raw materials (unity, coherence, and a funda-
mental agreement on issues and goals) for such a radical
transformation of the rules, it was Reed himself who defined
the strategic options open to the party, who mobilized these
resources, and who ultimately gave shape to the form the
legislative process would take under Republican rule in the
1890's and, as it turned out, during the first decade of the
twentieth century.
The dramatic quorum ruling proved to be merely the open-
ing salvo in Reed's campaign to restructure the House, both
to meet the legislative goals of the Republican party and
to more adequately reflect the party's organizational strengths.
On February 5, 1890, two days after the Smith-Jackson case had
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finally been settled, Reed conveyed a party caucus to
announce his pzrposed new rules package. Included in the
proposed new code were provisions giving the Speaker the
arbitrary power to refrain from recognizing motions he con-
sidered to be dilatory, and the right to count members for
the purpose of establishing the presence of a quorum. By
and large, the new rules presented to the Republican caucus,
adhered to Reed's broad vision of an activist House which
functioned under majoritarian principles.
Although these new rules would be brought to a vote in
the House, the real test of their acceptability came in the
February 5 Republican caucus meeting. For, implementing the
dramatic changes they entailed and the radical redistribu-
tion of power and authority they promised, required the full
support of the Republican membership. Indeed, near unanimity
among caucus members was imperative if Reed's Rules were to
be passed in the full House in the face of what was certain
to be the unanimous opposition of the Democratic party. Be-
yond that, however, the caucus vote was also a significant
test of whether or not the Republican majority would agree
to the curtailment of individual power which was implied in
the new rules. The Boston Herald, for example, reflected
upon this aspect of the new rules in an article written on
the eve of the caucus vote. "This year," the Herald reporter
suggested,
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the Republican leaders are trying to frame rules
that will render . . . filibustering impossible.
It is delicate work. Independent Republicans
like Anderson of Kansas, Cheadle of Indiana and
others are apparently resolved to oppose any
change that will rob them of the power they
held (as filibusters) in the last Congress. 49
Dependent as Reed's vision of the new House of Repres-
entatives was on the unity of purpose, the congruence of
member goals, and the discipline of the Republican legisla-
tive party, the caucus vote on the rules became the ultimate
test of that unity, congruence and discipline. The caucus
vote on the rules would essentially provide an indication of
the kind of conflict -- the unity or fragmentation, the
coherence or disarray -- which would characterize the Repub-
lican approach to the design of the legislative process in
the 51st Congress. In turn, it would also provide an indica-
tion as to how far the rules could go in centralizing power
and decision-making and how active the House would be in
national political affairs.
The timing of the caucus meeting was largely due to
Reed's insistence that the House begin its legislative work.
In part, Reed believed that the momentum gained during the
quorum fight would be used to push reluctant Republicans
toward a more comprehensive restatement of the legislative
process. His actions during the quorum debate had aroused
a great deal of anger among opposition members, but they had
also worked to galvanize support within his own party. He
wanted to take advantage of that momentary Republican euphoria.
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At the same time, however, Reed was becoming increas-
ingly sensitive to charges that he was cynically manipulating
the rules and expanding his personal power under the guise
of general parliamentary procedure. The delay in bringing
a formal rules proposal to the House, his critics suggested,
showed that Reed was both afraid of his own party and eager
to pursue his own and his party's narrow interests (for
example, ensuring that the contested election cases were
settled in ways favorable to the Republican party) in occupy-
ing the Speaker's chair. 50  Reed dismised the criticism out-
wardly, explaining to reporters:
When we first came here the obstructionists
declared that they would die in the last ditch
against my rules . . . and now they are wanting
to die at Thermopylae in defense of the liberties
of their country because we don't force rules on
them. If there would be fewer deaths at Thermo-
pylae and more business in the House the country
would be better off. 51
Despite the outward calm, however, Reed was himself anxious
to bring the new rules and his new vision of the House to life.
The February 5 caucus meeting revealed a few cracks in
the unity of the Republican party. There was, for example,
a prolonged debate over the provision granting the Speaker
power to deny dilatory motions, but it was finally passed.
Representative Atkinson of Pennsylvania was also successful
in amending the rules to give the Committee on Invalid Pensions
Ca prime Republican dispenser of pensions to party friends)
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the right to report pension bills at any time.51 For the
most part, however, the rules received the support of the
caucus although a formal vote on the total reform package
itself was never taken. In the end, "The opposition that
was shown to any proposition . . . was feeble," the New
York Times reported, "the Speaker's boldness having awed
his own party associates. Cheadle of Indiana and Anderson
of Kansas did a good deal of 'kicking' in the cloakroom,
but they were as obedient as well-spanked children in the
caucus.,,52 On the following day, the rules were presented
to the House, and with only minor modifications and over a
strenuous Democratic protest, they were eventually adopted
on February 14 by a strict party vote of 161 to 145. "The
Rules Passed," the Atlanta Constitution headlinedi.its news
of the action in the next day's edition, "And Reed is the
United States of America." 53
To a certain extent, the passage of the rules reform
package was indeed a personal triumph for Reed. Yet, it was
even more centrally a triumph for Reed's vision of how the
House whould.go about its business and of what role it should
play in national affairs. In accepting Reed's restructuring
of the House, the Republican majority had instituted a new
procedural and in fact behavioral code for Congress which was
based upon the new and, in contrast with the Democratic party
approach, distinctive principles of majoritarianism and
action rather than those of minority rights, individual
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autonomy and legislative passivity. In accepting Reed's
vision of the legislative process, the Republicans had acted
to reverse the gradual devolutiont:of power and the increas-
ing fragmentation of decision-making which had so character-
ized preceding Democrating Congresses. Individual rights,
powers, and prerogatives were severely limited and the powers
of the central institutions of authority to control and
coordinate the House process were strengthened. The House
of Representatives became, once more, an initiator rather
than a ratifier of national political decisions.
The most notable aspect of Reed's rules, of course, and
the feature most commented upon in the national press was the
dramatic increase in the power wielded by the Speaker. This
increase in power came at the direct expense of the powers
individual Members of Congress had gained during the years
of Democratic ascendancy in the House in the 1880's. The
power to count a quorum and the elimination of the right to
obstruct legislation through the refusal to vote deprived
small groups of the ability to thwart bills which they
opposed (particularly in Congresses ruled by a thin majority).
The Speaker also gained the right to refuse to entertain
dilatory motions, which further undermined the individual
member's right to filibuster. 54
Coupled with the traditional rights to appoint committees
and dispense other forms of patronage in the House, these
two features of the new rules gave the Speaker almost absolute
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control over the legislative process. Once again, these new
powers were derived from and dependent upon the sustained
support of the majority party. The Speaker's new powers
would have meant very little, for example, (indeed they would
not have been granted) had the Republican majority coalition
fallen prey at any point during the life of the 51st Con-
gress, to the kind of internal factionalism which so marked
the Democratic legislative party in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. The fact that the Republicans were relatively united,
however, allowed the Speaker to use his newfound powers to
the fullest.
The centralization of power in the House of Representa-
tives and the strengthening of the Speakership was viewed by
many observers as a natural outgrowth of obstructionism. One
Democratic leader, for example, suggested that the Speaker was
the natural beneficiary of the majority's impatience with
minority filibustering. "The inevitable result of filibuster-
ing," he wrote:
has been the extension of power of the presiding
officer. When a minority becomes obstructive,
the majority retaliates by curtailing the privi-
leges which have been abused. The Speaker is
usually the instrument by which the purpose of
the majority is accomplished. The business of
the House is placed more completely under his
control, so that he may afford the majority an
opportunity to secure the passage of legislation
which it desires. The power of the Speakership
has thus increased enormously and its growth has
beeniat the expense of the parliamentary privi-
leges of the individual members.5 5
The author of this; article implied, in other words, that the
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growth of the Speaker's powers under Reed was but the most
recent and obvious example of a more deep-seated tendency
in national political life. Reed's Rules, in other words,
were the natural products of an exuberant and dynamic new
order overthrowing an old and decaying order.
Others tended to see Reed's Rules instead as the most
recent step in a long-term and almost deterministic central-
izing trend in political institutions in general and in the
House of Representatives in particular. Borrowing from
Bagehot's assumptions about the inevitable supremacy of the
legislative over the Executive, and other assumptions about
the centralizing tendencies of political institutions, Albert
Bushnell Hart saw in Reed's Rules simply the latest manifesta-
tion of those broad historical progressions.
The recent addition to the Speaker's power has
not been conferred by the recent vote of the
Mouse in adopting rules, and in fact is not
expressed in the Constitution, the acts of Con-
gress, or the rules of the House. It is a
natural growth, and in part the tendency
throughout the national, state, and municipal
systems to put responsibility upon individuals
rather than upon boards. It is a wholesome
reaction from the divided irresponsibility and
wasteful system of conducting the business of
legislation.56
If, however, some of the more dispassionate observers of
national politics viewed the emergence of the Speaker as
"Czar" as the natural fulfillment of a long-term organization-
al process of development, many participants on.the rules fight
did not. Democratic members of the House, for example, tended
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to see Reed's innovations as dangerous departures from
American legislative tradition. The proposed change of the
rules, one Member of Congress insisted, means "that the
Speaker, instead of being, as for the past one hundred years,
the servant of the House, shall be its master."57  Another
charged that Reed had set himself up as an autocrat and had
proceeded toiradically transform the role of the individual
member. "Under this system of rules you reduce the individual
member simply to a wooden image. He has no rights under this
new code. "58 Far from adhering to the historic organiza-
tional tendencies of the House, in other words, Reed had
dramatically changed course. "Reform should have commenced
by curtailing instead of extending the authority of (The
Speaker)," John G. Carlisle contended in an article predic-
tably critical of Reed's reform. Greater equality was the
direction of Democratic organizational changes, he implied,
noting that "It is not strange that the advocates of equal
rights in the House should look with some degree (of anxiety)
upon every proposition to confer additional authority upon
its presiding officer." 59
Despite this strong undercurrent of opposition to a
stronger Speakership in the House of Representatives, Reed
himself had decided early on in his career that the central-
ization of power was the key to achieving the activist legis-
lative process he sought. In 1882, for example, he had
suggested to his House colleagues:
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that whenever it is imposed upon the Congress
to accomplish a certain work, whether by the
Constitution or by a law, it is the duty of
the Speaker, who represents the House, and in
his official capacity is the embodiment of the
House, to carry out that rule of law or of the
Constitution. It then becomes his duty to see
that no fractious opposition prevents the
House from doing its duty. He must brush away
all unlawful combinations to misuse the rules
and must hold the House strictly to its work.6 0
Reed pushed this belief consistently throughout his years as
opposition leader in the House to an increasingly receptive,
but powerless Republican minority. When the 51st Congress
convened, however, with its Republican majority, Reed re-
emphasized the need for a strong Speakership to his colleagues
and ultimately made it the keystone of his organizational
revolution.
Many of the resources which Reed would use to achieve
greater control over the legislative process already lay at
the disposal of the Speaker who was determined enough (and
who had the support of his party) to mobilize them. The
power to appoint committees, for example, used by some Demo-
cratic Speakers to reward factional allies or to safeguard
factional interests, was used by Reed to consolidate support
for centralization. Reed's appointments, for example, caused
little of the bitterness, frustration or disappointment which
generally greeted the announcement of committee selections
under his predecessors. Indeed, the great rules struggle of
January and February, 1890, which was carried on with the
overwhelming support of Reed's Republican colleagues, occurred
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after he had named his committees. In addition to the comm-
committee appointment powers, the Speaker also possessed
immense if (under the Democratic Speakers since 1880) latent
political resources as chairman of the Rules Committee. The
power of recognition, while largely unused, also existed in
the Speaker's organizational arsenal.
Of these existing organizational resources, the Rules
Committee was probably the most significant to Reed's attempt
to consolidate the Speaker's control over the legislative
process. Made a standing committee in the Revision of 1880,
it had already begun to emerge as a major force in setting
the legislative agenda by 1883. Under existing rules, the
committee was composed of five members (Three from the::major-
ity party and two from the minority party) and was chaired by
the Speaker. The committee's power stemmed from its right to
report at any time, bills pertaining to the rules, thus cir-
cumventing the formal House calendar. In a legislative body
which could typically deal with only a fraction(.of the bills
which were introduced in each session, the power to report at
any time was a major political and legislative resource.
Other committees had the same right with respect to their own
bills (for example, Ways:and Means on revenue bills and
Appropriations Committee on appropriations bills)61 but none
of them had as broad a mandate to report as the Rules Comm-
ittee.6 2
The key to the Rules Committee's power to control the
legislative agenda stemmed from its right to report special
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orders. These special orders or temporary rules, allowed
the Rules Committee to introduce bills which essentially
permitted the consideration of substantive bills from other
committees, which would otherwise have languished on the
House calendars. Special orders were themselves not unknown
to the House before the 1880's, but as Hinds notes, the
manner in which they were brought before the House was
different in the years before the creation of a standing
Rules Committee. Before 1883, bills could be taken from
the calendar, out of their regular order, only by unaiimous
consent (which of course meant the unanimous consent of the
House membership) or by a suspension of the::rules (which
required the support of two-thirds of the House membership):.
These methods, as Hinds suggests, were "cumbersome', since on-
any question which involved party differences, the attempt
was very likely to fail."63
In 1883, during the second and final session of the 47th
Congress, the majority Republicans attempted to report a
tariff bill over the opposition of the Democratic side of the
House. Lacking the ability to procure either unanimous con-
sent or the two-thirds vote necessary to suspend the rules
and allow the bill to be considered out of its regular order
(and before the reports of other equally privileged comm-
ittees), the Rules Committee sent a special order to the
floor. As a committee report, the special order in this
form, needed only a simple majority to pass the House. The
Democrats again objected to this procedural innovation, but
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it was sustained by the Republican iatority. Ironically,
it was Thomas B. Reed who made the Rules Committee report.64
The Rules Committee's right to report special orders
remained a serious point of contention during the succeeding
three Congresses, as the majority Democrats refused, for the
most part, to make use of that power. In 1887, for example,
the special report was still "regarded as a proceeding of
doubtful validity."6 5  In the 51st Congress, however, it
was reestablished as allegitimate means for both "bringing
up for consideration bills difficult to reach in the regular
order" and for-limiting the time for debate. 66  Although the
Democrats in the 52nd and 53rd Congresses (in which they were
once again the majority party) allowed this practice to con-
tinue and even encouraged its use, it was the Republican
party and particularly Thomas B. Reed who did the most to
politicize the Rules Committee and transform it into an
instrument of centralized legislative control.
As in the case of the Rules Committee and the special
order, then, Reed built upon the existing, if often once
again latent powers of the Speakership, to strengthen central
control over the legislative process. Redefining some of
these existing prerogatives and creating others, he greatly
expanded the ability of the Speaker to direct the business
of the House of Representatives. The scope of the Speaker's
recognition powers, for example, which had laid dormant as
an instrument of control under his predecessors Calthough
^ --lr~ -~-----~3-U~-nc~nr~,rr~---nr~·lr~-~?~~.? C"-
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Carlisle had occasionally made use of it to suit his needsl,
and was broadened under Reed's Rules.
The initial target of this expansive approach to the
power of recognition was of course the dilatory motion. Reed
had spent years decrying the use of such motions to stall
consideration of legislation. In 1882, for example, at a
time when Democrats were blocking the resolution of a number
of contested election cases, Reed introduced a bill from the
Rules Committee which would allow no:, more than one dilatory
motion during the consideration of an election dispute. The
Speaker was given the right to decide which motions were in
fact dilatory, and which were not.67  The measure was quickly
passed and adopted by the Republican House which thereby,
according to Reed, "summarily took away the power of using
dilatory motions in election cases, and thus put down the
parliamentary rebellion."68
This provision was struck out of the rules by subsequent
Democratic Congresses, but in 1890 it was reintroduced as
part of Reed's reform package. Reed, however, did not con-
fine the stricture against dilatory motions to election cases
alone, but broadened it to cover all debates in the House.
The broadened rule simply provided that "No dilatory motion
shall be entertained by the Speaker."69 Simply phrased
in the new rules code, this new provision nevertheless gave
the Speaker immense new powers to control the legislative
agenda. "We destroyed a system," Henry Chbot Lodge, a mem-
ber of the 51st Congress later wrote of this innovation in
--ll "·'"~·-·-··rr*·r~--·r·-·-~^ol*i-·r*
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House procedures, "where one man's voice could put a stop
to legislation and restored that in which the duly-elected
representatives of the people could do the public business." 7 0
The quashing of dilatory motions, however, was but a
portion of Reed's expansion of the Speaker's recognition
powers. Reed, for example, reaffirmed a precedent which had
actually been established by Samuel Randall in 1881 and sus-
tained by Republican Speaker Keifer in 1882 that decisions
by the Speaker on a question of recognition are not subject
to appeals from the floor. 71 Reed expanded the recognition
power even further by invoking a procedure first used by
John G. Carlisle, whl'ich demanded that a member state the
purpose for which he wished to be recognized on the floor
of the House. 72  These powers gave the Speaker almost total
control over the legislative agenda. Through them, "he could
decide what matters would come before the House and discip-
line Members who failed to comply with his wishes." 73
The exercise of this power was of course dependent upon
the willing support of the Republican legislative party. Des-
pite the unity and relative coherence of the majority party,
Reed could not have expanded the recognition powers to the
extent he did, without the cooperation of his Republican
colleagues. The Democratic experience in previous Con-
gresses had clearly demonstrated, and Reed was aware of the
fact that a fractious majority party or a group of recalci-
trant members could easily block the will of an activist
Speaker. Reed's primary resource in the struggle to expand
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his recognition powers, therefote, lay in the extent to which
his own party was willing and politically able to provide
him with the unity and support he needed.
Reed built upon this base, strengthening the consensual
impulses and emphasizing the congruence of needs and goals
within hislparty, and imparting a sense of purpose to his
aggrandizement of the Speakership to the point that his own
victories were effectively those of his supporters. Thus,
although a few Republicans grumbled over their diminished
prerogatives, many more took great satisfaction from Reed's
initiatives. One Republican, John Houk of Tennessee, for
example, who took great pleasure in "frequently badgering
his Democratic friends," was expecially taken by Reed's
masterful control of the legislative process, and his taming
of the obstructionist Democratic minority. To David Bulber-
son of Texas, Houk was once heard. to have remarked:
Dave, we Republicans have the ideal Speaker. He
is the best Speaker who ever presided over this
House. He won't recognize a Democrat to make a
motion to adjourn; he won't recognize the demands
of a Democrat for tellers, and (leaning over
confidentially) he is considering a proposition
to require the endorsement of two Republicans
for a Democrat to introduce a bill. I will
endorse you, Culberson, if you can get anyone
for a second. 74
Reed's centralization of power in the House, therefore,
was in part effected through the.broadening of the right to
recognize or refuse to recognize Members of Congress during
debate, but it was also achieved through the formalization
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of the right to count a quorum. The rules bill presented to
the House in February included the provision that members who
are present but not voting shall be considered present for
the purposes of a quorum.75 This removed what in a closely
divided House was one of the most potent weapons of obstruc-
tion -- the disappearing quorum, and as in the case of the
expanded recognition powers, Reed presented the reform meas-
ure in terms of party, rather than personal gain. Again,
Reed succeeded in identifying the expansion of the Speaker's
powers with the goals of his majority party colleagues. This
he did by clearly associating the centralization of power
with the right of the majority to rule. Whether there existed
other means of destroying obstructionism or not, in other
words, Reed's success lay in his ability to convince his
colleagues that the most effective guarantee of majority rule
was the existence of powerful Speakership.
The debate over this disappearing quorum issue (both
during the January battle over the Smith-Jackson case and in
the debate over the new rules code in February) demonstrated
the success with which Reed had in effect aligned his own
procedural reforms with the general goals and views of his
party colleagues. "A majority under the Constitution is
entitled to legislate," Joseph Cannon argued in the House,
for example, and "if a contrary practice has grown up, such
practice is unrepublican, undemocratic, against sound public
policy and contrary to the Constitution." 7 6  Other Republi-
cans returned to this theme again and again, invariably
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claiming that the majority party had the right and the duty
to do the work it was elected to perform. They did not come
to Washington, one Republican member noted of his colleagues,
"with no higher mission in proposing measures than to ascer-.
tain the will of an arbitrary and controlling minority." 77
Whatever problems were inherent in a strong Speakership,
then, Republican Members of Congress tended to see even great-
er problems in allowing an obstructionistcminority the right
to thwart their legislative (both public and private) goals.
For a united party and one which after years in the minority
sought positive action on an array of political questions,
maintaining the individual right to obstruct or veto legis-
lative initiatives was a far less attractive option than
the alternative of sacrificing certain personal prerogatives
to a centralized system which promised to expedite the pass-
age of bills through the House.
To some Democrats, this was indeed the motive force
behind the institution of Reed's Rules. "Under the proposed
rules," one Democratic Member of Congress charged, "we will
meet to simply vot money out of the Treasury without debate
or deliberation. Cliques and combinations will meet and
tell us the amount they want and without delay we will surr-
ender the Treasury key."78  As Reed, however, maintained,
with the evident agreement of his fellow Republicans, legis-
lation rather than deliberation and action rather than debate
were the true ends of the legislative process. As he later
argued:
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In order to make laws wisely, the body must be
a deliberative body; but deliberation, however
rnecessary or valuable, is only the means to an
end; and that end is the right decision whether
- to make a law or not, and in what shape to put
it in if made. Debating is useful in law-
making, but it is not in itself an end or an
aim. 7 9
In part, then, Reed's success in broadening the powers
of the Speaker derived from his ability to convince his fellow
Republicans that the Democratic preoccupation with delibera-
tion (a preoccupation which was itself the product of Demo-
cratic disarray and internal disagreement over legislative
goals) would produce fewer political returns than an institu-
tional commitment to action. Republicans, essentially united
over broad policy concerns, could gain more by working in
concert with one another and through the party structure than
they could by returning to the individual and factional pre-
rogatives afforded by an obstructionist (i.e. deliberative)
system. The extent to which Reed could mobilize support for
his legislative steamroller in the House of Representatives,
in other words, was dependent on his ability to transfer the
locus of bargaining, of logrolling, of the dispensationoof
political goods and indeed the deliberation itself, from
the House floor to the party caucus. Generally agreed among
themselves over broad principles and working under a creative,
competent, and generous leadership, most Republican Members
of Congress were content to have the House act, for the most
part, as the forum where decisions actually made by the party
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or by the party leaders were simply ratified. The central-
ized control over the business of the House was thus merely
the most visible aspect of Reed's-oparliamentary system. The
recognition of power, the right to overrule the use of the
disappearing quorum and the manipulation of the House agenda
by the Rules Committee merely expedited the confirmation of
decisions made off the House floor.
In streamlining House procedures, Reed clearly expedited
the process of legislation. In so doing, he also transformed
the role of the House in the nationzl policy-making system.
Essentially reversing the trend of the presiding Democratic
Congresses where the House had assumed a rather passive and
reactive role in national politics, Reed was determined to
elevate the legislature to an active and prominent role in
shaping Federal policy and setting the pplicy-making agenda.
Personally ambitious, 80 Reed did not want to lead a House
which was content to pass judgment on a policy agenda set
by either the President or theSSenate. In part, Reed's con-
cern for the House's role also stemmed from feelings about
the superiority of that body over the other branches of
Government. He personally disliked President Harrison,81
for example, and he openly scorned the Senate, once calling
it "the place where politicians go when they die." 82  Reed,
thus intent on expanding the stature of the House, saw the
reform of the rules as the instrument of that expansion.
The link between the centralization of power in the
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House and the new expansive role envisaged for that body
by Thomas B. Reed was noted by a number of contemporary ob-
servers -- both critics and supporters alike. The Nation,
for example, accused Reed of using his reforms as the instru-
ment of a process by which the Speaker sought to redefine the
role of the House in the national political system (.and indedd,
the instrument by which Reed implicitly sought to re-design
the national political system itself). Charging Reed with
achering to the belief that "the House is not a deliberative
body but an executive body," the journal suggested that the
House of Representatives was becoming more Parliamentary than
Congressional, and that the presiding officer viewed his role
more as a Prime Minister than a Speaker. 83 Albert Bushnell
Hart agreed with this assessment of Congress' new role and
saw it as an almost inevitable and clearly welcome milestone
in the evolution of the American national legislature.
The powers now exercised by the Speaker will
probably be exercised by each succeeding
Speaker, and will somewhat increase. Since
-the legislative department in every republic
constantly tends to gain ground at the
expense of the executive, the Speaker is
likely to become, and perhaps is already,
more powerful, both for good and-for evil,
than the President of the United States. He
is premier in legislation; it is the business
of the party that he be also Premier in
character, in ability, in leadership and in
statesmanship.84
Both critics and admirers thus saw in Reed's rules a dramatic
departure from tradition in their impact on Congress' role in
national politics. The 51st Congress had stepped beyond the
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paths of its immediate predecessors into one marked by
activism and a sense of purpose. "We have reversed the
uniform precedent of the national House," Henry Cabot Lodge
wrote a friend, "and such was our intention. We mean to
break down the vicious system which has reduced the House
to a position of impotence." 85
As in the case of the centralization of power and the
construction of mechanisms of central control over the
legislative decision-making process, the expansion of the
House's role was built upon the foundations of political
self-interest. Republican members supported Reed's Rules
and the broadening of the powers of the House as an institu-
tion in the national political system not because of a
visionary attachment to the abstract principle of legisla-
tive dominance, but rather because those changes promised to
produce concrete legislative dividends to the members them-
selves. United as they were over broad policy goals, most
Republican~:members tended to see the strengthening of the
House as yet another means by which those goals could be
more readily achieved.
To many, then, Reed's Rules as well as Reed's visi~n:.
of the House were simply the organizational expression of
a membership which was able and eager to translate the
unique and powerful resources which it possessed (unity,
coherence, and a more or less common legislative purpose)-
into a policy-making system which produced the specific
outcomes which that membership sought. The reforms of the
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51st Congress then, -- the redistribution of power, the
establishment of a coordinative decision-making system and
the new more expansive role of the House in national poli-
tical affairs -- were simply portions of the organizational
groundwork Republicans were laying for the enactment of new
tariff laws, a new election bill and dramatically higher
rates of federal spending.86
The extent to which the 51st Congress constituted both
a marked departure from the organizational traditions of
the Democrats, and a clear reflection of the unique demands
and resources of the Republican party can be best illustrated
by a brief account of the actions that were taken by the
Democratically controlled 52nd and 53rd Congresses. Having
lost the 1890 elections by a wide margin, the Republicans
retreated to their familiar role as minority party, and a
shattered Reed attempted to regroup his decimated ranks. The
massive Democratic victory had come largely as the result
of the McKinley tariff, but Reed's Rules had also figured
in the Republican electoral disaster. 87  McKinley himself
had lost his bid for reelection as did Cannon, and many of
those Republicans who had managed to win re-election con-
fronted a bleak prospect in the House of Representatives.
With only 88 Republicans in the new House, Asher Hinds
later recalled, for example, "my faith was weak that another
Republican majority would be seen in the House in my life
time." 88 The only positive voices were from those who,
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like Thomas Carter of Montana, could at least look forward
to sniping at the Democratic majority. We will have a
"field day in stirring up the animals," was Carter's view
of the 52nd Congress. "Our Republican boys look forward to
a session of Congress without responsibility, and with many
pleasing episodes in store." 89
The Democrats, meanwhile, prepared to organize the
House in accordance with their own peculiar partisan needs
and weaknesses. Divided as ever, it was clear that the
Democrats would begin their task by repudiating the form
and substance of Reed's Rules. Charles Crisp of Georgia,
who was nominated and eventually elected Speaker over the
expected victor, Roger Q. Mills of Texas, was particularly
keen on restoring Congress to its traditional obstruction-
ist ways. Crisp had won the nomination for Speakership
over Mills because of his moderate attachment to protection-
ism. A spokesman for the "New South", Crisp had attracted
the support of the large number of northern Democrats who
had been elected to the House in the 1890 landslide. 9 0
While this infusion of Northern (protectionist) Democrats
into the House had certainly helped Crisp in his bid for the
Speakership, it also heightened the internal tension and the
divisiveness within the party.91  As in the case of the
Democratic Congresses of the 1880's, the 52nd Congress would
have to mold its organizational procedures and its behavioral
norms to reflect the internal fractiousness and lack of
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consensus within the majority party. The system of central
control and the coordination of the deci.sion-making process
which had served Reed so well was clearly out of the question
in the 52nd Congress.
Indeed, the demands for a broader distribution of power
were clearly reflected in Crisp's first act as Speaker. It
had become the practice of both Republican, and Democratic
Speakers to appoint the Chairmen of the Ways and Means Comm-
ittee and the Appropriations Committee to the Rules Committee.
Crisp departed from this tradition by naming two other Demo-
cratic Representatives to the Rules Committee in an apparent
effort to produce "a.wider distribution of power and respons-
bility. "92
In January of 1892, Crisp continued this trend by report-
ing out of the Rules Committee a code which essentially re-
turned the organization of the House to its pre-Reed's Rules
days. With few exceptions, the new rules of the 52nd Congress
were to be those of the 50th Congress. Crisp did pay partial
tribute to Reed's concern for legislative efficiency in
commenting on the Rules Committee report (.suggesting that the
new Democratic rules would encourage legislative efficiency
every bit as much as Reed's Rules had donel, but the actual
nature of the proposed code paid a far more substantial tri-
bute to the traditional Democratic preoccupation with obstruc-
tionism and minority rights. The powers of recognition were
curtailed, the right to count a quorum was eliminated and
the Holman Rule was reinstated in a thorough attempt to
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reconcile House procedures once again to the exigencies
of a divided Democratic party. More than anything else,
this return to the norms of fragmentation and individual-
ism in Congress reflected the pervasive lack of consensus
within Democratic ranks. As the Nation would later suggest,
disunity and disarray were the hallmarks of both the Demo-
crats'in 1892 and the House of the 52nd Congress. "The
enormous majority of the Democratic party in the present
House," the Nation argued:
was regarded with apprehension by its most
intelligent leaders, and the result has, to
a certain extent, justified their fears. To
subject a vast crowd of new.lmembers -- many
of them owing their election to such elements
as the People's Patty or the Farmers' Alliance
than to regular Democratic voters -- to the
discipline required to make party government
effective, prov&d to be impossible. 93
When the 53rd Congress convened in 1893, Crisp, again
named Speaker by his party, decided to force a greater meas-
ure of discipline on his still divided colleagues. Expectant
Republicans enjoyed watching an uneasy Crisp (who now led a
reduced majority in the House) try to convince his fellow
Democrats that they should submit to a more centralized legis-
lative structure, particularly since Democrat Grover Cleveland
was once again President. "I see Crisp thinks the rules
must be modified." J.C. Burrows wrote Reed in 1893, "We agree
with him don't we? It seems to me we ought to insist on a
code of rules under which the democratic party can't help
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itself but must do business. It will be interesting then
to see the machine work."94
Crisp, meanwhile, attempted to frame his reform pro-
posals in terms which he hoped would reflect the sensibili-
ties of his party colleagues and win their support. Out-
lining a reform which would give the Rules Committee a more
prominent role in controlling legislative business, for
example, Crisp rather lamely suggested that "Democrats didn't
object to the rules of the 51st Congress as they did to the
imperious behavior of the Speaker himself. Under the 53rd
Congress' rules, the Rules Committee dominates, but a major-
ity of the Congress must ratify each move of the Rules Comm-
ittee."95
Republicans, for their part, feigned surprise that the
Democratic party, which had in the past spent so much energy
guarding the "rights of the individual member, standing upon
his sole leather and his conscience to stop the business of
the House," should "now cdepautte three gentlemen (the Demo-
cratic members of the Rules Committee) to put an end to him
so abruptly. "9 6  Many Democrats themselves were uneasy with
the proposed changes and sought to moderate the centralizing
impact of such a change by increasing the list of committees
given the right to report at any time. 97  In the end, how-
ever, Crisp was given the more powerful Rules Committee he
sought and filibustering received a setback.
While the new Rules Committee powers generally lessened
the opportunities for filibustering (the Rules Committee
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would typically limit the time for debate on important bills,
for example), little was done to alter the traditional Demo-
cratic approach to the Disappearing Quorum. Although the
53rd Congress did adopt the Reed provision making one hundred
Members of Congress (rather than a majority) sufficient for
the purposes of a quorum in the Committee of the Whole,98
the Speaker was given no right to count non-voting members
during House votes. Individuals could continue to absent
themselves from roll calls for the purpose of breaking a
quorum.
This raised serious problems for the Democratic leader-
ship, which found it increasingly difficult to assemble and
sustain the presence of its party members for roll call votes.
Divided as ever before, Democrats were quick to find in the
disappearing quorum a useful means of circumventing Crisp's
attempt to foster a measure of party discipline. As the
Nation noted:
The Democrats:-refuse to make a quorum in order
either to embody their own ideas in legislation
or to reverse the policy of the Republicans. A
large number of them hardly seem to think atten-
dance in Congress necessary at all. They draw
their salaries and attend to their private
affairs in various parts of the country. In
other words they refuse to discharge their
duties under the Constitution. 9 9
The plan of these recalcitrant Democrats, whose diverse in-
terests were not adequately recognized by their leaders within
the House "is simply to stay away from the legislative halls,
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and leave the Speaker to hammer and search for legislators."1 0 0
By February of 1894 the absenteeism and consequent diffi-
culties Democrats faced in assembling a quorum threatened to
bring the beleaguered Congress to a standstill. Republicans,
eager to force a Democratic Speaker to formally vindicate
Reed's practice of counting a quorum, began to make use of
the Disappearing Quorum tactic themselves. Democratic leaders
responded only cautiously at first by proposing (among them-
selves) different means of counting the quorum and coming to
an actual agreement on none of those means. So anxious were
the Democrats to find ways of dealing with the Disappearing
Quorum without giving the Speaker the right to count the non-
voting members himself, that a.'bemused Reed at one point rose
to suggest that "Perhaps it woiuld be well to appoint a justice
of the peace to administer the business of the House."101
In early April, the legislative crisis reached its peak.
The Democrats were unable to assemble a quorum from among
their own membership and the Republicans had little trouble
bringing all business to a grinding halt by refusing to vote
on the formal approval of the journal. After days of stale-
mate and immobilism, the Democratic leadership bowed to
necessity and introduced-.a proposal which would essentially
grant the Speaker the right to count a quorum. Although the
provision was actually worded to give tellers appointed by
the Speaker the power to note the presence of members refus-
ing to vote, it was nevertheless a full-scale surrender to
Reed's Rule; Q102 A number of prominent Democrats protested
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the proposed change, but it was eventually adopted on April
17, 1894.103 Business proceeded more smoothly after this
point, but Democrats were never able to recreate the effic-
ient machine Reed and the Republican party had developed in
the 51st Congress.
In the end, Reed's Rules received little more than a
forced and half-hearted Democratic endorsement despite the
fragmentation within the party. The divided Democratic
majority had been drivim.r to accept a measure of central
control through Republican prodding, rather than by the
wishes of its own membership. For centralization was largely
out of place and irrelevant to a party as divided as the
Democratic was in the late nineteenth century. The imposi-
tion of Reed's Rules on the Democratic House in 1894 did
little more than apply a temporary patch to massive party
wounds which showed no signs of healing.
In effect, then, the centralization of power, the coor-
dination of decision-making and the elevation of the House
to an active initiative role in Federal politics which Reed
had brought to the Republican 51st Congress, and which were
reaffirmed when the Republicans regained:control of the House
in the elections of 1894, was an attempt to reconcile the
internal legislative process with the peculiar resources
and interests of the late nineteenth century Republican party.
The norms, procedures and rules which had emerged during the
years of Democratic control were clearly irrelevant to the
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unity, the activism and the congruence of issue concerns
within the Republican party of that time. The desire for
legislative action on a specific range of goals and a con-
crete policy-making agenda, coupled with the unique organiza-
tional resources of the Republican party, produced the man-
date for a House of Representatives which was unfettered by
the normative and procedural constraints -- the preoccupa-
tion with minority rights, the rampant individualism, and
the acute sensitivity to factional interests -- which the
Democrats had been forced to accommodate when they were in
the majority.
In a sense, this striking contrast between Republican
and Democratic Houses, and the diametrically opposed ways
each party approached the design and construction of the
legislative process, presaged the twentieth century struggle
between the forces of individualism and fragmentation and
those of centralism and coordination. To a limited extent,
furthermore, these different approaches were rooted in the
same conditions and motivated'by the same forces which under-
laid this later struggle. In either case, the nineteenth
century struggle between individual or factional autonomy
and organizational coherence illustrates the types of forces
which tended to.give the House of Representatives its'internal
shape.
The dramatic fluctuations in the organizational style
of the House of Representatives which occurred in the late
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nineteenth century, however, were most clearly and uniquely
related to which party held power. The relatively detailed
examination of. the distinctive Democratic and Republican
approaches to Congressional organization during this period
suggests that the House was subject to abrupt change when-
ever one or the other party ascended to power. The abrupt-
ness of these changes themselves tend to challenge the assump-
tion that the House was developing a purely internal norma-
tive and procedural system according to the dictates of a
long-term organizational progression. An institutionalization
process, for example, would probably not have been as deeply
and decisively affected by such fluctuations in party con-
trol. In fact, therefore, one finds little evidence of any
broad trend in the evolution of the House of Representatives
during this period of time. Rather, the evidence suggests that
the House evolved in relatively direct fashion to forces work-
ing in its immediate'political environment. Democratic Houses
tended, for example, to differ quite markedly and consistently
from Republican-controlled Houses. Those controlled by the
Democrats during the Cleveland administration, furthermore,
tended to differ from Democratic Houses during the periods of
Republican control of the Executive Branch. The sensitivity
of Congress to these forces, therefore, and the degree of
variability which existed from Congress to Congress, lends
credence to the ecologist assumption that the search for the
roots of Congressional behavior -- at least in the nineteenth
century -- be-carried on beyond Congress' internal world.
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This traditional ecologist approach to House behavior,
it has been noted, is marked by a preoccupation with elec-
toral trends. The relationship between electoral competitive-
ness and House behavior is assumed to be critical in this re-
gard. As David Brady suggests, for example, the struggle
between centralized control of the House and decentralization
between 1896 and 1911 was most prominently the product of
the decline of electoral competition. "The most obvious
explanation for the transition from a centralized structure
to a decentralized structure," he argues, "seems to have
been the increasing number of safe seats in the House."1 04
This is clearly a persuasive argument for the relatively
rapid decline of the strong Speakership after 1908. Such
an explanation, however, does not take us very far toward
explaining variations in the pre-1900 period when both par-
ties experienced much the same levels of competitiveness.
Within the late nineteenth century period, therefore, it is
necessary to consider other forces working in Congress'
political environment and consequently on the internal shape
of the House of Representatives. This study's preoccupation
with the nature and sources of Congressional conflict serves
as a more useful focus here.
As this study has suggested, the nature, the intensity
and the patterns of conflict within the House are determined
by such factors as the strength and level of integration of
formal political organizations outside of Congress, the
manner:'in which demands on the part of the national constitu-
ency are expressed and organized, the distribution and content
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of those demands, and the pervasiveness or absence of broad
and cumulative ideological, interest-oriented or even effec-
tive cleavages in the nation (e.g. sectionalism in the nine-
teenth century). The nature of conflict within the nineteenth
century House of Representatives was clearly determined by a
combination of these forces. The sectional heterogeneity
of the Democratic party, and the relative homogeneity of the
Republican party base created major differences in the levels
of consensus or unity which each party brought to Congress.
The different levels of organizational integration of
each national party also led to major distinctions in the
patterns and scales of conflict Democrats and Republicans
brought to the House, as did the pervasiveness of broad and
unifying political symbols and ideologies each party was able
to mobilize in the electorate. This in turn reflected the
types of issues and interests which both parties encompassed
and which distinguished each from the other. These issue
clusters, and the levels of divergence or convergence which
characterized the constituents and interests reflected in
those issues, also produced, therefore, tendencies toward
internal partisan factionalism or disarray or internal unity
and coherence.
After 1896, the decline of electoral competitiveness
for both parties added yet another force to these other con-
ditions working on the nature of conflict in the House. The
decline of electoral competitiveness tended, as Burnham,
Price, Brady and others have suggested, to lead toward an
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increase in the autonomy and political independence
(independent at least from the often dramatic political
fluctuations evident in the national political arena in the
nineteenth century, if not necessarily independent from more
narrow and focussed constituency demands and interests) of
the individual members, and introduced a new (and largely
disintegrativel' element into the patterns of conflict both
parties contained. Before 1896, however, conflict in the
House of Representatives was largely a function of the or-
ganizational strengths and weaknesses of the national party
structures, and of the divergent or convergent sectional
loyalties, issue concerns and interests each party contained
within it. Clearly, each of these forces worked differently
for the Republican party which had a better defined, more
coherent and more active approach to public policy-making
than they did for the Democrats who were chronically divided
by their own peculiar and diverse combination of issue con-
cerns, sectional loyalties, and economic and political
interests.
Each party thus brought with it different patterns of
conflict or unity to the House of Represetntatives. When
the Democrats held power, the House was forced to conform
itself to the prevailing lack of consensus which character-
ized that party's policy coalition. Dispersion of power,
resistance to the central coordination of the legislative
decision-making process and a normative emphasis on minority
rights, obstructionism and individualism were logical
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outgrowths of a party unable to effect an enduring internal
agreement on political goals. In the absence of such an
enduring and sustainable agreement, the House was forced to
work under a decision-making structure which was flexible
and permeable -- one which recognized the Democratic depen-
dence on a moving or momentary concensus, issue-specific
legislative coalitions, and an open and broad-based bargain-
ing system.
The Republican party, on the other hand, brought to its
organizational task a greater measure of internal harmony
over a broad range of issues and political concerns. This
broad consensus within the Republican party was reflected in
the House by a diminished formal regard for individual rights
and prerogatives. Coalitions were:,built and sustained within
the party, political goods were centrally distributed and
legislative decisions were made and coordinated by party
leaders, armed by their rank and file members with the author-
ity (and the legitimacyl to direct the legislative process.
That legislative process, in sum, was designed not to achieve
a political consensus, but in effect rather to ratify an
already existing one.
The organizational system of the House of Representa-
tives -- its norms, its rules, its procedures -- is, this
study argues, the general instrument by which Congress
reconciles its need to make legislative decisions with the
particular forms of disagreement and dissensus it confronts.
Different levels and patterns of conflict within the majority
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party and within the House as a whole produce different
demands on the organizational system, which in turn produce
different obstacles to Congress' ability to make legislative
decisions (and not so incidentally to the ability of the
members to pursue and achieve their own particular political
and legislative goals).
Congress, and the membership, responds to the emergence
of these obstacles by modifying the system through which
those obstacles are overcome and through which conflict is
resolved. The central force in the evolution of the House
of Representatives' internal system, them, is the kind of
conflict it must manage. The late nineteenth century pro-
vides a useful illustration of the relationship between con-
flict and-organization in a legislative body because of the
often dramatic and visible changes which occurred in both
during this period of time. As the patterns of conflict
changed, as the obstacles to an ongoing legislative con-
sensus varied, so did the House itself change as an institu-
tion. This sensitivity of the internal world of the House to
conflict, thus suggests that the dynamic force in Congress'
evolution is to be found largely in the forces which define
and constrain that political conflict. More than anything
else, in other words, Congress is the product of the forces
which determine the levels and patterns of dissensus with
which its political environment forces it to contend.
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Chapter VI
The Politics of Particularism
and the
Legislative Process
Most students of Congressional history view the events
surrounding the 1910 "overthrow" of Joseph G. Cannon as a
major turning point in the evolution of the House of Repres-
entatives. For Nelson Polsby, the St. Patrick's Day revolt
was part of a deeper developmental dynamic which reached a
"take-off" stage during the first decade of the twentieth
century. Other internalists who, like Charles O. Jones,
see the decline of the strong Speaker as the result of a
failure of leadership, provide more limited explanations
for the major changes which affected the House during this
era. Nevertheless, both men, and both approaches tend to
stress the long term significance of this critical period
in Congress' history, and suggest that the changes brought
about during this time had lasting effects on the shape of
the twentieth century House. Neither approach, however,
takes us very far toward understanding why these events
occurred when they did or, particularly in the case of the
latter, why their effects were so decisive and so persistent.
Ecologists, on the other hand, who view the turn of the
century as a major turning point in the structure and
-357-
organization of American politics in general, tend to be
more successful in identifying both a visible source of
Congress' transformation, and in proposing reasons why that
transformation had the lasting impact it in fact had. The
emphasis of Burnham and Price on elections, for example,
has led both toward assumptions about the links which exist
between changes in the electoral system and changes within
the House. Both relate the dramatic changes in the national
norms of political participation, the depo.litUtation process
which surrounded it, and the fragmentation (or the pluraliza-
tion) of political forms of organization in the electorate
to changes within Congress during the turn of the century
period. As American politics as a whole changed, they argue,
the House of Representatives responded by essentially re-
designing its own internal world to reflect those broader
external changes.
Although the ecologist argument is persuasive, partic-
ularly in terms of the changes which occurred at the turn of
the century, questions do arise around the extent to which
the House can be seen as a purely adaptive body. How
directly, for example, is the internal world of the House
linked to changes in the electoral system? What type, or
what magnitude of electoral change affects the legislative
process; and does the House alter its internal world in
response to other forces working either within or outside
its walls? Finally, through what channels do these
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electoral changes make their impact on Congress and through
what mechanism does the legislative process respond (for
example, is the response a conscious one on the part of the
members or is it a more or less automatic institutional
response?)?
While, in other words, the ecologist argument seems to
work very well in explaining Congressional change during the
first decade of the twentieth century -- when there were
major and clearly identifiable changes both in the American
political system as a whole and in the House of Representa-
tives -- it does less well in explaining the often dramatic
fluctuations which characterized Congress' internal world
before 1896. Without a clearer idea of precisely how and
where the external world of elections, issues, ideologies
and norms of political organization intrude upon the internal
world-of the House, ecologists risk underspecifying some of
the more subtle yet significant features of the relationship
between Congress and its environment.
This study has suggested that the patterns of political
conflict within Congress provides a useful focus in the
search for this intersection between the environment and the
inner world of the House. On the one hand, the focus on
conflict directs attention toward a process which is central
to the internal workings of any legislative body. Conflict
is at least a major, if not, as this study argues, the major
force to which a legislative institution must respond. A
legislative body must achieve a workable consensus out of
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the varying forms of dissensus it confronts. A legislative
system is, in other words, a conflict-resolution system.
On the other hand, while conflict is an internal feature,
it is nevertheless one which has strong and explicit roots
outside of the legislative body. To be sure, conflict can
be generated internally and even to a certain extent manipula-
ted, as internalists seem to imply, by the legislative process
itself. In a representative institution, however, the ex-
ternal world inevitably leaves its mark on the patterns and
sale of conflict within that institution by constraining it
(for example, along party-specific lines or along more par-
ticularistic lines), by making concrete demands (the manner
in which constituents express and organize their demands is
clearly important in producing conflict in the House and
determining the patterns that conflict witl take), by identi-
fying pblitical goals, and in turn by defining the criteria
upon which individual members of Congress are judged, and
ultimately, sanctioned or rewarded. In sum, conflict in the
House is at once a phenomenon which is central to the internal
legislative process, and yet one which has clear links with
the external political world.
This chapter intends to show, therefore, that conflict
and the roots of that conflict both inside the House and
outside, continued to have dramatic effects-.:upon the legis-
lative process in Congress in the twentieth century. As in
the nineteenth century, the House was confronted by patterns
of dissensus in the twentieth century which were constantly
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evolving in response to changing political conditions in
the national political system as a whole. Variations in
the nature of political demand-making, in the issue agendas,
in the norms of political participation, in the organization
of political parties, in the structural characteristics
(the strengths, the weaknesses and the resilience, the vi-
tality or the decayl of these parties, and in the regional,
social and economic interests which coalesced or which
opposed each other in the American political system, pro-
duced equally important variations in the forms of conflict
which tended to emerge in the House of Representatives.
Congressional conflict in the partisan nineteenth cen-
tury, for example, was.particularly conditioned by such
variable factors as the strength or weakness of national
party structures, the coherence or divisiveness of national
party organizations, and the levels of consensus or dis-
agreement among leaders and constituents of the national
political coalitions over central political symbols,:*ideals
and goals. To these were added in the twentieth century the
declining role of integrative (particularly national-levell
political organizations in the recruitment of Members of
Congress. In the face of the disintegration of national
party structures, the pluralization of political demand-
making, changes in the voting laws Cwhich disenfranchised
some groups and placed hurdles in front of othersj, the de-
cline of patronage and other resources of political control,
local constituencies and individual Members of Congress
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gained levels of autonomy and independence unknown in the
nineteenth century. Cofflict tended to become more firmly
rooted in local concerns or particularistic interests as
these countervailing forces of central coordination and
integration weakened. As this happened -- as accumulative
political cleavages, unifying ideological symbols and
nationally based issue coalitions gave way to pluralistic
political cleavages and less comprehensive political symbols,
and more momentary and parochial political coalitions --
conflict tended to become more fragmented and less suscept4
ible to central control by party leaders within the House.
As broad cleavages, in other words, lost their relevance-.to
the national electorate, they also lost their relevance within
the House.
These broad changes were generally reflected in the
nation's electoral patterns as Burnham, Schattschneider,
Sunquist and others have shown. These transformed electoral
patterns (and electoral expectations as welll in turn served
to force the House to reorient its internal organization. To
be sure, this readjustment of the legislative process was
effected in immediate response to changes within the House
(members themselves reoriented the legislative process, not
elections, for examplel. Altered member expectations, new
demands on the part of individual representatives that they
be given a greater share of power, more bargaining leverage
and latitude, and a more active role in the decision-making
-362-
process, all contributed to the transformation of the
organization of the House in the first decade of the twen-
tieth century.
Yet, all of these'changes in member expectations, and
in the increased assertiveness of the individual Repres-
entative, were the products of changes in the character of
the voters those members of Congress represented. Increased
seat security, for example, which as we noted in Chapter II
was more the result of changes in the electorate and in the
constituencies than it was the result of changes within Con-
gress, gave individual Members of Congress the political
autonomy they needed to establish their independence from
the party machine within the House. Altered constituency
expectations also played a role in encouraging and even
forcing sometimes reluctant Congressmen to exploit this
political independence within the House. Thus, although the
organizational transition which occurred. in the House of
Representatives around 1910 did represent an institutional
adjustment to new internal pressures, these new internal
pressures were themselves.hthe products of a fundamental
transformation of American politics and of the electoral
system after 1896.
This chapter will begin the examination of this trans-
ition of the House from its nineteenth century to its twen-
tieth century form with a focus on the events surrounding
the dramatic changes brought on between. 1909 and 1913. The
"overthrow" of Joseph Cannon in ll0 is usually seen as a
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pivotal event in this transition process, and to a certain
extent it was just that. Yet, the changes which marked
this era of Congressional history certainly went beyond the
removal of the Speaker from the Rules Committee. In effect,
the revolt against Cannon was but one important part of a
broader revolution which erupted between 1909 and 1913. In
the end, Cannon was a victim in part of his own limitations
as a leader, but to an ever greater extent, his downfall
was but part of the chain of events which led the House of
Representatives from its attachment to the patterns of con-
flict, member expectations and political goals created by
the nineteenth century American political system, to an
attachment to the new forces working in American political
life in the twentieth century.
As this chapter will attempt to show, the events of
1910 were simply part of Congress' long-term attempt to
reconcile the needs of its members for a measure of con-
sensus and for legislative decisions, with the demands and
obstacles placed in the way of that consensus and those
decisions by the patterns and nature of conflict. As in
the nineteenth century, the House adapted its institutional
character to the forms of dissensus and fragmentation it was
forced, by its broader political environment to confront,
manage and resolve.
The Republican party, which in 1895 reassumed control
of the House of Representatives, was if anything more cohesive
-364-
and united than that which had controlled Congress in 1890.
Although the election of 1896 would mark the formal beginning
of a new era of Republic dominance of national politics -- a
dominance which would extend well into the twentieth century
-- the Republicans in the House had by the early 1890's and
certainly by 1895 already coalesced, for the most part,
around a common approach to the tariff and the currency ques-
tion into a disciplined and determined political organization.
The legislative process in 1896 reflected this return to
power of a unified majority party by adhering to the rules
and procedures, and by working to encourage the behavioral
norms which had:first emerged in.the 51st Congress.
The cohesiveness of the Republican majority in the 54th
Congress, and its size (the Republicans controlled 246 out
of 357 seats in the Housel rendered the return to Reed's
Rules and the legislative process of 1890 a relatively simple
and routine matter. The precedents for streamlining the House
already existed; the majority party supported the return to
the majoritarianism of 1890; and Thomas B. Reed, once again
elected to the Speakership, remained firm in his commitment
to the idea of an activist House of Representatives. For the
most part, therefore, the revision of 1896 passed the House
with little difficulty and even less public notice.
There was apparently a minor disagreement within the
Republican ranks over the need to reinstate the Disappearing
Quorum rule, particularly in view of the large Republican
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majority. There was little need, some thought, for a rule
which would never, in all likelihood, be used. Reed, how-
ever, insisted on its inclusion, maintaining that its adoption
was even more imperative under such circumstances. "Mr. Reed
thinks the present is a good time to adopt (the Disappearing
Quorum rulel," Asher Hinds noted in his diary, "since the
Republican majority is so large that it is not needed and
hence is not under any suspicion of being demanded for par-
tisan purposes."l
Despite this minor disagreement within the Republican
caucus, the party was united in its support of the new rules.
The Disappearing Quorum provision not only passed the House
in the end, for example, but did so with the active approval
of the Republican members. The depth of the Republican party
allegiance to Reed's vision of the House process in general
and to his insistence that the Disappearing Quorum rule be
retained intact, was perhaps best reflected in the way party
members greeted Reed's first quorum count. Hinds recounts
the event:
On Saturday (January 13, 1896) an interesting
little incident occurred. Only a few having
voted on a proposition, Wanger (R-Pa.) made
the point of no quorum, whereupon Mr. Reed
began to count the house. This act -- a very
frequent one in the 51st Congress -- had not
been performed before this Congress, and as
he began and continued the members burst into
loud applause. The new members were especially
interested in the process.2
The final rules package was eventually presented to the House
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and passed on January 23, 1896. Subsequent Republican Con-
gresses adhered to the procedures established by these rules
and continued to encourage the kind of legislative process
which reflected both the unity of the Republican party, and
its allegiance to the principles of legislative action.
The commitment to the centralization of power and the
relative lack of independence and autonomy for individual
members were both uphald by the belief among Republican::
Congressmen that they were necessary instruments of effec-
tive party rule. And.many of them further believed that
effective party rule was the system which best promised to
meet their individual political needs. The continued exis-
tence of this form of legislative government, then, depended
upon the persistence throughout the late 1890's of shared
goals among Republican members, the perception that individual
and party self-interest along a range of concerns were com-
patible, and the continued strength of the links which at
once bound the member to his constituency and his constituency
to the national party organization. These characteristics and
forces, working within the Republican party in the late nine-
teenth century, generally combined to provide a strong founda-
tion for the kind of House Thomas B. Reed had-:created and hoped
to sustain.
There were, of course, occasional cracks in the support
for this kind of legislative organization -- cracks which
began to become more numerous and significant in the first
decade of the twentieth century. Reed himself, for example,
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had recognized from the start that Republican Members were
likely to become restive sooner or later under the central-
ized system he had established. Reed believed, Hinds noted
in his diary in 1896, that "the pendulum has of necessity
swung rather far in the direction of shutting off debate,
because of the vicious system of using debate to kill and
not to consider. With the power of killing debate taken
away, there may be a fuller consideration without trouble." 3
To this recognition of the fragility of the procedures,
structures and norms upon which Reed's system was based were
added occasional voices of disquiet within the Republican
party, Mild at first, these voices of dissent became more
persistent as time wore on.4
By the opening of the 59th Congress, these cracks in
the Republican legislative 'edifice were beginning to attract
notice. During the 1905 debate over the rules, for example,
John Sharp Williams, the Democratic floor leader, claimed
that support among Republicans for a continuation of the
legislative process designed by Reed (and inherited and sus-
tained by his successors Thomas Henderson and now Joseph G.
Cannon) was beginning to erode, and that the unity and co-
hesiveness within the Republican.party which had underlaid
and nurtured this system were beginning to crumble. "There
is a great difference of opinion growing up in the ranks of
the Republican party," he suggested,
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The LaFollette idea, the Cummins idea, the new
Massachusetts free-raw materials idea, all sorts
of stand-pat ideas:come in upon us on the breezes
from the west and from the Northeast, all of them
from people pretending at any rate to want to
revise the present exorbitant tariff schedules
... Right here at the threshold I tell you that
if you adopt this resolution (to continue Reed's
Rules) ... you have adopted rules that will
render you just as helpless as a bird trying to
fly in an asphalt lake.5
Despite these warnings, and the evident appeal by Williams
to a new and still emerging diffuseness in the Republican
party coalition (and new conceptions on the part of Repub-
lican Members of their own self-interest), the 59th Congress
adopted the by now traditional Reed's Rules. Yet, it was
clear that his observations about the state of the Repub-
lican legislative party were not without a measure of truth.
By 1907 and the commencement of the 60th Congress, the
implications of Williams' remarks two years before were
beginning to be felt. Although Reed's Rules were once again
adopted, resistance to the kind of legislative process which
they sustained was beginning to gather strength within the
Republican party. This resistance became particularly evident
toward the end of the 60th Congress as a full-blown assault
on the rules began to take shape. In the 61st Congress
this nascent movement erupted into a formal and organized
revolt on what had by that time become the conservative
Republican conception of the legislative process.
The insurgency which erupted in 1910 had actually begun
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taking shape in 1908 during the closing months of the 60th
Congress. A handful of Republicans, Hepburn of Iowa and
Gardner of Massachusetts (who was Henry Cabot Lodge's son-
in-law) among them had in that Congress risen to protest
the automatic adoption of Reed's Rules in the party caucus.
In 1908, however, this as yet unorganized group of progress-
ive dissenters brought their reservations to the floor of
the House. In the opening session of the 60th Congress,
for example, Henry Cooper of Wisconsin made a short speech
against the "adoption of the rules without revision." 6
Then, in December of 1908, Augustus Gardner introduced a
resolution to discharge the foreign affairs committee of a
bill which directed the Secretary of State to determine
whether or not the British House of Commons had recently
reformed its own rules of procedure. Hidden within this
rather innocuous bill was a passage which directed Speaker
Cannon to appoint a committee to look into a revision of
the rules in the United States House of Representatives.
The discharge motion passed the House, but when Gardner then
amended the bill itself by proposing to strike out all but
the clause which actually directed the Speaker to appoint
a committee for the revision of the rules, the bill was
voted down. 7
Cannonism had meanwhile become a national political
issue in 1908. The Democratic platform contained a plank
dondemning the power exercised by the United States Speaker
of the House, newspapers and periodicals were beginning to
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call for a curtailment of Cannon's powers, and segments of
the public -- particularly in the Midwest -- were beginning
to urge their Representatives on toward open revolt.8 It
was also in that year that a group of Republican Members of
Congress' had begun meeting to plan for a revision of the
rules. George Norris was one of the leaders of this ad hoc
progressive-insurgent conclave, but others like Victor Mur-
dock of Kansas,and Gardner,were also important contributors
to this reform effort. As divergent pressures on individual
Members of Congress added urgency to the movement to change
the rules, this group grew in size and became more active
in its opposition to Joseph Cannon. /
The insurgents first turned to the White House for aid.
Conservative Republicans had been particularly hard on
Theodore Roosevelt in his last year as President, and the
dissenting Republicans in the House believed that he and
William Howard Taft, his chosen successor, would be espec-
ially inclined to help those in Congress who had most vigor-
ously supported Roosevelt's-:progressive policies. In fact,
however, although Roosevelt did evince a measure of interest
in the insurgent cause, he was reluctant to interfere in what
he saw as a problem which more squarely involved Taft and
the Congress.1 0  Taft, meanwhile, who was less than eager
to begin his Presidency on the sour notes of party discord,
publicly and privately sought a compromise between the
insurgents and Cannon. "What I am working for," he told
William Allen White,
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is a compromise agreement by which the insurgents
shall cease their insurrection for this session
. .. It is essential to the business of the
country that the tariff be settled and settled
quickly . . . I cannot afford, merely to accom-
plish one good purpose, to sacrifice all others,
when those others are as compared with the one,
muchmmore important."
,Insurgents saw this as an implicit rejection of their
quests for aid, and in effect it was just that. Trapped
between the progressive legacy left by Roosevelt, and the
need to work with the conservative and pro-Cannon majority
within his own party in the House, Taft vacillated at first,
but ultimately bowed to what he saw as the demands of poli-
tical necessity and lent his weight to the side of Joseph
Cannon. "The question with me," Taft wrote an acquaintance,
is practical, not theoretical, and I ask you
how a man of sense, looking at the situation
as it is, can expect me to do otherwise than
support the regular organization in the House.
I should have been glad to beat Cannon and to
have changed the rules within the party, but
I must rely upon the party and party discipline
to pass the measures that I am recommending.
How could I go to the party and ask for this if
I should support thirty insurgents who have
broken away from the other 190? '12
As the insurgency developed in the early months of 1909 then,
it was clear that little could be expected from Taft in the
way of assistance.
Denied the blessings of the President, the insurgents
explored other alternatives, and other sources of support.
In February of 1909, Victor Murdock issued an appeal to the
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newly elected Freshman members of the 61st Congress to
support the Progressive cause in Congress. Writing on be-
half of the insurgent group, Murdock outlined the reform
measures he and his colleagues sought. Included in the
list of proposed reforms were the transfer of the power to
appoint committees from the Speaker to a committee appointed
by the House; a curtailment of the Speaker's recognition
rights; and the establishment of a virtually inviolable
CalendarWednesday Rule and a Calendar Tuesday rule (under
which all members would be permitted to circumvent the Rules
Committee and report bills directly to the House every Tues-
day). For the most part, the incoming Freshmen were non-
commital in their replies to Murdock's letter, many asking
for more time to examine the rules of the House themselves.1 3
A few did promise support for the insurgent cause, and Mur-
dock duly added their names to the small but growing list of
House reformers.14
Throughout this period, the Democrats were quite eager
to do what they could to widen the rift between Progressive
and Conservative factions of the Republican legislative
party as the struggle over the rules gathered momentum. To
this end, Democrats,,publicized what they viewed as the evils
of Cannonism and did much to make the fight over the rules a
national political issue. Within the House, meanwhile, the
Democratsa&lso encouraged insurgents by lending their
enthusiastic, if somewhat qualified, support to the effort
to democratize the House. Democrats were quite willing to
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throw their weight behind all of the insurgents' demands
for reform in part because of their long-standing opposition
to the brand of legislative organization Cannon and his
immediate Republican predecessors in the Speaker's chair
had sustained. The Democratic party had never been comfort-
able with the principles of strong central control which had
guided the Republican approach to law-making from Reed's
time up to Cannon's.
Democrats also hoped, however, that their allegiance
to the insurgent reform program might lead disiident Repub-
licans to consider a more comprehensive and formal political
relationship with the House Democratic party. To this end,
Democratic leaders entered into discussion with insurgents
over the possibility of forming a coalition government of
sorts within the House of Representatives. "Really, the
only way to smash the combination," Wallace Bassford, Clerk
of the Minority (Democratic) Conference, wrote to the pub-
lisher of Success Magazine, "is for 24 insurgents to join
with the 172 Democratswho will vote for Mr. CChamp) Clark
for Speaker." The mere transfer of the committee appoint-
ment powers from the Speaker to a Steering Committee would
accomplish little, Bassford continued, since "Cannon would
dominate the steering committee." Nor would the Democrats
be able to give their unanimous support to an insurgent
candidate for Speaker. "It is not practicable to attempt
to drag the mountain to Mahomet-- 172 Democrats cannot be
rounded up without thelloss of a vote to support some
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insurgent -- and no insurgent stands out as good Speaker-
ship timber, either." The only solution, Bassford continued,
lay in the insurgent support for 'the Democratic nominee for
the Speakership. 15
The insurgents, however, were not quite prepared to
bolt their party. In the early days of the 61st Congress,
consequently, they produced their own nominee for the
Speakership, Victor Murdock. Democrats still held onto the
belief, however, that the insurgents, who hoped to at least
force a three-way deadlock in the Speakership vote (between
Cannon, Murdock and Clark), would eventually throw their
weight to the Democratic side. "After the deadlock," Bass-
ford suggested, "it is hoped that the Clark and Murdock
forces can coalesce,-elect one of the other Speaker, and
proceed to the adoption of new rules and the appointment
of a joint steering committee to select the majority of
the committees from among the combined forces. "16 Murdock,
however, quashed these hopes by withdrawing from the race.
When the vote for Speaker took place on March 15, therefore,
Cannon was easily re-elected by a margin of 204 to 106 over
Champ Clark. Twelve insurgents did cast their ballots for
other progressives in the House (8 for Cooper, 2 for Norris,
and I for Esch and 1 for Hepburn), but this small show of
intransigence did not affect the outcome of the vote.
The insurgents were clearly more interested in revis-
ing the rules than..in actually unseating Cannon. "The
vote for Cannon," one student of the insurgency suggests,
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"was no surprise, for most of the insurgents were concerned
with overthrowing the Cannon machine by changing House rules
rather than with waging a personal vendetta against the
Speaker himself."1 7  Insurgents, in other words, wanted a
new legislative process instead of merely a new Speaker.
Thus, the real struggle between insurgents and conservative
Republicans came on the vote on the rules.
Following the election of the Speaker, Dalzell of
Pennsylvania moved that the rules of the 60th Congress be
adopted as the rules of the 61st Congress. In an effort to
forestall debate, he immediately called for the previous
question (a parliamentary motion which immediately.,cuts off
debate). This motion was ordered on a close Roll Call vote,
193 to 189, but to the surprise of the organization Repub-
licans, the House promptly proceeded to reject the resolution
(the main resolution) adopting the rules of the 60th Congress
by an equally close vote of 189 to 193.18 Champ Clark then
introduced an alternative resolution on the rules which pro-
posed that the House adopt the rules of the 60th Congress
with certain major modifications. Among them was the cur-
tailment of the Speaker's power to appoint committees (the
Speaker would retain the power to appoint only five standing
committees -- Ways and Means, Printing, Mileage, Enrolled
Bills and Accounts), the enlargement of the Rules Committee
and the removal of the Speaker from membership on that
committee.1 9  Clark followed this resolution with a call
for the previous question in attempt to cut off debate and
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bring the resolution to an immediate vote. To the surprise
of most observers, this motion was soundly defeated despite
the fact that thirty-one Republican:'insurgents had, as
expected, lent their support to the measure.
The defeat of Clark's proposal was largely the work of
John J. Fitzgerald, a Democrat of New York, who with twenty-
three of his party colleagues opposed such a reform of the
rules.20  In the wake of this defeat, Fitzger&ld himself
introduced what he termed -.a !compromise measure which centered
largely upon the Calendar Wednesday rule. This rule had
originally been designed to set aside a specific time for
the consideration of bills brought directly to the floor from
committees. As the insurgents had also noted in their own
proposals, however, the growth of the Rules Committee, and
the emergence of the Special Order as the primary channel
through which Committee reports and resolutions gained
access to the floor, the Calendar rule had largely lapsed.
A simple majority vote could dispense with it, for one thing,
and the time allotted for committee reports, even when it
was employed, was too short to allow much business to be
transacted. In addition, one committee could usually prolong
debate over one of its own bills and over a succession of
calendar days to the point that few other committees would
ever get a(-chance to present their own bills and reports.
Insurgents, therefore, had hoped to resurrect the Calendar
Wednesday rule as a viable channel of Committee access:to
the floor. Progressives hoped that it could become a potent
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counterweight to the Speaker's (working through the Rules
Committee) control of the legislative agenda.
Fitzgerald'0s compromise measure, which probably had
Speaker Cannon's blessings, addressed this particular portion
of the progressive reform program by strengthening the Cal-
endar Wednesday rule (under his proposed change, for example,
the Call of the Committees on Calendar Wednesday could only
be dispensed with by a two-thirds vote of the House.)21
Clearly, however, his proposal did little to alter the central
targets of the"insurgents' displeasure. The7Speaker's power
to appoint committees was left untouched as was his recogni-
tion power. Indedd, even the Rules Committee would retain
most of its control over the business of the House. With
over fifty committees in the House of Representatives,
Calendar Wednesday would accommodate no more than a tiny
fraction of the resolutions and reports which awaited action
of the House floor. Thus, the pro-Cannon forces had little
difficulty in supporting the Fitzgerald amendment to the
Rules, and after a short but stormydebate, it passed 211
to 173.22
The adoption of the Calendar Wednesday compromise sig-
nalled defeat for rthe insurgents, but it was also clear that
Cannon and his allies had done little more than buy time in
their struggle to hold the House process to its traditional
organizational paths. President Taft, for example, was
aware of the transiency of the calm which followed the
insurgent defeat on the rules in March, but hoped that the
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momentary respite from internecine warfare thus brought
about might give him time to mollify progressives with
substantive reform legislation -- particularly reform of
the tariff which had become an obsession within insurgent
ranks. "I am glad to say that the solution of the diffi-
culties in the House was extremely satisfactory to me," a
relieved Taft wrote his brother,
I had sympathy with those who were protesting
against Uncle Joe's absolute rule, but I had
to deprecate, as the leader of the party, the
insurrection by 30 against 180, when I had to
count on the 180 to put through the legisla-
tion which we have .promised to the public.
I' think the tariff bill will be a step in the
right direction.2 3
Cannon, himself, had gained time to attempt to use the
resources at his disposal to defuse the bitterness which
existed within his party and to attempt to rebuild his
disintegrating political coalition. The judicious dispensa-
tion of political favors to insurgents might do much to
reunite the Republican legislative party.
Despite the relative calm which followed the March,
1909 fight over the rules, however, and despite the oppor-
tunities that calm provided party leaders for effecting
some sort of reconciliation between Conservative and Pro-
gressive wings of the party, Taft appeared unable and Cannon
appeared both unable and unwilling to reach an accord with
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the insurgent faction. The tariff debate, for example,
quickly dashed the hopes of many progressives for real re-
form, and did much to heighten antagonisms within the Re-
publican ranks.
To be sure, the tariff bill reported out of the Ways
and Means"Committee by its Chairman, Sereno E. Payne, of
New York, did contain minor reductions in particular duties,
but by and large the bill was poorly received by progress-
ives. Insurgent disappointment, however, turned to outrage
when the House version of the bill reached the Senate. There
Aldrich and his followers transformed what had at least main-
tained a semblance of moderation in its passage through the
House, into a protectionist masterpiece. Nor were House
progressives at all happy with Cannon's subsequent manipula-
tion of the rules to insure final passage of the (now pro-
tectionist) Payne-Aldrich Bill when it was returned to the
House.24
Even Taft betrayed a certain displeasure over the
Speaker's actions during the tariff debate. "I don't think
that Cannon played square in one respect," he told his
brother. "He nominated a conference committee (to formally
iron out the differences between the House and Senate ver-
sions of the tariff bill) that had four high tariff men on
it, and men who would not fight for the low provisions of
the House bill."25  In the end, therefore, progressives
regarded the Payne-Aldrich Tariff as a reminder of how
intractable the differences were that separated them from
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the conservative Republicans, and an indication of the
lengths to which Cannon himself was willing to go to manipu-
late the House process to meet his "stand-pat" political
philosophy.
Clearly, Cannon was unwilling to attempt to placate
insurgents through the use of his patronage powers within
the House. His intransigence on the tariff issue26 was
matched by an equally rigid refusal to include progressive
Republican Members of Congress in his distribution of poli-
tical prizes and resources. Insurgents were generally
appointed to unimportant committees and denied recognition
for even private bills. As Norris wrote to one constitu-
ent:
You cannot fully appreciate or understand just
how difficult.'it is to do anything surrounded
as we are on all sides by rules, regulations,
individuals, machines, and powers, owned
entirely by the opposition. We are ostracized
politically and socially. We have been de-
prived of all House patronage and robbed of
all good committee appointments.27
Although it is far from clear that Cannon could have
done anything to defuse the insurgent opposition to his
policies and organizational preferences, it is also plain
that he made little effort in this direction. Spurred on
by his own personal irrascibility and combattiveness, and
his imm9derate allegiance to political principles which
he believed to be correct, Cannon virtually backed ;himself,
throughout 1909, into a tactical corner in which his only
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options were total victory or capitulation to the insurgent
demands for reform.
Throughout 1909, then, the insurgent.limpatience and
frustration mounted steadily. Cannon refused to countenance
compromise, and a weak and vacillating Taft felt himself un-
able and increasingly unwilling to intervene on the insur-
gents' behalf. "What a fool I would be," he argued, "If I
joined . . . the yelping and snarling at Cannon and Aldrich,
which these so-called "progressives" and their amateur poli-
tical newspaper correspondents are insisting upon as a mark
of loyalty to the Roosevelt policies."2 8  Guided by what
he saw to be the mandates of political expediency, Taft chose
to cast his lot with Cannon and do little to extricate him-
self or his party from the deepening conflict in Congress.2 9
As 1910 approached, this conflict resurfaced as Con-
servative intransigence and insurgent frustration combined
to bring the Republican legislative party to an open break.
The revolt, which had long been brewing, was sparked largely
by the Pinchot-Ballinger dispute which by early 1910 had
moved to the center stage of national politics. Briefly, the
controversy grew out of the smoldering rivalry which pitted
conservationists against those who favored a less restrained
approach to the exploitation of natural resources. Con-
servationism had become a cornerstone of Theodore Roosevelt's
progressivism and a potent political symbol of the progress-
ive cause in general. Gifford Pinchot, the able bureaucratic
entrepreneur who had served as Chief Forester under Roosevelt,
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and for a time under Taft, was the principal spokesman for
the conservationist cause, and the focus of the specific
conflict which exploded into national prominence in the
spring and summer of 1909.
The immediate source of the controversy lay in a charge
made by Louis Glavis, an investigator for the Interior De-
partment, that the Morgan-Guggenheim syndicate had secretly
and improperly bought 5280 acres of public land (laden with
coal) in Alaska in 1904. Under existing laws, public lands
were sold in blocks of 160 acres to individual claimants for
ten dollars per acre. Although the intent of the law was to
encourage individual settlement and development of the public
lands in Alaska, the biggest purchasers of this land were
often large syndicates of investors who worked through "front
men." These "front men" would buy mineral-rich land as
individuals at the specified government price, and then sell
it according to terms worked out in advance to the development
syndicate.
In 1904 the law which governed the sale of public lands
was changed to prohibit this type of arrangement. The new
law specified that each claimant to a 160-acre parcel of
land in the public domain had to promise that his claim "was
made in good faith for his own benefit" and not on behalf of
any other individual or group. 3Q As Glavis was able to show,
the Morgan-Guggenheim group had violated this provision in
their purchase of Alaska coal land, and had probably done so
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with the knowledge, if not the assistance, of the then Land
Commissioner, Richard Ballinger. Whether or not Ballinger
personally profited from the Morgan-Guggenheim sale is not
clear, but it was clear to those concerned that Ballinger
was not in sympathy with the ardent conservationist lean-
ings of those like Pinchot. Indeed, Ballinger-had resigned
his post as Commissioner in 1908, largely in protest against
Roosevelt's public land policies.
In 1909, Taft surprised conservationists in general, and
Pinchot in particular, by naming Ballinger Secretary of the
Interior. Pinchot and others responded immediately by reopen-
ing first privately with Taft and later in the year publicly,
the Alaska land case. What followed was an inept and con-
fused attempt by the Taft administration to defuse the problem,
which included a:.half-hearted administration-led investigation,
the dismissal of Glavis from his post for insubordination,
inconsistent denials of wrong-doing, and an ill-conceived
and poorly executed "cover-up."3 1
By December of 1909, heightened public interest in the
case produced calls for Congressional action. On December 21,
the Senate called on the President to send it all materials
on the Ballinger case, and after negotiations between Con-
gressional leaders of both chambers and the President, it
was decided to convene a joint House-Senate investigation of
the matter. Taft acquiesced to this course..of action since
it was clear that few, if any, conservationists would be
appointed to the investigative committee.32 Insurgents in
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the House, however, who had been waiting for an opportunity
to reassert their call for organizational reform, decided
to resist what they saw as a rubber-stamp investigation of
the Ballinger affair.
When, on January 7, 1910, the resolution authorizing
the Speaker to appoint the investigative committee was
brought before the House, therefore, the insurgents respon-
ded by introducing a substitute resolution which instead
gave the House as a whole the power to name the members of
that committee. Introduced by George Norris, this insurgent
resolution passed the House with Democratic backing by a
vote of 149 to 146.33 This victory provided the momentum
which had been lost in March of 1909, and re-ignited the
drive among House dissidents to effect a broader reform of
the legislative process in the House. Taft's dismissal of
Gifford Pinchot on the evening of January 7, in obvious
response to the successful insurgent struggle in the House
(over the right to appoint the members of the investigative
committee), merely heightened the progressives' determina-
tion to force reform on their reluctant conservative Repub-
lican colleagues.
The increasingly determined insurgent bloc, however,
continued to be met with stiff and effective opposition from
the pro-Cannon faction. Access to the floor was still denied
to most progressives, and their proposals for reform of the
rules generally languished in committee pigeon-holes. Des-
pite these hurdles, insurgents and particularly George Norris,
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bided their time, waiting for the inevitable miscalculation
or procedural blunder on the part.df Cannon and his friends.
Then in March "quite by accident," Norris remembers, "in
the unguarded moment I knew would come, the opening for a
reformation of those rules presented itself."3 4
This unguarded moment, ironically arose out of an
attempt by the Republican leadership to weaken the provisions
of the Calendar Wednesday rule. On Wednesday, March 16,
1910, Edward Crumpacker "one of the minor subalterns of the
organization, "u34A introduced a resolution which dealt with
the census. Crumpacker claimed that since his bill dealt
with an issue mandated by the constitution, it should enjoy
the highest possible privilege (that is, to take precedent
over all other resolutions including those which would other-
wise have been considered first under the Calendar Wednesday
rule). Cannon predictably supported Crumpacker:Ls contention,
but after a lengthy debate, was himself surprisingly over-
ruled by a vote of 163 to 112. 35  The following day, how-
ever, the same motion was reintroduced by Crumpacker, and
this time the Speaker's ruling was sustained. "They there-
fore decided, on that fateful day," Norris recalls, "that
the Constitutional provision conferred a constitutional
privilege supreme over the general rules of the House."36
Norris responded to this decision by demanding the right
to introduce a resolution aimed at enlarging the Rules
Committee and relieving the Speaker both of membership on,
as well as his control over the recruitment of members to
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that committee. Contending that the rules of the House
were mandated by the Constitution, Norris argued that any
resolution which dealt in any way with those rules, there-
fore, had the claim to constitutional privilege as the
Speaker had conceded to the Crumpacker resolution on the
census. Dalzell of Pennsylvania immediately rose to protest
Norris' motion on a point of order. Cannon, meanwhile,
sensing danger, attempted to forestall the inevitable by
allowing debate over Dalzell's motion to continue well into
the next day. Fearing that his decision to sustain Dalzell's
protest would be overruled by the House insurgents and their
Democratic allies, he bought time while his friends worked
to rebuild their sagging defenses. Finally, on March 19,
Norris' resolution which was amended to stipulate-that the
Rules Committee should be composed of ten members (six
majority and four minority members) elected by the House,
and should not include the Speaker, was passed.
In a sense, this "resolution" fell short of effecting
the comprehensive reform of the House system which progress-
ives had sought. Speaker eannon retained his office in an
extraordinary contest which followed the Rules Committee
vote (Norris and many other insurgents supported him in this
vote), and the Republican conservatives who still constituted
a majority within the party caucus, were able to appoint
their own candidates to the new committee. Yet, the March,
1910 revolt was a major symbolic victory for the forces
r
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opposed to the kind of centralized control of the legis-
lative process which had characterized..the House since the
early 1890's. It also marked the beginning of a signifi-
cant and unfolding transformation of both the formal or-
ganization of the House, and the way in which individual
Members of Congress approached their own tasks and responsi-
bilities.
This transformation, the outlines of which were provided
by the 191Q revolt, were reinforced by the Democratic domina-
ted 62nd House which convened in 1911. In that Congress,
Democratic Representatives continued, for the most part the
insurgent-inspired assault on the institutions of central
control by transferring the right to appoint committees
from the Speaker to the House as a whole. Within the party,
furthermore, the committee selection or nomination process
was entrusted to a Committee on Committees chaired by the
Floor Leader, Oscar Underwoo4. The 61st Congress also re-
tained the Calendar Wednesday rule, reaffirmed its commit-
ment to the Discharge Rule, and strengthened the rights of
individual Members of Congress to introduce private bills.3 7
In effect, the Democrats of the 62nd Congress reinforced
and broadened the organizational trend away from centraliza-
tion which had been conceived, but only partially achieved,
by the Republican progressives.
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That this organizational revolution which occurred
between 1908 and 1911 was essentially directed against cen-
tralization in the House of Representatives, can be seen in
the reform proposals which were actually introduced by pro-
gressive Members of Congress. During that period of time,
opponents of centralization and the strong Speakership
directed their energies toward a number of specific areas of
concern. As Hepburn of Iowa suggested in 1909, there were
three aspects of the central system of legislative control
against which progressives were directing their efforts:
(1) the Speaker's power to appoint committees (i.e. the idea
of a Speaker's cabinetl; (2) the Speaker's power of recogni-
tion on the floor of the House; and C31 the lack of an auto-
matic system for(or at least more broadly distributed power
over) setting the legislative agenda. 38
On the first of these obstacles to what many in the
anti-Cannon camp viewed as meaningful democratization of the
House process, progressives and Democrats were more unified
and more specific in opposing the existing means of appoint-
ing committees than they were in actually coming up with
viable alternatives. Quite simply, George Norris suggested
on the one hand, the Speaker "appoints the committees, he
controls the whole situation.' 39  This power, he argued,
had a particularly decisive and sinister impact on the be-
havior andlindependence of Members of Congress since it
allowed the Speaker and his inner circle to "hold in their
hands . . . the political welfare of every Member."4Q As
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Victor Murdock added:
This House has surrendered its power to one
man. You can not get any power back yourself
as a Member on this floor . . . unless you go
to the sole place it is lodged, and that is
with the Speaker. He holds that power largely,
but not wholly, by means of committee appoint-
ments.4 1
While insurgent reformers were thus clear in their call
for changes in the committee appointment process, few were
willing or able to propose concrete reform measures. In the
early days of the 62nd Congress, George Norris did propose
that a geographically balanced Rules Committee be given the
power to appoint committees,4 2 but the Democrats who were
in the majority decided upon their own system under which
each party would choose its own nominees for committee posi-
tions. Both insurgent and conservative Republicans united
in opposing this solution. Norris objected to the strong
role of the caucus, and argued that caucus selection was
little better than the old system which gave the Speaker
that power. In a sense, he agreed with Republican leader
James Mann who argued that the Democratic method was little
more than a cosmetic departure from previous practice. "You
have simply provided a different method for carrying out
your caucus action," Mann suggested, "which you could have
carried out under the old rules with equal facility."4 3
Yet Norris, unlike Mann, was not simply sniping at the
form of the committee selection system proposed by the
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Democrats, but was more profoundly upset with the entire
thrust of that new system. A proponent of procedures which
would somehow render committee appointments more automatic
and uniform, Norris was galled by the continued Democratic
insistence that the process should retain its discretionary
and political character. Despite Norris' objections that
"we ought to get away from the caucus just as much and as
far as we can,"4 4  the Democratic.:.solution ultimately adhered,
at least in theory, more to the traditionalist Republican
idea that committee appointments could only be made "by an
authority that can with certainty be located and made to
bear the burden of responsibility," 4 5 than it did-to Norris'
idea that the process should be carried out according.to
automatic criteria.
At the same'.time, Democrats did agree with Norris'
prescriptions to the extent that Seniority -- itself an
automatic criterion -- did become more solidly entrenched
as a norm for the selection of Committee Chairmen. The
Democratic reliance upon seniority, however, was not so
much the product of a specific reform philosophy as it was
the product of peculiar party needs. As in the past, the
primary consideration of the Democratic leadership centered
around the need to encourage unity and harmony in a clearly
factionalized party. "By following the rule df seniority,"
one observer suggested at the time, "there was a chance to
achieve it; . . . So the seniority rule was pretty closely
observed, though it was stretched a bit to give Northern
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states sixteen chairmanships." 46
The Speaker's recognition powers represented a second
broad concern:of insurgents who sought to reform and decen-
tralize the organization of the House of Representatives.
To a certain extent, the narrow preoccupation with this
particular instrument of centralization was in reaction to
Cannon's insistence (which was once again in full accord
with the.practice of Speakers since the late nineteenth
centuryl that all petitions for recognition on the floor
of the House be cleared with.him in advance. This, to some,
humiliating procedure served as one.of Cannon's chief means-
of controlling the dispensation of patronage in the House
(for example, recognizing supporters who wanted House
approval of bills designed to aid local constituents in one
way or anotherl, and of rewarding loyal Members of Congress
and penalizing opponents. 47  "No member of Congress . .
can secure recognition upon any bill, no matter how trivial,
without first going to the private office of Speaker Cannon."
Irvine Lenroot remarked in a Wisconsin speech in 1908.48
Without this prior approval, and without recognition of the
floor of the House, another Member suggested, a representa-
tive "might as well be doing the morning milking into a
sieve . . . for all the legislative bricks he can hope to
set.''49 Insurgents generally sought to curb this enormous
power by attempting to "neutralize" the Speakership along
the lines of the English Speaker of the House of Commons.50
In 1911, the Democrats claimed to have done just this,
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suggesting that although the Speaker necessarily retained
the parliamentary "right of selection among several members
who seek recognition at the same time on questions of equal
privilege," his power to abuse that right had been "very
much curtailed. ''51
To a certain extent, this curtailment of the Speaker's
discretionary recognition rights was effected voluntarily
by the new Democratic Speaker himself. Champ Clark simply
refused to exercise many of the powers of the office or make
any effort to re-establish the kind of central control Cannon
had wielded. "I have been in the minority so long," he
reportedly told John Fitzgerald in 1910:
that I have seen the advantage and power of the
Speaker. The minority Leader is pitted against
the Speaker as the leader of the majority, and
the Speaker has all the advantages which his
power over members gives him. If I am Speaker
I do not want that power. Let it be a fair
fight between the leaders of the two parties
on the floor of the House, and the Speaker be
the umpire instead of the majority leader and
umpire as well.52
It was7.argued at the time that Clark's reluctance to assume
all the powers of the Speakership stemmed from his wider
political ambitions. "Because he is a candidate for the
Presidency," the reasoning went, he "doesn't wish to hurt
anyone's feelings . . . 53
The curtailment of the Speaker's power was also accom-
plished, however, by a number of formal reforms effected
between 1909 and 1911 which reflected the third broad Cand
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often vaguely expressedl desire of progressives.to relieve
the Speaker of his power "to prevent," in George Norris'
words, "the House from participating in Legislative action.
We want the House to be a representative of the people,"
he continued in a letter to a constituent, "and each indi-
vidual member to have his ideas presented and passed on,
and at the same timeto assume his share of the responsi-
bility. '54
To this end, progressives supported, among other things,
the establishment of a stronger individual or private cal-
endar rule. In 1909 Cduring the 60th Congress) for example,
the minority Democrats had proposed, with the evident support
of the Republican insurgents, a Calendar Tuesday resolution
which stipulated that one day each week be set aside for
individual resolutions. Under this proposal, each member
would be called in turn (by alphabetical order) and would
have thertight to introduce one public bill from either the
House or Union Calendar for consideration (with twenty minutes
debate allowed on each side of the questionj. Clearly aimed
at circumventing both the Rules Committee and the Speaker,
this proposal also included a discharge provision which would
allow the House to resurrect bills from committee pigeon-
holes.55 Pro-Cannon Republicans responded by proposing a
weak alternative which Norris characterized as O..a homeo-
pathic dose of nothingness," 56 and both sides resolved to
resume the debate after the commencement of the 61st Congress.
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When the insurgents and Democrats opened the new Con-
gress two weeks later with their almost successful assault
on the old rules, Cannon conceded some ground on the Calendar
rule by supporting the Fitzgerald compromise. 57 Insurgents
were clearly disappointed with the failure of their struggle
for wider reform, but claimed to have won a partial victory,
nevertheless, in forcing the Republican leadership to accept
this Calendar reform.58 Republican leaders generally resisted
efforts to use the.Calendar Wednesday Rule, and, fearing that
such reforms threatened to transform the "ouse of Repres-
entatives "from a deliberative Chamber into a wrangling
club," did what they could to limit its use.59 For the most
part, therefore, insurgents had to wait until the majority
Democrats of the 62nd Congress formally committed themselves
to an effective Calendar Wednesday Rule.
The Democrats in that Congress also implemented another
plank of the Insurgent reform platform when they resurrected
and strengthened the Discharge rule. Under the rules of the
62nd Congress, any bill could be taken out of committee and
introduced to the full House if the motion to discharge was
seconded by a simple majority of members present. This was
a major boost to the proponents of individual rights in the
House, and it received the enthusiastic support of most pro-
gressive Republicans, despite warnings from conservative
Republicans like James Mann who argued that it would
ultimately work to the advantage of no one.6 0
Ultimately, it worked too well for even the de-central-
izing Democrats who within a year decided to modify and
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effectively weaken it. In February of 1912, Democrats
introduced an amendment which would give motions to suspend
the rules (the old and more difficult manner by which bills
were brought before the House out of their regular order)
precedence over motions to discharge committees. Although
an apparently minor modification which was largely intended
to deprive Republicans of an instrument of filibustering, 61
it nevertheless promised to nullify the discharge rule and
signalled a partial departure from the original insurgent-
Democrat reform agenda. As Republicans suggested on the
floor, the Speaker could totally circumvent the discharge
calendar by simply arranging to have friendly Members load
it up with innocuous bills, or by having those same members
exhaust time set aside for the discharge calendar, by intro-
ducing an endless string of motions to suspend the rules.
This "is a step backward," an outraged Norris fumed. "It
is a surrender of the rights of the individual member and
a wonderful increase of the Speaker's power."62
Despite Norris' denunciation, and despite the modifica-
tions Democrats imposed on their reform agenda, the members
of that party in the House generally moved toward, rather
than away from the kinds of change insurgent:.Republicans
sought. The Democrats had never been comfortable with a
strong Speaker and total central control over the legisla-
tive process, and this traditional disinclination was amply
reflected in the rules of the 62nd Congress. It was also
reflected in Champ Clark's reluctance to exploit the still
-396-
significant, if latent, resources at his command. To be
sure, the Democratic Caucus, and its leader, Oscar Under-
wood, assumed an importance which insured a measure of legis-
lative policy coherence, but despite Republican and pro-
gressive claims to the contrary, neither the caucus nor
Underwood ever possessed the power and the authority, or
exercised the kind of central control that the strong Repub-
lican Speakers had wielded between 1890 and 1910. By and
large, then, the Democratic 62nd Congress gave institutional
shape to the insurgent demands for reform by working to ele-
vate the role of the individual Member of Congress in the
legislative process and by undermining the institutional
supports of centralization.
The revolt against centralization within the House of
Representatives reflected a number of broader changes which
were occurring in the American political system as a whole.
As that wider system changed, the House itself responded
by transforming the lines of its own conduct, style, and
ultimately its role in the policy-making process. The
transformation of the internal world of the House during
the 1909 to 1911 period was largely the product of changes
in national electoral patterns, in the organization of poli-
tical demands and ideologies, and in the norms of political
participation among constituents. As national policy
organizations fragmented, as voting laws and pluralistic
norms of political participation reinforced the latent
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parochial tendences of Congress' constituent base, and
as the individual Member of Congress became more immune to
electoral defeat, the cohesiveness, unity and coherence of
the political coalitions within the House becaome more fragile.
In effect, the assault on centralization in Congress was
the product of a far deeper and far broader revolt in the
electorate against the nineteenth century style of national
politics. In the House, therefore, this revolt was essen-
tially a reaction against an organizational system and a
particular form of leadership which no longer reflected the
political or electoral needs, concerns or interests of an
increasingly autonomous and (thus) fragmented membership.
The electoral needs of the individual Member of Congress
in the era of primary elections, for example, were quite
different from those of members who served in a time when
(or indeed areas wherel party caucuses still nominated
Representatives. Similarly, allegiance to national par-
tisan goals, symbols and concerns proved to be of declining
value to candidates at a time, and in constituencies where,
the most potent and best organized political demands were
coming from more particularistic regional and functional
interests.
In sum, the once powerful party machinery within Con-
gress, and the centralized, coordinative legislative process
which served that machinery in Congress, were by 1910 becom-
ing progressively less able to provide either adequate
inducements for organizational conformity or sufficiently
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harsh penalties for deviance. The growing electoral power
of incumbency and the individualism and political indepen-
dence which that encouraged, tended to create patterns of
conflict and levels of divisiveness which were increasingly
beyond the power of a rigid centralized organization to
control or manage. As Members of Congress began voicing
their own singular demands, interests and expectations,
seeking to set their own political agendas and in turn cal-
culating the-political costs and benefits of allegiance to
the traditional Republican legislative system, support for
centralization evaporated. The question remains, however,
why did this revolt occur when it did? What changed in the
1909 to 19.13-period to cause Members of Congress (particularly,
once again, Republican Members of Congress) to shift their
energies from toleration of Cif not support for) a central-
ized organization to outright opposition?
For the most part, the sources of the revolt were rooted
in three sets of long and short term forces at work both
within Congress and in its political environment after 1896.
Specific issues, first of all, worked between 1900 and 1910
to fragment the Republican party, nationally as well as with-
in the House. As the 1896 Realignment receded into history,
the concerns which had initially unified the Republican
party -- the tariff, the currency question, and to a certain
limited extent residual issues of the Civil War such as
voting rights and pensions -- gave way to the new interests
which produced no such factional or even regional unity.
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Secondly, the post-l0Q era saw a dramatic increase
in the electoral autonomy and consequently of the political
independence Cindependent of the national party machinery
and often independent of the local party machinery as well)
of the individual Member of Congress. The proliferation of
new voting regulations, and particularly of primary laws
tended to separate party fortunes from individual electoral
or political careers. The normative revolt on the part of
the electorate against the strong party and the subsequent
pluralization of political demand-making in the nation also
encouraged this emergent individualism in the House. Both
contributed to the increasing separation of the Member of
Congress from the kind of strict allegiance to broad poli-
tical coalitions, and broadly expressed partisan goals
which had so characterized the Republican party in the late
nineteenth century.
Finally, forces within the House, particularly person-
alities played a role in encouraging the revolt against
centralization. Cannon's intractibility, as well as Taft's
incompetence mixed with the often acute sensibilities of
many of the insurgents, tended to exacerbate party differ-
ences, and perhaps hasten the dissolution of the centralized
legislative system which had by 1910 become the hallmark of
Republican legislative politics. All of these factors com-
bined to fragment the lines of conflict within the House of
Representatives in ways the traditional organizational
system could not control. Ultimately, it was the inability
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of this late nineteenth century Republican incarnation of
the legislative process to manage and resolve these new
patterns of internal conflict, or to meet the new altered
needs and expectations of the Members of Congress in the
early twentieth century which led to its demise.
Among the issues which first of all contributed to
this increasing fragmentation of the Republican Party in
the House were the tariff and trust question, conservation
and a number of particularly progressive concerns which
centered around the general question of "good government."
Republicans had begun to divide over these issues before
1909, but a number of specific factors at work in the first
decade of the twentieth century did much to transform these
growing division into open factional warfare.
Theodore Roosevelt's Presidency, first of all, the
approach he took to these central issues, and the differ-
ences which separated his own peculiar brand of Republican-
ism from that of the more conservative and traditional party
leaders in the House, did much to accentuate these growing
party fissures. "By the time Roosevelt left office," Mowry
suggests, for example,
a distinct cleavage had appeared in the Republi-
can party. Roosevelt had not started the schism,
and it would have developed with or without his
aid. But he had abetted it, especially in his
last two years. In fact, his unsatisfied legis-
lative demands during 1907 and 1908 had provided
the progressive faction with a program. Thus
the inheritance Roosevelt left was a party
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divided between an increasingly stubborn con-
servative majority and a growing progressive
minority whose reform claims against the party
were underwritten by the most popular Repub-
lican President since Lincoln. 3
The issues which Roosevelt had emphasized in office, there-
fore, often in disregard of the views of the majority of
his party, produced particularly severe strains on the Repub-
lican coalition in the House. By sometimes flaunting his
independence from the party's mainstream, he implicitly en-
couraged those Members of Congress whose consciences or con-
stituents also placed them on the Republican fringes, to
assert their own independence within the House of Representa-
tives.
The conservation issue, for example, had become a por-
tent symbol of both Roosevelt's policy outlook and of that
of the progressives as well.6 4  It also created a breach in
the Republican party between conservatives who were eager to
retain their party's traditional support for economic develop-
ment and progressives who wanted to moderate and restrain
development where it threatened to exhaust the nation's
natural resources. To a certain extent, Roosevelt and
Pinchot had managed to bridge this gap through their approach
to forestry. The administrations' concern for the idea of
scientific management (or the exploitation of forest reserves
at rates and in ways which guarded against permanent defores-
tationl was clearly calculated to appeal to both naturalists
and developers.
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By the advent of the Taft administration, however,
conservationists and developers were moving apart in their
approach to the management of the country's natural re-
sources. Unlike the forestry question which could be dealt
with in a manner which satisfied the progressive concern
for the environment and the lumber industry's desire for a
renewable source of timber, the new concerns tended to
polarize the two camps. The question of exploiting non-
renewable resources, for example, posed somewhat different
problems for policy-makers intent on optimizing the returns
to both the conservationist and the development interests.
Clearly, acceptable trade-offs were more difficult.to
achieve in dealing with non-renewable resources than they
were when forestry was the central focus of concern. 6 5
The involvement of large syndicates on the side of the
developers was also cause for concern among many progress-
ives. The Ballinger-Pinchot dispute is a useful illustra-
tion of the extent to which questions of privilege and
private power were closely linked to the concerns of many
conservationists. This dispute, and the-impact it had
upon American politics in 1909 and 1910, both within the
Congress and outside, is also a useful illustration of how
important the general conservationist issue was within the
Republican party during this time. Like the broader struggle
between Progressives and Conservatives this particular con-
flict symbolized, the Ballinger-Pinchot dispute both reflec-
ted and created strains within the Republican party coalition.
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The tariff also created significant tensions within 'the
party, as the voices of diverse regional interests became
more insistent in the first decade of the twentieth century.
The growing conflict between the forces of tariff reform and
those of protectionism had begun to surface during Theodore
Roosevelt's administration, but it mushroomed into a major
confrontation during Taft's administration. Roosevelt, who
sensed the explosiveness of the issue as early as 1904 had,
throughout his second term, assiduously guarded against
placing the tariff on the national legislative agenda. 66
To a certain extent, he merely postponed the inevitable
struggle, but he also did so in a way that mollified the
reform element of his party. Mowry and Blum suggest, for
example, that the success of Roosevelt's progressive pro-
gram in the House in 1905 and 1906 was the result of a
tacit agreement reached with Cannon that he (Roosevelt)
would not push tariff reform if the latter agreed not to
stand in the way of the rest of the administration's pro-
gram.6 7  Progressives were thus willing to accede to the
delay in reforming the tariff as long as some of their other
concerns were given attention.
By 1908, however, reform sentiment in the nation and
within Congress became strong enough to force Taft, in his
campaign for the Presidency, to promise a revision of the
tariff.6 8  As Roosevelt had wisely feared, this promise
quickly exposed the deep divisions which had been developing
in the Republican party since 1900 at least, and heightened
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the tensions between conservative and progressive Republif
cans. These tensions rapidly escalated into full-scale
factional warfare as the Progressives' almost emotional
attachment to the cause of tariff reductions clashed with
Cannon's zealous support for protection. The conflict
which thus raged over the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill was
further heightened by Taft's well-meaning, but ill-advised
support for a reciprocal tariff agreement with Canada. This
agreement, which would largely have reduced the duties on
Canada's agricultural exports to the United States, found
little support, and provoked much resentment in the agri-
cultural Mid-West, and further soured the relationship between
progressives and the administration.
Finally, the Republican leadership's rigid disregard
of the specific reform proposals from progressive members
of Congress was a continual irritant. The persistent re-
fusal of Cannon and his fellow conservatives in:,the House
to consider even minor and often little more than symbolic
progressive efforts to streamline or-clean up portions of
the Federal government only increased the Progressive dis-
taste for Cannon and his legislative style. One such effort
which brought a measure of notoriety to its author, and
which became a minor cause celebre in progressive circles
was that of Victor Murdock. Murdock, a representative from
Kansas, had discovered that the postal service was being
overcharged by the Railroad Companies which carried the
mails. In Murdock's home state, the "good government"
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movement had become an important electoral force, and Murdock
clearly hoped to reap political dividends from his work in
exposing the anomaly in postal rates.
Briefly, Murdock found that the legally prescribed
method for calculating Railroad charges to the postal service
entailed weighing the mails carried by each Railroad Company
for seven days each week for a period of thirty to ninety
days. From this, the railroads would estimate their average
weekly mail load for the entire year. This weekly figure
was then divided by the number of working days (i.e. the
number of days the Railroads actually carried the mails) in
the week -- which the Railroads claimed was six -- in order
to arrive at a daily average. As Murdock rightly pointed
out, this divisor produced an inflated picture of the daily
weight figures (since the Railroads really carried mail
seven days a weekL, and led to an overcharge which he estima-
ted to be in the millions of dollars. 69
When Murdock made this discovery, he introduced a bill
to change the divisor rate to seven. This resolution was
favorably received by the Post Office committee of which he
was a member, but was effectively.blocked, nevertheless, by
Cannon and the Rules Committee. Despite public pressure to
reform the divisor system (which followed publicity given
the issue in a surprisingly large number of magazines), the
House leadership refused to concede its power to interfere
with the postal system's rate structure Cclaiming it was
legally an issue which had to be resolved by the Post Office
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Departmentl, and in the process reaffirmed the notion that
progressive and conservative Republican interests were in-
compatible. This was clearly the view of Murdock, himself,
who noted of the experience, "I believed . . . that I was
doing a public service of moment. I suffered the slings
and arrows of dalumny, abuse and ridicule because of it
. . . I am chiefly indebted to the experience myself for
the revelation it was to me."70
To a certain extent, then, the insurgent ranks were
filled by individuals bound together by an often vague and
certainly diffuse allegiance to a number of diverse reform
causes. The tariff, the conservationist movement and other
more minor and narrowly focussed. reform campaigns which
surfaced from time to-:tiLme, produced disappointment, frus-
tration or anger among Republican Members of Congress in
growing numbers and thus added recruits to the ever-growing
insurgent crusade in the House. The 1908 Republican
National Convention, with its implicit (to many progress-
ives at least) repudiation of Roosevelt's policies,71 and
the Congressional leadership's treatment of the President
in his last months in office, also worked to transform the
latent internal strains within the Republican coalition
into an open political struggle between conservative and
progressive factions.
In part, then, the insurgent movement blossomed into
full-fledged revolt because of increasingly urgent and
insoluble conflicts over important political issues, both
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within the Republican party as a whol , and clearly within
the Republican party in the House of Representatives. As
unity of political purpose gave way to divisiveness within
the Republican ranks in the House, party leaders and the
traditional Republican approach to legislative organization
were both confronted with a dilemma which may have been
beyond the power of either to resolve. These emergent con-
tradictions within the Republican party, however, were at
least complicated, however, by personalj.incompatibilities
and weaknesses which were magnified by the political
struggles which dominated the 61st Congress.
In general, the 61st Congress was marked by an un-
characteristic heightening of personal tensions within the
Republican party coalition. The spirit of compromise and
tolerance which had so marked that coalition in previous
Congresses quickly gave way to patterns of intransigence,
zealotry and dogmatism which were particularly inappropr.itate
for the kind of internal harmony the Republican party needed
in order to maintain its legislative system intact. As the
willingness on the part of both Progressive and Conservative
factions to subsume personal goals to common party goals
evaporated Cand as those personal goals became more diverse
within the Republican legislative partyl, the centralized
organizational form lost one of its most important sources
of strength and legitimacy. The conflict of personalities
was at least a secondary factor in the dissolution of the
consensus which had been so central to the Republican design
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of the legislative process between 1890 and 1908.72
The struggle between Cannon and Norris, for example,
was probably a struggle between two distinct egos and two
flawed personalities as much as it was a contest between
two divergent political philosophies. Norris, for his part
was an honest and diligent individual who nevertheless
lacked, according to one contemporary, "the broad vision,
the thoroughly trained mind, and the controlled imagination
that characterizes political giants."7 3 These intellectual
limitations tended to lead him toward a brand of zealotry,
single-mindedness and intransigence which he believed were
the hallmarks of courage and dedication. Despite this
veneer, however, Norris was at heart a crafty, proud and
opportunistic politician. He enjoyed the limelight and
assiduously courted political advancement. Cordell Hull
recalls, for example, that during the March revolt against
Cannon, Norris "would not agree to lead the progressive
Republicans in supporting the Democrats unless heTwere
permitted himself to offer the resolution (on the reform of
the Rules Committee)." 74
There is also reason to suspect that Norris' espousal
of the insurgent cause was not so much the result of long-
standing political differences with Cannon and his conserva-
tive Republicanism, as it was in part the product of personal
pique. Before the beginning of his third term in the House
in 1906 (the 60th CongressI, Norris wrote to Speaker Cannon
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asking him for a seat on the powerful Ways and Means Comm-
ittee. He concluded his rather amiable petition by noting
that "From several things I have heard and read . . . I am
satisfied that my ideas on the tariff question are in full
accord with your own."75  Cannon decided against acceding
to this request and Norris later learned that the Speaker
had never really given serious consideration to his candi-
dacy for the Ways and Means Committee. "If he was dis-
appointed," his biographer correctly suggests, "his papers
reveal no record of it." Yet it is also clear and perhaps
significant that it was during the 60th Congress that Norris
threw his support to the nascent insurgent cause.76
Joseph G. Cannon, for his part, was equally prone to
the kind of intransigence and self-righteousness Norris
displayed, and there is some reason to believe that both
qualities became more pronounced as the opposition to his
rule increased.77  Up until..1908, Cannon had become a sort
of national folk-hero. He enjoyed the "Uncle Joe" image
which his earthy, slightly old-fashioned and unorthodox
political style had created among members of the press and
the public, and he did what he could to foster that image.
Newspapers and magazines published numerous stories about
the Cannon style which clearly pleased him and amused the
public. "He wears tailor-made home-spun clothes," wrote
one contemporary, in a light-hearted approving vein,
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drinks champagne at banquets from his water
tumbler, smokes fifteen-cent cigars at a
two-fer angle and takes the outside seat
when riding in his friends' automobiles so
that he can spit over the side. 78
Cannon basked in the warm glow of national attention and
did what he could to encourage-•the public to fawn over his
down-home, no-nonsense brand of politics. Yet, if the
public seemed to love him, he was also the subject of admira-
tion and respect in the House. Members of his own as well
as the De.nocratic party often seemed as eager as the public
to show their support and demonstrate their approval of his
folksy style.7 9
Beneath Cannon's charming and quaint exterior, however,
lay a number of human weaknesses which would cause problems
between 1908 and 1910. Like Norris, he had a fairly limited
political vision Cone which was largely shaped in the Repub-
lican party political culture of the mid- to late nineteenth
centuryl and a very healthy ego. He was somewhat insecure
about hisiintellectual capabilities -- his enormous respect
for Thomas B. Reed was tinged, for example, with a measure
of envy and mistrust for his towering intellect -- and
tended to be combattive, even defiant, when his judgment
was questioned. Like Norris, he often tended to see intran-
sigence as a positive human virtue. He lionized James G.
Blaine, for example, and believed that the secret of his
leadership "was courage to meet situations, accept responsi-
bility, and fight as a gladiator with a challenge to any
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extremity of conflict." 80  It was this outlook which
tended to lead Cannon toward confrontation when compromise
might have been more appropriate; to be often rigid in his
view of politics and political orthodoxy when adaptability
might have been useful; to be quick to use his powers to
quash opposition when magnanimity might have been more
effective; and to be dogmatic and extreme when accommoda-
tion and moderation might have accomplished his purposes.
This combattiveness tended to heighten tensions in the
House and provoke equally combattive and determined -opposi-
tion on the part of insurgents, at least somecof whom might
have been supportive of a centralized House process under
a gentler, more flexible Speaker. As George Norris noted
of Cannon:
Other men, placed in the same position, with the
same power behind them, might be able to do the
same evil, or at least continue doing evil
longer than the present Speaker, because they
would be more circumspect and more politic in
the exercise of their power. They would not
exercise it so openly and defiantly, and puld
thus be able to conceal the real machine.
Norris thus believed that although the revolt against the
strong Speakership was clearly inevitable, Cannon himself
did much to exacerbate tensions and accelerate the process
which brought about his overthrow.
Norris' assumptions about the impact of Cannon's per-
sonality on the insurgent movement were probably correct to
a certain extent, but even more to the point were his views
-412-
about the inevitability of a revolt against centralization.
This revolt was probably inevitable because the Member of
Congress of the late nineteenth century -- particularly
once again the Republican Member of Congress -- who had been
so well served by the centralized system, was beginning in
the first decade ofzthe twentieth century, to give way to
a new brand of Member for whom centralization was less
attractive. While the issues and the personalities had
both contributed, in other words, to the assault on Cannon
and the strong Speakership, that assault was more firmly
rooted, and its inevitability more clearly assured by the
broader and more profound changes which were occurring after
1896 in the rules and norms that shaped the American political
system.
The decay of the Republican political coalition after
1908, first of all, played an important role in producing
a factionalized House in 1910 for which, as the Democrats
had found in the late nineteenth century, centralization
and decision-making corrdination had no place. Increasingly
fractious constituent voices within the Republican party
tended to force the representatives of those constituents
away from conformity to the party machinery in the House.
Direct constituency pressure, for example, played a major
role in leading George Norris to espouse the insurgent cause.
In 1908 he had won re-election to the House with only the
slimmest of margins after a campaign which had focussed
heavily on the issue of Cannonism. Up to the point, Norris'
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relationship with the Speaker was at least ambiguous enough
as far as the voters in his home district were concerned to
give his own supporters season for doubt and concern and
his opponents a campaign theme. "You know," a friend wrote
Norris in the middle of the 1908 race,
that Mr. Ashton is working the Cannon racket
in the district and especially in this county,
saying you are a special friend of Cannon's
and supported him in all his policies. It
has been talked of by a number of your friends
here, and some have suggested asking you to
declareyyourself (against Cannon) . . . They
concluded not to do so, but the feeling here
is very strong against Mr. Cannon."82
Norris' subsequent revolt a(ainst the Republican party
machine in the House only enhanced his image with .Republican
voters in Nebraska. By early 1910, he was already being
urged to set his political sights on the Senate by the same
constituents who had barely supported his 1908 run for the
House. Noting that his conversion to the insurgent cause
"may not be popular with the politicians and office-holders,"
one constituent argued, "With the rank,and file it is the
thing. If they (the old guard) will keep up their fight
against you they will drive you into the Senate."83  Indeed,
Norris was ultimately elected to the Senate in 1912 after
having declined a nomination in 19 10 84A in order to allay
suspicions that his attachment to the insurgent movement
was guided by "selfish motives."8 4
There is also evidence to suggest that other insurgents
-414-
particularly from the Midwest, were encouraged and guided
toward insurgency by the wishes of constituents whose
specific interests were no longer compatible with the poli-
cies expressed and pursued by the national Republican or-
ganization. In Kansas, for example, where the Populist
movement had become synthesized into a milder middle-class
progressivism by the turn of the century, the insurgent
cause received a great deal of support from old-line Repub-
licans who had only recently been converted to the cause of
progressive reform. William Allen White suggests that the
progressive movement in Kansas was in fact founded by
Thomas Benton Murdock Ceditor of the Eldorado, Kansas
Republican and a creative political activist), who, along
with his brother Marshall teditor of the Wichita Eagle and
father of Victor Murdockl and his brother-in-law, took up
the "good government" banner with an assault upon the con-
servative state Republican party.
The Murdock rebellion as it was apparently known, was
motivated, so White suggests, by a clearly opportunistic
attempt on the part of the Murdocks to seize upon both the
reformist appeal of populism and the weaknesses and poli-
tical excesses of the state Republican party organization.
The Murdocks believed that a call for a thorough house-
cleaning of the state party would provide new political
opportunities for the Murdock family. Skeptics "hooted"
over the Murdock's transparent conversion to the cause of
good government, but the citizensoof Kansas, themselves
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tired of the Republican Old Guard, ultimately rewarded
the family by sending son Victor to Congress, and by
supporting his insurgent stand.85
Elsewhere in Wisconsin, Iowa and Minnesota, voters
provided reform candidates with a growing string of impress-
ive electoral victories. These electoral rewards, in turn,
merely prodded those representatives toward more progress-
ive and independent courses in the House. In the 1910
election, for example, 81 percent of the most ardent insur-
gents Cthose who supported the insurgent reform agenda
throughout 1909 and 19101, and 70 percent of all Republican
Members of Congress who voted against Cannon in the cele-
brated St. Patrick's Day revolt, were re-elected to the
House. By contrast, only 54 percent of all Republicans were
re-elected to Congress in the 1910 elections. 86  Clearly,
support for the insurgent cause (and the political indepen-
dence within the House which that cause signified) produced
sizeable electoral dividends that year.
Indicative of the multiple splits which had begun to
appear within the national Republican party in the first
decade of the twentieth century, was the marked regionalist
flavor of the insurgent movement. As Table 6.1 shows, Mid-
western Representatives played a disproportionately large
role in supporting the cause of reform in the House. The
61st Congress, for example, contained five state delegations
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Table 6.1 -- Regional Breakdown of Republican Support Within
the 61st Congress for the Insurgent Cause (1909-1910).
Committed
Insurgents*
Percentage
of St*e's
Number Republican
Delegation
State
Other
Insurgent
Supporters**
Percentaef
of State s
Number Republican
Delegation
Total
Insurgents
Percentage
of State s
Number Republican
Delegation
Vermont
Massachusetts
New York
New Jersey
Eansas
Ohio
Michigan
Indiana
Iowa
Nebraska
Wisconsin
Minnesota
North Dakota
South Dakota
Washington
California
* Heamitted Insurgents =
** Other Insurgents =
took
Republicans who xa~lm the Insurgent position
on the March 15, 1909 vote on the rules;
on the Fitzgerald Amendment of the same day;
and on the March, 1910 Norris resolution on
the Rules Committee.
Republicans who did not always vote with the
Insurgents on all procedural matters, but
who voted for theNorris Amendment in March,
1910.
0%
9%
0%
14%
25%
0%
0%
0%
60%
100%
80%
38%
50%
33%
13%
50%90
12%
0%
o0%
314%
17%
50%
10%
0%
0%
25%
o0%
33%
o0%
0%
50%
18%
12%
14%
25%
31%
17%
50%
70%
100%
80%
63%
50%
33%
33%
13%
I - - - -~---J-- - - I
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in which at least half the members stood with the insurgents
throughout 1909 and 1910. All five were Mid-western dele-
gations (North Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Nebraska and
Iowal. Similarly, on the St. Patrick's Day vote on the
Norris Amendment to the Rules, there were eight state dele-
gations in which at least 50 percent of the members suppor-
ted the insurgent position, seven of which were from the
Mid-western region. The only exception here was the Vermont
contingent on which one of the two members voted with the
insurgents on the March 18, 1910 roll call vote.8 7
If regional strains in the Republican coalition were
evident in the insurgent revolt in the House of Repres-
entatives, so too were other political tensions. There
is reason to believe, for example, that the insurgent move-
ment in the 61st Congress was prompted by increasingly
serious generational strains within the Republican legis-
lative party. These strains were themselves the products,
as Paul Abramson suggestsL in his study of post-New Deal
voting patterns, of discrete and (in the case of the turn
of the century Republican party) increasingly incompatible
historical perspectives and political values. 87B
Just as Joseph Cannon was himself clearly driven by
values and assumptions reflective of the immediate post-
Civil War political culture, during which he received his
initiation into American politics, so too were many of
the House conservatives of 1910. animated by experiences
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and beliefs gleaned from an earlier age. By contrast,
as Table 6.2 shows, House progressives tended to be the
products of a later political era, and presumably of quite
different historical experiences. Younger, on the average,
than their conservative colleagues, these insurgents were
more likely to have been imbued with the new, and in many
ways, distinctive values and outlooks which were emerging
in the American political culture at the turn of the cen-
tury -- values which were increasingly at odds with those
of their political elders in the House. Thus, just as
divergent regional needs and experiences Cas well as
interestsl were promoting divisiveness in the Republican
party, so too were different time-boundzperspectives
frustrating efforts of party leaders to promote unity and
coherence within the Republican legislative coalition.
Finally, direct constituency pressure also worked to
force reluctant Members of Congress to espouse the insur-
gent cause. In Michigan, for example, voters and newspapers
in one district reacted so angrily to the equivocation of
their Representative (Charles E. Townsend) on the March,
1909 vote on the rules, that he ultimately voted with the
insurgents in March of 1910, after first promising local
voters in a public letter that he was in fact a dedicated
progressive and a committed insurgent. 88
To a certain extent, then, the revolt against the
Speaker in 191Q and the movement to effect a broader
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Table 6.2 -- Generational Tensions Within the Republican
Party in the 61st Congress.
Year of Birth
All.
RN Daboic•as
N Down Across
All
N Down crnto
N Down Across
Conservative
ReNoublicans
N Down Across
Pro-1840 9 4% 100% 0 0% 0% 9 5 . oo100%
1840-1849 39 18 100 5 12 13 34 20 87
1850-1859 74 35 100 14 32 20 60 36 81
1860-1869 66 31 100 16 37 24 50 30 76
1870 + 23 11 100 8 19 35 15 9 65
T .... .. ..211 I I 8 l
168Totalle 211
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transformation of the House system which followed that
revolt, was symptomatic of specific coalitional problems
that had developed within the Republican party. As the
twentieth century progressed, and as the decisive policy
coalition which had been formed in the Realignment of
1896 began to decay, the Republican party found itself
more susceptible to the kinds of internal disarray that
had so marked the Democratic party in the late nineteenth
century. The party which had once been so unified, was
by 1910 falling prey to increasingly insistent and dis-
cordant local, regional, ideological, and generational
groups, demands and values. By 1910, the conflicts and
contradictions which existed within the Republican party
coalition could no longer be reconciled by the party or-
ganization either within or outside of Congress. The
Republican party of Nebraska, for example, was building an
identity and a set of interests which had increasingly
little in common with the Republican party of New York.
Many of the constituents elements of the national Re-
publican coalition, therefore, began to see greater virtue
in a legislative (and indeed a politicall system which gave
their Members of Congress the ability to pursue more inde-
pendent courses in the House. They began supporting calls
for a democratization of the legislative process which would
allow their representatives a freer hand in actually promot-
ing their new and often more unique (in relation to those of
other constituencies around the nation, interests, and one
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which would allow them to maximize their chances of achiev-
ing preferred constituency goals. In an era when the
national Republican organization could no longer simultan-
eously address all of the interests and concerns of its
increasingly distended constituency, those constituencies
began seeking ways of circumventing that party organization
in the national policy-making process. The insurgent move-
ment in the House, then, was a portion of that attempt to
reconcile the national political system with the altered
needs and new more diverse demands of a fragmenting
electorate.
Yet, if the.fragmentation of the Republican party was a
significant factor in the timing of the 1910 revolt against
the Speaker, and in the demands for a more fluid and flexible
House of Representatives, it does little to explain why the
changes brought about by that party decay had such an endur-
ing impact on the shape of the legislative politics. The
House, in other words, had throughout the nineteenth century
fallen prey to the recurrent and almost cyclical crises of
partisan decay and realignment. The strong Speakership
of the 183Q's Cunder James Polk), for example, had given
way to the amorphous immobilism of the 1850's as the
Jacksonian coalition crumbled, and the nation headed toward
Civil War. The House process had also reflected the varying
levels of cohesiveness and discord within the Republican
party between 1860 and the early 189Q's. The centralized
-422-
and coherent House system erected by Thaddeus Stevens in
the 1860's had, like the centralized and determined system
built by Polk, eventually been weakened by the gradual, if
less disastrous, decay of the Republican Civil War policy
coalition in the 1870's and 1880's. Why then was the early
twent±eth century decay of the centralized legislative
system first erected by Thomas B. Reed in the 1890's (at
a time of Republican party insurgencel so significant and,
as it turns out, so enduring?
The answer to this must lie, as Burnham, Schattschneider
and Price have suggested in the more fundamental changes
which occurred, in the early years of the twentieth century
in the American political process as a whole. As they argue,
this period, while it was also a time of upheaval within
the Republican party, was more profoundly a time of major
changes in the rules of the American political game. Changes
in the electoral system, changes in the ways diverse con-
stituencies and constituents organized their demands and
defined their interests, and changes in the way they voiced
their political concerns, placed new and quite different
pressures upon the institutions of Government, and the
people in those institutions of government who made public
policy.
Congress, no less thanEany of the other national poli-
tical institutions, was clearly affected by these new
pressures. As the political party, which had so dominated
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the nineteenth century political landscape receded into a
less obtrusive role, as partisanship itself declined as the
central normative reality in America's political culture,
Members of Congress were forced to adapt to a new reality
in which political agendas were more fragmented and par-
ticularistic, in which local, regional and increasingly
functionally specific groups pressed forth their own often
narrow and highly focussed views and ideals, and in which
strict allegiance to broad clusters of goals, platforms or
ideologies on the part of constituents was increasingly
rare. As these features of the American political system
became more deeply entrenched, the bases upon which members
of Congress were elected or re-elected, sanctioned or re-
warded changed.
Among the most fundamental and important shifts in the
rules of the American political game to have an influence on
Congressional behavior, three specific changes had particu-
larly strong and enduring impacts on the shape of the legis-
lative process. First, the weakening of the political party
on the national level and the loosening of the constraints
which tied the individual member to broad and concrete
national policy agendas, produced major changes in the manner
in which the individual member set his own political and
legislative priorities. Confronted by a new political system
in which political agendas were increasingly set by disparate,
autonomous and particularistic groups and interests in the
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electorate, the member was given a greater latitude in
actually constructing his own personal agenda -- one
tailored to fit the specific and unique interests and
priorities of his constituents. Secondly, the legisla-
tive process was acutely affected by changes in the elec-
toral processiitself. New voting laws and new ways of
nominating and electing representatives (e.g. primary laws)
changed the entire range of electoral incentives under
which a candidate, or an incumbent member of the House la-
bored. Finally, changes in electoral outcomes -- specific-
ally the decline throughout the nation in competitiveness
-- which began occurring in the first decade of the twen-
tieth century, clearly affected the way individual members
of Congress viewed both their tasks and their roles in the
legislative process.
The decline of the political party as an integrative
force in elections, and by extension in the legislative pro-
cess, can be best shown in an examination of the increasing
independence of Congressional elections from other national
elections. The emergence of office-specific voting behavior
clearly reflected the extent to which Members of Congress
were becoming tied to demands and interests which had little
in common with the goals and interests expressed in the pro-
cess by which other candidates were recruited to fill other
positions in the policy-making system. As Burnham shows in
his article, "Insulation and Responsiveness in Congressional
Elections," for example, voters, from 1904 on, were beginning
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Table 6.3 -- Corrolation 3etween Percentage Democratic of the
Congressional. t.a and the Presidential Vote.(Non-Southern States Only).
Year
1900
1904,
1908
1912
1916
1920
1924
1928
1932
1936
19 0
"1948
1952
1956
1960
1964,
1968
1972
N Vote (r)
34
34
35
3?
37
37
3?7
37
3?
37
37
37?
39
3?
37
39
39
39
39
+*984
+*874,
+.870
+. 824
+.663
+.857
+.758
.•490
4: 555
+* 64
*.692
+*819
+.812
*,871
*.755
+.651+.579
+.*335
(r2
(.968)(.763)
.757)
.679)
.440)
.735)
.574)
.240) .
.308)
.402)
.1478)
.671)
S659)
.758)
.570)
*.:335)(.221)(.112)
Sources Walter Dean • urnham, Insulation and Responsiveness in
Congressional Elections8," PolEticl Science agrterl-y,
Vol. 90, No. 3, *all, 1975, P. 4za.
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to employ different criteria for choosing Members of Con-
gress than they were in choosing Presidents.
To be sure, the declining relationship between Presi-
dential and Congressional elections does not tell us
exactly what criteria distinguished the two electoral..pro-
cesses from each other. Yet, it is nevertheless clear that
whatever those specific differences were, voters after 1904
were increasingly selecting their representatives in Con-
gress on different bases, and presumably judging them accor-
ding to different standards of performance than they were
their presidential candidates. This suggests, in turn, that
the individual Member of Congress, or the individual Congress-
ional candidate was becoming free to set his own political
agenda to conform more singularly to demands of the con-
stituents who elected him. The nineteenth century political
system, in other words, which forced Congressional candidates
to balance and simultaneously align themselves with both
the.national party agenda and local constituency demands,
had by 1904 begun to give way to an electoral system which
allowed or indeed forced them to address more completely the
demands, the concerns and the agenda of their local con-
stituents.
This change, which increasingly forced Members of Con-
gress to serve the interests of their own particular con-
stituencies more directly and more single-mindedly was rein-
forced by changes in the way candidates for office were
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nominated. By 1910, the nineteenth century system by which
the Congressional candidate had been forced to rely on the
party organization in his constituency in order to stand
for election, had given way, in many parts of the country,
to a system which allowed him to stand on his:own rather
than his party's political record and performance. Primary
elections, for example, not only gave Congressional candi-
dates the right to circumvent state and local party organiza-
tions, but also encouraged Members of Congress, once in
office, to subordinate their party loyalties -- especially
once again loyalty to the national party organization -- to
their constituency loyalties.
As in'the case of the increasing uniqueness of Congress"
ional electoral patterns, the growing reliance on the primary
election had decided effects on fragmenting the lines of con-
flict, and pluralizing the lines of bargaining and coalition
building in Congress. This, in turn,, tended to lead members
in progressive larger numbers to call for a more open and
more flexible legislative process -- one which recognized
the peculiar needs of a member thus tied to his constituency
needs. It is probably significant, for example, that twenty-
one of the twenty-seven Republicans who supported the insur-
gency movement from March, 1909 onward, were from states which
had mandatory, state-wide primary election systems,90 and
most of the other six came from states which at least had
some, if more rudimentary form of the primary nomination
system.91
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Finally, the decline in competitiveness produced levels
of electoral security for membess of Congress which were
largely unknown in the nineteenth century (at least outside
the South). H. Douglas Price, on the one hand, suggests that
this had a direct impact on the design and restructuring of
the legislative process in the early twentieth century. Mem-
bers increasingly free of the spectre of electoral defeat,
Price argues, tended to develop a careerist perspective in
the House. Such members naturally wanted the Congress to
be the kind of place in which the long-term pursuit of a
career would be a rewarding and worthwhile endeavor. To
this end, the careerists who, in the 1900 to 1910 period,
began to become more numerous in the House, set about to
remake the legislative process to correspond to their needs
and general goals Ce.g.,a more even distribution of influence
in the House; an increase in the member access to decision-
making ceaters within the House; the emergence of a measure
of predictability in the process by which decision-making
roles were apportioned; and finally a modicum of security in
a position once achieved). 92  In a period of declining turn-
over, Price thus argues, the legislative process is, and in
the early twentieth century was, forced to adapt itself to
the demands and expectations likely to predominatelin a
House populated by a growing number of careerists.
The problem here comes in determining why the specific
changes which occurred in the legislative process took the
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forms they did. Presumably, for example, the careerist
would have wanted a far greater democratization of the House
than was actually accomplished in the early twentieth century.
There were, in other words, clearly limits on the extent to
which the careeristccould go in reshaping the House to fit
his needs. Secondly, there is no evidence to suggest that
careerism played a decisive role in the insurgent movement,
which itself-iwas part of a wider campaign to effect a more
even distribution of power and influence in the House system
between 1908 and 1913. Indeed, as Table 6.4 shows, the
insurgenas themselves tended, if anything, to be slightly
more junior (i.e., less deeply imbued with the careerist
perspectivel than those who supported the continuance of the
centralized legislative system. Despite this paradox, and
despite its inherent vagueness, the Careerist paradigm
nevertheless does present a compelling and intuitively sensible
portrait of the long term relationship between competitiveness
and membership turnover and the internal workings of the
legislative process.
The decline in electoral competitiveness also, however,
reflects and helps explain changesiin the legislative process
in a more limited, if for the purposes of this study and its
assumptions, a more relevant way. As Burnham has suggested,
the decline in electoral competitiveness in Congressional
elections has tended to insulate incumbents from the often
dramatic fluctuations which characterized electoral life in
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* Table 6.*-- Number of Terms served by Conservative and Pro-
gressive Republicans in the 61st Congress.
Terms Ardent
Served. Insurgents
1909 - 1910
Pro- Norri.s
vote in blarch,
only
1910
26
19
15
22
2
6
7
8+.
All
Republicans
38
28
34
32
18
16
21
25
18
13
16
15-
8
10
12
Totals 27 100 16 100 212 100
DL- - N -- sZ - "
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the late nineteenth century. The increasing autonomy of
the individual member of Congress, and his independence
from the changing electoral fortunes of the party of which
he was nominally a representative, was reflected by his
growing political autonomy within the legislative process.
The decline in competitiveness in the early twentieth
century, meant, in other words, that incumbents were less
readily affected by the kinds of voter shifts which in the
nineteenth century would havepproduced electoral defeat
for individual incumbents and a party and (given the impor-
tance and distinctiveness of parties in the nineteenth cen-
tury) a policy shift within the House of Representatives.
As competitivenessideclined, neither the individual incum-
bent nor the House as a whole was as sensitive to the elec-
toral changes, shifts or fluctuations which in the nineteenth
century would havecproduced equally significant shifts in
the political orientations of the House and its members.94
Presumably then, thisiinsensitivity of House elections to
changing electoral tides on the national level produced a
much more heterogeneous House membership. Elected in
different'times, on the basis of different local issues and
indeed on the basis of different national issues, the House
membership in a non-competitive, electoral system represented
a broad and, over time, a more diverse set of political goals
and interests, and indeed ,more diverse sets of electoral
mandates.
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This increasing heterogeneity produced by the decline
in competitiveness as well as by the other equally important
changes in the post-1896 American political system (the
decline of the political party, its increasingly peripheral
impact on Congressional elections, changes in the rules of
the electoral game, and fundamental-changes in electoral
behaviorl all tended to contribute to a fragmentation of the
lines of conflict, a diversification of needs and goals, and
a less cohesive political perspective Con the part of the
Members of CongressI within the House of Representatives.
This transformation of the lines of conflict, in turn, pro-
duced new and distinctive problems for Congress' conflict
resolution system. As this heterogeneity increased, as
members' needs and goals became more diffuse, the legisla-
tive process itself was forced, by its participants, to
adapt to the realities and demands of these new patterns
of dissensus. The House system developed by Reediin 1890
to deal with and take advantage of the unique conflict-
resolution needs of the coherent and unified Republican
party coalition, was by 1910, irrelevant of the needs of
members, and unable to contain or resolve the kind of con-
flict produced by the multiplicity of legislative agendas
which characterized the House from that time on.
There were thus major contrasts between the episodic
disarray which appeared within Congress in the nineteenth
-433-
century, and the more systemic disarray which began taking
root in the early twentieth century. While fragmentation,
disunity and to a certain extent individualism had been
persistent organizational:-problems for nineteenth century
Congresses, particularly for the Democrats, that disarray,
when it appeared, tended to be the product of specific or-
ganizational weaknesses in the party itself. In the twen-
tieth century on the other hand, the disarray was an increas-
ing function of broad changes occurring in the underlying
assumptions which shaped American politics.
These changes tended to add new obstacles to national
party coherence, to mass political movements in general, and
to accumulative political cleavages in society which in turn
had a pronounced effect upon the patterns of conflict which
emerged in the House of Representatives. The national inte-
gration of political goals (by parties or by other instruments
of mass political action on the national levell and the unity
which had characterized the Republican and to a much lesser
extent the Democratic party organizations throughout the late
nineteenth century, became much more difficult to sustain in
the twentieth century. The constitutional constraints which
existed on such unity of purpose in the nineteenth century
-- constraints which reflected the founders' desire for a
fragmented Federal system -- were in the twentieth century
multiplied by anti-party reforms, negative public reactions
to party rule, and the particularization of the national
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political agenda. The fragmentation and disarray which had
in other words characterized conflict in the House fromz
time to time in the nineteenth century, became a routine
pattern in the twentieth century.
The changes which occurred within the House of Repres-
entatives in the first decade of the twentieth century --
the assault on central control and the emergence of the.
Member of Congress as a more autonomous and independent
legislative actor -- were thus tied primarily to broad
changes in the American political system as a whole. To be
sure, the most immediate source of the.changing patterning
of conflict within the House in 1908 to 1910 was the break-up
of the once monolithic Republican party. Thisiin itself,
however, was but a part of the broader fragmentation and
particularization of the American political system which was
occurring around this time.
As these changes, then, produced new patterns of con-
flict within the elective institutions of government, those
institutions were forced to change in response. The disinte-
grating consensus which increasingly marked national politics
during this time placed new pressures on the House of Rep-
resentatives, in particular, to do itself what political
parties, political interest groupings and other organized
collectivities coild not -- build policy-making coalitions.
As new forms of dissensus appearediin Congress, the House
was forced to accomplish this by adapting itsiinternal
structures of- leadership, its bargainingsystem and its
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formal procedures to meet the exigencies of those new, less
unified, less cohesive and less coherent lines of conflict.
The House of Repeesentatives responded by redistributing
and dispersing power, by weakening its structures of central
control, 'by making its decision-making system more permeable
and by generally accepting patterns of membership behavior
which would have been discouraged in the past. As the follow-
ing chapter will suggest, the House was also forced to estab-
lish a new role for itself in national policy-making, as this
new conflict style became more entrenched.
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Chapter VII
Organizational Fragmentation
and Congressional Power:
Redefining the Role of the House
1911 - 1921
The revolt against the strong speakership was the
beginning of a broader movement to adapt the House of Rep-
resentatives to the new needs of the post-1900 member of
Congress and the peculiar demands of an increasingly plural-
istic form of legislative conflict. By 1910, the central-
ized system of leadership had already become irrelevant to
a legislative process functioning in an environment in which
national party organizations were declining in strength and
coherence; in which cumulative political divisions within
the House and in society as a whole were becoming increas-
ingly rare; and in which attachments to broadly defined
issue agendas were giving way to specific andeparticular-
istic interests and demands on the part of both geographic-
ally and functionally defined constituencies.
Voters had begun to encourage individualism in the
House by rewarding politicial independence at the polls.
New electoral patterns tended to rivet the attention of
Congressional candidates upon narrowly defined and often
parochial issues to the detriment ofdthe shared and more
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broadly defined goals upon which the pre-1910 exercise of
centralized power had been based in the House. In sum,
new and heightened expectations on the part of constituents,
and in turn on the part of Members of Congress themselves,
created pressures within the House which the traditional
legislative process was ultimately unable to accommodate.
The pressures which led to the dismantling of the
centralized leadership system in the House worked, in the
decade following the St. Patrick's Day revolt, to produce
a new organizational style. It was thus during this period
that the institutional consequences of the anti-Cannon and
anti-centralization movement became apparent. The disper-
sion of decision-making .responsibilities was accelerated
between 1911 and 1921; the fragmentation of power and of
the leadership structure was formalized during this time;
and the House began to abandon its pretensions of primacy
and legislative initiative in the national policy-making
system, in favor of a more modest and clearly more approp-
riate (to its new fragmented system of decision-making)
oversight and reactive role. In sum, .the House process
was.remolded during this time to fit the interests of its
increasingly distended and pluralistic constituencyvbase
which had itself created new electoral needs among members
of Congress and thus dramatically altered patterns of con-
flict within the House.
This chapter, then, will be devoted to an examination
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of the organizational adaptation process which occurred
within the House between 1911 and 1921. It will first des-
cribe the manner in which both Democrats and Republicans re-
designed the legislative process to accommodate the new
stresses of the emergent pluralist order. It will suggest
that while the response of both parties was slightly differ-
ent, both reflected the central problems of producing legis-
lative decisions in an institution increasingly devoid of
the kinds of strong, coherent and enduring political coali-
tions which had so characterized Congresses (particularly
Republican Congresses) in the nineteenth century. In the
post'eannon era, the House was forced to do what parties,
ideologies, voters and broad electoral agendas had done in
the past -- create a policy-making consensus. During this
era, the House organization was forced to accommodate the
diverse concerns of its members and their constituents by
devising new methods of consensus-building, bargaining and
decision-making, and by generally acceding to the new
realities of pluralist conflict in which momentary coalitions,
temporary political alignments and specific interests pre-
dominated.
As this adaptation process proceeded, the organizational
consequences of the revolt against centralization became
apparent. This chapter will examine these consequences by
first describing the manner in which power and decision-making
responsibilities were redistributed. In a sense, the 1911
to 1921 period demonstrates the extent to which the 1910 to
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1911 revolt against the strong speakership was an unfinished
revolution. This chapter will suggest, for example, that
while there was a broad and increasingly powerful agreement
among Members of Congress that centralization was inapprop-
riate in the House, there was little agreement over viable
alternatives. This uncertainty over alternative organiza-
tional forms, in turn, generally led to a de facto devolu-
tion of power and decision-making responsibility to a variety
of party or quasi-party organizations within the House (the
Committee on Committees, Steering Committees, Rules Comm-
ittee, etc.1 and to the House committees. While, however,
this redistribution process was largely unforeseen by the
original opponents of centralization,. it did nevertheless
represent a.conscious movement toward the kind of organiza-
tional fragmentation and decision-making permeability which
were consistent with the new patterns of conflict and the
new individually-oriented needs of the post-1910 Member of
Congress.
Finally, this chapter will argue that the evolution of
a more distended (less centralized) and more plural legisla-
tive process had important consequences for the House of
Representatives' role in national policy-making. The demise
of central control over the legislative agenda and the decline
of central coordination of the business of the House, led to
a necessary redefinition of the House's place in the Federal
political system. Democrats immediately retreated from the
broad leadership role Cannon, for one, had so zealously
-440-
claimed for Congress in general and the House in particular
during the first decade of the twentieth century, in favor
of Presidential leadership. Yet, even the Republicans were
gradually forced to recognize the limitations which had been
imposed on Congressional power by the destruction of the
centralized system ofi ieadership. While neither party surr-
endered the prerogatives (as they were formally spelled out
in thrt Constitution) of Congress, and while both at times
proved to be equally jealous of executive encroachments upon
the institutional rights of the House, neither party was
ever able to halt the assumption by the Presidency, of much
of the policy-making initiative (the agenda-setting, the
policy design, etc.) which had in the past been exercised
effectively by the Congress.
The 1910-1921 period was thus one of major change for
the House. Not only did it depart from the specific organiza-
tional norms which had guided the Republican Congresses since
the mid-1890's, but it also departed from the general philo-
sophy with which most late nineteenth century Congresses had
successfully or unsuccessfully approached the legislative
task. Ineffective or divided leadership, internal political
diversity, disarray, and the kind of fragmentation which had
been regarded as a characteristic of institutional or partisan
weakness in the nineteenth century were raised to positive
political virtues in the years after 1911.
Again, this was largely a function of the new patterns
and nature of the demands and interests which were at the
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turn of the century transforming the idea of representation
in general and the expectations of constituents on Members
of Congress in particular.. These new patterns of political
behavior outside of Congress tended to encourage the House
as a whole to abandon its traditional methods of legislating,
and to assume the new approach and the new role it in fact
adopted during the second decade of the twentieth century.
As this study has argued, the House is an adaptive body.
Its history is essentially the story of a continuing evolu-
tionary process. Thus, although the House has in the past,
and continues to evolve in response to the changing demands
of its political environment, the changes which occurred
between 1911 and 1921 were part of a particularly important
chapter in the story of that evolutionary process.
When the Democrats assumed control of the House in 1911,
it was clear that the de-centralizing impulses which had
first exhibited themselves during the anti-Cannon revolt,
would be reinforced. The Democratic platform of 1908 had,
of course, promised to reform the legislative process in
ways which would enhance the rights of individual members
to pursue their own, and their constituents' increasingly
distinctive goals and needs.1  The "democratization" of
the House, however, was also rooted in the Democratic party's
coalitional weaknesses. As in the late nineteenth century,
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the traditional regional and indeed ideological heterogeneity
of the party continued to impose major constraints on unity
ando organizational coherence. Thus, to the growing influ-
ence of particularism on all Members of Congress (a particular-
ism which led members of both parties to pursue new kinds of
political goals, which tended to change the manner in which
those members competed for preferred legislation, and which
transformed the nature and patterns of political conflict in
the House) was added in 1911 the typical Democratic divisive-
ness. Both of these forces in turn worked to reinforce the
organizational and normative movement away from centraliza-
tion in the legislative process.
The fragmentation (or incipient pluralization) of the
lines of conflict within the House was formally recognized
in the body of rules and procedures which the Democrats
established at the beginning of the 62nd Congress. As we
noted in the last chapter, the Calendar Wednesday Rule was
strengthened, the Speaker's recognition powers were curtailed
and the Rules Committee was enlarged. Beyond this, however,
the Democrats also redistributed the powers which had allowed
Republican Speakers since Reed to achieve virtually unfettered
control over the legislative process, to other institutions
and officers within the House and the party. A Committee
on Committees was created, for example, to make committee
appointments Cor technically nominations) and essentially
organize the House.
-443-
The committee itself consisted of the Democratic mem-
bers of the Ways and Means Committee, and its chairman was
the member selected by the caucus to be floor leader. This
post of Floor Leader was formally established as a distinct
office by the Democrats of the 62nd Congress and represented
a further fragmentation in theory of the leadership struc-
ture. In fact, however, Oscar Underwood who was named Chair-
man of the Ways and Means Committee was also elected Floor
Leader -- a marriage of responsibilities and powers which in
part offset (initially at least) the fragmenting impulses
of the Democratic reform. Finally, the Caucus itself was
resurrected and given a new formal salience in the legisla-
tive decision-making process. Democratic members were for-
mally bound by caucus decisions and instructed to vote
accordingly on the floor of the House. To a certain extent,
this caucus rule placed important constraints on the freedom
of individual Members of Congress, but it also gave each
Democratic member a formal role in the party's decision-
making process.
The Democratic floor leader quickly and somewhat un-
characteristically (at least for a Democratic Congress)
emerged as the dominant political figure in the 62nd Con-
gress. To a certain extent, this was the result of Oscar
Underwood's simultaneous election to the Chairmanship of
Ways and Means (which again also conferred upon him the
position of Chairman of the Democratic Committee on
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Committeesl and to the Floor Leadership position. These
three positions gave him an immense amount of influence
with the other wielders of power and authority in the Demo-
cratic House and did much to negate the party's strong
fragmentation ethos. Underwood's influence was also en-
hanced, however, by the force of his own ambition and by
the personal reluctance of Speaker Champ Clark to exercise
the still significant powers of his own office. Finally,
the Rules Committee (yet another relatively autonomous com-
petitor for power and influence in the House after 1911) had
been somewhat weakened by its enlargement, by the careful
selection of its members by Underwood and his colleagues on
the Ways and Means Committee, and by the coincidental fact
that its chairman twho owed his position to what was quickly
becoming the inviolable principle of seniority) was poli-
tically out of touch with many of the Democratic Members of
Congress. 2
The rapid rise of the Caucus and of Oscar Underwood to
power in the 62nd Congress raised serious questions about
the Democratic party's-.attachment to the cause of organiza-
tional "democracy" and to the rights of the individual Member
of Congress. To many, Underwood was simply recreating the
old "czarist" system many of his colleagues had Mought so
hard to dismantle. Early on in the 62nd Congress, George
Norris argued, for example, that the "machine today seems to
be on the Democratic side of the aisle. King Caucus seems
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to be there in control." He added, "If you surrender your
consciences to him you will be in as great a political slav-
ery as though you were ruled by a Czar on the Speaker's
throne." 3  Somewhat later, another observer suggested that,
If the country thinks that tyranny is dead
in Congress, the country has fooled itself.
It is not. The House . . . is still con-
trolled by the caucus, which in turn can be
controlled by a minority of theparty holding
the caucus, and this minority in turn can be
controlled by half a dozen powerful men, who
will usually be 1headed by Oscar W.Underwood.4
While critics thus railed against what they regarded as
a cynical, and rather hypocritical disregard of the prin-
ciples of Congressional reform, Democrats assiduously defended
their organizational form. Clearly pleased with his party's
surprising unity, for example, Champ Clark confidently de-
fended the caucus system in terms reminiscent of Reed's
earlier defense of centralization. "I will tell you the
whole truth about this caucus matter,"he said on the floor
of the House,
and this holy protestation that you folks are
making. The people of the United States want
to know what Congress does. They are much
more interested in results than in the methods
by which these results are worked out . .
They want results.5
The press, meanwhile, was drawn to and evidently sur-
prised by the apparent Democratic unity which seemed to
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underlie this strong caucus system. As one writer observed,
the House of Representatives was in 1911 and 1912 present-
ing the public with a "virtually unprecedented spectacle.
A Democratic majority in the lower branch of Congress has
become, for the first time in a generation, an effective,
harmonious,smoothly working legislative machine."6  Indeed,
for the first time in living memory, the Democratic party
in the House found itself parrying public charges that it
was resurrecting the idea of a legislative juggernaut.
Despite contemporary criticism and surprise, however,
the caucus was neither as monolithic or as powe4Aas even
modern Congressional historians have suggested,7 nor as
significant a long-term departure from the fragmented tradi-
tions of Democratic leadership. Even in the 62nd Congress,
where Democratic disarray was temporarily muted by the
general harmony which surrounded the party's long awaited
return to power, the Caucus' results were not as striking as
subjective accounts tend to imply.
According to Clubb and Traugott, for example, 60 percent
of the roll call votes in the 62nd Congress were party votes
(i.e. where at least 50 percent of the Democratic members
opposed at least 50 percent of the Republicansl. On all roll
call votes during this Congress, there was an average party
unlikeness Cdissimilarity) score of 53.0, and an association
of vote with party of .42. Both figures are lower than
those for the stormy 61st Congress and are in fact much lower
than the average scores of the Republican Congresses through-
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out the first decade of the twentieth century. Between 1895
and 1913, for example, these was. only one Congress which
registered a lower party unlikeness score (the Republican
60th Congress) and none was lower in terms of party associa-
tion with roll call vote. Finally, even these modest levels
fell dramatically in subsequent Democratic Congresses. 8
The marked decline of party dissimilarity and party associa-
tion scores in Democratic Congresses after 1913 (even while
Underwood served as floor leader and caucus chairman) suggests
that the caucus' perceived effectiveness and initial success
in introducing a measure of cohesiveness into the Democratic
coalition during the 62nd Congress did not represent an
enduring pattern. Clearly, then, the initial success of the
caucus was little more than the product of a transitory, and
quite fragile, period of Democratic party unity.
The relatively rapid decline of the caucus from even
its modest position in the 62nd Congress was rooted in a
number of factors at work within the Democratic party, the
House itself, and. the electorate at large. The temporary
euphoria which followed the impressive Democratic victory in
the 1910 Congressional elections, first of all, provided the
caucus with a membership generally content to defer differ-
ences in favor of political harmony. The spirit of intra-
party compromise was further encouraged by Republican control
of both the Executive branch and the Senate. Even in 1911,
Democrats could still produce a measure of unity from their
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sense of shared opposition to what still remained of the
conservative Republican politican agenda.
Secondly, the fact that the Democrats were organizing
the House after such a long period as the minority party,
conferred significant if once again temporary political ret
sources upon the party leadership. The power to appoint
committees, for example, was used creatively by Oscar Under-
wood who, as Chairman of the Democratic Committee on Comm-
ittees and Floor Leader (and ex-officio Chairman of the
Party caucus) was in a position to exercise immense leverage
over his colleagues. The large number of Freshman members
were particularly sensitive to the rewards and sanctions
which Underwood and his Committee on Committees could appor-
tion and the political careers which they could thus assist
or thwart. Yet older members too were not immune from the
requests of a man who could materially advance their own
careers:.in the House. The large number of committee vacancies
which had resulted from the Republican electoral debacle of
1910 therefore provided the Democratic leadership with a
useful instrument for inducing party regularity. This tem-
porary resource, dwindled rapidly after the 62nd Congress
as committee vacancies declined with turnover, and member
expectations rose.
Thirdly, the party rules themselves formally constrained
the ability of the Caucus to induce party regularity. It
took a two-thirds vote of the caucus, for example, to bind
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members to a particular legislative position on a pending
bill (not a simple majority, as had usually been the case
with the Repuboican caucus), and no one member could ever
be forced to cast a vote if it meant violating a constitu-
ency promise or a closely held deal. As Brown adds, the
two-thirds rule was particularly beneficial to the Southern
bloc which could thus exercise a veto an any measure brought
before the caucus. As such, the caucus was really only able
to exercise a decisive influence over the party if the
relatively unified Southern delegation permitted. This
decided Southern advantage tended in the long run to exacer-
bate differences and often widen the breach between factions
within the party.9
The political foundations of the caucus were also quite
fragile indeed. The initial attempt to create a strong
caucus by the Democratic leadership and its effort to in-
still a measure of unity and discipline into the legisla-
tive party increasingly found itself at odds with both the
character of its diverse constituent base and the electoral
temper of the times. The heterogeneity of the Democratic
constituency Cindeed, as Burnham shows, the pervasiveness
of constituency heterogeneity was problematic for both
parties after the first decade of the twentieth centuryll 0,
for example, provided a major obstacle to party unity in
1911 as it had throughout the lateL.nineteenth century.
Even the effectiveness and creativity of the Democratic
-450-
House leadership in the 62nd Congress was routinely negated
by the persistent strains produced by this problem of con-
stituency heterogeneity. In the second decade of the twen-
tieth century, in other words, the entire idea of party
loyalty was becoming irrelevant to members who because of
the fragmentation of the electorate represented increasingly
distended and (within the same party) competing interests.
In effect, the problem was one of competing mandates.
The fragmented Congressional constituency, and indeed the
post-1896 American political culture as a whole had already
begun to encourage Members of Congress to abandon tradition-
al loyalties and norms of behavior and to discard outmoded
forms of representation. In the era of declining competitive-
ness at the polls, decreasing levels of membership turnover
in the House, increasing seat security, and accelerating
party decay, constituents rewarded representatives for
personal, visible and increasingly particularistic legisla-
tive achievements. Party loyalty, and attachments to broad
issue clusters or ideologies were at a discount in the post-
Cannon era and consequently the Democratic attempt to foster
unity within the House tended to run against the prevailing
political cultural grain.
Finally, the attempt to build a strong Caucus or party
system in the House was hampered, from the 63rd Congress on,
by Woodrow Wilson's efforts to establish executive hegemony
over the national policy-making system.11  While his personal
attempt to build a political consensus around his own issue
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agenda did work (particularly in his first term) to enhance
party unity, it tended to undermine the efficacy of the
caucus by implicitly encouraging Democratic Members of Con-
gress to look to the President and not the legislative party
for political cues (and indeed often for rewards12). While
undermining the Caucus was clearly not Wilson's intent, his
insistence between 1913 and 1917 that the executive design
and coordinate the Democratic political program did little
to enhance the strength of autonomy of the leadership struc-
tures within the House.
The Democratic Caucus then confronted many of the same
obstacles which had destroyed the Republican system of
centralized leadership. Despite modest early successes, it
was ultimately no more able than the strong speakership to
withstand the distended pressures or accommodate the frag-
mented and increasingly plural lines of conflict which
emerged as central characteristics of House membership be-
havior from 1910 onwards. The initial unity which had pre-
disposed members to abide by caucus decisions quickly faded
as the particularism and heightened personal expectations
of the new political age combined with traditional Demo-
cratic divisiveness to weaken the foundations of strong
party rule within the House. The strong Caucus was there-
fore a temporary product of a transient political era which
was already on its way to extinction in 1911. By the end
of the Democratically controlled 64th Congress, it, like the
strong speakership was an anachronism -- little more than an
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institutional reminder of an earlier political age.
For the Republicans, as well as the Democrats, the
support for centralized control of the legislative process
evaporated quite quickly in the early years of the second
decade of the twentieth century. By the time the Republican
party reassumed control of the House in the 66th Congress,
it was no more able than the Democratic party had been to
resurrect the instruments of party control. The leadership
was clearly divided, still torn between the conflicting
political goals which had undermined the cohesiveness of
the party in 1910. Republican members-were also increasingly
committed to the pluralist (or individualist, prerogatives
which had been won between 1909 and 1911. Both of these
factors combined to produce a new Republican approach to
legislative organization in the 66th and later Congresses.
The. first of these forces which worked to sustain the
fragmented approach to legislative organization in the Re-
publican party was the manner .in which the idea as well as
the structure of leadership changed between 1911 and 1921.
The collapse of the strong speakership in 1910 created a
leadership vacuum in the Republican party. In subsequent
Congresses this vacuum was largely filled by a number of
claimants to portions of the power which the Speaker had
in the past exercised, so that by the 66th Congress, leader-
ship responsibilities had devolved to at least five formal
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groups or offices within the Republican legislative party.
The Speaker still had a measure of influence, but his
power to appoint committees had in the 66th Congress been
lodged (as the Democrats had done earlier).in a Republican
Committee on Committees which was composed of one member
elected by each Republican state delegation to the House.
The power to control the legislative agenda had been trans-
ferred from his office to the Rules Committee which since
1910 excluded him from membership. The control of the
Caucus (or party conferencel had been given to the floor
leader and.d the Steering Committee which together played
a role in coordinating the Republican legislative program.
Finally, the Appropriations and Ways and Means Committees
exercised, through their Chairmen, an independent power to
design and enact their own legislative agendas.1 3
Of these, the Committee on Committees and the Steering
Committee had perhaps the greatest potential for dominating
the Republican legislative process. As Brown suggests, how-
ever, both were weakened from the outset by what must
ultimately be seen as a fundamental and increasingly charac-
teristic Congressional antagonism to central control of any
kind. The Committee on Committees, for example, was viewed
by a number of hopeful Republican leaders as a possible
foundation for the resurrection of strong party rule in the
66th Congress. The judicious exercise of the power to
appoint committees, they believed could be used to the
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party's advantage. As Brown argues:
Those who were seeking to control the House in
the interest of party discipline, intended to
concentrate this power in the hands of a small
committee, and the slate had been agreed upon,
through understandings reached among members,
*in advance of the (party) conference. They
would have substituted for the old system of
the highly centralized oligarchy, a new
oligarchy by no means so formidable as the old
but possessing some of its attributes and in
a position to acquire others gradually through
the exercise of those powers thus conferred.14
As Brown continues, however, James Mann, the minority
leader between 1911 and 1919, who had been denied the
Speakership in the 66th Congress by the opposition of con-
servative party members, upset this plan by proposing in the
conference that the Committee on Committees be enlarged.
It was his suggestion that its members be recruited from
each Republican state delegation in the House. Appealing
as it did "with. irresistable force to every one since it
offered a place on the Committee on Committees to every
state," Mann's proposal was adopted by the conference, and
the attempt to build a new strong party organization in the
House on the basis of the committee appointment power
foundered.1 5
The other possible instrument of party rule, the Steer-
ing Committee, was also the victim of a surrender to the
anti-centralist forces at work within the post-Cannon
Republican legislative party. In the 66th Congress, the
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Republican Steering Committee attempted to produce a legis-
lative program which reflected the traditional partisan
pattern of organizational behavior in the Republican Houses
of the past (i.e. coordination of the design and enactment
of a party political program). It became abundantly clear,
however, that Republican party members were themselves in-
creasingly hostile to such an approach. Their own personal
goals and the diverse interests of their constituents had
already become incompatible with a system of program design
and decision-making which limited bargaining and coalition
building to the party conference alone.
More and more, the influence of pluralist politics and
pluralist conflict were becoming apparent in the House as
voting coalitions and bargaining networks transcended party
lines. In the 67th Congress, therefore, the Steering Comm-
ittee attempted to reconcile these new influences by
explicitly recognizing for the first time, the existence
and significance of narrowly defined "interest groups"
within the House. It did this by increasing its size in the
67th Congress, and by giving representation on the committee
to the farm bloc and to the organized labor group.16  The
result of acute pressure from the party rank and file to
broaden the representativeness of leadership structures,
these changes signalled a major shift in the structure of
leadership in the House -- one which.necessarily diluted
the implicit strength of the party by its formal recognition
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of discrete sub-groups and distinctive interests within the
party. "It was indicative," Brown argues, "of an increasing
tendency in the House toward the disintegration of party and
the growth of the special class."17
This pluralization of the Steering Committee was also,
however, an indication of the extent to which the whole idea
of leadership in the House had changed between 1910 and 1921.
This transformation was particularly startling and abrupt in
the Republican party, but it was also apparent within the
Democratic party. The centralized system of Thomas B. Reed
and his followers, for example, had been based on the assump-
tion that the majority party had been given a mandate by the
voters to carry out a generally agreed upon political pro-
gram. Republican leaders, aided by a general harmony within
their party's legislative ranks, were given the responsibility
for formulating the specific outlines of that program and the
power to enforce compliance with that formulation. To this
extent, leadership exercised an autonomous influence over
legislative behavior, and played a dominant role in setting
and pushing through the House agenda.
By 1921, House leaders Cagain Republican and Democrat
alikel could no longer base their claims to power upon adher-
ence to a party mandate. Members of Congress themselves were
increasingly elected on the basis of issues and concerns which
were either distinct and irrelevant to the broad formulations
of national Ce.g. Presidentiall campaigns or which cleaved
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across existing party lines., Legislative agendas and indeed
political agendas as a whole were decreasingly defined in
national terms -- broad alternatives were less and less a
part of Congressional campaigns -- and increasingly defined
within Congress by the specific interests of constituents
whose representatives gathered together in Washington after
each election.
The legislative agenda was thus shaped by the members
themselves and not by the leadership. As a consequence,
leaders were not judged on the basis of how well they did in
pushing through a general legislative program, but rather on
the basis of how well they did in catering to the particular
concerns which the membership in each Congress represented
and expressed. Leadership structures, similarly, were no
longer designed to give leaders the means for defining and
enforcing adherence to an agenda, but rather to give Members
of Congress a broader access to the shaping of that agenda.
In 1921, in other words, leadership was coming to be judged
more and more by its representativenessand sensitivity to
the increasingly diverse need of party members.
Coordinative and autonomous leadership declined then as
a central political value in the legislative process after
1910. Subtle and gradual, the shift was nevertheless an
important one. The Speaker, by virtue of his position and
personal influence still retained a prominent position in
House affairs, but increasingly the powers which his office
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had once exercised and the control it had exerted over the
legislative process was dispersed to a relatively wide
variety of new offices, groups and committees. Perhaps
the most visible beneficiary of this devolution of power
and of the general fragmentation of decision-making responsi-
bility in the legislative process were the standing comm-
ittees. As Wilson had suggested in 1885, the committees
had by then already begun to play a pivotal role in the
legislative decision-making process. Yet, as we noted, the
existence of a relatively strong Speakership stood as a
countervailing force to the centrifugal tendencies of comm-
ittee government. As long as the Speaker possessed and used
the right to appoint committees, he also possessed the power
to attenuate the autonomy and independence of those committees
in the legislative process. The revolt against the. strong
Speaker, however, effectively removed this countervailing
force from the legislative process; undermined the power of
anyone to coordinate the committee Idecision-making process
(although the newly formed, and itself increasingly autonomous,
Rules Committee played an important veto role here); and
consequently, implicitly conferred upon those committees a
recognition of their autonomy and independence.
To a certain extent, this can be demonstrated by a
cursory examination of the seniority principle. Clearly,
seniority had for years served as an important 4uide for
recruitment to leadership posts within committees (and
indeed to a certain extent as a guide to recruitment of
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members in general to committees). Indeed, in 1889 Henry
Cabot Lodge had suggested to an acquaintance that "the
custom of seniority is almost inviolable."1 8 Yet, it was
also clear that seniority could be readily ignored by
Speakers when the exigencies of coalition building or policy
edherence demanded that other factors be considered. In
1895, for example, Thomas B. Reed violated the seniority
guide in order to place Joseph Cannon at the head of the
Appropriations Committee despite the fact that Henderson
of Iowa was the ranking member. Reed preferred Cannon who,
according to Hinds, had "made a good recotd as Chairman of
the Committee in the 51st Congress" but who had been
"defeated in the Waterloo of 1890 and so lost his place at
the head of the Committee."1 9  Cannon, too, freely ignored
seniority in the interests of policy as was the case in 1905
when Tawney of Minnesota whose tariff views the Speaker sus-
pected, was transferred from the Ways and Means Committee to
the Chairmanship of the Appropriations Committee.2 0 Finally,
entire committees were consciously recruited on the basis of
political beliefs and issue orientations. Randall carefully
chose his Ways and Means Committee in the 46th Congress, for
example, to ensure that the principle of protectionism would
remain in force during.his tenure as Speaker. Reed similarly
chose his committee on Coinage, Weights and Measures in the
54th Congress to reflect his own sound money ideas.2 1 The
seniority principle therefore survived at the pleasure of the
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Speaker whose discretionary appointment powers were rarely
challenged up until the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury.
After the 1910 revolt against the centralized system
of leadership in the House, however., violations of the
seniority principle fell dramatically. To a certain extent
this was the result of the reduction in membership turnover
in the House, as Figure 7.1 shows. As the number of comm-
ittee vacancies declined from Congress to Congress, the
Speaker's flexibility in making new assignments also declined.
To be sure, he still had the formal right to name committees
up until 1911, but after 1900, exercising that right entailed
confronting an increasingly entrenched committee membership.
As Price suggests, too, seniority violations were always a
normal consequence of a party's (or faction's) initial
assumption of power in the House. In the nineteenth century,
when party control of the House changed hands quite frequently,
the seniority principle was often disregarded as "shadow
cabinet" gave way to "cabinet."23  As party variation de-
clined, however, one of the more potent reasons for reorganiz-
ing the committees also diminished as a factor.
The most significant reason for the rapid entrenchment
of the seniority norm, however, was clearly the de-legitimiza-
tion of centralized power in the House after 1910. In many
ways, the same forces which worked to undermine the strong
speakership also worked to destroy the right of any .one
individual or group to effectively manipulate the committee
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assignments of the other Members of Congress. To a certain
extent, this was the result of the growth in importance of
the committee as a base of Congressional careers. In the
era of pluralist conflict, individual committees, defined
and organizedzalong functionally specific lines clearly
gained a relevance and a political significance which they
had never before enjoyed (actually the nineteenth century
Invalid Pensions Committee and the power and salience it had
derived from its relationship with the G.A.R. -- an early
and very successful interest group -- was an interesting,
if somewhat isolated, example of how committees in general
would gain strength as interest groups became central to the
post-1910 American political systeml. The political fortunes
of individual Members of Congress were thus increasingly
tied to their association with the committee system rather
than to the party. The demise of a discretionary appoint-
ment system Cand the decline in the violations of seniority)
was thus partially the result of the increasing importance
of committee membership to member goals, ambitions and
career options, and thus the result of the increasing stakes
involved in the committee appointment decision itself.
As power in the House was dispersed, the leadership
structures were rendered progressively less able to inter-
vene actively in the committee selection process. As Polsby
suggests, uncompensated violations of seniority -- an indica-
tion of the extent to which the leadership felt both com-
pelled and able to intervene in the committee system's
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recruitment process -- declined dramatically after 1911.24
The inability of the leadership to manipulate the recruit-
ment process and the committee leadership selection process
were but symptoms of the broader and more serious inability
of party leaders to control or coordinate the committee
based decision-making system in general. As support for an
autonomous and coordinative leadership system evaporated
in the House, the independent influence of the committees
generally increased.
The assault on the strong Speakership in 1910 therefore
had major consequences for the way power and decision-making
responsibilities came to be distributed and exercised'in the
decade which followed. The formal leadership function filled
by the Speaker before 1910 was divided among a number of
alternative structures and offices'.in the House. Similarly,
the coordination (at least by a central authority) also
lapsed for the most part,although the Rules Committee did
retain a pre-eminent if much reduced role:.in setting the
legislative agenda. For the most part, legislative decisions
after 1910 began to be achieved through the increasingly
unfettered interplay of autonomous standing committees.
While the formal dispersion of power and decision-making
represented significant consequences of the rising individual-
ist ethos in Congress, the single most important transforma-
tion in Congressional behavior occurred in the limitations
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such changes placed on the House's role in the national
policy-making system. As this section will attempt to show,
the devolution of power, and the disintegration of central
coordination in the legislative process led to a dramatic
redefinition of the part the House would play in shaping
and initiating public policy. The fragmentation process
which followed the St. Patrick's Day revolt generally left
the House without the leadership structures it needed to
initiate and set the Federal policy-making agenda.
That the rise of-individualism in the House, the frag-
mentation of the lines of conflict and the consequent weaken-
ing of the structures of central control had significant
implications for the House's role in national policy-making,
was clearly not lost on the participants in the reform
struggle. While some insurgents, for example, optimistically
argued that the redistribution of power and the general
democratization of the House would have a positive effect on
Congressional power CVictor Murdock, for one, suggested that
the overthrow of Cannonism would improve the tarnished
reputation of Congress, and reverse its decline in relation
to the executive25), many others were far less sanguine
about the efiefects of the assault on centralized power in
the House. "Weakness and incapacity," one Member argued:
either in its leadership or in the use of its
powers by a large, representative body, would
necessarily tend to invite invasion by more
virile and centralized coordinate branches of
the Government in order that the business of
the country should be more speedily and
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perhaps more acceptably done . . . The weakness
and incapacity caused by scatteriag and dissipat-
ing its powers by a large assembly will grow
worse with time. 6
Asher Hinds, the parliamentarian and later Member of
Congress-, agreed with this assessment, suggesting that the
essential message of organizational reformersT, was that
the House "should be relegated to desuetude; that its
chief officer should be stripped of (his) authority . . .
and that the President should be relied upon to express
the popular will."2 7  Even,.proponents of reform, who like
William Cockran of New York were sensitive to this criticism
of the anti-centralization movement,admitted that "this House
might not become so important or as interesting" as the Con-
gresses of the past if its members were "placed in control
of (theirl own procedure."2 8
Clearly, in other words, the participaftts in the
struggle to overthrow the strong speakesship system under-
stood that the "democratization" of the House involved some
important trade-offs. The trade-off between individual
autonomy and institutional power in the national political
system was the most prominent of these, but the ability of
the House to perform its legislative function was also
brought into question in the reform debate. Herbert Croly,
for example, worried that the decentralization of the House
of Representatives would have grave consequences for Congress'
national perspective. In fragmenting power, Croly argued,
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the House was also necessarily fragmenting its perspective.
National issues and truly national concerns, he feared,
would give way to parochialism and particularism. "Both
Representatives and Senators are at bottom district and
State delegates in a national Legislature," he wrote shortly
after the 1910 St. Patrick's Day revolt,
Congress has succeeded in passing national legis-
lation hitherto partly by log-rolling, partly by
party discipline and partly in virtue of the fact
that the national interest has been conceived
chiefly as a composite version of individual and
local interests. But the newer national policy
demands that certain individuals and localities
shall submit to temporary losses for the benefit
of the national economic system . . . A Congress
composed of district and state delegates must be
coerced into the passage of the necessary legis-
lation, and the necessary coercion can be exer-
cised only by means of a stringent party discipline
and the autocratic organization of both Congress-
ional bodies.2 9
In dismantling the structures of central control and of effec-
tive leadership, Croly and others therefore argued, the House
was essentially stripping itself of the power to respond to
the national needs of the emerging twentieth century society.
It was also stripping itself of the power to make the re-
distributive decisions powerful and active national policy-
making institutions must make. In effect, the retreat from
centralization was a retreat from Congressional power.
That the adoption of the fragmented organizational
system represented a surrender of sorts can be seen in the
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way Members of Congress struggled to redefine the role of
the House after 1910. In effect, the ultimate decision
to retreat from the legislative initiative to an oversight
role was forced upon the House members who found themselves
trapped between the organizational consequences of their
assault on central control and the demands which constitu-
ents and events increasingly placed on the Congress as an
institutional whole. Nowhere is this clearer than in the
decade-long struggl which occurred from 1910 to 1921 over
the idea of a national budget. More than any other reform
measure enacted during this period, the debate over the
budget system demonstrated the limitations which Members
of Congress were ultimately forced to impose upon the House
(and themselvesl as a consequence of the new patterns of
plural conflict and the organizational norms and structures
which emerged to manage that conflict after 1910.
The idea of a national budget system first began to
emerge in the first decade of the twentieth century. Al-
though the need to coordinate the allocation of federal
funds had served as a periodic focus of debate since the
1865 fragmentation of the old Ways and Means Committee, it
was not until 1909 that this debate became the center of
the growing competition between Congress (particularly the
House) and the Executive Branch. This competition for
policy-making dominance came to center on the appropria-
tions process at this time because of the enormous increase
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in the demands made on the Federal treasury during the
activist Roosevelt administration. The dramatic rise
in Federal expenditures during this time prompted a grow-
ing interest in the manner in which those expenditures
were appropriated and controlled. 30
Yet the growing national interest in the budgetary
process (or the lack thereof) was also given an addition-
al urgency by the acute sensitivity of Speaker Cannon to
the role and stature of the House in national affairs.31
Cannon tended to see the growing debate over the budgetary
system as an implied threat to the pre-eminence of the
House in the appropriations process. Since the power, and
in the past, the dominance of the House, had been based on
the power it held to initiate appropriations for the Federal
government, any suggestion that the House was somewhat less
than effective in carrying this responsibility was, so
Cannon believed, a direct attack on the power and dominance
of the House in national policy-making in general. In 1909,
therefore, he suggested that the Congress "which alone exer-
cises the function or duty of check upon public expenditures"
begin the task of rationalizing its appropriations system.32
Although his recommendations were modest indeed, the speech
did seem to reflect a growing concern that the stature of
Congress, tied as it was to the ability to perform its
appropriations task efficiently and effectively, was in
jeopardy.
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The growing public support for governmental efficiency
in general, and the actual experiments in public management
which had been implemented during Theodore Roosevelt's
Presidency, however, were leading other proponents of budget-
ary reform to suggest that the executive branch take the
initiative in coordinating the appropriations process. One
of the most eloquent and clearly devoted spokesmen for the
cause of Executive leadership in the coordination of Federal
expenditures was F.A. Cleveland who in 1910 was named by
Taft to rationalize the budgetary process as head of the newly
created Commission on Economy and Efficiency.3 3
Cleveland, an almost dogmatic proponent of governmental
systematization, was particularly outspoken on the need for
a more effective and logical appropriations process. In
his view, Congress, and particularly the House, was singu-
larly responsible for the outmoded appropriations and budget-
ary system under which the Federal Government labored. 34
In 1912, Cleveland's Commission presented as part of its
report a paper entitled, "The Need for a National Budget"
which essentially called for executive leadership in setting
budgetary priorities and needs. The report decried existing
procedures under which Executive Departments petitioned Con-
gress independently of one another for funds and under which
department heads were essentially "ministerial agents of
Congress" rather than "subordinates to the President." Under
the increasingly fragmented system of leadership and decision-
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making within Congress (which was further fragmented'!by the
reforms enacted in the House around the time Cleveland began
his investigation in 1910), the lack of fiscal coordination
by the President or any other officer in the Executive Branch
was particularly conducive to massive inefficiency and finan-
cial irresponsibility. The Report suggested that this un-
controlled and, to Cleveland, increasingly uncontrollable
system be replaced by one in which the department heads in
the Executive Branch prepare "estimates for (Presidential)
revision and review"35 . Under Cleveland's plan, the Presi-
dent, not Congress, would set the budgetary agenda and
determine federal needs.
The Report of the President's Commission on Economy
and Efficiency posed a formal organizational challenge to
Congress -- a challenge which was initially implicit in the
Report but which was soon made explicit by Cleveland himself.
On June 27, 1912, Taft formally approved the Report, sent it
to Congress and proposed implementing its recommendations.
On AuguSt 24, however, the House formally blocked Taft's
initiative by prohibiting the use of Federal funds for the
compilation of a-unified Executive estimate of fiscal needs. 36
John Fitzgerald, now Chairman of the Appropriations Committee
in the House, explained this prohibition a few days later,
arguing that "it would not be wise for Congress to abdicate,
even by implication, its prerogative in this matter." Nor
would it be wise, he continued, to have
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the time and energies of large numbers of the
most capable persons in the several branches of
public service diverted to transforming the
entire estimates for the next fiscal year into
this new and unauthorized plan of a so-called
national budget to the neglect of their
ordinary and pressing duties. 3 7
In the months which followed,proponents of the proposed
budgetary system mounted a major public campaign to force
Congress to reverse its decision. In a speech at the Univ-
ersity of Illinois, for example, Cleveland suggested that the
new problems facing the Federal Government in the twentieth
century had already rendered the capricious Congressional
appropriations system out of touch with fiscal and political
reality. Excoriating the principle of Congressional domin-
ance in the appropriations process, Cleveland argued that
this dominance was the product.of a laissez-faire ideology
which was no longer appropriate in the management of public
funds. As long as this laissez-faire ideology prevailed,
Congress was, by default the dominant actor in the national
political system. "Congress held the purse strings. Since
we were without executive leadership, Congress came to
decide all questions (regarding) appropriations. "38
Congressional dominance in the appropriations process,
and indeed in other areas of policy-making in the past,
Cleveland thus concluded, was the product of an evolutionary
drift rather than one of a conscious application of the
principles of scientific management. Likening the President,
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in a later address, to a corporate executive (an increas-
ingly routine and illustrative analogy in the progressive
era) trying to function under a strong-willed board of
directors, Cleveland told his audience to:
Imagine yourself in complete isolation, select-
ing heads of departments who are asked to confer
with you about matters of current business, but
who in fact arec helpless because the board
(i.e. the Congress), through its committees
insists on directing the heads of bureaus and
divisions what to do and how to do it . . .
Imagine yourself a weak sovereign with a nominal
Kingship over a thousand feudal lords each well
fortified behind his own walls and you have the
picture of the chief executive of your corporation.39
Cleveland concluded his challenge to Congress by arguing that
the central issue was "Will (Congress) recognize the increas-
ing limitations of a practice that has already reduced that
branch of the service to a headless, footless, spineless body
which Conlyl makes progress by the momentum of mass weight?"'4 0
Indeed, the House was acutely sensitive to the implica-
tions of Cleveland's arguments. The increasingly insistent
and discordant demands for federal funds on the part of
groups and individuals in the society were clearly placing
a strain on the Congressional appropriations process. Shorn
of centralized leadership .in general and still functioning
under an appropriations system which had been fragmented
by the reforms of 1885, the House was peculiarly vulnerable
on the one hand to particularistic demands for Federal funds
by special interests, and thus, equally vulnerable to charges
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to charges that it could not control or coordinate its
authorization of public funds.
Yet, as inefficient as the system was, it was suppor-
ted by .a number of forces at work within the Federal Gov-
ernment. First, any attempt to reassert central control
over the appropriations process within the House (by both
reestablishing central legislative leadership, and by
reunifying the Appropriations Committee) was blockea.by
the general antipathy which after 1910 existed in the House
toward such an exercise of centralized authority as well as
the regard each of the appropriating committees had for
their own organizational prerogatives.41 Secondly, many
department heads within the executive branch, jealous of
the independence and autonomy which existing appropriations
procedures gave them, also resisted change.41A Finally,
the partisan differences between the House and the Presi-
dency in 1912 exacerbated the institutional conflict between
executive and legislative branches, and tended to discourage
the type of cooperation implied in Cleveland's budget pro-
posals.42
Congress thus found itself locked onto the horns of a
major and perplexing organizational dilemma -- one which
tended to become more unresolvable as the demands for a
resolution increased. On the one hand, rationalizing the
appropriations system within Congress and placing it
squarely under central control Cincluding control of the
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authorization processl was clearly untenable in the frag-
mented House. On the other hand, the alternative of
capitulating to the demands of Cleveland and the proponents
of an executive coordination of the budgetary process was
also unpalatable to Members of Congress conscious of their
prerogatives.
Yet, as Congress grappled with this dilemma, public
impatience with Congressional extravagance and inefficiency
mounted, as did demands that some systematic appropriations
system be put into effect. As early as 1912, public support
for a coordinated budget system had already begun to emerge.
Officials were besieged by letters which both supported the
budget idea and at the same time denounced Congressional
vacillation and inaction.4 3  A.B. Farquahr, Vice-President
of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and a prominent citizen of
York, Pennsylvania, summed up this growing public support
for the budget idea in:rone such letter asserting that "Any
member of Congress failing to support this measure, in my
opinion would merit impeachment."4 4
The election of Woodrow Wilson to the Presidency
merely heightened this pressure on Congress for a budget
solution. For one thing, Wilson's expansive view of the
role of the Executive Branch in coordinating public policy-
making implicitly prodded Congress toward acceding to both
the abstract idea of Presidential leadership in general, as
well as the concrete demands that the executive be given
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the organizational resources for exercising that leadership.
At the same time, Wilson evinced a special interest in
creating a workable budget system. In a pre-inaugural letter
to Senator Ben (Pitchfork) Tillman of South Carolina, Wilson
had written:
One of the objects I shall have most in mind when
I get to Washington will be conferences'with my
legislative colleagues there with a view to
bringing some budget system into existence. This
business of building up the expenses of the
nation piece by piece will certainly5lead us
to error and perhaps embarrassment.
This rededication to a budget system, coming as it did
from a Democratic President-elect, was still nevertheless
received by Congress with a measure of coolness. The res-
ponse of the House in particular was emphatically ambiguous,
although it was clear that the need for a systematization
of some sorts was generally recognized. In February of
1913, for example, Swager Sherley of Kentucky (a Democratic
leader in the Housel, outlined a proposal for a modified
budget system in Congress. Clearly intended to appeal to
the Congressional reluctance to formally acknowledge a
diminished institutional role in the appropriations process,
Sherley suggested that the House, in conjunction with the
Senate, organize a budget system which would be coordinated
and dominated by Congress itself. To achieve (or to main-
taini this dominance, Sherley argued, the House must
reintroduce a measure of centralization into the legislative
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process in general, and into the appropriations process in
particular. "A lot of trouble in American public life,"
he argued,
is not so much that a combination of men have
too much power, but that many individual men
have so much.hidden power that no party can
be held responsible by, the American people
* . . One of the curious features of evolu-
tion in America is that everywhere else than
upon the floor of this House the tendency has
been more and more toward centralization of
power and with it responsibility. 46
Sherley, therefore, proposed to reinstate the idea of
centralization through the creation of a budget committee
which would be composed of the ranking majority and minor-
ity members of all the Appropriations Committees, Ways and
Means Committee, and the Rules Committee, and which would
essentially coordinate both the appropriations and author-
ization process. The plan went beyond the simple re-
unification of the appropriations committee which Sherley
believed to be an "impossible task" anyway47 by effectively
calling for the reestablishment of a new more comprehensive
form of organizational centralization. Sherley believed
that such a budget committee would become the focus of a
resurrection of both party leadership, party rule, and
through that, public accountability.
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What I believe would happen is this, that the
recommendations of the majority members of
the budget committee would come before a caucus
of that party and would be perfected and adopted
in caucus, and that the minority proposals would
come before the minority caucua and be approved
there.48
The House would then essentially be presented with two con-
crete and comprehensive programmatic alternatives upon which
it would vote and be held accountable to the public. More
than a simple appropriations system, the Sherley plan rep-
resented a vehicle for the re-introduction of centralization
and decision-making coordination into the national legisla-
tive process.
Sherley's proposal was received with little apparent
enthusiasm from his House colleagues, some of whom retreated,
predictably enough, to the by now traditional reformist
refrain that the budget committee idea would place too much
power in too few hands. Another equally predictable protest
was that it would represent an unwarranted intrusion upon
the prerogatives of the authorizing committees.49  The
executive department, too, tended to respond with somewhat
mixed emotions. Wilson's ideas about Presidential leader-
ship were to a certain extent implicitly threatened by any
organizational reform which would attempt to recentralize
power in the House of Representatives,but it was also
likely that the bargaining process between Executive and
Legislative Branches would be simplified by such a
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re-establishment of a clearly defined legislative leadership.
Perhaps this latter consideration combined with a recognition
of Congress' jealous regard for its own appropriations rights
led Wilson to quash moves within the Executive Branch to
develop its own system for coordinating departmental
estimates, and encourage cooperation with Sherley in his
efforts to establish a budgetary system largely coordinated
by Congress. 50
Despite Wilson's apparent support, however, Congress
resisted the implementation of the Sherley Plan. Cognizant
of the need for a budget system, and clearly drawn to the
idea of Congressional dominance of such a system, many Mem-
bers of the House were nevertheless unwilling to surrender
their individual prerogatives or the power of their committees
in the policy-making and appropriations process. 51 Thus,
although Sherley's efforts were politely received and to a
modest extent encouraged by his colleagues, his plan was
never able to overcome the fragmented perspectives and
interests which had become so entrenched within the House.
The discrete interests and goals which increasingly animated
conflict in the House, and which produced the fragmented
perspective of its membership, also produced an enduring
antipathy to centralization.
As late as 1915, Sherley still believed his idea would
be accepted,52  but there is little indication that the
House ever intended to make any serious attempt to implement
-479-
the substantive features of the Kentucky Democrat's budget
system. In the fall' of 1915, a budget committee did meet
in the House to consider the appropriations for the coming
year, but it never enjoyed the support of the full member-
ship of the house nor the legitimacy it needed to serve as
either a long-term solution to the problems inherent in
existing appropriations procedures, or as a source of a
major re-centralization of power and authority in the
House.5 3  At the end of 1915, therefore, neither Congress
nor the nation were any closer to a workable budget system
than they had been in 1913.
Public attention, meanwhile, was becoming more highly
focussed on the budget. One of the sources of this growing
interest in the appropriations process was the persistent,
and to many, alarming increase in Federal deficits after
1912. In R193, expenditures exceeded revenues by $401,000
and in 1914 the deficit climbed slightly to $408,000. In
1915, however, this figure soared to over $62 Million.5 4
In and of itself, the existence of a Federal deficit was
not particularly new to the American public. Indeed, the
Federal deficit had already exceeded the 1915 levels twice
between 1894 and 1915, and during that same period of time
the Government had registered a deficit fourteen times.55
The public anxiety over Federal deficits was compounded
after 1913,however, by a major change in the way the Govern-
ment raised its revenues.
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In the past, Federal revenues had largely been raised
through indirect means. Indeed, for the most part, customs
receipts and land sales and leases had been the major source
of federal funds well into the first decade of the twentieth
century. The indirect nature of this revenue raising sys-
tem tended, therefore,to dampen to a certain extent public
impatience with excessive spending, deficits and the system
by which federal funds were appropriated. As John Fitzgerald
argued in 1913:
While a Treasury surplus is maintained by a
system of indirect taxation so ingeniously
devised that individual burdens are not
readily appreciated, but are assiduously
proclaimed as blessings, it will be difficult
to awaken the mass of the people to the
importance of the (budget question).56
By 1914, however, Internal revenues (e.g. corporation
excise taxes, occupational taxes, excise taxes and the per-
sonal income tax) had become the largest sources of Govern-
ment funds. In other words, it was during this time that
the more direct tax replaced the relatively indirect tax
as the major source of revenues for the Federal Government.5 7
This general change in revenue patterns tended, as Fitzgerald
had hinted it would,to rivet public attention on the means
by which federal funds were appropriated. The growing pro-
pensity of that appropriations process, moreover, to expend
more than it took in merely increased public impatience with
the existing procedures.5 7A
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In 1915, therefore, the already significant public
debate over the fragmented and clearly unsystematic appro-
priations system -- a debate which had been largely carried
on by special clusters of concerned academics, business
groups, and municipal and civic reform groups -- quickly
expanded to include people and interests of all stripes.
Newspapers and magazines began directing their attention to
the problem, and a host of stories about Federal extrava-
gance, Congressional incompetence and fiscal mismanagement
became the daily fare of American readers.
Arthur Page, editor of World's Work magazine, for ex-
ample, commissioned the noted writer Burton Hendrick to do
a series of articles on the need for a national budget.
Page's campaign for a national budget evidently had the
blessings of Woodrow Wilson who was himself becoming im-
patient with Congressional footdragging on the matter. In
1915, Wilson felt that whil'e he was in a poor position to
attempt to force Congress' hand, the time was right for a
national public debate over the budget idea -- a debate he
clearly hoped would result in a measurable growth in public
pressure on a recalcitrant Congress. 58
Many of the articles which were produced during this
editorial campaign focussed on Pork Barrel Politics and
some of the other more sensational and, to many, sordid
aspects of the Congressional appropriations process.
Hendrick's study for World's Work, for example, was one of
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a spate of assaults on the abuses of the pension system.
Provocatively sub-titled, "Why the United States is Spend-
ing 163 Million a Year to Pay for a War That Ended 50 Years
Ago," Hendrick's article attacked the Congressional Appro-
priations systemwhich led Democrats and Republicans alike
to capitulate to the selfish wishes of special pension
interests at the taxpayers' expense.59 The activity of
the Grand Army of the Republic (G.A.R.1 was specifically
cited as but one insidious example of how existing appro-
priations procedures catered to narrow interests. 60 The
Independent, another popular magazine also attacked the
distributive bias of the Congressional appropriations
process by applauding the efforts of Woodrow Wilson to
transfer the attention of Members of Congress from the
pork barrel to pressing defense needs. This, the editors
suggested, represented a tentative first step toward the
abolition of a systemv:which appropriated public money with-
out taking anything but the Congressman's coming election
into account.61  The ultimate step, these articles gener-
ally concluded, however, would not be taken until 'the
Congress instituted a national budget system.62
The growing public preoccupation with the national
budget idea,63 based as it was on the changing system of
taxation, was further encouraged by an-equally pressing
public regard for the issue of national defense. As the
European War deepened, and as public concern for America's
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own preparedness increased, support for a rationalization
of the budgetary system grew. In 1916, for example, the
city of Ripon, Wisconson, gained a measure of national
notoriety by refusing to accept federally appropriated
funds for the construction of a public building. In re-
jecting the $75,0QQ0 proffered by Congress, the city council
and other public groups in the area asked to have the money
applied instead "to preparedness for national defense."
An obvious part of the growing national disgust with what
was seen as an appropriations system that encouraged pork-
barreling, the renunciation of the Federal grant was accom-
panied by a petition from one of Ripon's civic organizations
which argued that "private and local gain and enhancement
should always be subservient to the common good."64  The
implication was, of course, that Congress was much more
sensitive to the former than to the latter.
Members of Congress were themselves beginning to question
the extent to which they were capable of distinguishing
local'interests from pressing national needs. Frederick
Gillett of Massachusetts, for example, decried, in 1917, the
"reign of localism in finance," which was reflected, he
believed, in a $35,000,000 public buildings bill which "was
prepared for the private interests of Congressmen" rather
than for the public interest. 65  Even Congressman Fitz-
gerald of New York, who had initially opposed the Taft
attempt to reform the national appropriations process,
-484-
embraced the idea of a national budget as the inadequacies
of the existing system were exposed by the new fiscal de-
mands of national defense and war preparedness.6 7
As early as 1915, Fitzgerald had suggested that the
new needs of national defense had clearly overtaxed Con-
gress' outmoded and inefficient appropriations system.
The need for reform had already been pressing for several
years, he' conceded, "but it became acute as a result of
the condition arising from the present war. '68 The war,
as well as public pressure, in other words, seemed to press
home the point that there was indeed a national interest
which could not be served by the simple and uncoordinated
competition of individual Congressmen and particularized
interests for specific political prizes. Yet, if there
did exist a separate "national" interest, who, or what
group, or which office in the fragmented House spoke for
(or who had the legitimacy to articulate) that national
interest?
Two years later, Fitzgerald reiterated his support
for a reform of the appropriations process, arguing that
the need for a change had become even more pressing. Direct
United States involvement in the war (from early 1917 on).
and the exigencies of war financing made it imperative that
the Congress systematize and coordinate its method of
appropriating funds. In particular, he suggested that the
time had come to halt the prevailing tendency toward.7frag-
mentation in the House and to re-introduce a measure of
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centralization and coordination. Initially, this was to
be accomplished by reconstituting the pre-1885 unified
Appropriations Committee, 6 9 but ultimately it would involve
recentralizing power and authority in the legislative pro-
cess as a whole. On the one hand, Fitzgerald argued, this
would make the House more efficient in carrying out its
political responsibilities. 70  Centralization would also,
however, have a positive impact on the stature and power
of the House in national policy-making. "This House needs
to concentrate power and responsibility if it is to maintain
its unique and unrivaled position in our system of govern-
ment," he~.argued,
We have emasculated the Speakership. That
office . . . has been so stripped of its power
in this body that the Speaker is not the im-
portant and influential factor he should be in
our system of government. We so diffuse our
power that we do not exercise the influence
in the affairs of government we should exercise. 71
In general, Fitzgerald's calls for centralization fell
on receptive if still confused ears.71A His House colleagues
continued to be reluctant to accede to such an intrusion
on their individual prerogatives and saw no one figure or
political outlook which could adequately reflect the dis-
jointed and fragmented issue agendas and goals which Members
of Congress in the post-partisan, plural House represented.
Yet, by 1919, the growing public pressure for a budget sys-
tem,72 and the acknowledgement within the House that such a
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system was indeed necessary and probably inevitable w4ere
both creating new, if grudging converts to the budget idea
among Members of Congress.
The Federal Deficit in 1919 has risen to an unprec-
edented $13 Billion 73 and many Members of the House were
fearful of the political impact this would have on their
re-election chances. Indeed the Republicans had been re-
turned to power in the 1918 Congressional elections in part
because of the general dissatisfaction with the fiscal ex-
travagance of the Democrats and their inability to make any
progress on the budget system. The Republicans themselves
had probably gained voter support, moreover, by promising
action of the reform of the appropriations and budgetary
process, and were thus able to ignore the public calls for
action.74  As Representatives were uncomfortably aware in
1919, the public was in an economizing mood.75  One Repub-
lican thus advised his party colleagues, "unless this side
of the House begins to retrench it will have a mighty poor
excuse upon which to go to the country when we are charged
with levying additional taxes upon the people."76
In 1919, therefore, the House began the difficult search
for a solution to the budget problem. The organizational
dilemma this search posed, continued to cause a great deal
of anguish among Members of Congress for whom solutions in-
evitably seemed to promise either a reduction of the power
of the House as a whole or a full-scale surrender of indi-
vidual rights and prerogatives in the legislative process.
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On the one hand, in other words, the price of continued de-
centralization of the legislative process and of the approp-
riations system was institutional ineffectiveness and public
indignation, while the price of centralization on the other
hand was a necessary diminution of individualism and a
negation of the pluralist patterns of conflict which had by
1919 come to animate the House political process. The prob-
lem was compounded by the fact that there no longer existed
the kind of consensus among party members, or among any
other broad and encompassing blocs of Members, which were
large enough or cohesive enough to constitute an enduring
majority within the House. In the absence of such coherence,
and in the face of such fragmentation, the re-introduction
of central control over the legislative process as a whole
was certain to be incompatible with political reality.
The search for a solution to the appropriations dilemma
thus tended to focus on organizational compromises which
neither called for the kind of full-scale centralization
the likes of which Sherley and Fitzgerald had initially
supported, nor the full-scale capitulation to-executive
dominance which many had argued would be the inevitable
consequence of the failure to effect this kind of total
centralization. Forced by the fragmented nature of conflict
within the House to eschew full-scale centralization, and
unable to avoid the political consequences of failing to
implement this re-centralization, Members of Congress
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eventually settled on a compromise which at once formally
redefined Congress' role in Federal policy-making, and at
the same time redistributed decision-making roles within
the legislative process. 77
This compromise reform effort revolved around the re-
constitution of the centralized Appropriations Committee,
which would function, however, in a House which otherwise
remained relatively free of central control. First sugges-
ted by Republican James Frear of Wisconsin in June of 1919,
the plan initially called on the President or the Secretary
of the Treasury to gather together and report aggregate
executive department needs on a yearly basis. This report
would then be sent to an Auditor-General, Comptroller-
General or some other "agent of Congress, appointed by Con-
gress, and acting independently of the administration" for
a review. This agent would check the executive estimates,
reduce them where possible or necessary and report his
recommendations to the Congressional Budget Committee --
essentially a House-Senate Appropriations conference comm-
ittee. 78
Even this moderate effort at organizational centraliza-
tion, however,faced resistance, particularly "from those
whose present position of influence, power and prestige,
on appropriations committees would be radically affected."7 9
Indeed, Frear's plan was rejected by the House, but to a
large extent it did a great deal to set the terms of the
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budget debate which ensued. In particular, it formally
established the idea that the budget system involved un-
avoidable trade-offs, and produced a relatively clear idea
of what those trade-offs in 1919 were.
As the debate proceeded over the following months, the
alternatives never departed far from those first laid out
by Frear. On the one hand, the Congress could minimize its
appropriations role (and indeed its public policy role), re-
tain its fragmented decision-making system,80 or it could
effect a compromise whereby appropriations powers alone were
centralized. The latter course, it became increasingly clear,
would necessarily involve giving the executive branch the
power to coordinate departmental requests for funds and im-
plicitly give the President the power to set the budgetary
agenda. At the same time, it would also give the House
(through its appropriations committee and to a lesser extent
the other standing committees) the specific responsibility
for overseeing the spending of those Federal Funds.
In July of 1919, the House Rules Committee formally
set the long-awaited debate in motion 81 and throughout the
months that followed, the terms and alternatives first set
out by Freer were discussed at length. By October, the
select budget committee, which had been authorized by the
Rules Committee and the House to design a new appropriations
system, made its report. It suggested first of all that the
Executive Branch be responsible, through a budget office,
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for coordinating the fiscal needs and estimates of the
administrative agencies. This bureau would gather depart-
mental estimates, and with the President's consent, present
its unified appropriations requests to the Congress.
"Agency proposals were to be studied for their relationship
to 'the President's financial program' and were to be sent
on to Capitol Hill-only if approved by the President."82
The Executive would essentially set the budgetary agenda,
although Congress would have the right to modify or veto
specific portions of that agenda.
To some, this continued to represent an institutional
capitulation to Executive domination of the Federal policy-
making process. Willis Hawley of Oregon, a Republican,
argued, for example, that Congress might become a mere
rubber stamp to the Executive if the budget system thus pro-
posed were put into effect,83 and Champ Clark warned that
although he favored a systematization of the appropriations
process, "I do not want some office created up here in the
administrative department that is going to bully and override
the House of Representatives."84  As Evans of Nevada added,
"You can not give away your authority and still have it
• . . We can not delegate a duty to someone else and still
have the same power and information that we would have if we
performed it ourselves." 85
Others, however, seemed to welcome the shift of res-
ponsibility to the executive branch, and argued that such a
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shift would produce electoral dividends. The Bureau of
the Budget would "serve as a buffer between the Members of
Congress and their constituents," one Member argued, and
suggested that in fact this was the primary appeal of the
new budget idea. Since Congress had been blamed for fiscal
mismanagement, he concluded, its members have been search-
ing for ways of shifting responsibility to the executive
branch.86  Meant in part to prick the consciences of his
fellow members and to taunt them, the suggestion that Mem-
bers of Congress were in fact looking to shift the burdens
of fiscal management more squarely to the Executive Branch
was not without a large measure of truth. Howard of Okla-
home agreed with this assessment and argued that such a
shift was both good for Congress and good for the nation.
"The Budget system," he suggested, "is a cure for unstable
government. It means practical executive supervision; it
means careful supervision of the public's money; . . . it
means administrative preparedness." 87 Many Members of
Congress were, in other words, prepared to transfer responsi-
bility and power to the executive branch by 19.19, if public
accountability and public pressure was also shifted.
The shift in public accountability was thus perhaps the
key element in the willingness of Members of Congress to
support a budget system which gave the Executive the right
to set and, thus to a certain extent control, the appropria-
tions agenda. As noted earlier, the Members of Congress had
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become increasingly trapped between two poles of a major
organizational and political dilemma between 1910 and 1919.
On the one hand, the demise of the party in the electorate,
the emergence of more pluralistic patterns of conflict in
the House (as well as outsidel had created an institution
in which power was dispersed and responsibility for poli-
tical (legislativel decisions distributed among a wide num-
ber of internal Congressional offices and individuals. To
a certain extent, this had created an organization which
was largely incapable of coordinating its own political
agenda. For example, because of the fragmentation of author-
ity, and the dynamics of the new post-1910 decision-making
system, it was difficult to give legislative substance to
the public mandate for fiscal economy or a reduction of
Federal expenditures. While Members of Congress in general
tended to voice support for retrenchment, the fragmented
system of authorizations and appropriations tended to ob-
struct the kind of legislation needed to achieve such a
reduction in federal spending. Conflicts between the
general desire to reduce appropriations and the specific
demands of interest groups, constituencies or departments
for funds tended, in the absence of a central organ of
control or coordination, to.be resolved in favor of the
latter.88
To a certain extent, then,.the apparent willingness
to surrender a measure of authority Cor discretion) to the
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Executive Branch was a function of the growing awareness
on the part of Members of Congress of the extent to which
the fragmentation of power and decision-making responsi-
bilities.in the House had rendered that institution incap-
able of acceding to the popular demand for economy and co-I
ordination in the appropriations process. 89  The lack of
central control over the legislative process had effectively
reduced the ability of the House to play a dominant role in
the type of tightly organized and accountable budgetary sys-
tem which constituents seemed to want. As a result, Repres-
entatives gradually,rif reluctantly, began to accept the
idea of Presidential leadership in the budgetary process.90
By the end of May 20, 1920, the House and Senate came
to an agreement over the specific terms of the new budget
system. A Bureau of the Budget would be created in the
Executive Branch and entrusted with the task of compiling
and defining the fiscal needs of the Administration. Con-
gress, in turn was given the right to veto, modify or accept
the recommendations which that Bureau made. In addition,
the Congress created the General Accounting Office, to be
headed by the Comptroller-General who would be entrusted
with the task of reviewing and auditing the Bureau's
recommendations. Although technically independent of both
Congress and the Executive Branch (organizational solutions
for Congressional problems after 191Q always tended to in-
clude the creation of an independent agencyl, the G.A.O.
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would be expected to provide the Congress with a means of
overseeing the manner in which the Executive Budget was
compiled. Thus, although Congress gave the initiative to
the Executive Branch, it formally established for itself
an oversight role in the budgetary process and reserved
the right to make the final decision on the appropriations
of funds.91
On June 1, the House faced what was believed to be the
last remaining hurdle to meaningful budgetary reform -- the
recentralization of the Appropriations Committee. To this
point, many Members of Congress had generally given support
to the idea of a budget as an abstract or at least a sep-
arate issue. The idea that the budget system necessarily
implied a recentralization of the Appropriations Committee,
however, was still resisted by many. Gilbert Haugen, for
example, had informed his colleagues in 1919 that "I am
absolutely opposed to the concentration of power in one man
or in one committee, thus curtailing the Member's rights and
personal independence."'92 Another argued that the new
committee would be unable to adequately represent either
"the difference of opinion over a country as large as this"
or the viewpoints of 435 members."9 3
James Good, who was chairman of the Appropriations Comm-
ittee, however, argued that the budgetary process would not
work if the appropriations power in the House remained frag-
mented. He repeated the by now familiar argument that the
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different committees which now held appropriations powers
were too closely tied to their own departments' interests
and too suceptible to the pressures of specific groups to
serve as a force for economy. "This is not true of the
Committee on Appropriations," he suggested,
It has no particular department to defend, no
particular project to advance. It stands as
the impartial arbiter of all the legislative
committees, so far as appropriations are con-
cerned, and at a time when retrenchment is
necessary can say to each that it is necessary
to retrench, and can lay down the rule by
which retrenchment shall be brought about.94
In the end, the House sided with Good and adopted the
proposal to recentralize the Appropriations Committee. The
closeness of the vote on the rule bringing the recentraliza-
tion proposal to the floor, however, revealed the size of
the opposition to the bill, and the extent to which many
Members of Congress continued to resist even this partial
decrease in their prerogatives. This resistance was par-
ticularly and predictably acute among members of the comm-
ittees which were to be relieved of the appropriating powers
they had held since 1885.95 Yet, the force of public press-
ure on Congress to accept the strengthened Appropriations
Committee as a substantive move toward a budget system was
also evident by the size of the vote on the final resolution.
Where the vote on the rule Cin effect a:.hidden vote on the
appropriations recentralization measurel had been won by a
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mere four votes (158 to 154), the resolution itself was
subsequently passed by a fairly healthy 200 to 117 vote
margin.96
On January 4, President Wilson surprised Congress by
vetoing its budget bill because of the provision that dealt
with the process by which the Comptroller-General was to
be appointed or removed from office. Although Wilson was
clearly "in entire sympathy with the objects of the bill,"
he nevertheless felt that this provision which made impeach-
ment the only instrument for removing the Comptroller-General,
represented an encroachment of the legislative branch upon
executive prerogatives and constitutional rights. 97 The
House agonized over this veto.briefly, some Members suggest-
ing that Wilson's desire to establish Presidential control
over the Comptroller-General was tantamount to permitting
"the cashier of a bank to audit his own expenses or the
books of his bank,"98 but the general sense of urgency
which surrounded the budgetary system quickly led most Re-
presentatives to accede to Wilson's wishes. As Republican
leader Mondell argued after the House had failed to over-
ride the Presidential veto, capitulating to the Executive
on this matter
is a most unfortunate and regrettable weaking
of the system we have so earnestly labored to
perfect. But, gentlemen, it is a condition
and not a theory that confronts us, and it is
the duty of a legislative body when it can not
do what it considers best, to do what it
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believes is the best thing that is possible
under the circumstances . . . We must meet
Cthe President's) view or have no budget
legislation.99
The House then passed the revised budget bill in which the
sections objectionable to the President had been eliminated.
Sent to the Senate, it fell victim to a filibuster and
languished. In the early months of the 67th Congress, the
budget bill was reintroduced by Good in its original form
(with the original removal clause intact), passed by both
the House and the Senate, and on June 10, 1921, finally
signed into law by President Harding.1 00
The history of the Budget Act provides a useful view
of the process by which the House of Representatives con-
formed itself to the broad implications of.its dispersion
of power and decision-making responsibilities between 1911
and 1921. It serves as a clear reflection of the broader
changes through which Congress redefined its role in the
national policy-making system, and the way that redefini-
tion process was produced by the combination of external
pressure and the exigencies of internal organizational
change.
For the most part, the alteration of the role of the
House in national policy-making was a consequence of the
broad electoral changes which transformed the lines of
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internal political conflict in the first decade of the
twentieth century. Those changes in the role and strength
of parties, decline of cumulative political cleavages, the
fragmentation of the electoral will, and the resulting c
changes in the kinds of pressures which were brought to bear
on individual Members of Congress led first to a restructur-
ing of leadership within the House and a dispersion of
power and decision-making responsibilities, and ultimately
a redefinition of the role of the House in the national
policy-making system. The creation of a budget system, and
particularly the restructuring of the Appropriations Comm-
ittee , were thus two notable and visible parts of this
redefinition process whereby the House formally began to
disavow its role as initiator of Federal Government policy.
As James Good characterized the new Congressional role
during the course of the final budget debate in 1921:
We do not appropriate money simply for the
purpose of making appropriations; we approp-
riate money to carry out work planned for
the Government. The President alone formu-
lates this plan.1 01
This abdication is perhaps clearest in the Budget Act
itself which formally recognized the President's right to
set the appropriations (and indeed much of the broader
Federal public policy) agenda. While Congress retained
the right to approve or modify this agenda, and oversee its
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implementation, the acknowledgement of Executive responsi-
bility for designing Federal policy represented a major
concession to the idea of Presidential leadership. Indeed,
as students of public policy in general tend to suggest,
the right to set the policy agenda constitutes one of the
most potent sources of Presidential power in the United
States political system. Similarly, the prolonged struggle
between the House and the Executive between 1911 and 1921
over the form of the national budget system, and the re-
luctance of many Members of Congress to grant formal recogni-
tion of the Executive's right to coordinate the Federal
budget agenda, indicates that the participants in the struggle
were themselves aware of the significant institutional im-
plications of that struggle.
The role of the restructuring of the Appropriations
Committee in reinforcing the trend toward Congressional over-
sight in the Federal policy-making process is perhaps less
clear. On the one hand, it could be argued that this cen-
tralization of the appropriations function represented a
reversal of the ten-year fragmentation of power and author-
ity within the House of Representatives.102  The reconsti-
tution of a centralized Appropriations Committee could also
be said to have strengthened the House as a whole in its
competition with the Executive Branch over the control of
the Federal purse strings. As Brown suggests, for example,
"In creating a single Committee on Appropriations . . . the
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House had not weakened itself, but had very much strength-
ened itself, both in respect of its relationship with the
President, and with the Senate. '"1 0 3 Yet, although the
creation of a single Appropriations Committee did lend a
measure of coherence to the budgetary process within the
House, and while it did represent a rather uncharacter-
istic centralization of power, in a larger sense it also
reinforced the idea of Presidential initiative, formalized
the oversight role of Congress, and did little to affect
the individual prerogatives of most Members of Congress.
The Appropriations Committee was first of all given
a veto power over a portion of the legislative process,
not the authority to coordinate or design the policy agenda
(either within Congress or in the Federal policy-making
system as a whole). Secondly, this veto was limited to
bills which required an expenditure of Federal funds. This
helps explain why this particular centralization measure
passed the House. Since it did not affect the rights and
powers of any but the six committees which held appropria-
tions as well as authorization authority (since 1885), the
reform of 1920 did not really affect the majority of the
Members of the House. In effect, the reform of 1920 changed
little (beyond perhaps equalizing the roles, powers and
status of all authorizing committees) and in the relation-
ship which already existed between most committees and the
appropriations committee. Thirdly, the authorization powers
remained intact in the authorizing committees. The central-
-501-
ization of the Appropriations Committee did little to alter
the autonomy of these committees and thus added little to
the coordination of the fragmented process by which these
independent committees produced legislation. Fourth, the
influence which the Appropriations Committee exercised over
the legislative process (an influence which was already
significant even before 1920) continued to be constrained
by other sources of power and authority within the House.
Unlike the Appropriations Committee of the 1880's or the
Speakership between 1890 and 1910, for example, the post-
1920 Appropriations Committee remained but one institutional
competitor for leadership in the House CThe Rules Committee
was another, as were the Ways and Means Committee, the Steer-
ing Committee, the Committee on Committees, the Speakership
and the Caucus). Thus, the fact that its power was largely
negative (at least in the public policy-making process as
a whole) and severely constrained, tended to preclude the
Appropriations Committee from either re-establishing com-
prehensive control over the legislative process or from
invading the rights and prerogatives already enjoyed by
individual members.
The recentralization of the Appropriations Committee,
finally, had a marked impact on formalizing Congress's
oversight role in the Federal policy-making system. By
giving the Appropriations Committee a decidedly negative
or veto role in the appropriations process within Congress,
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the reform of 1920 essentially locked the House into a
negative or reactive role in the budgetary process. As
Paul Hasbrouck suggested in 1927, for example, the net
effect of the reforms of 1920 and 1921 were that "the real
decisions on most matters of expenditure had passed from
the Capitol to the Bureau of the Budget."1 04  The separa-
tion of appropriations and authorization. functions in the
House also tended to free (or perhaps even force) substan-
tive committees to focus their energies more squarely on
their control or oversight of the executive departments
under their scrutiny.
The Budget Act of 1921 and the Appropriations Reform
measure of 1920, therefore, tended to reaffirm in a most
visible manner the transformation which had taken place in
Congress' role in the Federal policy-making process since
1910. Stripped of its system of central control or strong
leadership, the House was organizationally incapable of
setting the national political agenda. With its decision-
making system rooted in the actions of autonomous and to a
certain (thoughWnotutotal) extent isolated committees, and
devoid of central coordination, the legislative process was
structurally handicapped in its efforts to continue defining
(as it had often successfully tried to do before 1910) a
comprehensive and consistent national political program. To
be sure, Congress retained its institutional power to veto
or modify Presidential initiatives, and in the 1920's and
after, clearly demonstrated its willingness to use this power
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to obstruct or change Presidential programs. Yet after
1910, the Congress and specifically the House also showed
that it was increasingly unwilling or unable to play the
same role it had played before that time in actually shap-
ing and designing Federal policy.
Again, the Budget Act was but one visible part of this
tendency within the House between 1911 and 1921 to abdicate
its authority and pretensions of policy-making initiative
to the Executive Branch or to quasi-independent agencies.
As Oscar Underwood, who himself presided over part of that
abdication process later noted, this decline of Congress in
the agenda setting process was reflected in a broad number
of policy areas. Citing the Federal Reserve Board, the
Federal Trade Commission and the United States Tariff Comm-
ission as but a few examples of this trend, he suggested
that:
the legislation passed by Congress, transferr-
ing its powers to commissions and boards, was
the real surrender of its control over many of
the fundamental problems that were left in its
keeping, and that thereby (it) deliberately
gave to the President the exercise of the great
powers of government that came in contact with
the daily lives of the people.1 0 5
The Budget Act and the recentralization of the Appro-
priations Committee, then, reflected a broader series of
what must be seen in hindsight as unavoidable changes, and
indeed to a clear if indeterminable extent a reduction in
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the role the House played in the National policy-making
system. The emerging centrality of the oversight role,
the essential surrender of legislative power and discretion
to administrative agencies and commissions, and the adoption
of a reactive or veto oriented policy-making outlook all
served as major aspects of this redefinition process. For
the most part, these new roles, like the internal organiza-
tional changes which preceded them, were consistent with the
new more plural forms of conflict which emerged within the
House, and with the new electoral rewards and the changed
constituent expectations which so marked, and which to a
progressively greater extent throughout the following decades,
continued to characterize the twentieth century American
political system.
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Chapter VIII
Congressional Evolution:
The Changing Imperatives of
Legislative Conflict
This study has attempted to identify the forces which
have shaped the evolution of the United States House of
Representatives, and which continue to sustain the existing
patterns of Congressional behavior. It has suggested that
the changing inner world of the House is primarily the pro-
duct of variations in the form and scale of conflict which
that institution myst ultimately manage and resolve. The
legislative process is consciously designed by its par-
ticipants to fit the specific, and once again varying forms
of dissensus which appears within Congress. The history of
the House, therefore, and the explanation of the changes
which have characterized that history -- changes in the dis-
tribution of power and authority, in the structuring and
apportionment of decision-making roles, in the norms of
membership behavior, and in the definition of the role of
the House in the national policy-making system -- can be
broadly viewed as facets of a continuing institutional
attempt to resolve the problem of building agreement in a
perennially though variously divided and conflict-ridden
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legislative body.
Conflict within the House, we have suggested, occurs as
competition among members over the scarce resources of the
institution. It is, in other words, the product of the
struggle for power-, prestige and status, for access to the
centers of decision-making, and ultimately for preferred leg-
islative decisions Claws, policies, benefitsl.. The disagree-
ments and conflicts which the scramble for these preferred
goals causes, serve as the central reality to which the
House -- dedicated as it is to the resolution of conflict --
must respond. A conflict mode which is characterizedzby a
fragmented (factional or plural) pursuit of preferred goals,
for example, calls for a quite different system of conflict
resolution than one characterized by broadly constituted,
coherent and unified political coalitions.
The assumption is, therefore, that the House is an adap-
tive political institution. Its inner world is molded to
fit the political needs, goals and perceptions of the Members
who populate that inner world. The focus of this study has
largely centered, then, upon both the Members who consciously
make the rules, distribute power and decision-making res-
ponsibilities; who place limits on the institution's decis-
ions; and who define the role of the House in the American
political system, and upon the forces which constrain or en-
courage those Members of Congress to make the organizational
decisions they in fact make. It has suggested that ultimately
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the way Members of Congress approach the task of redesign-
ing the internal world of the House is heavily conditioned
by the manner in which the political demands and expecta-
tions of their-constituents are organized and expressed,
by the goals and expectations which the Members of Congress,
in turn and as a result express, and finally by the patterns
of conflict which the pursuit of these goals produce.
The varying goals of individual Members of Congress, in
other words, do not emerge in a political or social tacuum.
The external political environment of the House has a major
influence on that institution's internal behavior. Clearly,
the electoral link is the tie that binds these external
conditions to the organizational decisions made within the
House. As we have shown in Chapters II and III, for example,
the re-election impulse among Members of Congress did not
change markedly between 1880 and 1920. Controlled for com-
petitiveness, nineteenth century Representatives' desire for
re-election tended to be only slightly lower, and the pro-
pensity to abstain from seeking re-election only slightly
higher than their twentieth century colleagues. Clearly,
then, the electoral urge, and the need to cater to the needs
and wishes of the constituents who sent them to the House
was important throughout the period under study. The assump-
tion is, therefore, that the individual Member of Congress
of the late nineteenth century was as intent upon creating
a House organization which maximized his electoral chances
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as the Member of Congress of the twentieth century.
The differences between the late nineteenth century and
twentieth century Houses, then, and indeed the differences
between the Democratic and Republican Houses of the late
nineteenth century, lay in differences in the manner in which
each party's constituents (in the nineteenth century), and
the constituents of both parties in the twentieth century
expressed and organized their demands to their Representatives
in Congress, and consequently in the criteria voters used to
reward tvote forl or sanction those Members of Congress. The
strong attachment of most late nineteenth century voters, for
example, to the idea and the reality of political parties
certainly played a major role in shaping the signals those
voters sent to candidates for political office. As an ab-
stract social norm, partisanship provided voting cues, de-
fined a candidate's political stand [often in the broadest
and yet concrete terms), and presented alternative policy
agendas to the electorate in general and to the individual
constituencies in particular. As an organizational reality
in the political life of the late nineteenth century, more-
over, parties also provided the forum in which political bar-
gaining occurred, in which compromises were made, in which
specific policy agendas were designed and constructed, and
into which candidates and political office-holders were
recruited.
The attachment to partisanship as a social norm, in
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turn was based on, and in a large sense, a reflection of
broad ideological social and often economic allegiances
which late nineteenth century voters held. The Civil War,
for example, had reinforced and sharpened the intense re-
gionalism which had already served to animate much of the
political conflict which occurred throughout th& first half
of the nineteenth century. The Civil War itself, then, and
the political agenda which the Republican party produced
during and after the war, reflected this regional conflict
and exploited it. The specific issues of the day were thus
ideally the individual components of a broadly defined (or
to a certain extent formally and consciously aggregated)
political and indeed social world view.
In reality, of course, both parties differed in the
extent to which their specific policy agendas adequately
reflected the particular views of their constituents (or
the extent to which aggregated party platforms masked major
contradictions or incompatibilities among the constituents
of that party). There were also, therefore, major differ-
ences between those parties as to how unified or divided
they were. Republican constituents were clearly more
unified over the specific details of their party's political
program throughout the late nineteenth century than the
Democrats, although neither party was ever fully free from
the strains of internal dissension. Still, the Democratic
party, which contained a number of discrete and heterogeneous
-510-
factions in the late nineteenth century, was most suscept-
ible to the problems of coalitional disarray.
By the early-years of the twentieth century, the unity,
and indeed-the relevance of national political parties to
the specific concerns of the electorate, had begun to wane.
Partisanship as a norm was attacked, and parties themselves
were weakened by new regulations, laws, and formal limits
on the scope of their political activity. Ironically, it
was perhaps Warren G. Harding who best encapsulated the
nature of the changes which had by the end of the second
decade of the twentieth century transformed the American
political system from its traditional paths, in his 1923
World Court speech:
A great change has taken place, vitally influenc-
ing the work of administrative and legislative
fulfillment ... The great change has come about
unawares . . . It is the change in our political
system, the rule of the primaries, the drift
toward pure democracy, and the growing impotence
of political parties. We have got away from the
representative system; we have reached a point
where the lack of party loyalty has made party
sponsorship in government less effective than it
was. We have come to the time when a party plat-
form is regarded by too many men in public life
as even less important than a scrap of paper,
and groups or blocs are turned to serve group
interests, and many individuals serve their own,
while contempt for party conference or caucus
has sent party loyalty pretty much into the
discard.1
Clearly colored by his sympathy for the party government,
Harding's retrospective on the early twentieth century
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transformation of American politics nevertheless accurately
summed up the prevailing attitudes toward partisanship.
Nowadays, in many states, party adherence is
flouted, loyalty is held to be contemptible
and nominations for office are often influ-
enced by voters enrolled under an opposing
party banner, and platforms are sometimes
the insincere utterances of expediency,
influenced by nominees rather than by advo-
cates of principle.2
As Harding correctly suggested, the weaking of the
party andzof partisanship in American political life, and
the declining salience of broad and cumulative political
cleavages and attachments which underwrote this decline,
reflected a major and, as it turned out, enduring trans-
formation of the nature of political demand-making in na-
tional politics. The emergence of a new particularism in
American politics in the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury, produced a virtual disintegration of national party
coalitions, and gave way to the emergence of a new more
fragmented, more plural, system of political organization
and demand-making.
The decline of national parties and the emergence of
a particularized political agenda were also reflected and
reinforced by changes in the dynamics of Congressional
elections. Members of Congress, who had been dependent
upon local party organizations for electoral success Cfor
the nomination and for support in the actual electoral
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campaignj were beginning to exercise a measure of autonomy
in running for office after 1896. Primary election laws
freed candidates of having to win the favor of the party
organization in order to win its nomination for office.
The emergence of split-ticket voting also tended to reflect
the party's reduced role as a voting cue in Congressional
elections, and the increased role of office-specific cri-
teria. The twentieth century also saw a marked decline in
electoral competitiveness in House elections. This decline
tended to mirror the associated decline in membership turn-
over and the corresponding increase in the seat security
of individual Members of Congress.
Finally, the party structure itself began to fragment
after 1896. Local party organizations and to a certain
extent state party organizations tended to take a more par-
ochial and less national view of their goals and responsi-
bilities. All of these changes tended to add to the inde-
pendence and autonomy? of the Member of Congress in the
national legislature. Increasingly freed from the electoral
sanctions of the party in general, and the national party
in particular, the Representative was induced to focus his
attention more squarely on the specific concerns of the con-
stituents, in whose hands his..political future now so
uniformly lay.
These changes clearly produced new and distinctive
patterns of political conflict in the nation at large. These
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new patterns of conflict and these new patterns of demand-
making in turn produced equally distinctive patterns of
demand-making and conflict within the House. In the late
nineteenth century, for example, differences in the strength
or coherence of the national Republican and Democratic par-
ties had been clearly reflected in the different styles of
conflict each had brought to the House. The Republican
legislative party had been more unified and cohesive than
the Democrats who tended to be more fragmented and prone to
often bitter factional disputes. Similarly, the changes in
the twentieth century political environment produced equally
visible changes in the way Members of Congress pursued their
legislative goals. Changes in the patterns of conflict in
the American political system as a whole, then, were generally
reflected by patterns of conflict within the House.
As these patterns of conflict within the House changed,
the institution itself was forced to change in order to pro-
ceed with its task of making legislative decisions. Changes
in the patterns of conflict in the House, in other words,
necessarily produced changes in the kinds of obstacles which
that body was forced to overcome in order to carry out its
legislative duties. In the Republican Houses of the late
nineteenth century, for example, the conflict over legis-
lative goals was largely carried on within the party organiza-
tion (national committee, conventions, the party caucus, and
the leadership structures within Congressl. Because of the
-514-
relatively cohesive and homogeneous Cat least in terms of
broad political goalsl constituent base, and the Republican
party's success in achieving a broad internal programmatic
unity among its members in Congress, the House itself was
to a large extent simply the fornm where decisions and
bargains made within the party were formally ratified. As
such, the organization of-the House played a rather passive
role in actually overseeing the construction of a political
consensus.
By contrast, the Democratic Houses of the late nine-
teenth century, and to an even greater extent the Houses
after 1911, tended to confront patterns of conflict which
were characterized by a lack of pre-determined consensus.
Factionalism in the nineteenth century and a growing plural-
ism in the twentieth century were both expressions (if
qualitatively different expressions) of this lack of internal
accord among the majority of the Members who were elected to
these Congresses. In these periods, therefore, the House
organization was and continued to be forced to play a more
active role in actually cultivating a practical consensus
out of the specific and once again varying forms of dissensus
it faced. In sum, the patterns of disagreement (the diversity
or unity over views, goals, and idealsl, and the way in which
the pursuit of preferred goals is organized both outside and
within the House, determines the magnitude and nature of the
House's own consensus-building task, and thus the character
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of its internal world. The rapidity with which the House
changed the form and substance, the norms as well as the
procedures of its internal world throughout the 1880 to
1921 period suggests that it was extremely responsive to
shifts in the patterns of conflict, in the demands and in
the organization of public political demands which worked
beyond as well as within the halls of Congress.
The House responded to the changing patterns of con-
flict in three broad ways, this study has suggested. First
of all, the House redistributed power and authority;
secondly, it restructured from time to time its decision-
making process; and thirdly, it placed varying limits on its
decisions during the 1880 to 1921 period, or in effect re-
defined its role in the National policy-making system. In
a House dominated by a strong majority, united around a
coherent political agenda, for example, the legislative
process was oriented (for example, in the 51st Congressl
toward promoting the ratification of that political agenda.
Under Thomas B. Reed, the internal processes of the House
were designed to fulfill the strategic needs of the majority
Republican consensus which had been constructed,in effect,
independently of Congress. In such a House, and indeed in
that particular House, power was centralized (as it was in
the 1860's and to a certain extent the 1830's); decision-
making was largely coordinated by central authorities; and
the House itself was able (and it was clearly willingl to
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seek an active role for itself in enacting, and even enforc-
ing the implementation of its will.
In a House dominated by a majority party in which, by
contrast, such' an allegiance to a coherent political program
was absent -- a House in which, like the Democratic Houses
of the late nineteenth century and the Houses of both par-
ties after 1911 there was profound disagreement over poli-
tical goals among those who actually organized and designed
the legislative process (i.e. the majority party) -- the
internal world of the House was far more preoccupied with
the task of consensus building. In such Houses, the dis-
cord within the majority party (evident in factionalism as
well as in the milder but equally distended pluralism of
the twentieth century) was and is reflected by a legisla-
tive process which recognized the rights of each faction to
participate in the decision-making process and particularly
the right to veto legislation distasteful to their members.
The central exercise of power was curbed; the decision-
making system in both cases was dispersed and the House as
a whole tended to take a veto-oriented approach to its
policy-making role.
In effect, the legislative process was, in the 1880 to
1921 period -- and it could be argued that it remains today
-- designed to suit the functional needs and political goals
of those who have the right to organize the House. As these
functional needs changed, the House,too, changed its shape.
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In the Republican Houses of the nineteenth century, for
example, the legislative process was designed to fit the
needs of a majority which was determined to enact a speci-
fic policy program. Power was centralized in the Speaker-
ship, and decision-making was largely coordinated by the
leadership through both the Rules Committee and the Speaker
himself. This was particularly so in the Republican Houses
of the 1i890's which were dominated by a majority party
united around a broad political platform and intent on
enacting that platform. The structure of the House met the
needs of an activist and cohesive majority.
The Democratic Houses of the late nineteenth century,
on the other hand, and to a certain extent the Houses of
the post-1911 period, tended to reflect quite another set of
member needs and goals. The Democratic Houses of the late
nineteenth century on the one hand were marked by intense
divisiveness within the majority party. There was no broad
consensus over goals and indeed sharp conflicts over the
details of the Democratic legislative program. The House
process was thus designed to account for these internal
Democratic differences and meet the needs of a membership
which often found itself as divided over specific policy
goals as it was united in its general opposition to Repub-
lican party programs. In such a House, there was little
support for a centralized power structure or for a central
coordination of the decision-making process. In the absence
of a broad agreement over goals, power was distributed more
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broadly Cno one had the legitimacy to speak or act for the
Democratic majorityl, the Speakership was weakened and the
committees gained a new salience and a new power in effect-
ing the legislative agenda.
The distribution of power and the dispersion of
decision-making authority which characterized Democratic
Houses in the late nineteenth century also characterized
the House after 1911. Where factionalism had been the spur
to such a redistribution in the nineteenth century, however,
particularism was its source in the twentieth century. In-
creasingly freed of the constraints of national party dis-
cipline and of partisanship in general by the fragmentation
of the electorate; increasingly tied to a more particular-
istic expression of constituent demands by the emergence
of odfice-specific voting patterns after 1912; and increas-
ingly secure from defeat in re-election campaigns, Members
of Congress in the twentieth century generally sought to
create allegislative process which maximized the distribu-
tion of power and access to the decision-making centers.
In a House progressively dominated by particularistic con-
cerns, by cross-cutting and fluid political alliances, and
by a preoccupation with goals derived from a fragmented
electorate, Members of Congress steered the legislative
process away from rigid centralization and toward a more
permeable and dispersed system which gave them the widest
possible latitude in achieving their own particular legis-
lative goals.
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The movement away from centralization also, however,
while it increased both the stature of the individual Mem-
ber of Congress and placed him closer to the centers of power
in the House, entailed a necessary redefinition of the role
of the House in the national policy-making system. The
fragmentation of authority and the weakening of the struc-
tures which had coordinated the legislative process in the
nineteenth century, tended to diminish the extent to which
the House could compete with other institutions of decision-
making in the Federal Government in setting national prior-
ities and in designing and initiating a comprehensive public
policy agenda. That this redefinition and, to a certain
extent, diminution of the role of the House in national
policy-making was a necessary correlate of the fragmenta-
tion of power and decision-making, can be shown in a review
of the debates which led up to the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921. The ten-year struggle to reconcile the dispersed
organizational style of the House to the increasingly urgent
need for a budget system, and the reluctant acceptance on
the part of Congress to a reactive (veto and oversight) role
in the appropriations process, reveals the extent to which
Members of Congress themselves saw an abdication of institu-
tional power as the price of internal fragmentation. As the
endless series of debates demonstrates the House of Repres-
entatives was ultimately forced to concede both its inability
to set the budgetary agenda and its apparent unwillingness to
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take the organizational steps necessary to reassume the
budgetary initiative.
Clearly, the fragmentation of the decision-making sys-
tem within the House was an important source of this institu-
tional abdication of power (equalty evident in the creation
of the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Reserve Board,
and the grants of power and disceetion to a host of other
executive agencies and independent commissions in the years
preceding and during World War I). Shorn of centralized
leadership, the House also found itself unable to coordinate
its own decision-making process or design a comprehensive .
national political agenda. Instead, the legislative agenda
was set by increasingly autonomous committees competing with
one another for the right to distribute Federal resources.
This weakened the effectiveness of the House as the #rowing
inability to reconcile Federal revenues and expenditures
after 1913 demonstrates. Yet it also tended to weaken the
House in its bargaining relationship with other actors in
the Federal political system in general and the Presidency
in particular. Increasingly after 1911, the House of Rep-
resentatives spoke not with one voice, but with many.
This study, then, has attempted to show that in fact
the norms and formal procedures which characterize the
House, and the changes which have occurred in those aspects
of Congress' internal world, are related to the forms of
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conflict and dissensus which exist within each House. In
general, it has tried to provide an analytic focus which
bridges the theoretical gap between internalist and ecolo-
gist explanations of House behavior. On the one hand, the
linkage of internal Congressional conflict to the external
world provides a visible dynamic element which is largely
missing in internalist explanations of Congressional change.
It suggests that the changing patterns of conflict, which
are themselves products of changes occurring in the poli-
tical environment of the House, produce changes in the
legislative process. The focus on conflict as a reflection
of the complex interaction of personalities in Congress with
this political environment on the other hand suggests that
the process by which the House adapts to its changing
environment is mediated by significant factors (personalities,
goals of Members, and perceptions of constituent demands)
which work within Congress.
Finally, this study has suggested that the turn of the
century was a watershed in the evolution of the House --
not because the House embarked on any linear or determinis-
tic development path at that time, but because the national
political system underwent changes (which have either endured
or accelerated since that time) to which the House was
peculiarly vulnerable. The:.patterns of legislative conflict
in the House were particularly sensitive to the types of
changes which occurred during this time. It was, for example,
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during this time that political parties declined as
national organizers of political goals; that the national
political agenda began to fragment; that the issue concerns
articulated by the constituents of Members of Congress
became lese explicitly integrated with those concerns of
other constituents and constituencies in the nation; that
House elections began to reflect an institution-specific
regard for interests, issues and political goals; that elec-
toral competitiveness began its dramatic decline in Con-
gressional elections; and that seat security increased. All
of these factors tended to fragment the lines of conflict,
decrease the relevance of rigid, formalized and compre-
hensive political coalitions within the House and encourage
the creation of a more fluid bargaining and decision-making
system.
In effect, then, the House of Representatives, far from
being the isolated and autonomous institution described by
the internalists, is (and during the turn of the century era,
was) very much the creature of the wider political world in
which it functions. The distinctive and changing forces
which constitute that dynamic political environment create
equally marked variations in the rewards and sanctions, the
interests, and the demands which animate the scramble for
preferred political prizes within the House. Changing
constituent expectations, and the varying manner in which
they are organized and articulated thus produce the patterns
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of conflict to which the legislative process must be made
to conform. In this sense, the political environment deter-
mines the scale and pattern of conflict which each House
must confront, and thus also determines the norms, the
procedures and the roles which Members of Congress must
devise for handling that conflict.
The legislative process, in other words, is quite
simply the product of the conscious and collective efforts
of Members of Congress to design a system which best fits
the conflict mode which their constituents have imposed upon
them. As this study has attempted to show, the plural House
of the twentieth century, no less than the factional Demo-
cratic Congresses or the partisan Republican legislatures
which preceded it in the late nineteenth century, were all
the products of the peculiar ecological forces which together
defined and indeed explained the patterns of conflict each
was forced to confront and manage.
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No. 3, Fall, 1978, p. 488.
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